EXERCISING NON-DOMINANT

MEDIATIVE POWER

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Exercising Non-Dominant Mediative Power

Violence Interruption in the Periphery Communities of Florianópolis, Brazil

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Abstract

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Abstract: This thesis examines how informal mediation is practiced in Brazil's urban periphery communities, which are often associated with high levels of violence and insecurity. Based on ethnographic data from low-income neighborhoods in Florianópolis, my analysis of local people's interventions offers insight into the way that non-state, unarmed actors exercise mediative agency in the midst of everyday violence and insecurity. While a growing body of research shows that state and non-state actors are guided by diverse conceptions, intentions and approaches when they attempt to mediate public and private conflict amongst residents, less attention has been paid to the symbiotic relationship between, or the social impact of, conflict intervention and the reproduction of violence. This thesis argues that interveners use their interactions with antagonists in a particular territory in order to cultivate non-dominant power, which serves to obstruct and interrupt the way that violence reproduces and transmits into residents' lives. As such, it suggests that mediators can enable social change because they have a very particular relationship with the different and interdependent types of violence present in the periphery. Interveners develop and deploy a repertoire of social mediative tactics in order to contend with the complexity of local tensions and the erosion of democratic citizenship that these tensions produce. Defining mediative practices as a source of power invites discussion into community mediation's strategic potential in the project of urban peacebuilding and violence reduction, positing new directions for applied practices in Brazil and beyond.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACAM – Associação de Amigos da Casa da Criança do Morro do Motocó
AdC – Alto da Caieira (or Caieira)
ALESC – Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de Santa Catarina
AM – Associação de Moradores or Resident Association
BO - Boletim de Ocorrência or Police Report
CCEA – Centro Cultural Escrava Anastásia
CEDEP – Centro de Evangelização e Educação Popular
CONANDA – National Council on Human Rights of Children and Adolescents
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CT – Conselho Tutelar
CUFA - Central Única de Favelas
DV – Domestic Violence
ECA – Estatuto da Criança e Adolescente (Child and Adolescent Statute)
FE – Focused Ethnography
ITESC – Instituto Teológico de Santa Catarina
IVG – Instituto Vilson Groh
MG – Minas Gerais (state in southeastern Brazil)
MS – Mont Serrat
MSE – Medidas Socio-Educativas
MSS – Mont Serrat School
NDP – Non-Dominating Power
PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Accelerated Growth Program)
PC – Policia Civil
PCC – Primeiro Comando do Capital
PGC – Primeiro Grupo Catarinense
PM – Polícia Militar
PPCAM – Programa de Proteção a Crianças e Adolescentes Ameaçados de Morte (Protection Program for Children and Adolescents Threatened with Death)
ProCam – Procurando Caminho
PS – Problem Solving

RACDCA – Network for the Articulation and Connectivity of the Rights of Children and Adolescents
RJ – Rio de Janeiro (city and state in southeastern Brazil)
SC – Santa Catarina (state in southern Brazil)
SP – São Paulo (city and state in southeastern Brazil)
SRG – System of Rights Guarantees
TD – Territory in Dispute
TPI – Third Party Interveners/Intervention
UFSC – Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Glossary of Portuguese Terms

Abrigo – Shelter or Home
Acolhimento – A word often used to indicate the action of welcoming or receiving a person; also treatment, giving refuge, etc.
Aproximar – To get close to, or approximate
Articular – To connect or link up, or to articulate
Atendimento – Literally “attendance to” or treatment/attention
Atendimento Integrado – Integrated Treatment
Audiência Pública – Public hearing or event
Bairro – Neighborhood
Bandidos – Slang term for bad guys or criminals
Bater – To physically hit, beat or abuse
Beco – Alleyway
Beira Mar – Oceanfront
Boa noite – Good evening
Boca de Fumo (or Boca) – Designated area on the street where traffickers congregate and wait on consumers arriving to purchase drugs.
Bom día – Good morning/Good day
BOPE –Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Operations Forces of the Polícia Militar)
Caixa d’agua (or Caixa) – Neighborhood in Mont Serrat
Candomblé – A religion with predominantly West African roots
Casa de Acolhimento Darcy Brito – The CCEA-run *abrigo* for children in state custody, located in Mont Serrat
Catarinenses – Residents of Santa Catarina

Chico Mendes – Continental Neighborhood in Florianópolis with heavy PCC presence

Choque – Tactical Police Unit

Cidadanía – Citizenship

Comunidade – Community, or collective term used by residents to refer to the *morro*, *favela*, or periphery residents or neighborhoods. It connotes a sense of belonging, pride, and identity.

Comunidade Ambiental – Literally *environmental community*, this is the CCEA term used for its project to house those in transition out of homelessness or street-living.

Conselheiros – Counselors/Employees who work in the Conselho Tutelar

Conselho Comunitário – Local Community Council in Periphery Neighborhoods

Conselho Tutelar – Guardianship Council, autonomously functioning unsubordinated state entity, which provides oversight and support to the state's protections agencies, as well as community and families.

Correitivo – Corrective Measure/Punishment used by traffickers

Crèche – Childcare Center

Culto – General term for religious group or worshipers

Defensoria Pública – Public Defender

Delegacía – Police Station

Dono – Literally 'owner,' used as a synomym with *patrão* for trafficking boss (*o dono do morro*)

Dom/Dona – Sir or Miss/Mrs., typically used to respectfully address elders (e.g. Dona Dida)

Empregada – Domestic Servant

Florianópolitanos – Residents of Florianópolis

Floripa – Common term used for Florianópolis

Frutos do Aroeira – CCEA socio-educational project focusing on transitions of formerly incarcerated youth

Funk – Brazilian Funk Music

Horácio – Neighborhood on the *Maciço*

Irreal – The Unreal

Juiz-Corregedor – Magistrate Judge

Juiz- Judge

Lei do Silêncio – The law of silence, whereby *morro* residents refrain from speaking or cooperating with police about criminal activities, imposed and enforced locally by traffickers

Maciço – Literally 'mass,' as in land mass. The Maciço is shorthand for Maciço do Morro da Cruz, or The Hill of the Cross

Mae/Pai de Santo – Priestess or Priest of Umbanda or Candomblé religions

Malandro – Slang term meaning thief/criminal/bum

Meio Campo – Literally 'midfield,' this is a term to describe middling movement of interveners.

Meios – Means

Mesmice – Tedium

Meu Querido (or Minha Querida) – My dear

Monte Cristo - Continental Florianópolis Neighborhood

Morro – Literally hill, a term used to refer to urban periphery areas

Mutirão – A collective or communal public works project, such as to build infrastructure, homes, etc.

Negão – Slang term for black male

Nova Descoberta (or Descoberta) – An Area in Mont Serrat

Novo Horizonte - Continental Florianópolis Neighborhood

Ouvidoría – Ombudsman's Office

Padre – Father/Catholic Priest

Paredão – stop and frisk "on the wall" in the street by police

Pastinho – Neighborhood on the Maciço

Patrão – Boss or Trafficking Boss

Penitenciâria – Neighborhood on the Maciço

Perturbada – Perturbed/Disturbed

Polícia Civil – Also known as the Polícia Judiciária, this is the 'investigative' branch of the police.

Polícia Militar – Police branch tasked with active patrol for situations of emergency response, law enforcement and tactical functions.

Porra – Common expression meaning *damn*, or *shit*

Promotor – State Prosecutor

Promotoría – State Prosector's Office

Quadra – Gymnasium or Sports Area

Real/Reiais/(R$) – Brazil's currency, the 'Real'

Referência – Term of respect (e.g. She's a real referência in the community)

Roda – Circle

Salgado – Commonly sold, savory street-food

Saudade – An emotion described as the bittersweet presence of *absence*

Senhor – Mr./Sir

Senhora – Mrs./Ma'am

Serrinha – Neighborhood on the *Maciço*

Seu – Short for *senhor,* or sir, term of respect

Terreiro – Place of worship associated with religious of African origin

Testamunha/o - Witness

Tomar providência – Take control

Umbanda – A religion that blends African, Roman Catholic, Spiritism, and Indigenous traditions

UPP – Rio's *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* or Pacification Police Units

Vagabundo – Bum/criminal

Vamos – Let's go!

Vila União – Northern Florianópolis neighborhood with heavy PGC presence

Zona Franca – Tax Free Zone

Thesis Introduction

Mediation is practice used across the globe by a host of actors to engage with conflict, disputes, and rising levels of violence in conflict, post-conflict, to non-conflict environments. Prescriptions and models of mediation as a form of third party intervention are highly diverse, with orientations and technical skill sets as distinct as as the practitioners who use them. This variation parallels the diversity of claims and critiques offered by theoreticians and practitioners alike, seeking to define mediation's purpose, role and potential contribution to addressing both interpersonal to international conflict and disputes. Despite its proliferation, however, there are little grounds on which to unify practice or theory of mediation (Liebmann, Bowers, and Bitel, 2011). As this thesis will show, the blurring lines of international and interpersonal conflict help to problematize the very notion of how mediation is defined in an urban context, rendering the concept ripe for re-examination.

Though informal practices of mediation as a form of third party intervention have existed for centuries, the development and use of mediation, its skills, and processes, as a peacemaking and peacebuilding modality has merited increased attention in recent years. Faced with ongoing concerns sourced from conditions that foster skyrocketing levels of urban violence unfolding in Democracies across Latin America, policy makers, professional practitioners, and concerned community activists and citizens alike, are searching for new ways to integrate mediative activities strategically into their work.

Popularly known as an informal means for pursuing formal justice, mediation practices must be catalogued more broadly alongside their more narrow legal- or judicial-oriented framing, located within a gamut of third party conflict intervention practices that encompass and embrace international, intra-state, and community or neighborhood dispute resolution processes, some of which defy conventionally imagined 'table-bound' attempts at facilitated negotiation. Intervention practices cast a wide, and increasingly deep net in terms of epistemologies of practice, yet continue to reveal adaptations and evolution, stretching well beyond dominant conceptualizations that commonly call to mind

mechanisms of informal, accessible, and cost-saving extra-judicial conflict resolution practices by a neutral third party.

The roles, functions, and repertoires of mediators have expanded and diversified considerably over decades. Whereas some models and definitions of mediation propose rather static and organized efforts of facilitated negotiations conducted by a neutral mediator between two or more parties, other less centralized 'ally' roles conceive of third party intervention in more fluid terms, which encompass broader conflict intervention roles, embodied by consultation, strategic advising, and conflict coaching roles. These oft less formal iterations of *getting in the middle* to support parties in conflict are assumed frequently by "practitioners who also began as mediators" operating under the same core premises of process-advocacy, technical skills and values of mediation (Mayer, 2015).

Importantly, the meaning and purpose of what it is to 'mediate' fluctuates by sector. This proposes a breadth of what often remain implicit ideological assumptions and nuances in defining the practice. Foundations of practice are also shaped by historical, sociological and cultural forces that impact the mediator's charge and limitations of process, drawing from conflict type, country, sub-cultures, and mediation institutions relevant to a national or sub-national context (Wall and Dunne, 2012: 218).

Dominant mediation literature also tends to originate in Western Europe and North America, which for some has revealed a rather disappointing contribution to scholarship, as "replete coverage of the same topics in additional arenas," indicating that "scholars are redoing the easy work" (Wall and Dunne, 2012: 239),[1] without drawing from new data sets or cultural contexts to refine our basis of knowledge around mediation practices.

Scrutinizing mediation without contextualizing conflict more carefully, limits the understanding of the practice's value, as well as its possible impacts in or on a given community or society. This gains particular relevance where community mediation practices converge with dynamics of conflict that are intertwined with

[1] Wall and Dunne also suggest "researchers should devote more attention to the two-way dynamics of the mediator-disputant interactions as well as to the feedback effects that the outcomes have upon the core mediation process".

violence and insecurity, in spaces absent of overt political conflict or 'non-conflict' national contexts, presented by the case of Brazil. With "little systematic analysis to date of the specific relationship between change and violence," or "wider structural transformations" related to globalization (Moser and Rodgers, 2005: 1; Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002), it is difficult to speak conclusively as to the impact or effect that mediation as a third party intervention practice may have with regard to conflict and violence that often characterize 21st century urban environments.

Observers of violence and democracy in Latin America more broadly have come to characterize and understand urban environments as highly complex, wherein traffickers as well as elites and state authorities or institutions are implicated in contributing to the "multiplication of deadly personal interactions and private violences" (Pearce, 2010: 300).

But while perspectives on violence and insecurity in places like Brazil are predominantly nourished by the disciplines of political science and criminology, their approaches have tended to focus considerably on the nature of power, proliferation, and legitimacy of organized crime and non-state armed actors. Less abundant are studies that consider how, and with what impact, individuals, organizations and non-governmental conflict interveners nonviolently respond to challenging the existing power and legitimacy of actors who use violence, helping to sustain perversely violent social and political configurations and arrangements, exposing millions to deleterious everyday effects.

This study aims to better understand the nature of organic, local praxis of third party intervention in the context of these complex environments. It explores intermediary agency and potential impact of conflict interveners in relation to patterns and reproductions of violence, as experienced by citizens who reside in the urban periphery communities of Florianópolis, the south Brazilian state capital of Santa Catarina. Drawing on ethnographically sourced data, the study pursues an understanding at the convergence of local mediation activities performed by non-state, unarmed community residents, and the reproductions of violence that characterize urban periphery life for so many of Brazil's citizens.

At the heart of this research resides an interrogation into possibilities for 'bottom-up' peacebuilding and the *evolution* of mediation as a third party intervention practice, explored through the way local agency interfaces with structural and social dynamics that support reproductions and transmissions of violence in public and private spaces. Uniquely, the thesis explores how locals' intervention agency and tactics shape, but also how they are shaped by a dangerous and sometimes deadly context of social spaces characterized by volatility and insecurity.

By exploring local disputes and community-based conflict alongisde residents' interactions and propensity to engage them, this thesis offers a unique epistemological contribution to urban violence literature and the praxis of third party conflict intervention, offering new conceptual foundations for community mediation in Brazil's urban peripheries.

Mediating Violence

Dominant or conventional orientations about mediation feature skills, techniques, and processes that endeavor to engage non-violently with interpersonal disputes or conflicts. Such approaches define a growing number of sectors who have adapted mediation, from business to community environments, across Latin America. Theoretical and practical orientations to mediation practice, however, can be located along a broader spectrum, in an alignment that spans or roughly reflects with what Galtung (1969) defined as positive and negative definitions of peace.

Central objectives of intervention, thus, might be asserted from either a transactional, or a transformational perspective. Overall, it is clear to see that few, if any, of these efforts have infused or accounted for how the phenomenon of violence might shape mediation praxis, paying less attention to overt violence, as well as more covert cultural or structural dynamics. In this way, mediation practice remains limited in terms of its potential to build peace where these forms of violence play a key role in shaping the local social order.

Increasingly, conflict transformation-oriented scholar-practitioners have begun to discuss mediation practices that espouse overt, change-oriented goals, used

as a form of social intervention that links practice with diverse phenomena of power and violence in national contexts. These range from interrogations of mediation as a form of social justice (Neves, 2009) to critiquing conventional practices and roles against in contexts of high inequality & historical injustices (Henkeman, 2010), and uses in complex multi-cultural contexts involving deep-rooted political power struggles that shape community (Li-On, 2009).

Like many countries, the growth of mediation and programming in Brazil can be linked to theory and practice emerging from a blend of commercial, community, and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movements. The resulting practices, including innovative access-to-justice programming in periphery neighborhoods, however, tend to derive from orientations that can be bibliographically traced to North American and European praxis, as well as north-south professional exchanges.[2]

As Chapter 1 discusses, mediation protagonists often make unqualified and untested claims about mediation as a form of violence prevention, claiming its conflict resolving potential as a manner by which to de-escalate and non-violently satisfy parties' needs *before* they might turn to using violence as a means for settling problems, or achieving their goals. These claims often fail to account for questions raised by scholar-practitioners like Kolb (2001) and others (see also Trujillo, et al., 2008; Henkeman, 2010; 2013) who ask how practitioners might, or should, realistically engage with parties who experience deep histories of violence or injustice, and who likewise lack basic support and resources to do much about the historical conditions and dynamics of social conditioning around them.

Research at the convergence of mediation practice and the interplay of visible and invisible forms of violence raises more questions than concrete prescriptions. Few have taken up this charge. The more robust amongst

[2] Efforts continue to systematize and north-south and south-south experiences. For example, The George Mason University's SCAR/OAS sponsored annual courses entitled "Academic Development in the Transformation of Social Conflicts: Linking Theory and Practice to Strengthen Democratic Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean" held for over eight consecutive years has brought together Latin American peacebuilding practitioners to exchange and systematize ideas. See <http://scar.gmu.edu/cpp/project/latin-american-initiative> for more information.

existing efforts, however, include authors who have contemplated or developed practice-adaptations informed by critical theory, informing how practitioners can actively resist an unjust status quo and confront forms of social oppression (Hanson, 2008; Wing, 2008; Cobb, 1997). Others have critically endeavored to re-define a view to third party interveners like mediators as a "social instrumentalists," which may help to avoid the pitfalls of remaining 'blind' to the systemic phenomena of power and violence within conflicts into which they intervene and mediate (Schoeny and Warfield, 2000).

Elsewhere in relation to violence, mediation has been explored through the re-evaluation of what negotiation-assistance might bring to efforts at dismantling organized crime or working with non-state armed groups, where high levels of violence, most notably in Central America, continue to rise (Cockayne, 2013). To add to this complex array, mediation is also used as a peacemaking tool in the context of urban, inner city violence prevention efforts such as those which have been instrumental in defining a new wave of street-worker programs in cities in the United States, discussed further in Chapter 1.

Despite a robust literature offered by anthropological and political disciplines to more cogently comprehend violence and its reproductions in urban spaces, research, theory or debate about third party intervention and mediation's use, and its convergence with the violence phenomenon as it shapes these spaces, remains woefully inadequate. Scholars in recent years have affirmed that mediator-assisted negotiations in urban communities affected by physical and psychological violence have not received scholarly or policy attention compared to the international arena (Schmueli, Warfield, and Kaufman, 2009: 253).

These scholars have identified this as the result of a concern with the reach of the more immediate consequences of conflicts over the potential long-term impacts they might have on society at-large, as well as the emphasis on local transformation or reconciliation rather than larger, precedent setting concerns. This text thus departs from the premise that adaptations and evolutions of intermediary roles, functions, and processes used to address conflict in urban periphery contexts present a critical yet understudied dimension.

Since urban violence has only truly begun to feature on the radar of conflict intervention scholars and practitioners, studies at this nexus can infuse new evidence into debates over conventional understandings and theoretical claims. This is particularly relevant given the empirical evidence in the chapters that follow. Rather than endeavoring to harmonize or pacify local tensions through the cultivation of personal empowerment, interveners deploy a nuanced, strategic and tactical mediative repertoire in which intervention, interruption, and contestation are used to both de-escalate tensions and violence, while also influencing the way that dominating patterns of social ordering unfold.

This study departs from the assumption that where mediation's use in non-conflict countries continues to proliferate, particularly in contexts that experience high levels of violence, mediation practice carried out by different types of actors will continue to evolve beyond conventional definitions and premises. Practitioners, policy makers, and researchers alike must contend with, and account for, the way that models converge, adapt, interact, shape, or become shaped by the social and political contexts in which they are practiced or adapted.

This is particularly relevant for violence prevention efforts, which scholars admonish, require careful contextual analysis (Moser and Rodgers, 2005). These arguments are reflected by conflict resolution and transformation scholars (Brigg, 2003; 2008; Lederach, 1995; 2006) who, similar to Kennedy's (2011) caution and critique about street-worker intervention models (see Chapter 1), question the political and social implications of intervention model export/transfer in the midst of a dearth of empirical data, upon which such practices yet claim to build peace or prevent violence.

Lest we assume that interveners' tactics or strategic approaches evidence lasting impacts on violence, we must also consider that violence and the nature of social forces and conditions also impact how intervention practices are enabled or make real impact on those conditions over time. This thesis interrogates these potentials, adding to various bodies of knowledge by taking aim at 'insider' mediator subjectivities and intervention practices performed in the insecurity-fraught periphery communities of Florianópolis.

The continuing rise of violence, its origins and societal impacts upon heavily populated urban areas, seen both in Brazil and across Latin America, suggests a re-examination and attention to mediation in these spaces. On the one hand, the proliferation of formal, organized community mediation practices in Brazil's urban periphery communities offers an opportunity to learn about the interaction between conflict intervention practices and the complex context of lived insecurity.

As Chapter 1 explores, however, these predominantly state-sponsored efforts carry with them assumptions and approaches that were not initially conceived to address conflict and disputes that are co-produced by insecurity and violence, unfolding in the very unique socio-cultural environment of urban periphery life. In this way, I argue, they not only fall short of lofty and marketed claims, but may also help to sustain dysfunctional and even violent social impact over time.

Although this study does not provide systematic evaluation or measure the impact of an organized third party conflict intervention model of mediation, it does explore where and how violence and power factor into the role and agency being exercised by key informants who intervene locally in disputes. In doing so, it seeks to illuminate some of the basic building blocks of periphery-based mediation practice, including philosophical orientation and intervention tactics that local mediators exercise. In order to do so, the study also delves deeply into the anatomy of local disputes and conflict experienced by community residents, which are sourced in part from often violent processes of social ordering that shape everyday life in the urban periphery.

Violence in Brazil and Urban Peripheries

A robust multi-disciplinary literature on urban violence has illuminated ways in which violence shapes life in Latin America. Brazil also has some of the highest homicide rates in the world, with rates for young men in cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo far surpassing conventional wars such as the US invasion of Iraq or Yugoslavia's fallout in the early 1990s (UN/OHCHR, 2008; Alves and Evanson, 2011: 31).

Compared to its regional neighbors, Brazil is not considered a post-conflict country per se, though various patterns of violence and political rights violations during and after authoritarian rule (1964-1985) left social and institutional legacies that have challenged the country's transition to democracy, often resonating in violently ways for periphery residents. This complex legacy includes the emergence of organized crime facilitated by a number of factors, including the former authoritarian dictatorship's political imprisonment and censorship policies, the rise of extermination groups, slow judicial reform efforts, and the continuing presence of abusive security and policing practices aimed at poor urban populations after the transition to democracy (Cardoso, et al., 2011).

Although Florianópolis ranks low overall on violence registries amongst Brazil's 27 capital cities, violence and a sense of insecurity are rising in an unassuming southern capital that many outsiders have long considered one of Brazil's last bastions of peace and tranquility. Rates of lethal and non-lethal violence, organized crime activities, and security spending alike have seen dramatic increases over the past two decades. Multiple waves of attacks that wrought destruction of state property aimed mostly at police barracks, trucks, buses, and car-burnings, and destruction of private enterprise between 2012 and 2014 (*Governador de Santa Catarina*, 2013) have created widespread ripples of fear, as well as political and commercial impacts not unlike those that stunned observers in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo over the past two decades.

The urgency presented by these growth patterns, particularly the expansion of organized crime and prison unrest at large in Santa Catarina, have at times prompted deployments of the Brazilian federal army to aid state and local security forces. Both city and state security responses, as well as data collected through interviews that I conducted with high-ranking members of Santa Catarina's Polícia Militar (PM), provide evidence that point to a continuing tendency by authorities to continue to use repressive means and violent policing methods to attack and dismantle organized armed actors in the periphery communities of Florianópolis, reflective of those that have entrenched animosities and provoked violence escalation in other cities. Chapter 1 dives deeper into these issues, contending that mediators play a unique role on the front line of violence in the urban periphery, whereby physical and symbolic

interventions into disputes by key actors with key identity groups, may offer unique opportunities for violence reduction.

Periphery communities (sometimes referred to as *favelas*, slums or shantytowns) dot the urban landscape across Brazil's massive expanse. Zaluar (2010: 9) observes these irregular dwelling areas as "common to Brazil's large cities, because of accelerated and unordered urbanization that began in the early years of the twentieth century: urbanization without sufficient industrialization or economic development to provide employment for all those migrating to cities." Social inequalities and divides across Brazil still holds remarkably, and visibly true today, where "on one side there is the asphalt, prosperous classes, and democracy; and on the other, we have the hill (*morro)*, and the poor condemned to the eternal absence of civic, political and social rights" (Zaluar, 1994: 49).

Periphery zones are home to many of Brazil's urban impoverished. Sub-optimal living conditions of millions, can be linked to historical inequality, discriminatory public policies, turf battles amongst gangs, as well as confrontations with police, these zones are characterized, though not entirely defined by, high rates social tension, stress, insecurity and violence, sometimes at chronic levels (Pearce, 2007). Violence and insecurity in periphery communities is documented widely across Brazil (Soares, Bill, and Athayde, 2005), adding to our understanding of the unequal or disproportionate impact of violence on socially and economically vulnerable populations. Residents often find themselves caught in an "endless war" between armed conflicts, those amongst different 'commands' or gangs, and that of armed actors with police, who "do not always act to repress crime and maintain the law" (Zaluar, 2010: 15-16).

In Brazil's unique, unregulated, and marginalized social-ecological periphery territories (Fernandes and Gama-Rosa, 2010), interpersonal or neighborhood conflict and tensions are frequently linked to (in)security, stemming from social and political histories, events and evolving relationships amongst local power players. These relationships and conditions, details of which this study illuminates, foster a high degree of complexity, revealing how sources of interpersonal disputes and community conflict are invariably associated with

multiple forms of violence. This reflects empirical evidence gathered elsewhere in urban periphery zones (Goldstein, 2003; Goldstein, 2010), which suggest that urban dwellers, lacking appropriate distribution of public goods like security, are often left to 'cobble' together local solutions. In this way, violence features largely, if at times invisibly, in shaping social interactions, decision-making, and disputing behaviors. This not only inclues the anatomy and local impact of disputes, but also the way by which interveners go about pursuing pathways to resolution.

These observations introduce new dyanmics into the way that "new and decentralized security entities have become powerful producers and regulators of violence, particularly in parts of cities with weak state–society relations. These groups use violence as a means to bring about decentralized permutations of security—even as they may be violently destabilizing to others and draw on illicit economies as forms of revenue—in an effort to achieve order" Willis (2015: 7-8). While these groups often have, or seek, little revolutionary political goals, they are supported by those who are "well past placing faith in democratic or traditional civil society institutions, existing in spite of the state rather than in protest with it," despite the destabilization they invite Willis (2015: 8).

Informal conflict intervention performed in these spaces thus contends by default with violence of local social ordering, and the antagonistic nature of social relations that shape periphery life. Where blurring lines between political and social violence raises challenges for peace scholars and policy makers alike, mediation or third party intervention practices, particularly those focused on neighborhood conflicts, offer an interesting intersection, in their inextricably linkage to larger territorial troubles that define contemporary urban woes. Against the backdrop of Brazil's endless or *newest* wars, characterized by high levels of interpersonal and armed violence in relatively compact spaces (Moura, 2005, 2007), exploring these practices implicates strategic possibilities for peacemaking through the work of mediative actors.

This nexus raises questions about opportunities to understand mediation as a non-violent change-making practice against the often lack-luster state provision

of security as a public good, and lack of access and enjoyment of rights guaranteed to all under Brazil's 1988 Democratic Constitution. In light of the growing challenges, concerns, and impacts experienced in the context of state-society relations, particularly with regard to high levels of corruption, crime, violence, and expanding power of organized armed actors in Brazil's formal state of democratic peace, what role might, or do, mediators play?

Mediative Actors in Periphery Communities

While contributions from anthropological, political, and conflict studies cast a wide net around violence and disputing behaviors, this thesis asserts that our knowledge is still relatively ill-defined when it comes to the confluence of violence reproductions and mediation as a form of third party intervention. Although scholarly attention to conflict intervention in the periphery is not new (see Santos, 1977, 1995; Junqueira and Rodrigues, 1993; Davis, 1998, 2000, 2001; Arias and Davis, 2006), a critical peace studies approach offers value to theoretical and and practical pursuits alongside the existing, largely uncritical views to conflict management in contexts of violence, which are often based on a limited 'field reality' (Fetherson and Parkin, 1997: 20).

As Chapter 1 explores in depth, two main actors of the state, and non-state armed actors, predominantly occupy third party conflict intervention roles in periphery communities. While literature about mediation in urban periphery communities has proved groundbreaking, such as identifying how residents use community mediation, as well as how and why traffickers engage in resolving disputes at the request of their neighbors (Alves and Evanson, 2011). empirical research about these actors in dispute resolution roles, remains limited.

Similarly, whereas research on the role non-violent mediators is mainly focused on state judicial initiatives, including those carried out by civil society actors[3],

[3] Top-down mediation initiatives in periphery communities in Brazil are organized through partnerships between state institutions and local partners, using existing, externally derived methodologies and commonly seeking local leaders or "community agents" for capacity building in these skills (Gonzalez, 2010). Almeida (2010) for example, has outlined a stage model of training delivery that portends common methodological elements, wherein professional private mediators and academics first train attorneys, law students, and selected community agents, who then selected further community leaders, which included sector specific to state-institutions such as health and social services, to participate in secondary phase trainings (see also Bomfim, Duarte, and Duarte, 2005). That is, even these community-oriented approaches tend to

analysis of non-state armed, or *uncivil* society actors (Nan, 2009) such as traffickers, propose distinct understandings about mediation's uses and impacts. [4] Scholarship that presents empirical evidence from periphery communities suggest, for example, that residents may even seek to satisfy their dispute resolution needs through traffickers as a way to augment their own personal protection – effectively using mediation as a form of coping with violence and uncertainty by currying local favor in a context where they feel generally unsafe.

This, as Arias (2006) and Arias and Rodrigues' (2006) work shows, reinforces legitimacy of local power players who residents suppose will provide them protection in the face of threats or sources of insecurity and danger. As such, disputing behaviors, including traffickers' 'dispute intervention' behaviors and associated political calculations, reflects an organic harmonizing ideology through which traffickers' role in settling disputes, either as peacemakers or arbiters of a punitive, violent justice, serves to uphold their influence over local social order, suppressing dissent, and consolidating legitimacy.

At first glance, the ideologies implicit in conflict management approaches undertaken by both trafficker and state or civil society actors evidence forms of pacification and control. On the one hand, scholars have suggested that trafficker-negotiated dispute resolution provides a way for these *uncivil society mediators* to encourage community harmony. On the other hand, state-sponsored and civil society programming operates on liberal individualistic premises, claiming and aiming to satisfy certain individually guaranteed rights, with interpersonal harmony as a secondary possibility.

At the same time, the latter seems to confer value upon material satisfaction indicated by parties, despite what research and program evaluation in this area evidence as glaring personal safety or community security dilemmas (and concerns) present in the data from mediated case logs and reflective practice

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ascribe to the premise of top-down '*hipo-sucificiencia'* embedded in Brazil's institutional culture, from health to legal sectors.

[4] For example, where local actors have been observed to mediate disputes using violent means for resolution, due in part to the absence of available or accessible alternatives, civil society efforts have attempted to respond, using imported models of practice.

discussions. In this way, I argue that both of these particular actors' engagements in local mediation efforts (albeit using widely different approaches), passively and actively sustain agendas of a particular social ordering, placing the interests of medaitive actors' or institutions over the needs, interests, or concerns of the parties with whom they mediate. As this thesis argues, these mediative actors effectively dismiss some of the principle concerns, needs, and interests associated with local disputes that I observed in the highly complex and insecure environment of everyday life in the urban periphery.

As I will demonstrate, this rather surface-oriented use of mediation to resolve interpersonal problems over time, enables a pattern of increased distance between citizens' ability to access rights, and the state's public responsibility to deliver critical public goods like education and security. This, in part, leads to further "governance voids," in which scholars have observed local ordering by non-state armed actors to fill the gaps, and generating "perverse rather than productive forms of social capital and hasten social fragmentation and the onset of violence" (Rodgers and Moser, 2005: iv).

Such patterns, while suppressing local conflict and supporting forms (if perverse) of social cohesion, in fact simply add to the depth of organized criminal power (Wheeler, 2014). These patterns further reproduce violence and insecurity, while also distancing the state from upholding its responsibility, and thus enable a central source of social conflict in Brazil, aiding in the reproduction of political, institutional, economic, or social forms of violence in a peace-time context (see Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

Learning from existing, violence-sustaining or imported models of dispute resolution based on a settlement orientation to practice limits an understanding of what local mediators do, and the possible social impact that these mediators might have on community life beyond those accounted for by programming evaluations. Furthermore, claims made by existing state-driven community dispute resolution initiatives established in Brazil's peripheries, which suggest mediation as a tool for violence prevention, assumes a narrow and direct physical form of violence that remains interpersonally oriented. Studying these, while perhaps enriching, fails to interrogate local mediator agency at the nexus

of interaction amongst variables of conflict, local intervention logic, and multiple, overlapping forms of violence. Existing studies offer a yet limited view to rather complex phenomena and their interplay in a unique environment.

As Chapter 1 contends, community mediation practices that do not operate with a critical and broader view to the conditions of violence and insecurity offer an incomplete picture. Furthermore, mediation performed as a dispute resolution practice without accountability to the nature of local power dynamics at stake, are susceptible to critiques of reproducing a form of social control. While this emphasizes peaceful resolution of interpersonal conflicts, it may ultimately reveal how well-intentioned peacemakers and third party interveners 'misrecognize' and normalize violence, effectively rendering mediation *counterproductive* to its social impact and violence-transcending claims.

Studying non-judicialized third party conflict intervention practices in periphery territories is thus significant for peace studies, as research can deepen and broaden our understanding about approaches to violence and change in 'non-conflict' environments that evidence intractable dynamics of social conflict. This is particularly perplexing given observations from the limited scope of existing studies, including Faundez (2003: 53), who found difficulty examining non-state judicial systems "in isolation from local residents' efforts to develop survival strategies to resist eviction, protect their families from local gangs…."

Whereas state institutions form part of the problem or are incapable of attending to these issues, collective action remains a typical response. Still, Faundez (2003), echoed by Arias (2006), asserts that conditions are often unsuitable for collective impact, finding diminishing returns on collective organizing and impact after peak confrontational ripeness has passed. Given these gaps and uncertainty, this thesis complements existing third party intervention literature, particularly that in the realm of community mediation, which remains sparse when it comes to examining questions of practical convergence in contexts of insecurity and violence, and still nascent overall in the Americas.

The study also contributes, therefore, to core concerns about security and development in contexts that experience rapidly scaling changes (Davis, 2012),

as well as dynamics of fragile cities and states, a category into which other scholars have considered Brazil's urban violence situation right at home (Moser and Rodgers, 2005; Koonings and Kruijt, 2009).

Similarly, the study stakes its claim in the ongoing debates over terminology defining conflict management, resolution and transformation, which draw upon third party intervention practices and views that place greater or lesser analytical attention on power and violence (see Mitchell, 2006; Jabri, 1995, 2006). In this way, critiquing dominant models of community mediation, as well as seeking new data about such practices in violent contexts, underscore both scholarly and ethical imperatives, which must be addressed for the purposes of both knowledge production and leading with do no harm principles in peace programming and design.

Ultimately, the advent of global narcotics and entrenchment of urban street-market economies are widely believed to give rise and reproduction to various types of violence, presenting new and compounded challenges to creating secure communities and strengthening democratic citizenship. Given this trajectory, this thesis thus adds value to discussions regarding local agents' roles in battling back such trends, along with a nuanced look at community mediation's purpose in light of insecurity and violence. It seeks to better ascertain how such purpose relates to social change possibilities and violence reduction in the Brazilian, and possibly wider Latin American context, simply by asking what we might we learn from actors who engage in conflict or dispute intervention practices in this milieu?

Pursuing a Third Perspective

Moving beyond existing accounts of what mediation is and how it is used requires serious consideration of the contributions that *non-state unarmed resident actors* -the same residents often depicted as simply *users or consumers* of conflict intervention or disputing services performed by others- make in this arena. Little to no contribution has been made to this discussion about residents as mediative *agents* who engage in neighborhood disputes, or the impact this may have on insecurity and violence. What, if any, ideology (or hybridity), might undergird a third perspective to intervention practice in these spaces? Based on empirically-derived understandings about how the mediative

activities of non-state, unarmed actors, what can we learn about addressing the range of conflicts, tensions, or disputes in a context of insecurity? What might these actors' contribution be to strategic peacebuilding with regard to violence's reproduction, and the 'endless' and 'newest' wars experienced by periphery residents?

This study thus inquiries into existing practices of mediation in the periphery, as well as beyond the realm of what we currently know local conflict intervention practices in urban Brazilian contexts. It endeavors to understand meanings and contributions of residents who intervene uninfluenced by formal, external praxis of mediation, and whose exercise of agency is influenced by the very experiences of insecurity and violence that shapes insecurity, fear, and exclusion in the periphery.

Furthermore, it explores the outcomes, impacts, and effects that such exercises may have in relation to how local agents enable and promote change in the way people experience violence. In doing so, the central question to be pursued asks whether we can speak meaningfully to a practice of community mediation in the context of urban violence that is informed by, but also interruptive of violence's transmissions, while also promoting transformative social change in a context of insecurity?

Significance of the Study

While a comprehensive review of mediation practices in Brazil is beyond the scope of this study, a central premise for my research departs from the observation that a limited number of studies have observed, classified, or catalogued mediation's use and impact, in light of the way violence and power shape social life for Brazil's periphery citizens. Currently, little, if any work is being done to better understand, conceptualize or systematize community mediation practices in contexts of high urban-based violence and insecurity.

Despite lofty claims, we have little data to reinforce our understanding about what broader impact or implications these practices have on communities or society. Acutely speaking, little is being done to track practitioners' work in the way they adapt strategically to such environs in function of deploying mediative

skills and tactics as conflict interveners. Learning about interventions performed by non-state unarmed actors is critical for a variety of academic and practical purposes. Above and beyond the satisfaction mediation may afford to periphery residents in terms of attending to their immediate needs (insecurity, material, or otherwise), I suggest that mediative or conflict intervention work performed by local can also contribute significantly to the citizenship strengthening of periphery residents, as well as resonant peacebuilding impacts elsewhere, such as in reforms sought by Brazil's judicial sector.[5]

As our foundational knowledge basis about urban violence and reproductions in urban spaces grows, so too can we encourage complementary, cross-sector peacebuilding initiatives. Original empirical evidence in this text reveals commonly overlooked perspectives in the accounting of existing dispute resolution ideologies and programming, as well as support innovations in third party practices under conditions of insecurity. In this way, a broader gamut of actors can benefit from research about the ways that individual, collective, or institutional agency can strategically support the interruption of violence, which can be linked in part, and sustained by, insidious cultural and systemic challenges, such as institutional fragmentation and social distance.

In the absence of an organic or bottom-up community mediation movement in Brazil, existing conflict intervention practices like those cited earlier will continue to occupy the central source of information regarding localized conflict practices. A peace studies perspective that explores alternative practices based on non-traditional sources of knowledge, is opportune in this light, filling a gap in knowledge at the confluence of mediation and urban violence, which are often distinctly-studied subject areas.

[5] For example, judicial authorities in Florianópolis who practice restorative justice and family mediation expressed to me their frustration at the way that their existing (imported) practices, skills and processes seem to offer rather temporary and reactive, rather than proactive efforts when it came to sustainably preventing violence. Similarly, I observed these same judicial actors and innovative desires to be significantly limited by their inability (despite good-intentions) to evolve practices and develop closer linkages to their target population (predominantly periphery youth). While their programming's flexibility was in part stymied by institutional limitations, the cross-boundary learning opportunity discussed in this study offers a unique change for informal and formal mediative activities to learn and reinforce one another.

This pursuit is critical as demand for mediation continues to grow and be delivered by state and NGO social service-provider organizations. Inevitably, one can surmise that adaptations and unique strategies to deal with the nuance of periphery disputes will continue to emerge in the face ever-rising levels of complex violence. In the face of this trend, this research offers an important precedent to learn more about localized peace practices.

Self-selected local actors who exercise mediative capacities independently of any organized initiative or institutional program, represent the key informants in this ethnographic study. These agents exercise a range of mediative tactics that interact with diverse actors in a particular social environment. This includes engaging in dispute resolution processes with traffickers, who are in many cases, complicit in violence's reproductions.

In spite of the ongoing, if subtle, power struggles that present increasingly precarious and risky situations for them and their neighbors, mediators deal with these actors, often times in scenarios in which interpersonal tensions often transcend interpersonal realms, and are difficult to cleanly disentangle from larger social forces and social conflict that shape them. In periphery-based disputes and tensions, managing the urban experience of violence frequently becomes an unavoidable component of such interactions.

The findings in this study contend that focusing on the work of non-state unarmed actors is significant, as local mediator agency can clearly be instrumental, over time, in shaping local social ordering alongside violent actors. Importantly, observing these activities help us to better understand power as a dimension of mediation, which is a subject under constant debate. As data in this research shows, the social mediative tactics exercised by local actors who cross physical and social boundaries, also exemplify practices of non-dominating power, and hold forth as a force upon local social ordering, directly shaping the way that conflict and insecurity is experienced locally.

Learning from residents whose 'ways of living' in contexts of insecurity (Penglase, 2013) inform how they craft creative ways to engage in and navigate daily life at the margins (Goldstein, 2010), necessarily draws upon localized

orientations to the way people engage with social ordering and ways by which power operates locally. These views can contribute important elements to a broader understanding of power exercised to reduce violence and craft structures for peace in urban periphery zones. This thesis furthermore draws heavily upon how local knowledge and emic propositions of the subject matter under study to make its central claims. Such knowledge, as others have asserted, plays a fundamental role in our unfolding notions of the politics of conflict resolution (Walker, 2004; Wilding, 2009; Brigg, 2003; 2008).

Contribution to Literature

This study contributes methodological originality, as well as new empirical data that can be useful in multiple bodies of literature, not limited to the arenas of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, urban violence studies, and praxis of conflict intervention and community mediation. Community mediators who intervene in the periphery context find themselves at the forefront of possibilities to engage and interrupt violence reproductions through social transmissions. Where scholars have observed violence becoming more entrenched through invisible, misrecognized, and normalized ways, ultimately "legitimizing policies and institutions that politically impose suffering on the socially vulnerable" (Bourgois, 2009: 17), this study offers a chance to consider the flow of local practices against this tide.

Exploring interventions *in situ* contributes methodological originality to augment the epistemological resonance in the arena of conflict transformation and intervention theory and practice. It provides, at the very least, a partial platform on which to comment upon 'bottom-up' approaches to peacebuilding and possibilities for non-violent change in democratic contexts wherein citizenship rights, acts of resilience, and voices are frequently violated, constrained, or silenced.

In the conflict studies field, transformation is a term that has created semantic difficulties and debate. Empirical data in this text offers contextual clarity and a unique Brazilian contribution to operational and theoretical distinctions between conflict resolution and transformation, which has long been identified as lacking (Botes, 2003a: 1). Similarly absent and unaddressed are discussions about the

role of third parties or conflict interveners with respect to "'who' are transformationalists and 'why' they are performing their professional and social roles" (Botes, 2003a).

In the same vein, this research adds cautionary views expressed by peacebuilding scholars using ethnographic methodologies, about the 'compound friction' (Millar, 2011; Millar, et. al., 2013) created when external (international) peace methodologies and operations meet with local actors' understandings and priorities. Without overstating the existing presence of imported community mediation models, I nevertheless follow authors like Autesserre (2010) and Fontan (2012) who have called attention to the danger of an entrenched and dangerous international peacebuilding culture that has deprioritized or turned a blind eye to the critical relevance of attention to local disputes in supporting conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts at the country level. Where others have argued for greater attention to local contributions and bottom-up approaches to peace, what answers does the Brazilian context contribute?

Methodologically speaking, rare is the ethnographic accounting of violence and non-violent third party conflict intervention that engage more broadly and intentionally in, or with, widespread patterns of violence. This is particularly true beyond the research-saturated sites of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo in Brazil, where levels of violence remain high. As Alves & Evanson (2011: 5) have admonished, citizens who live in Brazil's urban periphery communities are typically seen only on the *receiving end* when it comes to understanding or building security in these contexts. The design of this study therefore responds to these authors' poignant questions of "where is their voice? Who pays attention to what they are trying to say? Where are the voices of those who are in the crossfire of this supposed war?"

Finally, the recent rise in literature on the use of ADR in Brazil's periphery spaces has left much to be desired when it comes to the historical debate and claims made around mediation's social change possibilities. This includes claims made by Brazilian proponents about mediation's emancipatory potential as a specific benefit rendered for periphery residents, who can participate in

state-sponsored ‘justice’ activities as a participatory, democratic exercise of citizenship (Egger, 2008; Veronese, 2007).

It is here that authors claim mediation’s social transformation possibilities (Ribeiro and Strozenberg, 2001; Selem, 2010; Sales, 2005), despite a relatively narrow view to the phenomenon of violence and how it influences relationships and decision making inherent to disputing and resolution processes. Where such claims are proposed in more philosophical terms, I argue that they lack much if any in depth backing, examination, or empirically-based premises or measurements, specifically when it comes to understandings of how to deconstruct violence’s reproductions.

Dwindling attention over the last decade to such debates regarding mediation’s contributions and social change potential offers room in which to raise the implications of this gap in a ‘new’ context. I take up this task with respect to a particular set of priorities which I identify as inherent to mainstream ADR scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. It is within this purview and orientation, which tends to carry a pragmatic and often *apolitical* outlook, that heavily influences how mediation is conceptualized and defined, as well as imported and employed, despite the lack of accounting for alternative possibilities under certain conditions.

This text then offers a unique contribution to a largely uncritical body of literature that tends to have an apolitical and pragmatic orientation to what we understand as disputes and disputing processes. On this basis, we are presented with an incomplete picture when it comes to how conflict is managed in the midst of active and often violent social forces that disproportionately shape citizenship experiences and social relations in these spaces.

I argue thus that practitioners’ impact poses important ethical questions, specific to the way that they can be viewed as subsuming and translating of structurally violent rights-related claims or needs into individualized conflicts, to be resolved through existing community mediation practices. Furthermore, despite the common practice identified in organizedperiphery-based mediation experiences, which train and count on local residents as mediators, there is no substantial evidence that indicates that a fusion of external theory and internal knowledge has become woven into the fabric of operations. This study thus also invigorates

debates about local agency and ownership of conflict resolution work where they have previously been absent. This is true not only for the Brazilian context, but more broadly as well.

Finally, the empirical data adds new dimensions to debates about mediation as a form of second-class justice. Instead of comparing mediation as a form of justice in contrast to the judicial or court system, it refocuses the question by interrogating the nature of local conflict intervention as a response to the existing injustices felt by second-class citizens. These citizens, despite their inherent rights and protections in a democratic context, live under daily social arragnements that facilitates severely deleterious dynamics of violence on a regular basis.

Given this experience, local mediation practices exercised by local people through methods of their own devising (rather than the priming from an external model), offer a unique view to potential alternatives for preventing violence and promoting social change. In some ways, such local activities offer a parallel, participatory, and 'insurgent' form of citizenship and democratic representation of the voiceless (Holston, 2008; Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle, 2009).

Chapter Overview

Chapter 1 of this thesis establishes the analytical framework for the study. It begins by exploring the multidimensional and complex phenomenon of violence, exploring the way scholars understand violence to reproduce itself through interwoven spaces and over time. The chapter moves on to framing these issues alongside the peculiarities of the urban Brazilian context. Here, I begin to clarify one of the study's central claims, which is to assert the often underrepresented or understudied complexity associated with the localized disputes, tensions, and repercussions of intractable social conflict with which residents must cope and manage everyday.

Before looking critically at mediation in Brazil and mediative actors in urban and periphery communities more broadly, I traverse existing literature that offers us a yet limited convergence between the practice of mediation and the study of the violence phenomenon, or its treatment by mediators in urban settings. By doing so, I argue that little is understood about the ultimate effects of mediative

practices and the potential that local agency might have with respect to larger social impact in such complex environments.

This chapter continues with an examination of what we know from existing research about the two primary sets of mediative actors at work in the periphery: 1) State or state-sponsored civil society dispute resolution initiatives, and; 2) Non-state armed actors who are often called upon by their neighbors or acquaintances to resolve local problems. By critically deconstructing the activities, ideological orientation, and associated social impacts associated with these mediative actors, I assert that despite often well-intentioned efforts, the scope of existing mediation practices may in fact do more to foster violence's reproduction and normalization than intended.

Given what we know about the existing array of uses of mediation in the periphery, I contend that mediation used by these primary actors erodes citizenship through the individualization and misrecognition of violence. Ultimately, Chapter 1 more carefully frames, and problematizes, our understanding of mediation as a non-violent conflict intervention practice in a particularly complex context. In this way, I argue that what we know about existing mediative practices and actors may ultimately help us better understand how these activities reinforce insecurity and violent social ordering as experienced by residents, who nevertheless seek them out in pursuit of their dispute resolution needs.

The chapter ends with an exploration of the rather confusing assortment of labels and definitions that have scholars and practitioners alike have used over time to explain and delineate the variation in third party roles and repertoires. In doing so, I set the stage for understanding the work of a set of a third group of non-state, unarmed, *mediative* actors. Providing insight into the use of terminology I have elected to use in this thesis, I begin to describe and contrast some of the nuanced dimensions of mediator repertoires that I observed in the periphery communities of Florianópolis.

Chapter 2 begins with a description of this study's story of origin, where I walk the reader through details and phases of my research and participation in

Florianópolis between 2012-2014, during which time I lived, volunteered, and later visited in order to conduct research in the neighborhoods of the *Morro do Maciço da Cruz*, under the auspices of the *Centro Cultural Escrava Anastácia* (CCEA) and *Instituto Vilson Groh* (IVG). Moving on, I outline the methodology and data sourcing activities, and what I define as a hybrid ethnographic approach to the research. This approach draws from Focused, Critical, and Engaged orientations to ethnography, each of which I treat in kind, before discussing how these orientations helped discern and structure the central questions and overall research design.

I argue that a hybrid approach was important not only with respect to building key relationships that would eventually allow me access to otherwise highly restricted spaces and interactions. Rather, it also proved to be responsive to key informants and the community at large, in light of the historically extractive relationships that outsiders (including researchers) have tended to have with insiders, as described to me frequently by residents. In this way, I discuss how the methodology supports a mutually beneficial generative experience on the basis of an otherwise extractive endeavor.

Chapter 2 also offers critical reflections on my fieldwork experience and positionality. Here, I discuss the way that research questions were shaped by the experiences of people I eventually came to know well, all of whom are at least loosely associated with the CCEA.[6] In doing so, I discuss my positionality in relation to my professional role and identity, as well as the implications this had on issues of community access, safety, and ethics. Here, I grapple with the tension of upholding researcher transparency and substantiating the objective validity of the data that was sourced amongst people with whom I lived and interacted with regularly. Importantly, this chapter thus clarifies the ways by

[6] Uniquely, this study does not present data on an existing, organized community mediation center, an idea that was rejected by CCEA staff for reasons that become apparent through mediator identity development addressed in Chapters 2 and 4. This explains in part what constitutes mediation practice at the base, and why locals intervene using particular tactics in particular community spaces. Instead, the text offers an ethnographic accounting of activists' encounters with and interventions in conflict - mediations and middling actions which I personally shadowed, observed, or reflected about during a range of activities, which include multiple interview sessions with community residents and key informants that speak to a range conflict sources, local tensions, historical injustices, and ongoing territorial disputes across the *Maciço*.

which I came to access sensitive data, and data about third party intervention that was extremely difficult to come by. In doing so, I ask what, if any, implications my positionality, or that of key research subjects, might have had on the totality of data sourcing activities or the research process.

Chapter 3 presents an ethnographic view to the territorial disputing context, narrated predominantly through the experiences and voices of, but also my observations of interactions amongst, residents, state authorities, and non-state 'criminal' actors. Here, I interrogate the backdrop of overlapping relational and structural influences that shape the way that residents, and third party mediators both, experience, approach, and manage local conflict and disputes. Seeking to explain the complex array of social, economic, infrastructural, and cultural sources that stimulate social conflict and localized disputes, I ask how it is that that residents experience and understand their conflicts and disputes vis-à-vis such robust and ever-present challenges, and pursue answers to how violence may impact dispute escalation, as well as residents' pursuit of answers or pathways to resolution.

Ultimately, I argue that, well beyond superficial interpersonal problems, the experiences of periphery residents can be understood as a unique kind of *democratic disempowerment (DD)*. This, I suggest, is the lived experience and result of exposure to heightened personal risk, social harm, and deleterious erosion of citizenship that residents face through their attempts to remedy or resolve their disputes or conflicts.

In doing so, chapter 3 portrays specific examples that illuminate some of the nuanced ways that sources of local disputes are couched in, and catalyzed by, a panorama of complexity posed by multiple sources of violence and insecurity, shaped by an interplay of actor behavior, uncontrollable circumstance, and an unresponsive or unprepared legal architecture. In this way, the reader is able to identify some of the obstacles present for residents as they make decisions about whether, or how, to confront evolving problems or conflicts through the various actors and legal options (in)accessible to them. The complexities involved in decision-making can thus be seen as coloring by the way residents' perceptions and experiences are intertwined or interwoven with the often

invisible, if unforgiving social ordering processes that define periphery living on a daily basis. It is here that the relationship of this thesis's central oragnizating frames (discussed here below) of social ordering, democratic disempowerment, and the non-dominating power used by local mediators begins to come into greater focus.

Chapter 4 endeavors to discern a local logic and orientation to conflict intervention practice, by framing the thought processes and exercises of mediative agency with respect to residents' understandings of violence. This chapter draws from a series of interwoven experiences depicting local tensions in the Mont Serrat neighborhood to interrogate and explore how interveners construct mediative subjectivities in light of dynamics of conflict and violence, as well as lived interactions directly and indirectly with territorial antagonists in the periphery realm.

I contend that these subjectivities and associated local logic underpinning *morro*-based mediation, can be explained by how mediators address this complexity through a *discursive consciousness* (Pearce, 2013a). In this way, local agents' orientation to intervening and mediating local tensions, or supporting residents-in-dispute make decisions in a complex environment, prioritizes a relational approach that is responsive to local social ordering and creative 'non-resolution' endeavors that attend to less visible transmissions of violence. By linking micro tensions to macro systemic influences and issues, I assert that mediators' use of a unique analytical platform guides their intermediary activities in ways that strategically position themselves to enable longer-term social change. In this way, mediators' localized interventions facilitate an overall reduction in the way that dominant power and violence wielded by key territorial antagonists, shapes periphery life.

Chapters 5 and *6* together, explore more carefully the approaches and social mediative tactics used by local interveners to engage in local conflict with territorial antagonists. Given the peculiar orientation to mediation work discussed in Chapter 4, this chapter inquires into the corresponding set of activities and tactics that key informants use when performing a diverse set of interventions. Here, I present and elaborate upon the unique repertoires of social mediative tactics, which I observe as interruptive, oppositional, and

otherwise socially inappropriate and resistant in the context of expected social ordering patterns fostered by territorial antagonists.

Building on the orientation and logic of interveners, I begin to demonstrate how mediation practiced by key informants on the *morro* is a provocative, change-oriented exercise of power, through which mediators exert and achieve more than simply mediate disputes. Key examples illuminate complementary tactics that mediators use, which I label as *deconstructing* and *reconstructing* endeavors. In this way, I suggest that conflict intervention work in this context operates in counter to conventional mediator tenets, in which mediators typically "see their role largely as managing or resolving rather than precipitating conflict" (Brigg, 2003: 289).

Chapter 5 thus explores the lexicon and script-breaking *deconstructive* interventions used by key actors, while *Chapter 6* analyzes mediators' *reconstructive* efforts, which underscore the value and change-potential of physical and social boundary crossing. Together, these activities constitute critical middling movements that help community mediators cultivate and exercise non-dominating power in the periphery, and suggest a peculiar type of stewardship that reinforces citizenship-strengthening through a unique set of mediative tactics.

The final chapter in this thesis, Chapter 7, provides analysis of these social mediative tactics and the impacts they have on the way non-state, unarmed mediative actors build legitimacy and effecting non-violent change. Taken in turn, I demonstrate alignment between Pearce's (2013a) six propositions of Non-Dominating Power and the panorama of mediative capacities and activities employed by local agents, which I argue constitute a unique exercise of non-violent power.

Drawing from key examples, I probe the nature of the social and economic potential that mediative boundary-crossing has into both internal and external *morro* spaces, on the city and on citizenship at-large. Ultimately, I assert that mediative tactics provide a vehicle through which we can observe the effectiveness of both the totality and cross-over of mediator work (strategies,

engagements, and tactics) become effective in levying larger social impact on conditions and relationships involved in perpetuating (in)security and violence over time.

In the *thesis conclusions* I revisit my central questions, discuss some of limitations of this study, as well as the claims and contributions that makes to the larger field of peace studies. Here, I highlight the study's implications and claims for both scholarship and practice, and speak to the possibilities of understanding mediation's broader meaning vis-à-vis practices of third party conflict management in contexts of urban violence in both Brazil, and Latin America more broadly.

Key Conceptual Frames

The interrogation of main and sub-research questions, along with the assertion of central claims in this text, relies heavily on the way this thesis uses the conceptual frames of social ordering, democratic disempowerment, and non-dominating power. By using these devices, I aim to more vividly depict and assert claims about the nature of local agency and the deployment of mediative capacities in highly complex environs of Florianópolis's periphery communities. While each frame is unique in its own right, discerning the relationship between and amongst these concepts, which I explore now briefly, and more in depth throughout the text, is important for the research's contribution to knowledge.

Democratic disempowerment is an experience that occurs as a result of dominating tactics of power used by individuals and institutions that play a significant role in the *social ordering* of life at the periphery. The intervention into, or mediation of disputes is a window through which third party actors attempt to reduce the intensity and impact of citizens' affective *and* democratic disempowerment, while also striving in unique ways to reconfigure the way that local social reproductions unfold. Intervention into disputes and the tactics deployed therein, can be understood thus as much more than simple management of conflict.

Rather, they include a range of activities based on non-dominating premises, in which third parties are observed to play a host of roles and functions in a very

particular urban context. Non-dominating power is a form of power that characterizes the social mediative tactics that key informants use in mediating or supporting the navigation of disputes and social conflict. These efforts stand in clear opposition to existing and identifiable norms of social ordering that relies on violence and intimidation.

In this way, non-dominating power (NDP) is a concept that speaks to the role of a unique mediative mechanism that has evolved, or is being carefully adapted, to serve third parties operating in a context of insecurity, by which non-violent social ordering (vis-à-vis conflict intervention) finds traction. The use of NDP-based tactics also enables social change and social impact by constructing and asserting new relational and cultural dynamics, as well as simultaneously minimizing interveners' risk given the dangers associated with engaging interpersonal or inter-group conflict in the periphery.

In chapter one, for example, I critically examine how state and non-state actors in Brazil engage in mediating disputes in periphery neighborhoods. By doing so, I draw attention not only to the differential ways in which mediation practices are exercised by key actors in these peculiar community spaces, but also argue that these practices are part of an incomplete picture, and used, if in some cases unintentionally, to reproduce a more violent social ordering. Drawing upon studies that illuminate the social and structural aspects, interactions, and conditions that shape the quality of life and citizenship in Brazil's urban peripheries (Arias, 2006; Dagnino, 2004; Colak and Pearce, 2009; Goldstein, 2003; Goldstein, 2012; Penglase, 2014), the concept of social ordering can be understood as a system structure or shaped by direct and indirect actions that inform and implicate norms and cultural rules, as well as conditions of material and economic deprivation, and decision-making and behaviors.

I contend that disputes constitute a significant form of neighborhood interaction that strategically shapes the social order in the city's peripheries, particularly when they involve members of specific identity groups under study. It is, thus, that *disputing* writ-large presents a prism through which to view how social ordering and social reproduction processes shape individual and community life in Florianópolis's peripheries.

This furthermore implies that the behaviors, interactions, and corresponding interventions (or non-interventions) may also have immediate, as well as long term effects, subtly shaping residents' quality of life, relationships, and experiences of citizenship and (in)security in constructive or deleterious ways. Thus, the engagement of third parties into interpersonal and communal tensions, disputes, and aspects of social conflict in which key informants exercise their mediative agency,[7] are fundamentally linked to the way social ordering unfolds in periphery spaces.

The mediative agency and activities (roles and functions) of non-state, unarmed interveners can be contrasted or juxtaposed to the mediative activities of state or non-state armed actors, who engage in such activities upon premises and purposes that carry distinct outcomes specific to their own peculiar contributions to the social order. Chapter 1 observes in detail how these activities can, at their worst, contribute to reproductions of social violence and insecurity.

Social ordering and disputing are also linked to democratic disempowerment*,* which is a device that I use to describe the impact on residents, defined through discerning the association between the pursuit of solutions or resolutions to local problems, and the destructive or deleterious experiences that mark periphery residents' lives in their attempts to navigate local tensions and disputes. In an asymmetrical negotiating environment, where resolving disputes commonly cues interactions between or amongst residents, their neighbors, and/or public officials (disputants or territorial antagonists, can thus be identified as part of more nefarious, intimidating, or less trustworthy identity-groups and institutions), the phenomenon of democratic disempowerment is used to describe and label an experience that levies both individual/interpersonal (micro) as well as collective (macro) impacts on any given disputant in question.

The evidence in this thesis demonstrates that third party interveners proactively exercise their mediative roles with the intention of reducing the intensity and impact of democratic disempowerment. This possibility, however, is not simply

[7] The empirical data presented in this thesis underscores the ways in which a distinct set less visible, less centrally organized, and understudied group of actors and intervention approaches respond to local residents' experiences, which form part of the social ordering process.

linked to micro interpersonal interactions, such as for supporting individuals in emotional-affective, or dignity-affirming ways. In this context of high stakes, decision-making by disputants can easily become a matter of safety or survival, as well as a question of asserting and claiming one's rights and protections as a democratic citizen.

In this context, key informants or mediators are seen to deploy a range of what I call social mediative tactics, in which their intervention and accompaniment work (through which they literally and/or figuratively mediate local disputes) help to generate change or shift the disempowering impacts felt by residents, on both micro and macro levels.

In the same way that disputes are interactional premises that can and often do adversely affect residents' lives, so, too, do I identify how mediated interventions and the social mediative tactics used by local agents effectively contest the intractability of social conflict, while reducing risk and harm in more broadly reaching ways. In this way, the contribution of local mediators stands uniquely and distinctively alongside the mediative efforts of state and non-state armed actors, which this study and others discussed in Chapter 1 have identified as using such efforts to contributing to the embedding of violence in social and related processes.

Given the identity of key actors with whom key community mediators work, their activities and impact can be viewed beyond a simple dispute-resolution service with impact in the sphere of interpersonal relations. If mediated intervention is premised not only on interpersonal but also collective citizenship concerns for resisting or reducing citizen disempowerment in a context of democracy, then intervention itself forms part of the social ordering process that must not see micro interactions dissociated from cumulative macro impact in social, cultural, or political terms.

As a conceptual device, democratic disempowerment helps us to frame and link the notions of micro interaction within an everyday dispute, with the macro implications of how localized disputing (and conflict intervention activities) bring to bear significant impact on periphery residents' citizenship experience. For

example, data that defines disempowerment reveals how and why residents' perceived ability to access or enjoy certain rights and protections are distressingly compromised.

These patterns derive in part from the normal flux of interactions between community members and state authorities (police, judicial services, social services), which are often steeped in suspicion and frustration. Such experiences tend to render residents' perceived or actual ability to access to individuals and institutions of protection or support, as perilously sub-optimal, fraught with frustration, fear, mistrust, and/or a bewildering experience of discrimination.

Disempowerment thus emerges when a clearly informed citizenry knows it must face such bewilderment when even daring to consider the idea of accessing officials, authorities, and citizenship rights all tasked to protect them. This only further reinforced patterns of social division, distance, and stereotypes that materialize in disempowering and tension-escalating ways, wherein citizens' pursuit for the defense of their rights becomes a cautionary one, often second guessed, at best.

I observed patterns of disempowerment in situations that involved directly negotiating with actors who were known to use violence or threats to silence or intimidate their neighbors, as well as in the way that residents in a dispute went about decision making as to whether to involve or seek the support of state mechanisms or authorities to help with resolution of their problems. Given this reality, the study of how disputes unfold provides a unique window through which to observe and understand the dynamics of less visible forms of violence, as well as the nature and degree of efficacy around efforts made to interrupt their reproductions, both of which shape citizenship experiences in 21st century Brazilian Democracy.

Finally, the linkage between the premise of democratic disempowerment and social ordering is offered further relief through my analysis of key informants' social mediative tactics and intentionality as a particular form of power. I argue that these tactics are used to contest what I observe as the 'business-as-usual'

of violent social ordering processes at the periphery. In spaces and interactions through which more powerful actors (state security agents and local traffickers) are actively complicit in perpetuating citizens' *disempowerment* through violence, intimidation, and mistrust, shaping *morro* residents' quality of life, then the role and relevance of community mediators and their interventions as non-violent actors, present as a critical object of study.

The complexity of local social relations and the way that state officials and local traffickers alike, build and sustain their own power, offer little reprise for residents who seek answers, protections, or resources to help navigate local conflict. This further compromises their individual negotiating power, increasing physical, affective vulnerabilities, while undermining and eroding the strength of democracy.

In this milieu, I observe mediator interventions as *Non-Dominating Power,* which can be contrasted to the more dominating forms of power exercised by other territorial actors, whose use and performance of intimidation, threat, repression, or violence as a manner of approaching local disputes or responding to a community's conflict needs, dominantly shape the social order. Pearce (2013a: 641) defines Non-Dominating Power (NDP) as that which "nurtures cooperation and capacity to act but which also impacts and generates change". I use Pearce's development of this type of power as a way to explain how the mediative activities and agency exercised by key informants, shape effective resolution of local disputes, while also enabling social change in structural, cultural, and relational forms.

While we cannot always draw or observe clear cut lines, causality, or impact between and amongst these interlinked phenomenon, they must be understood as occurring in conjunction with each other to a significant degree. Nevertheless, empirical data shows how key informants mediate, sometimes through playing allied roles, seeing through or supporting individuals according to key informants' unique repertoires, as they navigate conflict. Another way to think about this is that disputes are the platform, portal, or entryway through which mediators deploy non-dominating social mediative tactics as a form of power, while engaging with territorial antagonists (see Chapter 1).

By doing so, mediators contribute effectively to the reduction or mitigation of democratic disempowerment, facilitating not only the critical and security-sensitive decisions or de-escalatory dynamics in the face of tensions and conflict, but also through the shaping and fostering of reconfigured local social relations over time. NDP is indicated as a device that informs how we might understand *community mediation* in these spaces, as it defines and explain the nature of mediators' contribution to social ordering through their preventive or proactive engagement with local disputes.

By doing so in ways that not only facilitate solutions for residents, but furthermore endeavor to deconstruct and transform the way that dominating forms of social control rendered through policies, codes, or institutional workings, we are able to draw a more direct line between local mediative agency and its social impact in the realm of (in)security and violence reproduction.

CHAPTER ONE

Problematizing Mediation in the Urban Periphery

Introduction

Under Brazil's judicial reform efforts since the mid-1990s, community mediation initiatives have gained momentum, grown, and expanded in Brazil's urban peripheries. These predominantly state-sponsored, often delivered in parternship with civil-society managed programs, aim to stimulate legal agency of periphery citizens who have been historically excluded from access to judicial institutions, while also reinforcing the rule of law in their locales (Brinks, 2009).

Limited scholarly analysis and evaluation regarding community mediation programming, however, reveals a rather low-intensity impact, along with some inconsistency, despite these efforts' claims about their social change potential, above and beyond the measure of satisfying judicial and 'democratic-citizenship' related objectives.

If still in their infancy, such community mediation initiatives are nevertheless groundbreaking. Scholars and evaluators have heretofore provided important insight into the interests, behaviors, and ultimately complex context regarding themes and actors involved in conflict and resolution in urban periphery communities. Sussekind (1999) for example, observed that

> "Many of those served reveal that they have had their problem for a long time now, did not remember anymore when it had happened, and that now, that justice has arrived, are attempting to resolve it. Many others, however, reveal that they had sought out legal aid in public, state or municipal agencies, universities, without any type of resolution or without an acceptable resolution. Innumerable clients declare that they were now seeking the aid/intervention of a group of young narco-traffickers that dominate needy communities."

Despite the numerous concerns that this passage may raise for research, the relative scope of inquiry about local dispute resolution efforts and the degree to which disputes interact with violence and experiences of insecurity, remains

limited. What is known, however, is that both legitimate state and NGO actors, as well as non-state armed actors, are two sets of actors that engage in mediative activities to help residents address and resolve their conflicts and disputes in areas or neighborhoods often characterized by high levels of violence. This chapter explores the broad scope of violence in these spaces, as well as the actors and ideologies that constitute existing, studied forms of community mediation, exercised in periphery communities.

The text begins by tracking the roots and rise of urban violence and its reproductions in Brazil, along the course of the country's transition to Democracy. It begins to give analytical attention to the ways in which violence and insecurity as influential to local conflict dynamics and the origins of disputes. Considering contemporary social and living conditions, a review of literature about violence in Brazil and more specifically in Florianópolis, illuminates antagonistic legacies of state-society relations, as well as the emergence of narcotrafficking, amongst other factors, to demonstrate how these factors contribute to social ordering of contemporary periphery life. It is this complex context that plays host to sources of neighborhood and interpersonal tensions and disputes in a context of insecurity.

From here, I move on to discuss existing, albeit limited literature on mediation practices in contexts of violence to more carefully understand where and how scholars and practitioners are approaching the phenomon of violence. Bringing together this research with Moura's (2007) newest war theory aids in problematizing mediation practices in the periphery. On this basis, I move into examining Brazil's experiment with community mediation in the urban periphery, which ultimately explores both state- and civil society sponsored iniitatives, as well as the uncivil society mediation of traffickers. Drawing from a broader literature on third party intervention models and change, I examine the rationales and intentions that undergird these actors' efforts to address local conflict and address citizens' resolution needs.

This section first offers a detailed view to the operations, discourse, experiences, and evaluations of dispute resolution carried out by state-driven/NGO partnership initiatives. Here, I look critically at the intentions and

claims of social impact levied by these third party actors. Sourcing primary and secondary data that ranges from interactions with Brazilian practitioners to bibliographical references, I contend that where the community mediation project in Brazil has, to date, adapted ideologically tenable claims and practices from Northern influences, these remain judiciary-centric, functioning in line with individualizing, citizenship-strengthening endeavors in relation to those institutions, despite their claims of broader 'social transformation' potential.[8] As Harrington & Merry (1988: 719) have observed, such programs, which provide mediation in community vis-à-vis a service delivery ideology, have been critiqued as a form of state control:

> "[T]he emphasis here is on the provision of services *to the community,* rather than building social networks *from the community*. Community justice is equated with providing the community with greater access to dispute resolution services. It is still a symbolic resource for the service delivery project although it has not been mobilized to support what the social transformation project calls community empowerment".

I contend that these practices, which locate mediation's potential in interpersonal or individualizing enterprises, offer little evidence to suggest that state or civil society actors have made adaptations or analyses to gauge or adapte their practices in the face of localized violence. In this way, their mediative repertoire or models of practice employed may do more invisible harm than acknowledged or intended, by misrecognizing and suppressing violence. Furthermore, they present little, if any clear evidence of social impact in terms of existing measurements or evaluations when it comes to violence reduction, to back up their claims.

[8] Guindini and Ansari (No Date: 3) write, for example: "[Mediation's] pedagogical aspect – inspiring a type of social, engagement, and citizenship posture – opens the door to even broader models of mediative concepts such as Community Mediation, which is implicated in the consciousness and capacity of communities to resolve local issues. More than an alternative method for conflict resolution, it poses a paradigmatic proposal to Law: an interdisciplinary, intersectoral, and integrative proposal of social transformation. Community mediation includes and goes beyond general principles of mediating conflicts, based on the influence of the local context of people – who possess an shared experience of identity – in their conflicts, departing from the impact and learning or transformation proposed by mediation in that context."

This inconsistency, grounded in emancipatory language by organizers and protagonists, gives rise to questions of whether and how mediation is being used and creating impact in communities, as well as how it 'measures up' against claims about violence reduction in complex environs. Although mediation is marketed as a citizenship-strengthening exercise that reinforces the rule of law and reduces violence, such practices seem disconnected from any analysis of social and structural dimensions related to violence's origins and reproductions. In the periphery context, this reveals a rather superficial, fragmented perspective about the nature of disputes as a form of social interaction, as well as adaptations that influence residents' decision making under the influence of social exclusion, poverty, and security concerns that shape these environments. Empirical data collected from local conflict interveners will later help to substantiate this contrast a relative absence of the way these elements factor into organized mediation practices in the periphery.

Reflecting upon technical practices and service delivery, I also consider these otherwise well-intentioned rights-servicing efforts in light of scholar-practitioner debates about community mediation's social and political change potential. I demonstrate that while these programs adopt social transformation oriented discourse, their ideological lean and technical orientation actively *misrecognize* violence through processes in which violence and less evident rights violations are subsumed into individualized disputes.

While an important step, I argue that these dispute resolution initiatives exemplify what Scimecca (1993: 219) observes as "an instrument of social control, a process to keep the have-nots in their place". In this way, they contribute, if unwittingly, to displacing emancipatory discourse or collective mobilization against conditions that foster violence and insecurity, in counter to the marketing that community mediation protagonists portend, citing promotion of social change related to local conflict and violence.

Beyond state-sponsored and civil society mediation work, Chapter 1 also explores what we know about the third party dispute resolution roles played by non-state armed actors in the same context. Though the majority of formally researched experiences are based inRio de Janeiro, their empirical offerings

provide insights useful for understanding the impact that violent actors have in terms of local conflict. They furthermore illuminate how and why residents enlist these actors as mediators to resolve disputes or distribute justice in the community.

Whereas some evidence points to these actors as viable resources for meeting residents' disputing needs, it also presents a pattern in which the local legitimacy and power of less savory, and sometimes violent actors gets reinforced. The growth of local trafficker power through their exercise of mediative roles revelas the perverse side of "democratic mediation" roles identified by development scholars, which suggest the importance of new actors in providing services or advocating in some way between key (or vulnerable) groups and the state (von Lieres and Piper, 2014). To date, this research, along with Wheeler's (2014) look at traffickers as perverse democratic mediators, form part of an extremely underresearched nexus of mediation, democracy, and violent actors in Brazil.

Ultimately, Chapter 1 argues that mediative roles and processes exercised by these two sets of actors depict a range of mediation modalities specific to periphery communities, that may ultimately serve residents' more immediate conflict needs at the expense of pacification. While these may introduce a superficial sense of harmony in community relations, they may also serve to reinforce a more violent social ordering and reproductions of violence.

As the discussion will demonstrate, the predominant peacemaking practices of third party actors most accessible to residents inadvertently support reproductions of violence by reinforcing the way antagonistic territorial actors consolidate power on the one hand, while 'misrecognizing' violence on the other. This becomes more evident through an examination of how traffickers use an inconsistent and sometimes violent repertoire of tactics to resolve residents' disputes, while more 'legitimate' state or civil society actors passively or actively dismiss violence's relationship with conflict, despite making socially transformative claims to the contrary. Overall, I contend that existing practices of mediation in the periphery effectively cultivate a rather limited and eroding

version of democratic and rights-based agency, while producing or effecting little change in the larger forces that shape the context of insecurity.

Ultimately, these examples evidence distinct uses for mediation while offering little about the ways in which dispute intervention and conflict management practices might work in the opposite direction, to *foster* security through non-violent attention to conflict, or posit socially transformative impacts around violence with more collective social impact.[9]

Finally, the chapter concludes with a clarification about my use of terminology in the thesis. Here, I return to explore what existing literature offers specific to identifying and categorizing roles and repertoires of third party interveners, who I call local mediators. In this section, complemented further by Chapters 5 and 6, I posit why the identification of *mediation* is the term chosen as a best-fit descriptor, and begin to introduce the contrasting range of repertoires exercised by key 'mediator' informants, which I observed during my fieldwork.

Violence in Brazil and Florianópolis

Throughout its transition to Democracy since the mid 1980s, Brazil has experienced rising levels of urban and rural violence. Imbusch, et al. (2011) suggest that "the increase in homicide rates since democratization in the 1980s was caused by a combination of increased inequality, disorganized urbanization, availability of firearms, weak social institutions, and drug trafficking, together with cultural characteristics and a democracy that guarantees political but not social rights."

Despite relatively low-intensity violence over twenty years of authoritarian military rule (1964-1985), violence today, particularly in urban arenas, is linked to complex political and social arrangements, as well as global economic forces. Based on these patterns, Arias and Goldstein (2010: 13) have coined the term *violent pluralism*, which they describe as more than "the residue of democratic failure" but rather, a "key element of… democracy itself, as the basis on which it

[9] Whereas local agency, resistance or resilience have been explored in terms of passive, proactive, and *shielding* strategies (see Davis, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004), local conflict intervention practices in urban contexts of insecurity in Latin America, have not generally been thought about in this regard.

was founded and a critical component allowing its maintenance" in the 21st century.

Unlike regional neighbors, however, Brazil's consolidated institutions, election cycles, a robust third sector, and participatory political processes find support and legitimacy amongst the populous. Despite this, violence continues to plague Brazil's global reputation. As Zaluar (2004: 139) observes

> "Despite the relative absence in Brazil of large-scale social and political violence over the past century or so, this country has always displayed a gap between the formal institutions of the rule of law and citizenship rights and the ambivalent domain of social processes and practices not controlled by them. Over the past few decades this has facilitated the rise of new forms of violence, particularly in the urban context and directly related to the spread of the distribution and consumption of illicit drugs."

Brazil's homicide rates rank amongst the highest in the world, estimated around 26.2 per 100,000 in 2011 (Waiselfisz, 2012). Rates among adolescent and young men is estimated at 10 times that of young women, while non-lethal assaults rate twelve times that of homicide levels, at 340 per 100,000 (Murray, et. al. 2013). Brazil's population, nearing 205,000 (IBGE, 2015), boasts the highest overall murder totals amongst regional leaders (Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador). In 2012, homicides topped 56,000 (Igarapé Institute, 2015; Waiselfisz, 2014). Amongst these, over 90% of victims were male, 54% between the ages of 15-29.

Brazil's 2012 GINI index of 51.9 was "the 16th highest out of 136 countries worldwide (the United States ranks 42nd, and the United Kingdom ranks 91st). In 2009, the poorest fifth of the population received just 2.9% of the nation's income compared to 58.6% received by the richest fifth" (World Bank Data, 2012, in Murray, et. al, 2013). In the same year, 10.9% of the nation's population was poor (living on less than $2 per day) (Murray, et al, 2013). Regarded as a top global narcotics producer, consumer, and exporter, Brazil is also the second highest firearms producer in the Americas behind the US. Incarceration rates have increased dramatically in the last decade, placing Brazil amongst global leaders like Russia, China, and the United States, with

over half a million citizens incarcerated, for a rate of 270 per 100,000 population (Ministerio de Justiça, 2012).

While contemporary patterns of violence in the region, and in Brazil to some extent do not fit neatly into traditionally defined categories such as that of political violence, historical and contemporary patterns do reflect the country's interconnected experience of issues. This includes violence emanating from confrontations between "paramilitary and drug traffickers, protection rackets by urban militia, 'social cleansing' operations, political assassinations, organized and petty crime, as well as youth inter-gang warfare, brawls and vendettas. To these should be added social violence within households and between individuals, primarily sexual abuse both inside and outside the home" (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004: 3).

Adorno (2002: 88) posits four central tendencies underlying Brazil's urban patterns of violence. These include: 1) Urban delinquency and rise in property crimes (theft, extortion by kidnapping) and aggravated homicide; 2) organized crime related to the international drug trade which effectively modify conventional urban delinquency and suggest new challenges for criminal law and the criminal justice system; 3) egregious human rights violations that compromise the democratic political order, and; 4) the explosion of neighborhood conflicts that tend to converge in fatal encounters.

Pronounced geographic, class and social divisions also characterize the urban experience shaping continuities of insecurity and fear shared widely by citizens. Whereas violence in urban Brazil "follows poverty" (Perlman, 2009), dense interconnected environments render a significantly complex reality, affecting all. Whereas poverty and inequalities are highly visible in the urban context, these support, but do not directly cause, violence. Importantly, responses to fear and insecurity undertaken by citizens are constructed differently across classes, and have increased the use of violence by encouraging elite demands for heavy-handed law enforcement responses to crime, private security, and even the literal walling in of residences (Perry, 2000).

The poor are also subject to the impact of crime and criminal acts, leading as well to increased calls for law enforcement responses (Moser and McIlwaine,

2004; also see Caldeira, 2000), despite the adverse and violent effects these may bring through concentrated, militaristic police incursions into peripheries. Such patterns, in part, reinforce local social control and legitimacy of gangs, or in some cases *milicias* operating in *favela* neighborhoods (see Gay, 2009; Koonings and Kruijt, 2004).

Sources of Violence

Ethnographic contributions ranging from political science to anthropological disciplines have illuminated ways in which "diverse forms of criminal and interpersonal violence … are ravaging the lives of the urban poor" in Latin America (Auyero, et al., 2013, p.1; see also Koonings and Kruijt, 2007, 2009; Abramovay and Pinheiro, 2003; Wilding, 2013).

Homicide and other forms of violence in Brazil have a particular ethnography and geography, impacting different communities disproportionately (Alves and Evanson, 2011). Whereas direct violence statistics may be higher in certain geographically concentrated areas, less visible but widely shared patterns of stigmatization, criminalization, and negative perceptions perpetuate fear and social dissociation in urban life. This helps feed into the way that violence reproduces, reinforcing a vicious cycle of stereotyping and resulting calls for heavy-handed law enforcement responses.

Perlman's (2009: 56) identification of factors that underwrite perceptions about Brazil's epidemic of violence, demonstrate a wider and more complex range of issues, illustrating the interconnectedness of dimensions that help sustain and reproduce impact in ways that are difficult to overcome. These range from sensationalist media attention that help foster acceptance of police abuses, to state weakness and collusion with organized networked criminal gangs and sustainable drug markets.[10]

[10] Perlman lists factors associated with Rio's violence to include: 1) Stigmatized territories within the city that are excluded from state protection; 2) inequality levels among the highest in the world; 3) cocaine, a high priced illegal commodity with the alchemist's allure of turning poverty to wealth; 4) well-organized, well-connected drug gangs and networks; 5) easy access to sophisticated arms and weapons; 6) a police forces that is poorly paid, understaffed and unaccountable; 7) a weak government that does not guarantee 'the rule of law'; 8) independent militias and vigilante groups with virtual impunity in the use of extrajudicial lethal violence; 9) a powerless population of

In this way, violence in relation to organized armed groups can be seen as linked to social responses against unequal resource and opportunity distribution, which Barker (2005) has cited as a "breeding ground" for violence. Despite conditions of poverty, social cohesion amongst periphery neighbors has been noted as relatively high (Perlman, 1973, 2009; Zaluar, 2009). Unlike in North America, high levels of violence and social cohesion coexist. Murray, et al (2013) explain that positive association can be linked to histories of collective struggle and organizing at the threat of government removal, shared stories of migration, and informal mechanisms of survival.

Violence also linked to Brazil's democratic transition, whereby the development of perverse interactions between state institutions and impoverished communities, as elsewhere across the continent (Goldstein, 2010; Faundez, 2003), have contributed to mistrust, animosity, parallel power and consolidation of illicit economies, trade and commerce. Zaluar (2004: 140-1) has characterized the legacy of military rule (1964-1985) as perpetrating of institutional violence through an entrenched system of corruption, whose effects on the poor and excluded are the negation of basic civil rights. This is aided by unlawful practices encompassing extermination and illicit market activities practiced by state agents, further facilitating the emergence of organized crime against an ineffective judicial system.

As Perlman (2009: 63) writes, "people have nowhere to turn for help". Dispelling the myth of traffickers' 'parallel power' (see Leeds, 1996), which suggests growing power and service delivery by traffickers, Perlman and others (Arias, 2006; Arias and Davis Rodrigues, 2006; and Dowdney, 2003) have argued this view as misguided, since "traffic takes no responsibility for the general welfare of the population," even in the "vacuum created by the state's absence". Nevertheless, Davis' (2012: 15) study on urban resilience suggests that non-state armed groups have also been effective in "monopolizing violence and providing protection and territorial governance in exchange for citizen allegiance," particularly given historical neglect by state policies, opening doorways to alternative forms of power and authority.

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over 3 million people living in poverty; and 10) a sensationalist media empire fomenting such fear of criminality as to foster acceptance of police brutality.

When it comes to local conflicts, these arrangements tend to complicate and bifurcate residents' selection or access to dispute resolution modalities. As Chapter 3 contends, deep mistrust and threats to security by both traffickers and state agents, position residents in a state of *democratic disempowerment*, or the problematic, constraining burden citizens experience as they attempt to manage or pursue pathways to resolving neighborhood, family, or interpersonal conflict. This conceptual frame helps confirm Leeds' (1996) view that uncivil strategies are used both implicitly and explicitly, including by the state, to threaten and intimidate those seeking peace and justice.

Discriminatory and abusive practices by law enforcement, experienced with frequency and anticipation by periphery residents, lead to mistrust of state authorities in general, whether police, judicial officials, or social workers, creating obstacles to the realization of peaceful, democratic exercise of citizenship (Alves and Evanson, 2011; see also Wheeler, 2010). This has rendered a situation in which "public institutions meant to provide security and to protect citizens' rights are non-performing, absent or have become part of the threat" (Koonings and Kruijt, 2004: 13).

Clashes between police and traffickers also pose numerous threats to residents. Home invasions, theft, and abusive treatment become routine during police raids, while gang members who force their way into hiding spots in residents' homes help to provoke these actions (also see Perlman, 2009). These leave residents equally vulnerable to internal and external threats (Yazdani, et. al., 2014: 461).

Internally, threats and interpersonal conflicts arise amongst traffickers, many of whom are sons and daughters of the same territory, over territorial rights for drug sales, or with neighbors or shop owners. For residents who wish to speak out against these issues, the law of silence and "code of the hill" strengthen less visible forms of coercion, violence and intimidation. Local crime, code enforcement, and intimidation produce territorial stressors and tensions, which play a role in shaping social relations.

Adorno (2002) and Szabó de Carvalho (2008) argue that while human rights violations are committed by police agents using abusive force, as well as by

traffickers and vigilante 'death squads,' [11] interpersonal conflict and neighborhood disputes *also* rank amongst leading causes of violent homicide. Instances commonly arise from

> "Fights amongst family, friends and relatives, as well as neighbors, work colleagues, business owners and patrons, people who interact in community, in which misunderstandings occur for a variety of reasons, over possession of property or a material good, unmet commitments, unrequited passions, broken promises, unfulfilled expectations in the realm of conventional social roles such as mother, father, wife, child, student, worker, home-maker, etc. In most cases, these reveal how sensitive the social fabric is to tensions and confrontations that, in the past, did not converge as abruptly with fatal encounters (Adorno, 2002: 99).

Silva (2004: 189) suggests that such problems reflect a broader social order characterized by Durkheimian anomie, purporting a failure that lies in the state and civil society's "inability to generate mechanisms to reduce the levels of violence and to renounce the use of force and physical confrontation as instruments for social and political struggle."

Overview of Violence on the Maciço

While Florianópolis demonstrates some visible geographic and demographic similarities to coastal capitals like Vitória and Rio de Janeiro, statistics on violent crime are, by comparison, significantly lower. This is in part due to *Floripa's* historical geo-political relevance. With a total greater metropolitan[12] population approaching one million inhabitants, the city's homicide rate hovers around 15 per 100,000. While half the homicide rate of Rio, the figure matches the current per capita rate in São Paulo, albeit experienced in a much more consolidated area (Igarapé Homicide Monitor, 2015).

Influences that shape violence and conflict in Florianópolis' peripheries include a growing influx internal migrants, illicit smuggling of arms and drugs, and

[11] There are very few reported or recorded incidents of this in Florianópolis, though less clear examples by word of mouth amongst periphery residents during fieldwork were noted.
[12] In 2014, the Governor of Santa Catarina, Raimundo Colombo, officially signed a law creating the RMF or Florianópolis Metropolitan Region, consisting of eight municipalities. The most populated of these are the adjoining cities typicaly considered "Greater Florianopolis," including the Island (pop. 461,240) and continent, which includes the cities of São José (pop. 228, 561) and Palhoça (pop. 154,254) (*Governo de Santa Catarina*, 2014)

increasing investment and real estate speculation linked in part to the rapid growth of international tourism. These patterns, not unlike Rio, have augmented inequalities, exclusion, growth of organized crime, and violence in the peripheries whose residents contribute to licit and illicit economies linked largely to middle- and upper class consumption patterns and service industries.

In the periphery neighborhoods of the *Morro do Maciço da Cruz*, a landmass that occupies a large portion of the city center, family lineage of the *Maciço's* estimated 25,000-35,000 residents, can be traced to rural sections of Santa Catarina, as well as Brazil's impoverished northeast, from which many left in search of employment in the industrializing and modernizing cities of the south and southeast beginning in the early 20th century (Holston, 2008). Alongside turf wars amongst traffickers, overcrowding has created territorial tensions and acute socio-geographic divisions.

Proximity to Argentina and Paraguay also make Florianópolis an ideal arms cache and drug smuggling transit zone through which traffickers import and export increasingly high caliber and sophisticated weaponry. International tourism has also been linked to global narcotics export, while also providing an increasingly robust year round local market for sales. By all accounts, as the city grows, so have the local and national organized crime factions, leading to clashes with police, prison riots, as well as assaults and bank robberies.

In this complex entanglement of social, economic and political forces, what possible role can mediators realistically play in 'interrupting' violence? Does local conflict intervention seem futile against the backdrop of historically entrenched, but also constantly shifting patterns?

Violence's Reproduction

Violence is understood as a multi-faceted, complex, and reproduced phenomenon, manifesting in visible and less visible or identifiable ways (Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004). While its impacts can be direct, they can also implicate social and cultural dimensions, broadening our understanding beyond physical aspects and specter. Historical legacy and the interplay of contemporary political, social and economic dynamics see violence transmit across time and space, blurring lines between political and social violence and

public and private spheres (Pearce, McGee, and Wheeler, 2011).

Violence's reproduction contributes to rising levels of fear and insecurity, and permeates Latin American societies (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999), in turn inducing calls for increased security persistently violent law enforcement responses (Caldeira, 2002). Failing to acknowledge the way that violence less visibly reproduces however, also "runs the risk of degenerating into a theater or pornography of violence in which the voyeuristic impulse subverts the larger project of witnessing, critiquing, and writing against violence, injustice, and suffering" (Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004: 1).

Violence shapes private spaces of intimate relationships as well as collective, public interactions. Yet this is not always in direct ways. As a phenomenon "central to the organization of power in everyday life," Bourgois (2009: 17) contends that direct violence can distract us from

> "Less clearly visible forms of coercion, fear, and subjectification through which violence deceptively and perniciously morphs over time and through history. These deceptive forms of violence are largely invisible to or 'misrecognized' by both protagonists and victims – who are often one and the same. This miscrecognition legitimizes to the general public the policies and institutions that politically impose suffering on the socially vulnerable".

In contexts of exclusion, violence is linked to everyday interactions, norms, and codes that mark periphery life. Structural or 'everyday' forms like poverty, hunger, humiliation and indignities translate from the public experiences into private spheres (Schepher-Hughes, 1993; Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, Wilding, 2012). The reproductive effects permeate and shape socialization processes as well.

In Brazil, where young males account for the majority of homicide deaths -both as victims and perpetrators- researchers have linked violence's reproduction to masculine identity development (Baird, 2012a, 2012b; Barker, 2005). Structural exclusion, which has been pointed to as fostering the development of youth gangs (Baird, 2015), implicates social and economic arrangements that affect the poor disproportionately.

For periphery youth, often criminalized by Brazilian police and society alike, gangs and street-market economy participation can be instrumental for identity

formation. This has gained attention particularly by scholars studying pathways by which young people join the ranks of armed actors in environments of deprivation and exclusion (Pinheiro, 1998; Barker, 2005; Baird, 2012a, 2012b), wherein "gangs become attractive mechanisms for impoverished boys to achieve manhood, and gang members themselves become figures of admiration" (Rodgers and Baird, 2015: 14).

In these environments, Edberg and Bourgois (2013) describe as *generative* the process by which value is ascribed to the use of direct violence, specifically in the context of the street-market and common social domains. Similarly, Pearce's (2007: 19) view to contexts of 'chronic violence' argues that

> "Everyday violences take place in spaces of the home, the neighborhood, the school etc. Political violence emanating from state and non-state armed actors also takes place in spaces, sometimes the home, but more often the street, the neighborhood, police stations, prisons etc. And spaces are about social relationships and interactions, thus when violence penetrates those spaces it also colors and contaminates those relationships, or conversely those social relationships are already contaminated by violence which is then further reproduced. The interaction of different types of violence with the spaces in which they are executed allows transmission and reproduction of violence over time through the social relations embedded in those spaces."

Visible and Invisible Transmission

How one sees or locates violence informs how to treat or interrupt its transmissions. Focusing on one realm while remaining impervious to others can be problematic, as direct forms of violence may draw attention to one area, while masking larger complexities in another. Speaking about patterns of violence in Latin America over the last three decades, Bourgois (2009: 18) for example, has expressed specific concern that posit a "shift from political to intimate violence in Latin America… has legitimated social inequality and demobilized popular demands for redistribution of resources". This can, in turn, implicate distinct and ultimately unhelpful responses or approaches to peace (Cockayne, 2013).

In addition to less visible reproductions of violence, peacebuilding and third party interveners have paid less attention to physical spaces and infrastructure.

Observers of violence, nevertheless, recognize these physical spaces as "ideal ethnographic sites for theorizing how broad and abstract social orderings such as the state, citizenship, criminality, ethnicity and class play out concretely at the level of everyday practice, revealing how relationships of power and hierarchy translate into palpable forms of physical and emotional harm" (Rodgers and O'Neill, 2012: 402). Citing Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois' (2004) theoretical discussion about the *continuum of violence,* Auyero and Burbano (2012: 13) have empirically illuminated the connection amongst *violences* as inseparable as it impacts on lives – as if in a chain – particularly in Latin America's urban periphery areas, wherein

> "Diverse forms of violence do not present themselves in discrete forms. … [S]tudents recount episodes in which criminal, police, domestic, and sexual violence intersect and interact, making it hard to tease out which one comes first and which second, which one causes what, which one translates into the other."

The overlap highlights another challenge for peacebuilders and researchers, which is what Wilding and Hume (2015: 94) have called an *arbitrary distinction* between types of violence, in which 'forced compartmentalization' of violence analytically also misses violence's multiple forms and gendered impacts. In researching gender violence in the larger political economy in the region, these scholars call attention to the way that violence is interconnected, arguing that, by contrast to the *ungendered* literature of violence, tackling the phenomenon holistically requires an acknowledgement of "its interconnected manifestations, and the factors that facilitate it. This involves looking at violence both materially and discursively" (Wilding and Hume, 2015: 94).

Less visible forms of violence and its gendered dimensions, transmissions and reproductions, also lack attention when compared to more spectacular, criminal, and institutional displays. These require, as Wilding and Hume (2015: 109) argue, "not to be treated as separate phenomena that can somehow coexist in the same locale without sharing any common source or logic". Pearce (2006: 45) complements that

> "Gendered forms of socialisation and gendered constructions of space continue to produce and reproduce the relational dynamics which embed and perpetuate violence in our human societies. These socialisation processes increase the

> risks that violence will be used as an instrument to pursue a range of goals, from the worthy to the unworthy.

In this way, those who work with local conflicts and disputes involving issues that range from intimate to neighborhood relations in highly dense and socially cohesive environments, engage in interventions that are highly influential in the social transmission processes through which violence is legitimated, sustained or reproduced. Empirical data on periphery-based mediation evidences that mediating actors engage and intervene around contentious social relationships, from private intimate, to public or collective spaces, and that many of these encounters are particularly salient for gendered analysis. Local mediators seem to be responsive to these issues, and prone to addressing in the process of supporting parties make decisions, satisfy interests, or transform relationships.

As such, local residents who are sought out, or elect to exercise their intervention agency around local tensions present strategic possibilities and influences on the transmission of violence, as they engage directly with the way local social ordering unfolds. Thus, intervention can be linked to social ordering, whether through the facilitation of decision-making processes with individuals or in the process of direct negotiations pertaining to social interactions and permissions, spaces, boundaries, or even material goods and resources. This unique role and station lends itself to a unique interrogation about local agency and intervening influence or power exercised through mediative acvitities linked to social violence and insecurity.

As Pearce, Howard, and Bronstein (2011: 265) assert, it is not simple in the absence of easy solutions but rather "*in the presence of violence and power through a political lens* that we might learn how development efforts are shaped." In communities, "Latin Americans working on 'development' would find this term "a little vacuous, empty of the political content which communities need to 'develop', or as they might put it: gain voice and power, challenge inequalities and struggle for social justice" (Pearce, Howard, and Bronstein, 2010: 265).

Whether speaking to community mediation initiatives as part of 'development' or

'peacebuilding strategies,' learning from mediative agents' engagement with violence's direct, indirect, or symbolic reproductions, speaks to transformative possibilities embodied by conflict resolution practitioners. Orientations to mediating conflict in such a context that fail to account for how sources of conflict or disputant behaviors are shaped by violence, may thus be inadvertently complicit in the reproduction of the phenomenon.

This is particularly important in spaces where high rates of direct violence become routinized, banalized, and normalized by victims or voyeurs, wherein violence's everyday expressions are quietly folded into community and individual lives (Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004; Pearce, 2006). By delving deeper into the "chains, spirals and mirrors" of violence understood along a continuum (Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004: 1) and in the context of Brazil's unique history can more appropriately frame the unavoidable confluence of this phenomenon with mediation practiced in periphery communities. This is particularly relevant for treating conflict or disputes amongst *intimates* in community, whether in the home or the street, drawing value from Pearce's (2006: 47) observation that "the home and the intimate is arguably the formative space for gender socialization, and the most dynamic force for replenishing the circulation and flow of power and violence over time and space

Following Pearce's (2007: 20) argument that "different forms of participation in violent contexts may help us to learn about the process of de-legitimizing violence in social spaces," this text posits that local mediators have a critical, if not strategic imperative for interrupting violence, perhaps on many levels. Such a view is more appropriate in the unique democratic paradigm that Brazil presents, wherein a non-conflict country simultaneously plays host to some of the highest levels of violence and insecurity on the planet. As mediation and third party intervention processes continue to evolve to meet sector-specific needs, whether at the table or on the streets, more research must be done to learn from local orientations and intervention tactics that treat conflict in a context of insecurity.

While existing community mediation efforts do create channels for citizens to access institutionally-certified justice, thereby fulfilling citizens' rights, *morro*

residents admonished how related judicial and law enforcement groups simultaneously turn a blind eye to the social forces and relations involved in (re)producing local disputes and social conflicts. For citizens, this implicates a degree of complicity, eroding trust placed in institutions of the state more broadly, ultimately nourshing a sense of urgency and insecurity.

Departing from a more in depth understanding of violence in Brazil, I turn now to discussing mediation practices in contexts of violence. By doing so, I ask what we can learn about mediation as an evolving practice of peacebuilding through models that engage explicitly with dynamics of urban violence, and the various forms addressed above. This leads into a key discussion about the existing scope of community mediation in Brazil's periphery neighborhoods, in which I begin to explore actual and potential uses, contributions, and limitations of conflict interveners in these peculiar social spaces.

Mediation Practices in Contexts of Violence

The convergence of mediation and violence is relatively new. Corbett and Corbett (2012: 13) cite that out of the 400 community mediation program members of the National Association for Community Mediation (NAFCM) located worldwide only 6% include violence interruption as part of their programmatic service portfolio. Indicating similar deficiencies, Charkoudian and Billick's (2014: 273) literature review suggests the "desperate need" for qualitative research that directly ties community mediation services to violence prevention. While it may be premature to suggest that answers will come by formally establishing community mediation as a key response to several social problems in the periphery, we can say that there is much to be learned from the lack of attention and systematization, a recognized gap which this thesis attempts to help fill.

Milner's (2001: 395) account of Linda Colburn's foray beyond the conventional reaches of mediation and into realms of violence, sustains Colburn's self-described peacemaking 'other' side of practice as "a less formulaic, far more fluid, and far less frequently taught than generic mediation." Narrating her combined peacemaking and conflict intervention undertaking in "situations and settings that were vastly different from those usually emphasized in the traditional mediation movement," Milner's attempt to describe what happens

"when a mediator ventures away from [a] sheltered model" trying to "take seriously the idea that mediation can work in very violent situations and in situations in which it is hard to remain distant and neutral," finds itself in rather uncharted territory amongst community mediation literature.

While rare, this view nevertheless raises theoretical questions for arenas in which mediation practitioners engage in risky realities, something that Kolb (2001) admits can get very messy, straying from the many myths that constitute public understanding of mediation practice, which often runs along a binary of pragmatic or more transformative conceptualizations.[13]

The literature on the US street-worker model offers perhaps the most robust discussion and debate surrounding mediation and urban violence. The popularized 'violence-interrupter' model is based on epidemiological theoretical premises, and seeks to address "immediate causes of violence." Mediation here entails non-violent on-the-spot interventions with individuals or groups, to strategically engage and emotionally de-escalate those deemed at-risk of performing retaliatory violence (Kotlowitz, 2008). Here, the premise and practice of intervention, implies a view to preventing violence as a central, and collective interest or objective. In this way, mediation comes with a pre-established goal linked to violence, whereas the negotiation of one's non-participation in a violent act provides the data by which to measure mediation successful.

These initiatives, also now being exported for use in cities across the US and globally, consider mediation a formally or informally organized set of interventions wherein violence interrupter-agents de-escalate and prevent violence, based on their legitimacy and connections forged with targeted individuals. These interrupters receive training in mediation values, skills, and particular orientations to practice that assist them in their communicative activities and processes.

[13] Kolb's helpful attempt to reconcile the mythical 'art vs. science' debate is accomplished by a framing that captures "both the structured patterns implied in the science metaphor and the ad hoc quality alluded to in the art metaphor". While such accounts effectively extend the reach of mediation into new realms, violence typically remains outside the 'frame' of practice inquiry.

On the street, they hold the primary responsibility of *getting in the middle* of tensions involving community youth or gangs with regard to territorial issues, interpersonal antagonisms, re-entry conflicts amongst the ex-incarcerated and families, and homicides. Their primary goal, as one intervener observed, was "to squash [a problem] before it gets to gun play." While valiant and needed, this particular approach to prevention reflects the "aim of street- and gang-related violence as a way of thinking, and not a politico-economic phenomenon" (Skogan, et al., 2009: 3-16).

In a similar vein, Carstarphen and Shapira (1997) have outlined a non-crisis dialogue-oriented mediation model based on a third party problem-solving approach, for improving relations between gangs and police. Others have forwarded less structured or process-oriented, training-support, or ally-type models with community leaders to enhance and integrate formal theory and skills in mediation and negotiation with local knowledge, so as to enhance local mediator capacity in low income, high violence arenas (Schmueli, Warfield, and Kaufman, 2009). Together, such examples reflect a trend in the conceptual evolution away from conventional mediation uses and structures in resolving 'problems' that may not be suitable for direct face to face facilitated negotiations.

Engaging with urban violence locates the mediator role and purpose 'beyond the table,' setting skills in service of preventing direct and indirect violence through a variety of explicit and implicit goals. Nascent research in these areas points to the need for attention to adaptations, and possible impacts, when it comes to violence. In the US for example, reflections on these intervention practices in cities like Chicago and Boston, showed positive effects in decreasing rates of homicide through negotiations and breaking retaliation cycles (Whitehall, et al., 2013). Still, while some replication projects such as Baltimore's Safe Streets (Webster, et. al 2012; Whitehall, et al., 2012) reflected the trend, other neighborhoods demonstrated *increases* in rates, when controlling for street-mediation model projects (Wilson and Chermak, 2011).

In the US context, this has led Kennedy (2011) and Papachristos (2011) to argue that despite the celebrated impulses of these programs and

commendable high-stake risks undertaken by street-outreach workers or mediators, evaluations from the panorama of six surveyed US cities reveals mixed and sometimes *iatrogenic* impact, atop the relatively sparse evidence-based evaluations actually performed to date.

While Kennedy (2011) acknowledges the value of street-outreach workers who mediate conflict, his critiques center around the *way* these agents operate, addressing the touchstone challenges of building street-legitimacy, and sustaining strategic institutional *liminality* between gang members and strategic, external community actors (see also Lopez-Aguado, 2012). They remain disconnected from consideration of impact more broadly.[14]

Nevertheless, mediation is increasingly adopted within the context of urban violence in less conventional, more mobile, and less transactional ways in relation to gangs and in urban communities. Observations indicate that there is something brewing in the way that mediation is operationalized in urban environments, drawing a link between skills deployment *and* relationship building with key internal and external actors, and particularly in spaces of civic conflict wherein disaggregating or disentangling social, political, and economic dynamics of violence becomes more difficult (Thomas, Rodgers, and Beall, 2013).

Still, violence remains a target, if limited to direct and instrumental definitions. In this light, mediation becomes a tool used in responsive or reactionary ways, to address urgent tensions, escalation, and verbal or sometimes physical altercations. While the linkages between intervention into conflict, the phenomenon of violence, and social ordering become more clear, what remains murky is how agency is exercised in function of communicative action or related efforts in the face of a dispute, which may also have pro-active non-violent change repercussions *beyond a reduction in homicides*.

[14] In this debate, Kennedy (2011), for instance, points to fundamental role of evidence in guiding the development of programming, rather than simply replicating initiatives blindly in new spaces, which can have disastrous results. Where excitement over new possibilities creates the illusion of a quick fix, no single program has yet to provide the result of routine and reproducible public safety outcomes.

Researching third party conflict interventions -from community to commercial to international realms- has been historically challenging, since conventional mediation processes often rely on fundamental tenets such as confidentiality, in order to be effective. In theory, confidentiality provides 'safe' spaces in which antagonists dialogue and make decisions around sensitive and sometimes 'off limits' issues in the presence of trusted mediator figures, and away from the exposure, pressures, or risks posed by constituencies, intimates, or media.

In some ways, this has limited contributions to research from non-practitioner observers or data, narrowing analytical opportunities upon which to understand interactions amongst disputants and conflict interveners. Furthermore, whereas we know, for example, that initiatives like the Cease-Fire model (Skogan, et al., 2009), and gang-mediation training efforts (Cavitt, et al., 2013) employ distinct practice orientations in their training repertoire, comparative studies, systematic testing, critical evaluations, and a lively sector-specific debate around the interface of mediation and violence in urban settings, whether or not in a conflict or non-conflict setting, remains inadequate (Wall and Dunne, 2012).

Newest Wars

Violence and the scope of actors in Brazil share elements not uncommon to those of the "new" wars of the 1990s and 2000s. In these, as Kaldor (2001: 143) argues, "it is difficult to distinguish between political and economical, public and private, military and civilian [violence]". Moura's (2007) research posits periphery communities as the sites of the *newest wars*, based on the persistence of organized armed violence occurring in micro-spaces. Here, violence cannot simply be considered internal, labeled misguidedly as criminal activities without political dimensions.

Moura (2007) argues that if we "understand the impacts of these local phenomena in an international context, we see the emergence of new kinds of conflicts, disseminated on a global scale." Taking a broader view, a new geography of organized violence, subjects citizens to a "highly intense concentration of violence in very limited territories, or micro-territories (neighborhoods, urban communities, suburban zones), within a national context of apparent formal and institutionalized peace". Her classification draws

attention to the globally occurring phenomena of blurring the lines between traditional and rather *artificial* labeling of criminal vs. political conflicts, of intrastate nature.

This work, Moura (2005: 77-78) claims, aims to "analyze alternative and non-violent forms of prevention and transformation of conflict" or "*the newest peaces*," lifts up important discrepancies that are increasingly recognized as unhelpful by observers of international organized crime and conflict intervention scholars in contemplating strategies and interventions where violence arises at the nexus of unresolved and inseparable political and social conflict dimensions (see FDFA, 2013; Wennmann, 2013, 2014; Whitfield, 2010, 2013; Cockayne, 2013).

Empirical data from Florianópolis suggests that the work of mediators who engage with conflicts and actors in this context is inseparable from the co-production and shaping of everyday community life. These actors find themselves, therefore, if unwittingly, at the nexus of Moura's micro-territorial wars, engaging routinely with decision-making of key actors (traffickers, organized crime leaders, state authorities, and non-state unarmed residents) when it comes to their contributions to the local social order.

In light of the *newest* wars, exploring the convergence of these themes in Brazil's peripheries challenges us to understand the emergent role and impact of mediators with respect to peacebuilding and violence. In this way, research about how mediators and mediation practices engage with violent actors and thus impact social ordering in space characterized by violence, can lend significantly to understanding of conflict transformation and intervention practices in new contexts.

Nevertheless, existing research about community mediators' engagement with violence remains limited. In the following section, I draw upon data and analysis published in Portuguese- and English-language academic articles and books, Brazilian Ministry of Justice reports, NGO program descriptions, internal and external evaluations and related research, to examine mediation efforts in periphery communities. I argue that while existing mediation initiatives in Brazil's

peripheries espouse worthy and well-intentioned goals, their ideological emphasis and practices for resolving interpersonal conflicts is incongruent with their claims about mediation's change potential.

Critical assessments of community mediation have yet to be taken up with vigor by Brazilian practitioners or scholars outside the legal sector, remaining scarce in light of violence overall. The 'too big to fail' evaluations of urban 'street-worker' violence interrupter mediation/intervention models offer the most robust or perhaps sector-specific assessments. Like conventional approaches to mediation, however, major initiatives like Chicago's Cease Fire define violence rather narrowly, as a contagious, epidemiological phenomenon (Skogan, et al, 2009; Mazadoorian, 2009), rather than accounting for some of the discussions in the previous section. This leaves much of what we know about violence and its pernicious reproductions unaccounted for with respect to urban conflict intervention practices.

Problematizing Intervention Practices

Dominant ideologies that ground institutional mediation practices typically conceptualize violence, intimidation or threats as 'non-negotiable' precepts, rendering settlement or resolution processes involving them either a non-starter, or ineffective. The logic undergirding this contends that mediators cannot ethically engage in, craft or facilitate processes wherein the ability of parties to make sound, non-coerced decisions, based on tenets of good faith and self-determination, is compromised.

In part, dominant mediation logic and orientations operate on the assumption of a socially blind, blank slate, whereby an implicit reliance on individual agency suggests that a technically-sound, facilitated dialogue or negotiation can effectively address challenges such as communication issues, material incongruencies or relational disatisfactions, upon which conflict has emerged. In a context of violence, where sources of insecurity shape decisions, behaviors, and approaches to navigation and negotiations in everyday scenarios, disputes that arise within such environment require a distinct view, as few can participate in processes like self-determined decision-making or direct communication without other implications. As Chapter 3 discusses, violence thus informs the

way people develop options and pathways for addressing, achieving, or resolving explicit and implicitly meaningful issues.

Penglase (2014: 6) contends that multiple forms of violence present in everyday life exist for families in favela communities, who experience a deeply contradictory and ambivalent social universe, at once safe, dangerous, familiar and unpredictable in their exposure to cross-fire amongst or between gangs and police. Despite this consistency, generations of residents locate pride in their survival and progress.

The complicated nature of social ordering and local power dynamics, characterized by deep insecurity and vulnerability, must be accounted for in the context of understanding interventions into antagonistic social relations. To this environment, residents respond, Penglase (2014: 7) has observed, by "emphasizing creativity, improvisation, and the ability to carve out zones of temporary autonomy and pleasure while not engaging in potentially costly battle with larger and more powerful structures of authority".

The tactics they use often "complicates answers to a series of dichotomous questions… about whether favela residents accept or reject violence, whether they cooperate with drug traffickers or are coerced into assisting them, seem to miss the point" (Penglase, 2014: 7). Left to their own devices, Penglase's research in Rio advocates the utility of learning from the way that residents adapt social tactics to navigate daily life where criminal and social violence converge. A recent International Alert Report (2013: 4-6) advocates for parallel and similarly unorthodox approach to understanding criminal violence from a *conflict* perspective, given the benefit of bringing together tools from diverse sectors:

> "Even though we as peacebuilders have not traditionally focused directly on criminal actors, we have developed and piloted conceptual frameworks to deal with conventional types of conflicts which will add insight into the motivations and identity issues behind criminal violence. Understanding criminal violence from a conflict perspective can therefore open new and innovative ways of addressing it".

Despite intimate linkages I observed between patterns of violence and insecurity and residents' disputing experiences, existing community mediation services in Brazil's peripheries, for the most part, serve to target distinct objectives than those of violent power dynamics, threats, intimidation, and social conflict. Despite this, the broader discourse and claims employed by legal and mediation professionals to market mediation's use by residents, tend suggest mediation as a prevention toolin this regard - not only for preventing violence, but also in terms of improving social relations.

Such a framing operates on a a set of implicit assumptions, including that people will use violence to achieve their interests or goals during a conflict, suggesting that an overt conflict must exist in order for mediated interventions to be effective or useful. It also prioritizes and understands a particular dimension of direct violence, and similarly requires parties involved in a conflict to initiate contact with a mediator in order to initiate the involvement of an intervener. While some of this may be effective, a significant gap in recognition and analysis using a more robust view to violence remains.

Similarly, conventional interpersonal mediation models widely view the concepts of conflict, violence, and resolution in the context of community mediation through a lens that relies more readily on the ability of mediators to work with key issues of miscommunication and unmet interests, involving greater or lesser degrees of emotional or material content. To address these, third parties use creative, mutually rewarding, interest-oriented negotiation processes. Such approaches are not necessarily designed to treat, seek or pry into, nor account for (and thus shy away from) ways in which violence, power, or experiences of insecurity may shape a dispute or a relationship fraught with tension.

While these facilitated processes can offer valuable pathways for resolution of interpersonal disputes, they offer limited and narrow windows throughw which to gain understanding about local conflict dynamics and possibilities for third party intervention beyond what such conventional models offer. Discussions about how power or violence instigates, aggravates, or shapes and generates outcomes, or what impact mediators have on them, are rarely part of practitioner reflections within existing Brazilian literature. This is particularly

absent where *a priori* models of mediation practice and case intake narrowly define what issues are realistically negotiable by third parties.

This absence of violence as a dimension of conflict analysis that can inform conflict intervention and negotiation practices, effectively problematizes the notion of conflict's mediation in the periphery context. This is particularly salient for practitioners, given Pearce's (2013b) observations that

> "People often think of 'power' as belonging at the centre and 'violence' to the edges or the social margins. Such thinking reflects our yearning for order and ordering and the assumptions we make about the nature of order and disorder. Our urge to order can, however, become dangerous when we work in situations of complex disorder. It can blind our understanding. Our social peripheries are also expressions, of the ordering processes at the centre.
>
> On these edges, life is experienced intensely and in great insecurity as people struggle for the material and emotional sources of survival. For practitioners who work in such areas, there are multiple challenges, but perhaps the first one is to deal with the ordering which has constructed their own worldviews. Such an ordering is itself an outcome of the way power constructs our subjectivity. The practitioner must first see her or himself as subject to and sometimes participant in the ordering processes, which lead some to feel lesser than others. Behind the ordering processes is power."

Pearce's observation about the interconnectedness of practitioners and the nature of social ordering in complex social spaces reinforces this chapter's contention that that existing practices of mediation observed in the periphery fall short of a critical dimension of engagement when dealing with conflict and disputes. Despite a clearly outlined observation of remarkable challenges and conscious areas for contemplation, the symbiotic relationship of conflict resolution practitioners and environments of complex social order have been relatively unexplored vis-à-vis empirical research.

The State of Community Mediation in Brazil

Across the country, in state judiciaries, as well as professional, legal, commercial associations and NGOs, have partnered to pioneer legal aid and extra-judicial dispute resolution in urban periphery and favela neighborhoods. The last official state mapping of Brazil's community mediation programs

registered 67 centers providing services, thirty-three of which identified as purely state-sponsored for mediation purposes, with 27 of those being "partnership-administered". Another 32 centers of this total offering mediation as well as other diverse and specialized NGO activities, with two identifying as internal-university programs (Ministerio da Justiça, 2005: 21-27; Ministerio da Justiça, 2008; Sales, 2006). A smaller 2014 government research project on access-to-justice in Brazil placed the diverse services NGO category at 44, showing an increase of about one per year over a ten-year period (Acessoajustica.gov.br, 2014).

These programs use mediation to promote access to justice as a manner of strengthening citizenship and empowerment for periphery and *favela* residents (Bomfim, Duarte, and Duarte, 2005, Malchow-Vedana, 2003). With origins in the mid 1990s, community-based justice and mediation programs began in part to respond to Brazil's transitional institutional crisis, sustained in part through utterly inaccessible or discriminatory interpersonal interactions with state institutions and agents, particularly in law enforcement and judicial system (Ministerio da Justiça, 2008).

Mediation services in periphery communities often co-exist with legal-aid services, and increasingly with youth violence reduction activities (Santos, et al., 2011). These services may include rights education and citizenship-building activities, case referral services to mental health institutions, citizen defense, social service offices, or formal judicial services where issues are deemed inappropriate under the purview of mediation.

Where community mediation projects in the city of Belo Horizonte (MG) have begun to link mediation to violence and criminality prevention, theoretical discussions have emerged around themes that include gender violence, *machismo*, and masculinities in the context of incidences and negative effects of crime and violence, as well "strengthening protection factors" (see Santos et al., 2011; Brettas and Almeida de Morais, 2009). Whereas these issues are widely discussed in Brazil, efforts that tie them into periphery-based mediation service-areas are yet few and far between.

Still, these examples frame violence primarily as a phenomenon that originates within communities, or focused on, and limited to, localized impact or effects of criminality, where mediation goes "in search of the reduction of vulnerabilities and confrontations with violence, implemented in regions with high levels of criminal violence" (Santos, et al., 2011: 13). The aim here is "to diminish criminality and its effects by focusing on reversing risk factors," through which community mediation is seen as a primary violence prevention strategy (Comissão Técnica, 2011: 2). While merited, this nevertheless poses a limited view to the phenomenon of violence itself, or an accounting of social patterns and forces that help sustain and reproduce it.

Questionable Claims

The service-delivery model through which mediation is provided by the judiciary seeks to proactively offer informal mechanisms and channels through which citizens can access officially sanctioned justice and judicial outcomes to their conflicts. The accompanying discourse of these efforts proffer rather lofty claims. Promotional and scholarly literature discussing these initiatives refer often to citizenship, democracy, social networks, and transformation alike. By way of example, a Ministério da Justiça (2008: 11) report stated for instance that

> "A variety of Community Justice centers are being implemented and strengthened in all regions of the country, with the objective of promoting social cohesion, solidarity, promotion of peace through activities that provide information, community mediation, and stimulate social networks. This offers a concrete contribution toward the inclusion of millions of Brazilians that still find themselves on the margins of the Justice System".

Evaluators note that coherency amongst claims, practices, and measurable outcomes, however, based on internal and external evaluator standpoints, is not replete, and may thus pose more questions than answers (Mendonça, 2005; Selem, 2010). Whereas the judiciary's intentions remain clear about how they use mediation in periphery communities, the adoption of concepts that mediation is claimed to promote, including social cohesion, promotion of peace, etc., clearly express expectations about mediation's potential to promote peace and social transformation around target populations.

These draw upon social change premises linked to still contentious debates in community mediation movements in North America and Europe beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Such claims have been adopted in Brazil with little to no evident, or culturally-relative theories about change, nor data on which to back them up.[15] That is, studies and evaluations about mediation practices suggest that these rely almost exclusively on satisfying more narrowly-conceived aspects of a much deeper set of rights violations that have historically been enabled or produced by public policies. Still, these effort focus little to no attention on 'social' impact when it comes to major issues on residents' agendas in terms of insecurity and contemporary violence in the context of their everyday lives communities.

Critiques regarding differential ideologies (see Bush and Folger, 1994; Folger 2008) and mediation as a form of social control asserted by early scholars and critics of community mediation substantiate what Schoeny and Warfield (2001: 264), highlight as a "thin" notion of democracy wherein "systems maintenance" is "uninformed by a vision of social justice" falling prey to practices that uphold citizenship as constructed around a series of self-interested bargains. Common to such initiatives are assumed premises of mediation dynamics to

> "Strengthen social ties through the way they operate through, for, and within the very community, transforming conflict into an opportunity to sew a new social fabric. In community mediation, the community produces and utilizes local knowledge for the resolution of problems that affect it. The community opens a channel through which to 'give community answers to community problems' (Ministerio da Justiça, 2008: 57).

Creating a new social fabric often fails the 'hope lines' test (CDA, 2013: 16), as individual level activities intend, but fail alone, to create change at the much needed socio-political level. Well-intentioned efforts may ultimately disappoint when it comes to reaching changes anticipated, due to inadequately developed

[15] One subtle exception (see Sales, 2005) contends that despite the innovation of geographically locating mediation services in periphery neighborhoods, and training of local volunteer mediators, efforts remain individually oriented and are rarely discussed or analyzed through a collective prism or inferences to structural change.

theories of change. As the Reflecting on Peace Practices (RPP) research (CDA, 2011: 16) asserts,

> "Assuming linkages does not mean they will happen. Many programs assume that certain activities in the individual-personal realm will lead to changes in the socio-political realm. For example, they may assume that dialogue or training that results in changes in attitudes, reduction of stereotypes, skills, or development of relationships amongst program participants will lead automatically to changes in the socio-political realm, such as changed inter-group relationships, better negotiation processes, advocacy on key issues related to the conflict, collective support or advocacy for peace processes, etc. The activities are at the individual personal level, but the ultimate goal is at the socio-political level. We call these linkages «hope lines» because the linkage is based on a hope or assumption that the socio-political changes will occur. The challenge here is how to fill in the missing programmatic steps that would link the initial activities to the socio-political goal."

For instance, the Belo Horizonte project's community mapping initiative provided data by which to classify structural, social, and personal conflicts for 'empowerment' and 'mediation' purposes. A community mapping effort revealed an interesting array of 'difficulties' faced by communities, including unemployment, illiteracy, lack of basic sanitation, lack of health clinics and schools, domestic violence, homeless children, organized crime, youth gangs, alcoholism, school absenteeism, crimes, child abuse, psychological problems, amongst others. These forms of violence, according to the report, comprise a useful mosaic upon which to guide or stimulate collective reflection about individual circumstances (Comissão Técnica, 2010). Based on this effort, conflict intervention activities were tied into awareness building activities, but appear to be decoupled from any further considerations about mediation or strategic intervention process design.

As Mendonça (2005: 61) observes, the *Casas de Mediação Comunitária do Estado do Ceará* promotes its mission as 'promoting social peace' with the objective of resolving conflicts through mediators. This program claims mediation as an interpersonal violence prevention mechanism, as well as a channel for the exercise of citizenship, where mediation of conflicts contributes to improving the lives of people and reducing social exclusion experienced by

residents by acting incisively in the management of conflict. In the federal capital of Brasilia, another example defines contributions combining activities of rights education, mediation and conflict transformation (Ministerio da Justiça, 2011). Mediation here is defined as

> "an important tool for the promotion of empowerment and social emancipation. Parties have a chance to reflect about the context of their problems and understand the differences in each other's perspectives, allowing for the chance to construct a mutual solution that can guarantee social pacification for the future".

Training 'community agents' is a way for these programs to operate democratically. Describing their rationale for employing and training citizens as mediators, one report contends that these activities promote social inclusion and active citizenship based on local knowledge. In this way, individuals erect their social relations and can participate more actively in political decision-making. In this scenario, capacities of citizens' self-determination are exercised, along with the appropriation of one's active engagement in their own history (Ministerio da Justiça, 2008: 27). Nevertheless, no systematic depiction of where or how local knowledge has been integrated into these endeavors is elaborated.

Similarly, the term conflict transformation is used to offer an opportunity for building social networks of solidarity amongst those who might share common problems. One report assumingly claimed that transformation had not theretofore been enabled, because citizens did not organize due to the fact that they do not communicate; activities aspired therefore to transform fragmented communities into open spaces for the development of dialogue, self-determination, solidarity, and peace (Ministerio da Justiça, 2008: 24). The myriad of implicit assumptions made within the project logic, as well as the deficiency of concrete pathways about how to integrate 'local knowledge,' categorically dismiss contextual dynamics that impact upon the way that citizens interact, organize, and navigate local conflicts.

Technical Models and Ideological Divergence

As noted earlier, orientations to technical mediation practices tend to depart from an understanding of conflict that is relationally oriented, rather than structural or cultural. The emphasis on miscommunication and failure to cooperate, rather than issues of power or violence, assumes to promote a vaguely defined notion of social change. That is, disputes are mediated according to the presumption that facilitating conversation and creative problem-solving can be an individually *empowering* process that will resonate and somehow unleash social transformation, promoting violence prevention in spaces of historic exclusion through mere participation.

Relying on conflict analysis that fails to consider power effectively misses the everydayness of violence that becomes embedded in social scripts of periphery life at the nexus of relational, cultural, and structural interactions. Third party intervention researchers like Cobb (1997), have used this argument to critique mediation as a process that 'domesticates' violence, developing the idea that rights related to violence are effectively subsumed by a dominant mediation morality whereby interveners are compelled to pursue satisfaction of interests over the materialization of rights infused with violent experiences. Similarly, Sibley and Merry's (1986) research emphasized the cunning engineering by which community mediators reinterpreted statements of conflict parties into 'morally neutral' terms while 'postponing' others, raising significant questions around their complicity in ironing over injustice and negating power within the process.

By way of example in Brazil, Vezzulla (2011: 44), a highly influential mediation scholar and practitioner across the country, distinguishes between what he terms the liberal mediation 'settlement' model linked to the interest-based bargaining model of the Harvard School, and the "responsible mediation" of Bush and Folger's (1994) transformative orientation. While the former draws upon positivism and rational actor logic, the latter is based on a humanist orientation. Still others adopt a social-constructivist underpinning in the development of intervention practices (see Winslade and Monk, 2008). Philosophical premises that give rise to practice orientations are trans-mutated into distinctly instructed skills-sets and process guidance, which in turn shape

the way practitioners make claims about social impact of their work.

As Vezzulla (2011: 44) writes, instead of supporting power plays or moves for individual gain, mediators' work is instead to encourage collaboration: "to endeavor toward the parties' deepening of their motivations. Through active listening, parties are able to produce recognition between each other. In this way, they integrate these motivations (unsatisfied needs) as a common problem, so that neither attacks, nor cedes to a solution, but rather that all motivations are contemplated". Thus, mediation under Bush and Folger's (1994) empowerment and recognition framework is seen as a learning process through which it is assumed that parties will develop tools with which individuals can address future incidents. In this way, Vezzulla (2011: 45) contends

> "Responsible mediation produces emancipation because it develops capacities in the parties for which they can, departing from this experience, utilize the concepts of mediation to dialogue and resolve any future problem. This emancipation produces an expansive effect in the community that eventually incorporates a relational form of participation, responsibility, dialogue, cooperation and solidarity that permits them to self-manage in the attention to their conflicts and future planning. The important piece is that this slow change is not accomplished through a colonizing nor imposed way, but rather with the development that they already posses and choose in preferring cooperation over confrontation or violence".

Here, Vezzulla makes a common, albeit unfounded presumption of transferability, suggesting also that change and 'emancipation' occurs with greater collective impact over time through the eventual interactions amongst disputing parties who adopt mediation's values and principles. This rather lofty 'by-osmosis' logic, which he also admits has yet to occur "despite many years of mediation in effect," is broadly folded into the claims fostered by Brazil's community mediation programs.

These views also take little account of how local interactions amongst periphery residents, traffickers, and/or state authorities help to construct, deconstruct, escalate, or mitigate conflict or the power exercised through social ordering processes. In this way, as Neves (2009: 492) has argued, an individualzing focus may

> "Run the risk of neglecting structural (social, cultural, and economic) elements.

> In a most extreme case, a mediation session could amount to nothing but a bubble in a suspended reality, a communicative fiction between strangers with an insuperable distance between them. It is in this way that mediation could be instrumental to the neoliberal trend that demands individual—but often impossible or sterile—responsibility.

In my own research site visits to mediation programs in both periphery and non-periphery communities in cities that include Rio, Curitiba, and Florianópolis, the widespread bibliographical influence of Dr. Vezzulla's work, particularly given his stature as a bilingual author, was clear to note. His work has helped to shape both technical repertoires and administrative capacity building efforts nation wide. Using this as an example, we can see how extrapolating the effects of a narrow set of inputs has shaped the way that community mediation has developed. This, in part, offers one example of how an incomplete set of assumptions regarding intervention practices, found the claims and approaches taken up by community mediation protagonists in Brazil.

Given the clearly incongruent connections between practice claims and impacts, the chapter now considers the underlying ideologies (and critiques) that have shaped conflict intervention models. Moving from the international sphere to the arguably more robust, Portuguese language literature that draws from ADR and community mediation fields, I explore the influence of ideologies and their shaping of existing services, which make little room for social change possibilities in rather complicated contexts.

Here, I argue that the ideological thrust of third party interverntion practices like mediation in periphery communities, some of which clearly claim transformative ends, predominantly emphasize an unfounded link between *individual* growth and social transformation. This suggests an incongruence between practices and discourse related to *collective* impact or social change possibilities.

Broadly speaking, Harrington and Merry's (1988) ethnographic study of community mediators in North America have found three ideological projects of mediation: service delivery, social transformation, and personal growth. As service-delivery, mediation heralds an informal, extra-judicial practice that responds to unresponsive, slow, costly or inefficient systems. This is perhaps

the most predominant reason for which community justice initiatives[16] in Brazil, and indeed globally, initially adopted and continue to explore possibilities of community mediation.

The social transformation ideology, on the other hand, contemplates a re-structuring of policies, procedures, and power-arrangements, envisioned in relation to the establishment of community-based efforts to peacefully and efficiently resolve conflicts without the need for state intervention (see also Warhaftig, 2004). The notion of popular justice thus informed community mediation movement protagonists to "reshape society and to give greater power over the handling of their conflicts to relatively powerless people" (Merry and Milner, 1993: 9). This movement can be located in what Pearce (2013a: 642) describes in her useful critique of empowerment based on individualizing ends:

> "The post-1960s 'new social movements' were much less centralized in their leadership than previous people's organizations as they involved historically marginalized sectors which trade unions and Left political parties, for instance, had failed to engage. The notion of empowerment of the powerless grew out of the awakening of these new social actors. Feminists, in particular, made an appeal to take account of the corrosive, 'disempowering' impact on subjectivities of long-term marginalization which required a '(re)empowerment' to liberate suppressed agency."

Premises of popular justice initiatives ranging from China in the 1950s to Cuba's post-revolutionary theater of justice and Portugal's societal transformations after the 1974 Carnation Revolution, and adoption of performances like Theater of the Oppressed, are examples of ways that subordinate groups could structure access and control over their lives, highly influential to the growth of the movement (Merry and Milner, 1993: 8). In the North American context, Harrington and Merry (1988: 715) observed that "talk of community empowerment, the creation of a new sense of community through self-governance or neighborhood control, decentralized judicial decision-making, and the substitution of community members for professional dispute resolvers".

These efforts were not, however, without their critics. While the "American version… had a characteristically American flair [emphasizing] individuals

[16] Not to be confused with indigenous justice or pluralist movements.

achieve full personhood and a stress on the expression of feelings as a way of resolving conflicts," Merry and Milner (1993) asserted that these did not challenge hegemony such as the state or state law. Whereas the Cuban, Chilean, Chinese, and Portuguese popular justice experiments were those in which "informalism was harnessed to the task of reshaping society according to a new, revolutionary vision" (Harrington and Merry, 1988: 716), the now highly-exported American experiment may have, at best, offered a 'persistent critique' or even subverted state law "by constructing a cultural space - an alternative justice that is more responsive to community desires" (Merry and Milner, 1993: 9). Nevertheless,

> "[u]nless it establishes a base of power outside the state legal system, popular justice is more likely to entrench and reinforce social changes already occurring in other segments of society or to consolidate changes accomplished through other forms of political transformation. A significant shift in relations of power and a substantially empowered local community seem beyond the possibilities of popular justice" (Merry and Milner, 1993: 9).

This would point to an important critique in the argument or claims made by Brazilian community mediation organizers and protagonists, who draw upon the social transformation language to substantiate their claims, despite clear origins in a service-delivery ideology, which result in technical models of practice that emphasize *personal/individual* empowerment and growth.

While proclaiming social transformation, these programs more realistically describe their impact in individualizing or interpersonal, rather than larger social or collective terms. Absent an influx of discussions regarding power and violence, or a broader reach of practices to engage with public concerns such as power holding, violence wielding actors or other structurally generated conflicts, limits these claims in real terms. As Pavlich's (1996b: 729) study on the political logic of community mediation concluded*,*

> "contrary to most mediation advocates, the search for empowered individuals within communities is unlikely to offer an alternative to the power relations of existing dispute resolution arenas. So long as community mediation is enlisted in the service of individual dispute settlement, the self-identities it tries to fashion are likely to perpetuate – rather than eradicate – the liberal,

> governmental power formations that nurture particular conflicts in the first place".

Pavlich (1996b: 729) argues thus, that mediation will thus "always lean toward restoration rather than fundamental change," where dispute settlement orientation and goals exist in an undefined or 'unspecified community order'. That is, whereas mediation is observed as an agency-driven process requiring the embodiment of a role that shapes both individuals and social interactions, it may not have larger resonance. Pearce's (2013a: 651) exploration of non-dominating power (explored in Chapter 7) offers a useful and complementary way of thinking about power in this regard, citing the "distinction between affecting (to act on something) and effecting (to bring about) … that to affect something or somebody but not effect anything is not an exercise of power, and it is the latter which matters most".

In what way then, if any, are experiences of violence, or its patterns and reproductions that shape local life and disputes, implicated in individual or collective change-making efforts vis-à-vis the repertoire of local mediative, or conflict intervention practices? In other words, what can we learn by examining the nexus of mediation as a third party practice, and the nature of violence when it comes to impacting social forces that are seen to help reproduce the very phenomenon? To begin to answer these questions, I turn back to third party intervention literature in order to detect potentially of existing models and their inclinations for generating change in this regard.

Conflict Intervention Models and Change

Intervention models in general have been critiqued for their lack attention to the at-large complexities that phenomena such as culture, gender, and emotion present with respect to how practices are carried out. This is particularly evident in the critiques leveled on international third party intervention models for with respect to addressing social and political change, albeit particularly so in the realm of intra-state conflict scenarios (Abu-Nimer, 1999; also see Kelman and Warwick, 1973; Kelman, 1972; Fisher (1980).

Augsburger (1992) and Abu-Nimer (1999) have critiqued Problem-Solving (PS) workshops and contact-theory-based initiatives along emic/etic lines, noting that while useful in some contexts, their emphasis on individual and psychosocial levels fails to deal effectively with power or impacts at the macro-structural level. This, in turn de-links third party intervention endeavors from realistic change-making possibilities given the influentiable conditions that sustain sources of conflict or violence.

Amongst the most practical of these considers the obstacles involved when participants who may have made important personal transformations toward antagonists in the isolated environment must face challenges in fostering change amongst leaders or constituencies in the perceptions about the enemy or conflict back home (see Rupsinghe, 1995).

Some of this can be traced back to underlying theories of practice. Dialogical-analytical approaches of the PS workshops borrow from Game Theory and Burton's (1987; 1990) use of Human Needs theory, both of which fail to tackle essential questions around the role of culture, social structure, and power more generally (Scimecca, 1993: 213). One of the central critiques in discussing the nature of "satisfaction" in a process is, "where do needs come from" (Avruch and Black, 1987; Avruch, 1998)? This question has particular resonance for those intervening in the midst of environments of chronic violence, wherein needs satisfaction, as well as violence, are not necessarily on display, nor experienced as neatly identifiable, or categorizably 'resolvable' ways.

Scimecca (1993) offers Weberian social conflict theory, for which the root cause of conflict manifests around unequal power distributions, as a way for practitioners to overcome theory-deficit of ADR practices, and its potential use as a form of social control. This is made possible by shifting away from ADR's positing of miscommunication as a primary source of conflict. This in turn shaped technical development of intervention practices in mediation, rather than an effort based on an engagement with power and social order as an implicitly understood source of conflict (Duke, 1976; Scimecca, 1993).

While international approaches such as PS workshop-interventions engaged parties experiencing intractable conflict scenarios, Scimecca (1993: 271) cogently observes that by contrast, ADR is used for conflicts that are

> "organizational, industrial, matrimonial, communal, environmental… which do not involve widespread violence, confrontations with authorities or defiance of legal norms. These conflicts limit the role of the third party to helping conduct discussion and to pointing out the misunderstandings in communication that arise".

Unlike the PS workshop, the models of practice under the ADR heading, particularly the skills, processes, and capacities employed by those involved in community mediation practice, were not designed to engage with the phenomena of power and violence. The subsequent, albeit sparse, development of orientations that began to shape mediation practices have accomplished what Scimecca (1993: 219) has called "shifting the locus of resolution onto justice." This has made power an explicit part of the process, wherein the third party "would always consider the role of power along with possessing an obligation to point out where and when the unequal distribution of power might force the weaker party to settle (Scimecca, 1993: 281). These views, however, do not inform community mediation practices existing today in Brazil's periphery.

Practices of mediation that are built around this orientation include nuanced technical orientations including social justice mediation (Wing, 2008) and narrative mediation approaches (Cobb, 1993, 1997; Winslade and Monk, 2008, 2010), both of which critique conventional problem-solving facilitative models' precepts as based on the commitment to positivist ideals (such as mediator neutrality), which can be found "at the core of the hegemonic paradigm permeating mediation literature and practice in the United States" (Wing, 2008: 95).

In practice, this means that mediators treat disputants equally despite an unequal playing field, carry unassuming consequences in theoretical or practice terms for justice, with resounding practical implications for individuals, including the ways in which "mediation can prevent or undermine structural changes

based on precedent-setting legal decisions" (Wing, 2008: 97). These modalities of mediation practice are relatively unknown or misunderstood, and infrequently or rarely adapted into formal mediation programming particularly in state-driven ADR initiatives. Even in mediation-replete contexts such as northern Europe and North America, such orientations inform a tiny minority of programs.

ADR and Community Mediation

From the outset, it should be noted that despite the "unlimited progress" asserted by Hedeen's (2004) observation of a lack of studies about social change potential of mediation, well over a decade ago, community mediation *remains* a field supported by extremely limited research. Charkoudian and Billick's (2015: 272) review of the literature ten years on, found a significant lack about social impact with regard to empowerment and social change:

> "There has been no subsequent research on this question. Quantifying or even qualifying an impact of any program on broader societal dynamics is challenging. As a result, most of the research that attempts to examine the impact of community mediation on broader societal dynamics falls short of this goal. Instead, it examines community mediation partnerships, services, and impacts on individuals. While these connections and results are significant, it is important not to confuse these with conclusions about broader societal impact".

For as long as mediation has existed as an organized practice, critics have fiercely debated the nature of ADR and community mediation as informal mechanisms of second-class justice. While individually empowering on the one hand, mediation has also been viewed as way for the state to extend their reach into the community to control and order, through a deceptively subtle, yet widely popularized ideology of empowerment that effectively masks Foucault's double-bind (1982: 216; cited in Pavlich, 1996b: 729).

In this way, Pavlich (1996a) suggests that mediation itself orders through techniques of discipline of self toward the 'restoration' of harms, and control over potential for disputes to 'interrupt,' or bring about forms of change. Echoeing this, scholars from the US and UK have argued that community mediation as a mechanism of informal justice is delivered as a form of social control (Mulcahy, 2001; Scimecca, 1991; Abel 1982a, 1982b; Bayley, 1973; Merry, 1989; Merry and Milner, 1995; Leibmann, 2008).

Nevertheless, both ADR and Community mediation practices are widely celebrated for their premise and promises of individual and community empowerment, the possibility of 'popular justice,' and instigating pragmatic institutional reform. Mediation critics have pondered mediation's viability to serve the ends of popular justice, contending that while its possibilities reside "as an ideal only in societies that already have state law… popular justice is promoted as an alternative to the violence and coercion of state law" (Merry and Milner, 1995: 3). Still the question remains whether the "ambiguities of authority, procedure, ideology, and practice inherent in constructing an oppositional justice within a state-dominated legal system make popular justice a practical impossibility" (Merry and Milner, 1995: 3)?

Research about mediation's impact vis-à-vis empowerment is not removed from critiques of international third party intervention models. Comparing the way that social theorists and early mediation theorists discussed empowerment, Schwerin (1995: 78) found that "the mediation writers mention political awareness, political participation, and political rights in only half the cases". Mediation writers emphasized "psychological and social aspects of empowerment" where the primary concern is with personal psychological transformation and not with developing political awareness. Most of the mediation theorists do not link individual conflicts with a political analysis of deep-rooted societal causes" (Schwerin, 1995: 78). Pavlich's (1996a) study of community mediation programs similarly critiques individual empowerment as a concept that "entrenches" forms of state regulation.

By way of example, the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB) program[17] was critiqued for incoherent and ambiguous results in this fundamental pillar of their practice and ideology. In the 1970s, SFCB's social re-design efforts and collective empowerment premises focused more on "mediation as a practice rather than on popular justice and democratic empowerment" as they had "not located its mediation offerings within an analytic framework that challenges

[17] SFCB founder and leader Ray Shonholtz, played a fundamental role in the global proliferation and US-export of Community Mediation and ADR up until his death in 2012, through his organization Partners for Democratic Change, which also heavily promoted justice reforms through technical advising through USAID contracts in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

hegemony" (Thomson and Dubow, 1993: 196).

Despite SFCB's continuing reputation as a beacon and symbolically successful operations, their work in realizing this vision was critiqued as having ambiguous results, ultimately failing to achieve political empowerment (Thomson and Dubow, 1993: 196). Recognized as a leading actor in the global community mediation movement, SFCB remained rather insular from other new populist organizations. As critics noted, networking could have "benefited from the combination of macro level analysis of issues and strategies of collective and direct action with the mobilizing ideology, the empowering technology, and the overall respectability of community mediation" (Thomson and Dubow, 1993: 197).

Mulcahy's (2001) critiques of informalism underpin her argument that mediators might best serve as 'message-bearers' between state and community from one world or another, which incidentally reflects some of the views expressed by periphery mediators discussed in the following chapter. Mulcahy's argument cites overinflated ideological claims by informal mediation programs according to their assumptions of power to 'heal' communities, while removing the state from disputing processes. Here, informalism encourages "further suppression of the disadvantaged and reinforces existing inequalities between disputants" (Mulcahy, 2001: 139), whereby informal dispute management facilitates the 'offloading' of cases considered trivial by the state, ultimately disallowing formal precedent to be set (often referred to by critics as mediation's role in service second class, or cheap justice; see Abel, 1982).

This, Mulcahy (2001: 139) writes, is "significant since proponents of mediation have used the rhetoric of egalitarianism to justify their more conciliatory approaches to disputes… because of their informality". Informalism thus increases the risk of unfair discrimination, and oppression through its "appealing rhetoric of voluntarism, popular justice, and individual empowerment [which] disguises coercion" (Mulcahy, 2001: 140). In a structural re-organization, the US trend toward community mediation's co-optation by state institutions suggests a formal 'threat of coercive action by the state [as] a shadow in many neighborhood mediation sessions" (Coy and Hedeen, 2005). Observations of

community conflict along this line are significant because intervention that seeks to treat them effectively

> "serves to underplay the conflicts between powerful and less powerful groups in society, such as social landlords and impoverished tenants. Disagreement about social and political values does not feature as a dominant issue. Informalism can have the effect of siphoning discontent from the courts and in doing so reduces the risk of political confrontation. The result is the preservation of the stability of the social system" (Mulcahy, 2001: 142).

Challenges to mediation's social impact are elevated when the state is implicated in underlying causes or catalysts for disputes. This has particularly relevant implications for 'inner city' issues (Mulcahy, 2001, citing Liebmann, 1997), since framing complaints about administrative policies "as disputes between neighbors, the state avoids direct challenges about the quality of its social housing and social services" (Mulcahy, 2001: 143). Critical views to these practices emphasize the lack of macro-level analysis, which neither the design of international or 'domestic' conflict intervention models account for with any diligence, at least not as robustly as their ideological and theoretical underpinnings suggest.

Viva Rio's Balcões de Direitos

Of the more well known community mediation initiatives in Rio de Janeiro's periphery neighborhoods were the *Balcões de Direitos* or 'Rights-Desk' program, in which the NGO *Viva Rio* partnered with the state to offer legal aid and mediation services to *favela* residents. A significant number of conflicts treated by these services revolved around property claims, precarious construction, and poor infrastructure, which are generally complicated given the nature of illegal construction, un-regulated zoning, and un-enforced codes (Ribeiro and Strozenberg, 2001).

Despite the popularity of these programs, internal evaluations found that their reach was rather limited when it came to resolution of issues, as many cases had to be referred to other agencies located physically outside of the community. This posed paradoxical and contradictory access problems for users (Davis, 2001), while other evaluations revealed efforts to take on

assistentialist tendencies, in counter to the emancipatory and empowering promises being claimed (Isoldi, 2008).

As Selem's (2010) research observed, prior to the *Balcão*, local disputes sourced from unregulated urbanization meant that judges had to take one of two risks: 1) to decide upon solutions that would follow the letter of the law, rendering *de facto* rulings unenforceable by state agents who became increasingly powerless or simple ignored enforcement duties in *favela* neighborhoods, or; 2) to get creative in legal regulation making decisions that would ultimately land outside the boundaries of existing legal frameworks, whereby decisions were likely to be overturned by a higher court on appeal.

Operational in just a handful of Rio's *favelas*, these programs were nevertheless pioneering for their presence in areas characterized by high-density population and violence, which some contend, enjoyed "little or no space for establishing dialogue or peaceful discussion" (Sales, 2005: 32). As Davis (2000: 17) found, mediation in these spaces was critical as financial and time costs, as well as "futility of resolving a problem through legal means" associated with the traditional legal system meant that this option posed a 'remote possibility' for residents. Similarly, this allowed a decreased reliance on 'dangerous' forms of mediation such as traffickers. Nevertheless, as Davis (2000: 17) writes

> "The existence of legal mediation has provided an alternative to the traffickers that has been embraced not only by residents but also by the traffickers themselves. While it would be naïve to think that the simple existence of legal mediation has any real effect on the position the traffickers hold in the community, especially in their traditional role in sanctioning criminal behavior, it does provide, in small measure, an alternative recourse in minor-level disputes. In this respect the state has regained a role as an agent of social control within the community."

Notably, while Davis suggests a naïveté in thinking that mediation may somehow influencing trafficker power, research on disputes mediated at the *Balcão* remains primarily focused on their impact on resolving *transactional* issues. This means that residents sought non-judicialized informal negotiation processes facilitated by a mediator to settle less ambiguously defined issues that held some legal currency, including cases such as child custody, consumer

affairs, small claims, or property disputes. Internal evaluations of these social intervention efforts considered these experiences to be generally effective and useful for residents (Novães and Mafra, 2001; Davis, 2001).

Still, as Chapter 3 argues, this representation offers a limited purview as to the nature of disputes and conflicts that occur in these spaces. It also conveniently accounts for the state's involvement and responsibility to help residents peacefully resolve their disputes, based on the idea that mediated agreements would be viewed as formal contracts that the state either facilitated or would uphold.

Learning from the community mediation experience of the *Balcão* is also limited, not only in the use of a problem-solving model utilized, but wherein mediators came from outside the community and brought limited to nil local knowledge or experience. Many were lawyers or law students, assisted by locals to develop their understanding of scenarios' nuance. Davis's (2000: 8) evaluation observed that "many [outsider mediators] have never entered a favela and are unaccustomed to the particulars of construction, sale and transfer of property of the *favela*".

Similarly, though observations about local conflict cases do recognize the realities of violence's impact, these experiences are not taken up in substantive terms of the interactions between mediators and parties, assuming perhaps that they are beyond the ability of a mediator to treat. While this may hold true with respect to the intervention model being used, its transactional reality simpoly cannot suggest ends of social transformation. Conflict interactions with power-wielding actors such as gangs, traffickers or state agents, actors who residents observe commonly violate rights and use violence, threats, or intimidation in public and private community spaces, are not expressly discussed at all by these programs, neither in relation to how practitioners managed conflict, innovated in process design, nor sought alternative goals beyond the presenting issues.

Conclusions, claims or definitions of periphery mediation practices draw from an ultimately limited data set, provide an equally limiting basis on which to theorize

about the nature of conflict or third party intervention in these complex disputing environments. Absent of comparative options, there is little by which to assess the nature of mediation's claims about social impact as a manner of transformation or change when it comes to reproductions of violence.

Uncivil Society Mediators

Third party conflict intervention practices that fail to contemplate or conduct analysis regarding dimensions in which violence reproduces and impacts on behavior and decision-making, are incomplete. On the other hand, literature on exercise of individual and collective strategies for survival, coping and resiliency in a context of violence do not typically consider or analyze third party conflict intervention as a form of resilience for transforming violent conditions.

Davis (2012: 47) has defined *resilience* along a spectrum including passive, reactive, positive, negative, and equilibrium forms, differentiated in part by proactive actions "initiated to lay a foundation against crime and violence expected in the future" … and reactive, or "adaptations are responses to crime and violence that has already occurred." She adds, "resilience can be categorized in terms of whether community adaptations strengthened, weakened, or stabilized the existent forces and conditions of violence" (Davis, 2012: 47). The importance of establishing 'vertical connections,' implicates the state's involvement to proactively boost resilience of communities and their "attempts to be resilient in the face of insecurity" (Davis, 2012: 50).

In Brazil, Arias (2006) presents empirical data to suggest both reactive and vertical resilience forms alive and well in the peripheries of Rio. Here, however, residents' success in fostering lasting change against patterns of violence by building power and momentum are often short lived, interrupted frequently by the ebb and flow of precarious police presence and changes in trafficking leadership. This is in part due to connections that residents built with the state across the geographic and ethnographic *'favela'* boundaries, supported by major events like massacres and media coverage.

Arias and Rodrigues (2006) argue that one way residents attempt to achieve personal security depends on their relationship not to the state or outside actors, but rather to internal organized armed actors, or traffickers. They and

others (Alves and Evanson, 2011; Wheeler, 2014) document traffickers' *mediative function* in resolving local disputes, though observations and explanations vary by neighborhood and according to hyper-local dynamics. Donna Goldstein's (2003) research highlights residents' mixed reliance/rejection in terms of traffickers in resolving local issues.

Accessing trafficker involvement, Goldstein (2003) contends, could also be seen as a way by which residents reject state authorities and institutions, while also seeking local protection. In Arias and Rodrigues' (2006) view, residents' use of traffickers to resolve disputes legitimates trafficker power, as these actors arbitrate and distribute justice, sometimes violently, in the view of the community. As trafficking power grows, they note, so too did the nature of insecurity in many neighborhoods.

Tracing the rise of trafficking power and decline of the AM, Arias and Rodrigues (2006: 61) cite the distancing of AM leaders to engage in mediation in response to their own needs for survival, which gave way to increasing political co-optation by traffickers. Previously, local *Associação de Moradores* (AM) or Council members would mediate neighborhood disputes over property and community issues. At the apex of their power, these local institutions and functionaries performed similar to those of today's community mediation and legal aid centers, before the advent of organized crime and local trafficking (Santos, 1977, 1988).

Local institutional life and AM power in Rio's *favelas* dwindled as local political figures and leaders aligned with traffickers, ultimately shifting the onus of dispute resolution onto new mediative actors. Though data that considers mediative functions by traffickers is still limited, existing evidence suggests that residents use traffickers as mediators in function and favor of the 'myth of personal security,' on which

> "Individual order and security in an unsafe environment are built out of choices the resident makes and how these choices affect the person's participation in particular communities. People engage with the traffickers, be it through religious conversion or other changes in their behavior, in an emotional response to the violence they face and the lack of hope that the state will resolve the problem" (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006: 59).

Empirical evidence suggests diversity in the way traffickers mediated and arbitrated decisions in the face of local disputes. Davis (1998) has found these to be inclusive of violent resolutions, and often, rather arbitrary or without consistency. More recent observations of traffickers as mediators and arbiters of justice, contend that traffickers operate under a carefully considered political calculus when deciding how to resolve local issues, emphasizing ways that sustain their legitimacy and control in terms of territory and social order (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006).

These authors argue that residents, contesting the construction of their own marginality, may use these opportunities to decry police violence, suggesting that "the traffickers with whom they have to live provide a higher degree of security in their community than exists in surrounding areas." This (falsely) provides a sense of safety in their daily context, even as the "degree of safety that residents perceive in favelas is tied heavily to the specific ways that residents and traffickers interact" (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006: 48). These findings parallel Goldstein's (2003) research, which suggests that periphery residents who access *uncivil* society actors as third party conflict interveners may be seen as inverting the state's attempt at social ordering.

Where some residents can, and do, turn to legal state actors for support with conflicts and neighborhood tensions, the enjoyment of legal protections and rights are often shielded from periphery citizens, contributing to a broader ineffectiveness and erosion of citizenship. As Chapter 3 discusses, mistrust in the state's social interventions is legion amongst periphery denizens.

Where the use of non-state armed actors in conflict resolution roles offer some residents a false sense of security, Arias and Rodrigues (2006) confirm that doing so can subject neighbors to risks and potentially unsavory outcomes, leaving many caught between a rock and a hard place when seeking resolution to conflicts fraught with complexity not often seen in transactional disputes. As Davis (1998: 23) has written:

> "In Brazil, judicial democratization has lagged far behind its political democratization, recent reforms notwithstanding. If the use of [trafficking gangs] to resolve disputes in the *favela* is a function of the lack of viable legal alternatives, then understanding how both forums coexist and are employed in

> one community is crucial to improving the accessibility to the rule of law and diminishing the control that the [gang] hold in these communities."

While 'resolution' of cases by traffickers may involve direct violence, their conflict intervention role and function helps to preserve their local legitimacy, in both stabilizing, but also harmful and destructive ways. The constructive social returns of mediation are offset therefore by a wider sense of insecurity and closing off of social relations or civic participation that come with increased legitimacy of traffickers and organized crime factions, which often prove to invite more violence over time. In some ways, this result is not dissimilar from residents' experience of discrimination or harm they or their families suffer in attempting to access state institutions or authorities to help address conflict. As I explore in Chapter 3, this undermines democratic citizenship in a variety of ways (see Wheeler, 2010, 2014).

Mediation as Resilience

Strategies of confrontation, conciliation, avoidance, and submission to violent actors have been well documented through participatory research and ethnographic research methods in Brazil and elsewhere on the continent (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; Arias, 2006; Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). Though research in urban periphery contexts has not expressly focused on mediation as a resiliency strategy employed by the urban poor, they do demonstrate ways by which individuals and groups manage fear, violence and insecurity in passive and active ways.

Resilience strategies in *favela* communities include discursive methods to normalize situations, including humor, laughter, and joining religious movements (Goldstein, 2003; Schepher-Hughes, 1993; Caldeira, 2000), as well as growing use of women's police stations in situations of domestic violence (Hautzinger, 2007). Other observers of urban Brazil have pointed to the interruption, negotiation, and related performance of interactions that fall under peculiar cultural scripts of b*riga* or street brawls. Linger's (1992) work includes mention of actors and scripts, including *a turma deixa disso* (a group that interrupts street fights), that mediate escalation and de-escalation of violence without loss of face. Linger suggests these scripts of interpersonally violent action and de-

escalation, are both related to a social response of dealing with the harshness of urban life and the lived impacts of social inequities.

In the Latin American context, a fragmented and multi-disciplinary collection of literature from political science to anthropological perspectives have dealt with the way that citizens engage in mediation and conflict interventions when it comes to coping in the context of insecurity. While interrelated, there are marked differences between strategies for nonviolent coping, and those that pursue proactive solutions to reducing violence. These are influenced by more general trends in the urban poor's lack of trust in institutions, as well as resource constraints (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

A sense of constraint is not limited to Brazilian periphery zones. Daniel Goldstein's (2012: 6) research in Bolivia contours the experience of urban periphery residents who become 'outlawed' as they pursue collective security and materialization of rights under the government of Evo Morales. Empirical evidence in Chapter 3 echoes Goldstein's (2012: 6) contention that while the rule of law exists theoretically in marginal areas, it is also selective in that it often fails to protect citizens against insecurity or criminal victimization, nor support them properly when violated.

Instead, the rule of law poses obstacles to periphery dwellers at the detriment of personal and collective security that these citizens 'desperately crave,' simultaneously imposing a social order that may itself conflict with their needs and interests. In this way, Goldstein (2012) contends that this dysfunction creates a "double outlawing" in the midst of "regulatory regimes of [the state's] own devising," leaving people problematically insecure, at once inside and outside of the protection of the law. Such patterns were to an extend indicated to me by residents of the Maciço.

At once included and excluded under Brazil's democratic rule of law, urban marginalized spaces are exposed to multiple forms of violence and violent social ordering that restricts and erodes rights, fomenting social conflict and antagonisms amongst actors. Despite typified characterizations of poverty and neglect seen across "a host of … urban slums and squatter settlements … [the

urban periphery] can also be spaces of invention and creativity, as marginalized people explore new ways of resolving local problems, relatively unfettered by broader political or cultural considerations" (Goldstein, 2012: 28).

From Bolivia to Brazil, the formula of limited research, questionable claims, and critiques that I have forwarded with respect to violence and mediation, leaves much to be learned about non-violent third party intervention practices in contexts and conditions of urban insecurity. Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, a particular group of actors presents a unique, and heretofore understudied role as mediators of disputes and conflict that emerge in the everyday flow of periphery life.

Conflict, Disputes, and *Mediative* Third Party Intervention

Thus far, this chapter has widely explored nuances and various forms, models, and approaches to community-based conflict resolution. It has considered mediative actors, issues, and implications relevant to these practices both broadly, and details specific to the Brazliian context. As a preface to subsequent chapters, all of which present empirical data and analysis to substantiate this study's contribution to knowledge, it is important to first reflect upon and clarify my use of terminology specific to this subject area.

No study of this nature would be complete without a broader perspective and acknowledgment of the vast contributions made by conflict scholars and practitioners to more accurately organize, characterize, and define third party roles. Looking at the roles and repertoires of third party engagement in a variety of a social contexts, this final section draws from literature defining third party intervention roles and functions, in an effort to more accurately frame fieldwork observations about the key informants and exercise of agency in this study. By doing so, I seek to elaborate upon the distinctions amongst labels, tasks, and functions of third party intervener roles from the literature.

Similarly, I further attempt to render more explicit my decision to label non-state, unarmed mediative agents as local *mediators*, in light of their peculiar exercise of agency in an urban context characterized by complex patterns of violence. In the face of their own skepticism and rejection of outsider approaches to

mediation practices, what roles or activities are local actors are actually performing? Given the broad array of unique intervention practices, what ultimately constitutes *mediation* in the periphery communities under study?

To begin, I will identify and clarify assumptions about my use of terms like conflict and dispute, antagonist, and territory-in-dispute, before moving on to literature on Third Party Intervention (TPI) and third party role and function. This is important for locating the original contribution of this thesis in the broader literature about conflict intervention practices, as well as mediation practices in contexts of urban violence. From there, I will move into a discussion about TPI and what I suggest offers, arguably, more than a few blurred lines defining third party roles.

Clarification of Terms

Many of the terms that I use to discuss local conflict, dispute, and third party roles, such as mediator and mediation, have been adopted and adapted from existing conflict resolution literature. This does not mean, however, that these labels perfectly reflect existing definitions or replications of third party roles and practices. In fact, as a review of literature demonstrates, the terminology around Third Party Intervention (TPI), particularly the use of term *mediation* (Brazilian practices are no exception), is a bit blurry. Labels tend to avoid neat categorical consensus amongst those who draw from practice to theorize about such questions.

My choice to use the terms mediation, mediator, and the word *mediative* as key descriptors, while also at times using terms like intermediary and intervener to identify key informants' roles interchangeably, finds justification first and foremost from emic sources. Though mediation was not the *only* term used by key informants to reflect upon their work, it was the most common term referenced *across the range of key informants* to self-identify and describe their own sense of agency, adherent to activities of intervention, including dispute mediation, dialogue with antagonists, convening, and change-oriented efforts.[18]

[18] Chapter 5 explores the use of 'middling' language used by these actors in greater detail. Key informants' references to de-escalating local disputes or facilitating negotiations, as well as other key 'non-dispute-oriented' interactions, which I label Night Walks and Street Talks, are explored in depth in Chapters 5 and 6.

For close to 50 years, conflict scholars have attempted to more accurately define third party intervention terminology and processes. At times, these attemptes effectively work in contention, blurring categorical lines and labels. As Fisher and Keashly (1991: 33) have written, “there is unfortunately, no agreed-upon typology for classifying third party interventions in intergroup and international conflict. In some contexts, terms are used interchangeably (e.g. consultation and mediation) and in some cases, a single term, usually mediation, is used to refer to a wide range of different third party interventions”.

Distinctions or boundaries amongst terminology that is used to more accurately describe roles or functions of third parties and intervention processes, particularly the broad use of the term *mediation,* vary considerably. Terminology has also billowed to include a variety of unique approaches and brands amongst conflict resolution professionals who seek to assert themselves in a contemporary conflict resolution services marketplace (see Jarret, 2009; Mayer, 2009). Innovations in diverse sectors and state institutions, where emerging mediative roles like *Night Correspondents* for example demonstrate expanding and innovative attempts to mitigate incivility and urban neighborhood violence through dialogue and service provision (di Carlo, 2002).

Conflict practitioners’ work can often be identified and differentiated by their chosen unit of analysis, which helps define their particular labeling (see Jarret, 2009: 57; Riskin, 2003). In this way, Jarret (2009: 57) cautions that “theory development must avoid creating a mistaken one-shot image of mediation, analogous to a photographer attempting to pass off a snapshot photograph as a faithful representation of a moving image.” Still, traditional labels serve as points of departure on a journey to develop new conceptualizations of these roles given new fields and contexts of application, through which relatively similar activities and skills may be applied in otherwise nuanced ways.

My use of the terms *mediation* and *mediators*, however, is also based on my choice to employ descriptive terminology to assist the reader comprehend the nature of subjects involved in creating complexity around local conflicts and disputes. My use of the phrase *territorial antagonist*, for example, is one that

offers both an emic and etic compromise to describe and facilitate both the identification and transmission of critical nuances about third party work with particular actors.

Disputants, Antagonists, and Conflict Parties

Key informants (local mediators) did not necessarily refer to individuals-in-conflict as *disputants*, nor *parties,* nor *antagonists*, or did they employ vocabulary commonly used by conflict intervention scholars. They did identify, more often than not, however, an 'antagonistic' individual's connection to an identity group, for example, indicating a specific reference by neighborhood, neighbor or kinship circle, or other type of social relation. That is, local mediators linked the subjects of their interventions to some one else in the community. This located a party to a dispute or 'disputant' simultaneously in two camps – both as part of an identity group whose actions had repercussions, *and* as an individual involved in exercising their own agency while stimulating, or even suffering from, local tensions.

This framing, I would argue, was not by mistake. Rather, one of the ways through which to appreciate the nuances of an analytical exercise undertaken by third parties in determining the appropriateness of a given intervention in an everyday context of insecurity. Well-intentioned intervention into a localized dispute, mediators knew, could not be de-coupled, if by default or by accident, from *some* interaction with larger dynamics of social relations, social conflict, and ultimately, social ordering influenced by way that antagonistic social groups (i.e. state security agents and traffickers) interacted on a regular basis. This informs the nature of TPI work in the periphery context, distancing it further from conventional conceptualizations defined by professionalized roles such as those discussed in Chapter 1, while increasing conceptual alignment with evolving forms and considerations of third party work, informed by conditions of insecurity.

My general use of the term antagonist (also *disputants*) is used to depict residents, as well as state, or non-state armed actors, who were involved in a localized dispute, or for those who may come into direct contention with one other on an interpersonal level (in spite of whether or not they come into direct

negotiation with one another). The word antagonist also signals a simmering, subtler, dual level of *antagonism* that any intervener had to confront.

This usage thus helps to capture a unique tension that local mediators had to consider, and sometimes actively manage, in their decision-making. This is because parties to a local dispute could simultaneously be part of any number of key demographic or identity groups who lived amidst ongoing social antagonisms or tension-filled relationships (i.e. traffickers and police). In this way, localized disputes and interventions must be recognized as part and parcel of the larger dynamics of social conflict in urban Brazil, which carry accompanying ontological concerns for residents.

In this way, the use of intimidation or threats by a neighborhood resident who engages disputing or even violent behaviors, thus, cannot be removed from the social channels, mediums, or cycles through which violence is also reproduced. Disputes must be considered as unique social processes or even *opportunities* through which certain actors reinforce a dominating, violent local social order. Third party mediation, and the proactive, conscious decision that interveners make to involve themselves by *getting in the middle* of disputing interactions, serve as a gateway through which mediators actively contest violence reproductions. Mediation in this arena must then be observed as a form of action through which local agents attempt to *non-violently* shape the social order on the *morro*.

It is precisely this overlap between local disputes and broader social conflict vis-à-vis common, everyday, and often overlooked interactions, that signals local mediators' nuanced approach to intervention work in the territory. This working hypothesis proved useful during the analysis stages of research, both in terms of discerning the relationship between interpersonal or inter-group disputes, and in elucidating the change-orientation repertoire of interventions such as Night Walks and Street Talks, which key informants performed alongside their work in more traditional, facilitated negotiations.[19]

[19] The repertoire of interventions discussed throughout this text demonstrates that local intervention work does not always a require an escalatory set of tensions or acute dispute or disagreement as precursor or premise to define mediation or intervention work

Conflict vs. Dispute

Though often used interchangeably in the literature, the term *disputes* differ from *conflicts* in that the former typically refer to a more acute situation, such as a quarrel over a presenting issue, or disagreement. Abu-Nimer (1999: 19-20) defines *dispute* as that involving interests or even values which can be adjusted or settled, whereby "settlement is mainly an arrangement over scarcity or a correction of misunderstanding." *Conflict*, on the other hand, references broader challenges.

A Human Needs approach defines conflict as a concern more ontological and universal in nature, for which 'resolution' often requires changes in, or of, a system (Burton, 1990). Resolution can be accomplished or facilitated, in part, by third party intervention processes that might emphasize collective narratives, relationships, and attention to satisfiers of concomitant needs at stake (see also Max-Neef, et al., 1987).

Whereas a Human Needs perspective views third party engagements as a way to engage in a peace process with the objective of reaching a needs- and interests-satisfying resolution, the lens of Conflict Transformation understands conflict through a relational frame. In this sense, the broader project of shifting relationships and creating new structures through creative change processes informs the primary purview of third party work, entailing distinct applications at interwoven personal, relational, cultural, and structural levels.

A conflict transformation approach identifies a dispute as a mere 'presenting issue,' whereby they become a point of entry or passageway through which third party activity effectively engages in efforts to shift something deeper. While a presenting situation deserves treatment, the presenting issue is not the sole focus or objective for third party action. Rather, tensions or disputes offer "a lens through which to view the horizon of a preferred future" (Lederach, 2003). This could involve the forging a new social arrangement, policy, norms, behaviors, expectations, or material exchange to re-define interactions amongst antagonistic groups. For Lederach (2003), a starting point for inquiry into the development of an agent's response to conflict through a lens that suggests two spheres of action.

Disputes or “presenting” conflicts are thus situated as part of a larger process of change-making, significantly impacting the nature of third party actions and role, particularly when it comes to deciding or crafting what ‘process’ or set of actions might be undertaken as part of an intervention. Here, the horizon of change remains at the center, to be worked toward, if never touched, through the development of interlinking change-oriented initiatives. This approach reflects the mediative efforts of key informants observed in this study, whose intentionality becomes clear vis-à-vis rich descriptions about individualized repertoires, which I take up and contrast briefly below, as well as in Chapters 3 through 6.

The Territory-in-Dispute

The term Territory-in-Dispute (TD) is one of the descriptors used by some, but not all interveners. I have used it in this text for purposes of clarity, however, to more accurately depict and frame local agents’ orientation to their work. The Territory-in-Dispute can simply be defined as the spatial prism through which mediators engage in their activities, where people are regularly exposed to, or participating in, many interwoven disputes that occur on micro and macro levels. TD is relevant in a number of ways. First and foremost, perhaps, it stands in as a marker of place or institutionalized space in which third parties operate, suggesting the territory in the absence of any centralized or organized institutional home for dispute resolution or intervention activities.

Framing interventions outside any traditional institutional entity, or organization, marks the importance of interveners’ socially networked orientation to this work. When it came to local mediators locating themselves and their actions in a social terrain, the territory in dispute reveals attention to the way that micro interactions are connected to macro impacts vis-à-vis the social ordering processes that evolve through disputing experiences, and in which these agents can play a key role.

Whereas many third party roles or processes such as *mediation* or *consultation* (discussed below) assume a set of relatively organized, if multi-dimensional peace making steps or phases, the territory in dispute becomes a useful

organizing device in particular for seeing how key informants attempt to make shifts in the larger dynamics of social conflict that are in party sustained by, and infused with, social reproductions of violence.

Interveners' contemplation and movement within their individual territorial spheres of influence, signals their understanding of the larger dynamics of violence and its reproductions in the way these shape the antagonistic environment in which they live. This framing further illuminates how mediators' peculiar understanding of violence and its reproductions, as well as mediation as an exercise of "articulation" (see Chapter 4), plays an integral part of their orientation.

Third Party Intervention

The unique framing of third party roles and repertoires is informed by both emic and etic views to local actor agency in this particular social and geographic territory. If anything, the difficulty associated with a more precise labeling offers a unique view into an *evolving,* if incomplete concept of mediating and conflict intervention in scenarios of protracted urban violence. For purposes of simplicity in a sea of imprecise labels, I have elected to use identifiably common terms to frame local third party conflict intervention agency exercised by periphery residents. As the reader will have noted, these include, sometimes interchangeably, terms like mediation, mediator, intervener, and agent to label these individuals and their work. A short discussion of third party intervention literature, as well as my key informants' use of the term mediation, substantiate this selection.

The use of the term mediation is also relevant to the trend of mediation's expanding use by state actors more broadly in Brazil. More importantly perhaps, it finds place alongside a tradition of research and debate regarding evolving conceptualizations of mediation or conflict intervention practices, not to exclude those exercised by state and non-state armed actors discussed earlier.

Literature on conflict intervention models is vast and wide, and can be delineated "according to process or practice [activities], intervention levels, and the role of the third party" (Abu-Nimer, 1999: 18). This scope is not limited to

analysis of third party decision-making (Jabri, 1990), constituencies' influence (Botes and Mitchell, 1995: Wall, 1981), insider vs. outsider roles (Wehr and Lederach, 1991, UNDP 2014; Touval, 1982) as well as formal vs. informal roles (Botes, 2003), challenges to entry (Touval, 1993), strategic functions and tactics (Bercovitch, 1984), and more, offering an almost unruly expanse of practical and theoretical debates.

Abu-Nimer (1999: 17) broadly characterizes scholarship on intervention models into international/interethnic, or community/organizational models. While the former encompasses arenas such as consultation, the Problem-Solving Workshop (see Fisher 1980; 2001), Track II Diplomacy (see Montville, 1987), and Intercultural Education, the latter can be grouped into Labor and Industry Management, Community Dispute Resolution, Interpersonal and Family Dispute Resolution, and Public Policy formulation.

Notably, realistic limitations exist when comparing third party roles, activities, and objectives, across social contexts. For example, interpersonal mediation services performed by an external, professionalized third party at a community mediation center in the UK, carry a distinct set of assumptions, characteristics, and intentions than third party efforts of 'insider-mediators' working to prevent violence in Central Africa or Central America. Similarly, the actions and objectives of "violence interrupters" discussed earlier, or those who intervene through non-coercive strategic *mediative* movement and the deployment of communication skills to prevent homicides on the streets of South Side Chicago, contrast to Northern academics who might convene and facilitate Track II or Problem-Solving Workshops (PSW) with participants in South Ossetia.

Linguistically speaking, a third party actor conducting a *mediation* or playing a mediative role (thus, a mediator) may also at once be distinguished by their role/s as a *facilitator* of a peace process. This same role may be discussed as one that performs the task of *negotiation* on a substantive issue, and/or simply works to increase communication or improve relational dynamics. For example, literature on international conflict from scholar-practitioners such as as Fisher (1983) and Fisher and Keashly (1991: 30) distinguish Third Party Consultation

and Problem-Solving workshops from *pure*, *muscle, or power* mediation, wherein the mediator acts to "assist the parties working toward a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives, and, in some cases, the application of leverage."

In this role, the mediator, which they refer to as a State acting as a third party, operates with a particular set of interests at stake, despite the appearance of playing a neutral role. Bercovitch's (2004) work also defined mediation through a fixed process, positing that "mediation is defined … as a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law".

These contrast to Fisher and Keashly's (1991: 30) PSW *Consultant*, whose role it is to support parties through a workshop/dialogue format, separate from official mediation, to "improve communication, diagnose underlying relationship issues, and facilitate the search toward creative resolution of the conflict". This role boasts a host of functions and strategies including "inducing mutual motivation for problem-solving, improving openness and accuracy of communication, diagnosing the processes and issues of the conflict, and regulating interaction among the participants" (Fisher and Keashly, 1991: 32).

In the consultation role, the third party's objectives emphasize the importance of identity, relationship, and communication, rather than driving toward a settlement or agreement to characterize the tasks and role of the "pure" mediator. Instead, they enter into direct, "helping" relationships with conflict participants in a distinct process that is contact- and analytically-oriented, without seeking resolution to any particular issue. In this role, third parties are at once culturally sensitive and supportive, while also engaging in facilitative, non-evaluative, non-coercive, and non-directive ways of pursuing changes in attitudes, perspectives, and communicative dynamics amongst parties (Fisher and Keashly, 1991: 32-33).

A Panoply of Intervention Roles

Though some third party roles are defined by more rigid classification of functions or goals, others operate using a more nuanced and flexible repertoire, performing similar or critically related tasks that are 'just as vital' to *any* process (Fisas-Armangol, 2013). Nevertheless, important distinctions exist between international practices and the realm of interpersonal mediation models, despite a clearly evident cross-over in the use of terminology and implicit assumptions that inform theoretical boundaries of third party role definition. This offers no greater clarity for asserting universally consensed upon terms. Nevertheless, it is possible to more carefully decide what label of TPI may be appropriate, by exploring an intervener's role as linked to task and function.

In the interpersonal conflict intervention and mediation realm, roles are sometimes classified according to what scholars call transactional vs. transformative orientations to practice (Bush and Folger, 1994). Riskin's (1996: 2003) facilitative-evaluative continuum, along with new sociological perspectives about philosophical distinctions identified amongst practitioners (Jarret, 2009; 2012), help us to draw comparisons between these realms.

Here, the *pure* international mediator role most adequately reflects a more evaluative or transactional orientation, while the *consultation* role more adequately reflects facilitative and transformative criteria. As Warfield (2003: 418) has observed, this cross-over requires greater nuance and debate, as "geographical and content-defining terms tossed about cavalierly say more about competing hierarchies and elitism than functional geopolitical designations." More useful still, I contend, is to continue to boil down what third parties actually do while in their roles in a particular context.

Drawing on Mitchell (1981) and Young (1967), Vivenne Jabri (1990) acknowledges three types of third party roles. Her characterization of imposition, intermediaries, and interventionist or 'expansion,' find rough equivalents to Young's (1967: 52) enforcers, intermediaries, and allies. These labels can be placed along a continuum of intervening actors according to whether interveners exercise more to less control over parties and process.

Drawing on the work of Louis Kreisberg (1982) and Jim Laue (1987), Jabri (1990: 6) also posits that many roles or ways to see third party participation in conflict exist, though these differ significantly in form and function. Such roles can be identified as active or passive, and perhaps best understood through their underlying intentionality, be they third party spoilers, strategic-neutrals[20], partisans to a side, or those who engage strategically with the aim of assisting parties find some sense of resolve to their issues *despite* partisan interests or inclinations.

Analyzing Western state intervention in Namibia, Jabri (1990: 17) contends that intermediary and mediator functions generally provide "facilitation of communication between parties and influencing parties toward changing their positions in order to make agreement possible," offering a blend of Fisher and Keashly's (1991) *consultation* and *mediation* depictions. Other well known scholar-practitioners including Jim Laue (1982; 1987), William Ury (2000), and Bernie Mayer (2000; 2009), all present third party roles along a continuum or spectrum, circumscribing a broad range of functions or service-orientations to interveners.

Drawing from practical examples in Zimbabwe and Somalia, Mitchell's (1993) "panoply" of roles within his proposition of a framework to expand the conception of a *mediating* entity, also elaborates a broadly conceived range of intermediary functions. Mitchell (1993: 285) classified third party tasks and functions to include: the convener, the facilitator, synchronizer, process advocate, forerunner, guarantor, de-coupler, aggregator/unifier, enskiller, etc.

Mitchell (1993: 288) argued that "different functions in the overall mediation process can be – and frequently have to be – carried out by different third parties and by different kinds of third party". In this way, playing the role of a unifier or enskiller could likely compromise, prohibit, or delegitimize the same third party agent from convening or facilitating with certain actors at future moments. This suggests that an expansive view "might well be the best way of

[20] The purity of value-neutrality, or chosen impartiality of interveners are, today, widely debated, whether in international and domestic practice realms.

both conceptualizing an analyzing the nature of mediation and of answering questions about the reasons for their success or failure…" (Mitchell, 1993: 288).

Similarly, Moore (2003) recognizes that the targets and levels of intervention change, in order to meet demands of parties, while different conflict 'contexts' reveal distinct orientations. For instance, a family mediator's strategic relational, procedural, and 'orchestrator' orientation rests on the assumption that parents know best for their family system, thus defining the mediator's job as offering support that helps parents gain insight or revelations about their relationships, or how to engage with specific problems. Drawing from Kolb's (1983) discussion of Labor-Management dispute mediators, Moore contrasts a family orientation to the functionality of the mediator as 'deal-maker,' in which a mediator is more active in defining and directing a fixed process for parties who are otherwise ill-prepared or unaware of options within a negotiation. In this regard, mediators rely heavily on the design, as well as communication about process, vis-a-vis their process-expertise.

This contrast of mediator orientations about the nature of engagement with parties and processes help to frame the actions of periphery interveners. Mitchell's (1993: 285) proposition is complementary in suggesting that we might "conceptualize a mediation process model as a number of interlocking and complementary roles, perhaps enacted by a variety of appropriate mediators". The statement reflects Laue's (1987) concern and skepticism of hired gun credo of technocratic oriented 'have process will travel' interveners (Black and Avruch, 1999). Laue (1990: 20) was more pragmatist, however, in considering the power and agency of the intervener, whereby intervention can be observed as form of advocacy.

Like Mitchell, Laue (1987; see also Laue and Cormick, 1978) observed that a broader variety of roles were also "subsumed" under the intervener heading. Laue's perspective on intervention roles "was not simply pragmatic" in that he acknowledged that intervention could produce greater harm. Laue and Cormick (1978: 217-218) broadly defined intervention as when "an outside or semi-outside party self-consciously enters into a conflict situation with the objective of influencing the conflict in a direction the intervener defines as desirable".

As Black and Avruch (1999: 25) observe, this exposed Laue's "awareness of the different roles available to third parties, and especially of the relations of power and party-commitment to each role, [that] was central to a conflict resolution practice that put the intervenor squarely on the side of the politically and economically disadvantaged party struggling to attain equity and justice." In this way, the mediation role can be seen as that of advocating for a particular type of process, undergirded or guided by the ethical question of whether intervention contributes to the ability of the powerless to determine their own destinies within alignment of a greater common good (Laue and Cormick, 1978).

Writing on the dynamics of interpersonal or inter-group conflict, Mayer (2000: 47-48) lists five 'most prevalent' roles that people play in conflict, all of which can contribute to escalation or de-escalation. Aside from coach, recorder and record keeper, cheerleader, publicizer, convener, and gatekeeper, Mayer (2004) also discusses Advocate (negotiator), Decision-maker (arbitrator), Facilitator (mediator), Information Provider (expert), Observer (witness, Audience), echoing "international" scholars' variation in repertoire. Mayer (2000, 2004) and Mitchell (1993) concur with Jabri's (1990) discussion and deconstruction of roles, which she notes *often overlap* and may be better discussed along a continuum, fitting well within the larger conversation of 'mediating conflict'.

Despite the robust contributions to analysis of third party roles offered by these pioneering scholars predominantly between the 1960s and 2000s, the strongest consenus is not around whether or not something can be labeled mediation, but rather, about the importance of diverse roles that third parties might play, some of which are likely to overlap, blur lines, or become categorically slippery when attempting to compare across contexts of practice.

Taken as a whole, this echoes Fisher's (2012: 694) drawing "attention to the succession of barriers that must be overcome in a mediation process and makes clear that no one third-party intervener is capable of de-escalating and resolving an intractable conflict," while reiterating the importance of using a variety of "fine-grained" methods and roles employed by third parties. It

furthermore supports Bercovitch and Jackson's (2009: 34) statement about defining mediation in the context of complex, international conflict scenarios, when he states that

> *"Some may consider … quibbling over definitions as inconsequential, merely an exercise in academic nit-picking. It is most emphatically not so. The myriad possible mediators and the range of mediation roles and strategies are so wide as to defeat many attempts to understand the essence of mediation. In the absence of a generally accepted definition, there is a tendency to identify mediation with one particular role (e.g., a go-between) or a single strategy (e.g., offering proposals). This does not help us to understand the reality of international mediation."*

We might better understand mediation thus "not only a process but more importantly an intrinsic attitude that expresses itself within every action (Berghof-Foundation.org, 2015).

Insider Mediation

A growing but not entirely new contribution to the array of third party literature is that involving insider mediation roles. Insider mediators have taken on new relevance particularly where international peacebuilding efforts and architectures struggle to adapt to emerging political contexts and complex social realities involving issues of urban violence or non-conventional armed actors. Periphery mediators also reflected much of their defining characteristics.

The role of insider mediators, which the UNDP (2014) defines as "an effective means for building national capacity for conflict prevention," is exemplary in further developing our understanding of the nature and scope of mediation. Similar to Track II scholars, González Bustelo (2015: 9) has recognized their particular relevance in Latin American contexts, given the "advantages of non-governmental actors in terms of early engagement, exploratory initiatives, and humanitarian dialogue… particularly in situations where the political constraints prevent involvement of state-related national or international actors."

Unlike external intervening actors, who also have the luxury of *leaving* a context or process, insiders exercise a distinct role and repertoire precisely because their relationship to the conflict or involved parties is not solely defined through professionalized intervention roles. Their work can be viewed through the lenses of association and identities in addition to the functions they assume. In

this way, trust afforded to *insider-partial mediators*, a label that Wehr and Lederach (1991) long ago coined, is built through longevity, precisely they *do not, or cannot,* leave.

By contrast, the outsider-neutral model, which finds resonance in "North American field of intergroup and interpersonal conflict management… is commonly defined as a rather narrow formal activity in which an impartial, neutral third party facilitates direct negotiation" (Wehr and Lederach, 1991: 86). The connection between outsider-neutrals and parties is defined through emphasis on personal distance, and through the conflict alone, and which become the primary mechanisms by which legitimacy and trust are afforded.

Whereas external interveners' impartiality and disinterested stake in the outcome are often considered 'pre-requisites' for playing the mediation role, insider-partial mediators are labeled as such precisely due to the related interests or association as part of the community or national/regional belonging defined by their connectedness, attributes, and identity. While the participation by external mediator professionals may be requested formally, insider mediators may have already become engaged by intervening formally or informally in situations of escalation and de-escalation. They do so *first* as interest-bearing members of a community or group affected by conflict, escalation, tension, or violence, or on a more ad-hoc, rather than regular basis, to pursue a variety of goals. Wehr and Lederach (1991: 87) argue that their effectiveness is due in part due to the nature of *complexity* with which they are already familiar, often linked to international or intercultural disputes.

According to a recent UNDP (2014: 4) guidance note, *insider mediators* are actors who work both overtly, and behind the scenes, using their legitimacy and influence to constructively alter behavior, relationships and conflict trajectories, through both formal and informal operations, which include processes of conventional mediation, dialogue, and other facilitative processes. The UNDP identifies five key ways in which insider mediators affect change:

> "[F]irst, they help identify or create entry-points, often paving the way for official negotiations to begin; two, they build consensus between stakeholders, bridging differences around key stumbling blocks in peacebuilding processes; three, they

> play direct mediation roles, thereby actively preventing and/or managing a particular conflict; four, they play important advocacy roles, connecting national-level processes with wider public opinion; and, lastly, they act as early warning 'beacons,' ensuring that action is taken on an issue before tensions can escalate into violence. Beyond these more defined roles, insider mediators also help initiate and deepen dialogue across the board, planting ideas and shifting discourse towards peace in the context of debates across society."

This range of insider mediator engagement extends far beyond the role conceived of by conventional mediation descriptions. Here, roles and goals move into closer alignment with the Conflict Transformation orientation, wherein formal mediation processes do not define the sole focus of mediation as a form of intervention. Instead, the mediator figure subscribes to a broader repertoire of agency in function of conflict or disputing engagements. Evolving understandings and conceptualizations of mediators also emerge vis-à-vis practitioner propositions about how to more strategically support people in conflict. Mediators thus have a strategic role to play in working as allies with parties in *enduring conflict,* which Mayer (2009) defines as situations appropriate for third parties to exercise the benefits of trust and legitimacy while supporting parties in conflict. This is accomplished by paying attention to the ongoing (enduring, endemic, or long-term conflict) aspects of conflict, rather than on actions that aim to negotiate or work only toward more easily resolvable issues.

Failing to observe these broader role possibilities may overlook the value that third parties can when serving individuals, organizations, or communities. This is particularly resonant in contrast to professionalized mediation role definitions, which remain contingent upon selling itself as a quick fix solution to problems. Mayer's (2004: 188) use of the term *conflict engagement specialists* is way in which to describe a third party's engagement in several tasks within a complex adaptive system. Rather than a mediator upholding traditional tenets of neutrality, for example, Mayer (2004) has argued that conflict specialists must be poised to perform non-traditional functions, such as awareness building, articulation, mobilization of resources, activation, connection, needs satisfaction, release, process selection, and more. Put simply, they must figure out what a particular party's needs are, then help them with that task (Mayer, 2004: 190).

In later work, a book *Staying with Conflict*, Mayer (2009) does not draw a functional distinction between what he labels as conflict allies, and the mediator role. This is based on the same view to the potentially strategic position of 'mediators' to accompany and be allies to parties as they work through the conflicts they face. Mayer uses the device of time to re-frame how a third party mediators might serve disputants, given the enduring nature of their conflict situations or experiences. Recognizing limitations of conventionally framed roles of mediators, Mayer (2009: 250) further links the ally role to the mediator label:

> "Coaches, strategists, advocates, consultants, and organizers are examples of ally roles we might play. Even as allies we are often asked for advice on a short-term conflict, but effectiveness in the ally role almost always requires that we understand the enduring context. The key challenge for the ally is determining how to help disputants understand and engage in the enduring aspect of conflict while at the same time focusing on the immediate issues that form the context of most disputant discussions. Meeting this challenge requires clarity about our contract, a viable format for working with disputants, and an effective set of intervention tools."

This view to third party "engagement," while emphasizing a broader set of supporting interventions, moves well beyond a *resolution* orientation to mediation deepening the importance of a third party intervener's interpretation of the social context. Mayer (2009: 269; see also Rothman, 1997) effectively argues for a re-evaluation of a label for the conflict resolution practitioner, based not on settlement orientation to the use of an actor's repertoire, but rather on a long-view of the *engagement* of conflict over time.

The "consistent and overriding purpose" of mediative actors is thus to be prepared to respond to, and serve, the multiple ways to assist people in *enduring* conflict. In order to serve such ends, Mayer claims (2009: 146) that a mistake would be the way that professionals interpret "conflict and its resolution in a narrow and overly procedural way," or that which is more appropriately resolvable through short-term agreement-oriented mediation or negotiation processes. Where enduring challenges abound, a distinct perspective on the mediator is required. Reflecting the distinction asserted by Wehr and Lederach (1991), Mayer (2004: 190) suggests that "by looking at conflict in this way, we

can escape the trap of automatically assuming our job is to take people through a predetermined linear process toward an inevitable end resolution".

Situated amongst the many scholars who have discussed power with respect to the mediator or conflict intervener roles (see Cobb, 1997; Wing, 2008; Trujillo et al., 2008), Mayer's (2009: ix-x) contribution also calls for recognizing and utilizing one's power as a mediator in the strategic development of relationships and communication channels,[21] by way of a more dynamic role over the long-haul:

> "Constructive engagement … means developing durable avenues of communication that will survive the ups and downs of a long- term conflict. Constructive engagement requires using one's power and responding to others' use of power wisely—upping the level of conflict when necessary but doing so in a way that promotes desired behavior rather than becoming destructive. It means negotiating and problem solving within the context of the long-term challenge, and it means developing support systems that can sustain and energize individuals throughout a conflict."

Looking beyond resolution toward a horizon of transformation, John Paul Lederach's work also finds usefulness in moving beyond third party labels completely when it comes to defining what a mediator is and does. Lederach (2002, 2006) finds traction in the use of *social mediative capacity* to describe "the kind of social responses [practitioners] hoped to infuse in … groups conducting a wide variety of tasks in community work. These [practitioners] did not see themselves as mediators, but did see their responses as 'mediative' behavior" (Lederach, 2002: 92).

This conceptual re-focusing on *mediative capacity*, are those in which intervener roles and mediation are characterized by "introducing a quality of interaction into a strategic set of social spaces within the web of systemic relationships in order to promote constructive change processes in the conflict-affected setting as a whole". *Mediative capacity* is that which asks practitioners to consider "social spaces for constructive change processes that have intermediary impact"

[21] Curiously, Mayer's dealing with power focuses on constructively channeling power's strategic use by parties, rather than contesting it, in terms of supporting a constructive and sustainable power exchange (see Mayer 2009: 152).

(Lederach, 2006: 95). This situates the mediative actions and involvement of third parties well away from conventional embodiment of the third party responsible for negotiating between adversaries.

Mediative capacity also speaks to a more widely stimulated 'mediative' impact embodied by the way that agents exercise their capacities in a broader sense, one that "underscores attitudes, skills, and disciplines that include and engage the diverse perspectives about a conflict and a capacity to watch for and build opportunities that increase creative and responsive processes and solutions around conflicts" (Lederach, 2006: 95-96). Such capacities, Lederach describes, are versatile:

> "One set of capacities points toward direct, face-to-face interaction between people or groups. The other set underscores the need to see, pursue, and create change in our ways of organizing social structures, from families, to complex bureaucracies, to structures at the global level. This requires a capacity to understand and sustain dialogue as a fundamental means of constructive change" (Lederach, 2003)

Refining Roles in Periphery Mediation

Mediative roles exercised by agents in a context of heightened social complexity transcends conventional role definition regarding mediator work. The roles played by insiders on the *Maciço*, whose engagements were often (but not always) indicative of non-conventional, informal, and ad-hoc "mediative" efforts, were more aligned with the materialization of Lederach's mediative capacity, than Fisher and Keashly's (1991) "pure" mediation.

Key informants' roles and repertoire of skills, which I elaborate upon further in examples throughout Chapters 5 and 6, were deployed under the purview of an orientation informed by local dynamics, including those of calculated risk in a context of insecurity. In this sense, conditions often disfavored a conventional sit-down negotiation, while also presenting opportunities for me to observe a wide repertoire and unique roles reflected by the contingencies of responding to disputes that emerged in such an environment.[22]

[22] For many reasons, highly structured negotiations, particularly with non-state armed actors, can be extremely difficult to organize, particularly by outsiders, or in many cases, not a desirable

Critical to understanding the nature of key informants' mediative intervention is the evidence that intervention decisions are not always based on rational actor logic. Following Jabri (1990: 16), I use empirical data to describe how an intervener may become involved in a conflict, while not always being "precise about all possible outcomes to the conflict and the probabilities that it may influence this outcome or that particular outcomes may be attained." In this way, they forego a "rigid calculation of all alternatives and consequences prior to selection of a role in response to the conflict... [under] their assumptions of static and consistent preference orderings". Jabri (1990: 16) further observes that

> "Within an interactive and dynamic setting, such as a negotiation system, the third party cannot realistically have precise preferences for each possible outcome to the conflict or calculations of the probabilities of particular outcomes being attained. This ambiguity is amplified by the complexity of most conflict situations with multiple issues and parties as well as overlapped conflicts."

Key Informant Repertoires

Distinguishing more carefully amongst key informants' roles, my observations suggest that age, race, and gender, as well as location (such as neighborhood of residence) all proved to be important factors in interveners' effectiveness or directive, in terms of the decisions of if, when, how, and with whom to (co)intervene (or not). Not only were these decisions important for preserving mediators' security, they provided data that further allowed me to draw a link between interveners' risk, and short and long-term objectives, as a matter of how they prioritized. That is, there were obvious moments when *a decision to not intervene* in any immediately recognizable short-term way, was clearly made in function of working strategically toward a longer-term goal.

Where empirical data shows how interveners or local mediators intervene in a situation where a neighbor is experiencing a dispute with another neighbor, the *mediative* quality of this intervention does not always, or solely, refer to a face-

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or effective form of intervention when it comes to de-escalating tensions. Less organized, informal interactions, on the other hand, must then also be seen as part of these insiders' mediative repertoires, even when they do not reflect conventional mediative roles.

to-face endeavor to resolve the dispute through a facilitated negotiation. This does not, I argue, disqualify the labeling of one of these 'parties' as a party to a dispute, or an actor involved in a conflict, but nor does it allow for an easy definition of third party roles on the *morro.* As a whole, their work may be better understood under the *insider-partial mediator* moniker, discussed above.

Data regarding the linkages between risks posed to interveners in contexts of violence, and their strategies for mitigation, are rare (Fast, 2013). Given this reality, the original data in this study that points to the way distinct mediator roles operate in concert, if at times loosely organized or ad-hoc, providing contributions to a more holistic understanding of how interveners engage in risk-mitigation, strategically navigating potential vulnerabilities or volatility in the face of local tensions.

For example, Lia likened her role, on a number of occasions, to that of a parental figure. In this way, she reflected on establishing a calculated, strategic presence that she exercised when, and for, interfacing effectively with young traffickers. This role, which she also described as generating a peer-to-peer sense of mutual respect (despite significant age differences), would gradually lead to her to the opportunity to level strong and meaningful critiques about the world of trafficking in the presence of local soldiers.

On the other hand, there were times when Lia's decision to refrain from exercising a parental function of admonishing or condemning direct violence, despite the duress and frustration she later acknowledged, suggested that mediators can be highly selective for strategic purposes. On some occasions, such decisions might prioritize a goal of establishing a trusting relationship by avoiding short-term intervention, deprioritizing the desire to negotiate smaller victories or even to prevent violence.

Lia's involvement with territorial antagonists, mainly young traffickers, rarely involved activities in open conjunction with other mediators. Rather, she felt more effective working independently, evidenced by the fruits of her "street-talks," despite playing an instrumental role in information gathering that initiated a key convening process later on. In this way, her unique role contributed

directly to others' mediative roles and functions, by helping them be more informed, avoiding risk, or remaining apprised of a dynamic and shifting social landscape. Lia also attached her exercise of mediative capacities to what she called the power of her interventions to influence and shift violent behavior of local youth over time (see Ordway, 2013).

To the extent that Guga, another key informant/mediator and former professional footballer, represented a captivating figure in the community, his more public notoriety offered him a different set of opportunities with the same young men and women. Guga drew not upon the symbolism of a parental figure, but rather on his attributes and skills as team-player peer, and coach. In the interactions I observed between Guga and young traffickers for example, Guga took a more direct, almost non-apologetic approach to communication and negotiation. He was unafraid to hold forth in demand-making and boundary-setting, particularly when it came to communicating expectations of the ProCam project. I observed these interactions hold true in Guga's interface with individuals, as well as small groups.

Figures such as Darcy, or Vilson, both of whom were important local mediators and activists, exercised both outsider and insider mediation roles at different times. Whereas Darcy's (and her daughter, Ana's) strengths were on display through their convening efforts with key antagonists, Darcy also drew upon her legitimacy and trust that she built over years as an outspoken activist, community leader, and elder, which ultimately helped her foster a safe space for highly confidential and risk-prone conversations.

Like Lia, Darcy's and Vilson's physical neighborhood proximity to certain groups offered these actors a chance to build up particular relationships, and trust. At times, mere proximity and convenience facilitated communication of sensitive or risky information amongst mediators, or between mediators and disputants. Proximity also posed certain risks for people like Darcy, however, who seemed to disfavor the adoption of a more confrontational or openly "mediative" role in her immediate vicinity.

Complementing Darcy's work were people like Vilson who, whether in

volunteering to negotiate with the family of Dona Teresa, or participating with a team of local leaders to de-escalate tensions in the *Descoberta* neighborhood, could be viewed as more active in addressing disputes head on, facilitating and convening along the lines of more conventional or 'pure' mediation efforts. Vilson also exercised mediative capacities in less conventional, insider ways, emulating or echoing Fisher's *consultant* role, or Mayer's *conflict coach,* and ally. In these roles, Vilson drew from his strength as a patient listener and adept communicator, who could also draw from years of legitimacy building, as well as external resources to help diffuse local tensions in strategically interruptive ways. This was no clearer than in a series of meetings with group of local men seeking a non-violent set of possible solutions to manage growing community tensions in the *Caixa* area.

By far, the majority of interventions undertaken by key informants had nothing to do with the expectations of achieving a clearly envisioned or expected resolution. Mediation of local disputes nevertheless involved taking risks as mediators involved themselves in tensions or strategically with territorial antagonists, often in order to promote some type of shift in the way that conflict or violence impacted local life for residents writ-large.

On the *morro*, little if any consultation or case-intake occurs in a centrally organized or systematized way. That is not to say that key informants do not communicate with each other or parties to a dispute. Frequent peer communication did occur, however, on more of an ad-hoc basis, whether or not it was preventive, *proventive* (Burton, 1990), or intentionally responsive to an already locally developing dispute. Not all interventions within a mediator's repertoire can be classified using conventional description of dispute resolution or a mediated peace process.

It is most appropriate then to describe the periphery mediators as deploying their skills and performing myriad functions hand in hand with conscious, if loosely fitting goals of pursuing change through their particular associations, affinities, or influence. It is through these identities that they could more effectively produce 'entry' or level some impact distinctively upon local social

dynamics and reproductions of violence, whether or not these were directly or indirectly linked to tensions or a presenting dispute.

He or she who engages, depends on a variety of factors, including proximity and relationship, as well as a potential of their identity, to be effective. Importantly, the degree to which interveners had some type of connection or influence could be linked to the type of third party task or function they assumed (perhaps in concert with others). Vilson more often engaged with traffickers at the lower level of hierarchy, while also exercising his political clout to engage with the city's elite, high level police officers, or state authorities. Lia, for her part, engaged with higher ranking and 'older' traffickers more effectively.

By contrast, Guga was most effective in situations such as the once emerging dissonance involving a young, rebellious teenage male in conflict with his mother. Twice self-purged from relatives' homes on the grounds of unacceptable and volatile behavior, the young man went to live on the street, talking increasingly about engaging in violent behaviors.

In this particular case, given the particular nature of influence that Guga (joined by Felipe, another CCEA staff member) exercised as public male role models, were indicated. Intervention into this dispute involved a series of family visits, not unlike what I observed other mediators do, too. While Guga was the principle mediative figure here, meeting with family members and keeping in contact with the young man, he was also supported by at least two key informant peers, who helped discuss possible approaches and challenges as the dialogue and 'intake' process developed.

Nevertheless, neither the community, nor the CCEA, perhaps a logical home for such dispute resolution efforts in Mont Serrat, offered any type of formal programming to support intervention efforts. Where conscientious skills deployment, role specialization, and operational spaces become evident, all key informants demonstrated that their actions to intervene were never contemplated without some indication that a larger social impact was at stake. In this way, local dispute intervention can be situated within Dugan's (1995) *Structural Sub-System* (discussed in Chapter 4). My observations also parallel

Lederach's observations of local insider-mediators in Somalia, who engage 'because of' systematic concerns, as well as, or by necessarily finding traction and starting with, the problematic relationships and localized issues (Lederach, 1997: 57).

Conclusions

This chapter has moved from understanding violence's origins and reproductions in urban Brazil, to identifying the interplay that violence has with sources of local conflict in periphery neighborhoods. It also explored the yet limited way in which mediation literature has tackled the phenomenon of violence in urban settings. It also examined the two primary mediative state, and non-state armed actors, who operate in periphery communities, unpacking their roles, operations, ideological underpinnings, claims, and associated social impacts of their conflict intervention efforts. Finally, the chapter clarified the often complex range of labels and definitions associated with third party roles and repertoires, and began to peel away at some of the contrasting dimensions of local mediators whom I observed in the periphery communities of Florianópolis.

Establishing the analytical framework for the thesis, the chapter argues that relatively little is understood about mediative practices and their potential in these complex environments, and specifically so in relation to violence and its prevention or interruption. Similarly, despite some well-intentioned efforts, the scope of existing mediation practices in these communities may in fact foster violence's reproduction and normalization while eroding citizenship. In this way, I claim that existing efforts ultimately contribute to long-term insecurity for residents who pursue conflict and dispute resolution needs.

In the chapters that follow, I present observations and narratives that constitute a 'third-side' of community mediation at the margins - one practiced by non-state, unarmed periphery residents who exercise mediative agency in the face of complex local conflicts and disputes involving territorial antagonists. Drawing upon what we know about existing modalities and mediation orientations in Brazil's urban periphery neighborhoods, what can internal, organic, bottom-up or local knowledge offer to the question of transformation of violence in these

contexts? What can an understanding of local conflict intervention agency contribute to the field of peace studies, conflict intervention, and urban violence?

CHAPTER TWO

An Ethnographic Approach to Conflict, Violence, and Mediation

Introduction

Chapter 2 presents the methodology I selected to pursue the study of mediation practices and agency exercised in a context of violence and insecurity. The text presents the study's origins and methodological orientation. This orientation, which I refer to as a hybrid ethnographic approach, is informed by critical and focused ethnographic instruction, as well as an 'engaged' researcher stance.

Certainly, the privilege of my full-time presence living on the *Maciço* facilitated what Thomas (1993: 34) called the discernment of "deeper levels of meaning that lie beneath superficial surface appearances... beneath the surface world of accepted appearances [to] reveal the darker, oppressive side of social life." Nevertheless, such a pursuit and resulting claims suggest a more robust discussion in light of the various commitments and compromises inherent to my identity and involvement with the people and dynamics present in Florianópolis' periphery communities. The hybridity, I argue, responds to the challenges inherent to the context, given the peculiar challenges, obstacles, limitations, and demands presented to me in the researcher role.

Lest this role and perspective seem at odds with traditional views to observing the rigor and validity of data, analysis, and claims, I follow other researchers working in contexts of chronic violence who have contended (Baird, 2012: 170: also see Wheeler, 2012), a range of "issues and insights" would have otherwise fallen beneath the radar, the most fruitful of which were dependent upon the relationships that one establishes.

As Goldstein (2012: 45) has noted, researcher engagement in a complex environment is in fact better facilitated by the nurturing of such relationships, as this can elicit the enthusiastic participation of research subjects, which is the first step in making a critical approach to data sourcing and analysis even possible. In this way, discussing my "positioned objectivity" helps to render the research process, and rigor, more transparent, yielding "privileged insight,

analysis, and theoretical innovation that otherwise would be impossible to achieve" (Hale, 2008: 20).

The chapter opens with a description of the study's origin, and the influences that helped to situate the research I would later conduct on the *Maciço*. From there, I move into a discussion about what I call a hybridized methodological approach, which refers to a blend of Focused Ethnography (FE), Critical Ethnography (CE), and guidance provided by scholars who take an engaged or activist researcher stance.

After providing details about the fieldwork research timeline, I describe the range of data sourcing activities that I undertook in this ethnographically-informed project, probing my own 'researcher-positionality,' in order to highlight and render more transparent some of the assumptions, identities, and relationships that informed my ability to access data and treat ethical concerns. Without transparent discussion and critical self-reflection about these issues regarding the juxtaposition of my status as an outsider (or temporary insider) and my data sourcing process, the reader is left without a platform upon which to formulate critiques regarding the validity and claims that I make in this text.

Origins of the Study

This research originated from discussions that I had directly with residents of the Mont Serrat community who, together with inputs from neighbors, staffers, and volunteers from the CCEA and Instituto Vilson Groh (IVG)[23], effectively proposed exploring the tactics and possible impacts of conflict intervention and adaptations in a context of insecurity.

Exploratory conversations with residents during my first visit to Florianópolis in 2009, before ever commencing my studies at Bradford (September 2010),

[23] Officially created on the 23rd of December 2010, to create a synergy amongst and provide coordination and capacity-building support for strengthening the network of collaborating organizations. This network of organizations, all of which Vilson (with the support of many) helped to found, consolidate, and grow, are located in Florianópolis's peripheries. They are sometimes the only social, educational, and organized entities to provide education and related social services where the state or other NGOs have not maintained a presence. These include the Centro Cultural Escrava Anastácia (CCEA), the CEDEP (Centro de Educação e Evangelização Popular), a ACAM (Associação dos Amigos da Casa de Criança e do Adolescente do Morro do Mocotó), o Centro Social Elisabeth Sarcam, and the Centro Social Marista Irmão Celso Conte, Monte Serrat e São José.

helped to formulate the research topic. In January of 2009, I spent three week's at Vilson's home, getting to know CCEA projects, and visiting Maciço neighborhoods by day. In May of 2010, I returned to Brazil to conduct research about community justice projects in Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba (PR), visiting Mont Serrat again only briefly, for just a few days. On the eve of that trip, while living in Washington, DC, I was invited to speak at a US State Department panel to discuss US community mediation experiences over a dozen visiting judges from the state of Rio de Janeiro. Their trip, which aimed to expose them to US experiences and professional exchanges, would help enhance, improve, or refine their own local initiatives and innovations in programming, which at the time included things like *itinerant justice buses* to deliver legal services into Rio's urban periphery communities.

These and other professional and informal exchanges with conflict scholars and Brazilian practitioners, helped to pique my interest around the topic and growing movement. The conversations prepared me to identify significant differences in the way that periphery residents, and non-resident conflict resolution practitioners in Brazil were approaching disputes and intervention both theoretically and practically. The totality of these trips and exchanges furthered my inclination to pursue a study that would further examine these differences.

I came to know Mont Serrat, the CCEA, and key informants like Vilson Groh through a professional acquaintance, then doctoral student and Florianópolis native, João Salm, whom I had met in 2007 at an ACR[24] conference in the USA. Having grown up in Florianópolis's *centro*, João had been traveling between the US and Brazil to promote the establishment of a restorative justice initiative for the CCEA. As an acquaintance of Vilson's, he had also arranged for five CCEA staff members (community residents and non-residents) to receive dispute-resolution mediation training from the Mediation and Arbitration Chamber of Florianópolis.[25] João would eventually attempt to enlist my peer support in seeking Ford Foundation funding to launch this project. His initiative failed however, to take flight for various practical reasons, a few of which in part underscore the relevance of this inquiry.

[24] Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR)
[25] See: http://www.camaf.com.br [Accessed 10 April 2014]

Three of the individuals whom I interviewed, who had also taken the dispute resolution training, leveled important critiques about the coalescing of their experiences. This included a lack of involvement on João's part (an intermittent presence, given his studies in the US), and competing views to priorities and resource allocation for the CCEA organization, which disfavored establishing a mediation center. More striking perhaps were the philosophical differences and critiques about why a conventional dispute resolution model did not seem coherent with nuances of local conflict intervention needs or practices. As Ivone (2012) explained:

> "When the mediation trainers came with João to talk about the training, the central theme was conflict in the periphery and how you would use the methodology of mediation to eliminate conflict. They were *very* focused on the problems of the periphery, so we thought the course would be on that. In training, periphery conflicts became *totally marginalized* in the content. It was dislocated and invisible in terms of the larger context. Instead, mediation was discussed in relation to sports, like resolving conflicts in fights with a referee for example – how bizarre!
>
> From then on [the assumption was] you could just set up shop, hang out your *community mediation* sign, listen to two people in conflict, and help them walk out as friends. It was something so [pauses] *just so extremely superficial*. You know, at first, those of us involved were enthusiastic because we're all familiar with homegrown conflicts, but these really couldn't be taken forward because [trainees] realized that in reality, the causes of those small conflicts were actually much bigger. What's more, those who were giving the training were part of a universe that generated those bigger conflicts, and we [trainees] couldn't really go forward.

Mont Serrat trainees would describe disconnection, dissonance, and discrepancies with the model of dispute intervention, as this was also seen as incoherent with their inclination or experiences treating *morro*-based conflicts. What began to come to light was a distinct view about mediation practices, inextricably linked by their protagonists to the questions of violence and community dynamics, or the larger social conflict, impacting their everyday lives. As Leandro (2012) opined, mediation was highly relevant for engaging issues beyond simple access to a mechanism through which to 'realize' one's rights

through institutional responsiveness, which other periphery experiences in Brazil emphasized. In light of conflict and tension with the state's agents and institutions, he expressed that

> "What would've worked best was mediation that, maybe not between the community, but between the community and the public authorities - mediation for defining rights. I think that we should do a bit of surveying – we never asked 'what conflicts do we have here?' We support mediation, but what conflicts are we gonna mediate? What are the demands?
>
> The demands that come from [the periphery] are not disputes between neighbors. That's not why people go to the *Centro Cultural.* They go because they don't have access to running water, *cesta básica*[26], or their roofs are caving in. People live at the margins of what the public authorities make available. What you see aren't individual problems. People have difficulties, of course those exist - but others don't get involved in that. It's part of life. What you see are social issues and that's what gets identified, like 'what you've got there is a social problem, not an individual issue."

He continued, illuminating discord between the real and ideal:

> "There was a disparity between what the [dispute resolution training] course was supposed to do and what was supposed to happen in practice [in the community]. What we got was this mediation more for business, maybe for the judiciary, for lawyers, you know, people more connected to that environment. What was supposed to happen in practice was to deal with community conflicts. Those [conflicts] could have been negotiated, but in the background, not really.
>
> Conflicts about the neighbor expanding their floor plan, or broken sewers running into someone else's house, issues between neighbors.... Between neighbors that is all about relationships that happens over the years…. There's a different reality here and a different functionality, and another type of power at work. The [mediation] course was… I'm going to be honest, it was a course for the middle class, [the periphery was] dealing with conflicts, fights, *conflitos do barraco (conflicts in the shack), bah bah bah* (mimicking noises of voices arguing). And you know, conflicts of the impoverished. And we [had] wanted to develop this for these issues in these areas."

[26] *Cesta básica,* or food parcel, contains a monthly supply of non-perishable food and other necessities allocated to families in need. For more, see http://www.dieese.org.br/ [Accessed 15 May 2015]

Jared: "And violence?"

> "We talked about that. [We asked] could it be that we could really reach these problems, or conflicts that were more criminal in nature? To be honest, I had big doubts about our capacity to confront those issues, but maybe with practice, with the people and community, having this mediation program, if people had more trust over time. For example, today, I'm at my office, because people don't trust me if I'm not present, if I don't open my door. That's the work of a mediator."

Conversations with residents like Alessandra, Vilson, and others, challenged the 'fit' of the purpose of conventional mediation model training, despite anticipating some of its benefits. Furthermore, residents and CCEA staff working in socio-educational *projects*,[27] it was suggested, already performed interventions into conflict and interruption of violence on a regular basis, both in terms of saving lives, but also in service of creating changes for young generations and the community at large in relation to trafficking and violence. For disputes related to violence and trafficking, local agents located third party negotiation most explicitly in terms of disputing themes involving gun- or drug-debt repayment, but did not also discount contending with more extreme scenarios.

In *Mocotó* for example, Floripa's 'crack-central' neighborhood under PGC control, Alessandra shared with me that there had been a microwave (*micro-ondas*) style murder in 2006,[28] reflecting the more heinous example of violence seen in larger Brazilian cities. Feeling a sense of urgency, the idea of mediation as an exercise of local agency to prevent such event was just the type of thing residents considered as a new and perhaps innovative practices with the possibility, or as one that sought to augment, enhance, or improve whatever it was these local actors were already doing, so as to make a greater impact.

[27] *Projetos* or projects is the general term used to refer to organized activities for community youth that span various discipline areas (*oficinas*). Across periphery communities in Brazil, NGOs, including the CCEA, *projetos* run programming in conjunction with school schedules, to provide opportunities ranging from information technology to team building and individual empowerment efforts through sports, music and culture such as surfing and capoeira classes.
[28] See: http://anoticia.clicrbs.com.br/sc/noticia/2009/10/acusados-de-crime-do-micro-ondas-vao-a-juri-popular-na-terca-feira-em-Florianópolis-2682516.html [Accessed 15 September 2015]

Despite the absence of clear intervention approach, residents and CCEA staff seemed eager and willing to engage in local negotiations despite the risks these presented. This included interfacing regularly, if cautiously, with non-state armed actors, and in local scenarios in which violence linked to the trafficking world was a proactive step, rather than reactive, or avoided.

The search for accessible intervention tools and mediation knowledge, for which I was initially consulted, surfaced questions about the blurring the line between violence as a local source of conflict, and what it meant for interveners to develop or frame existing intervention practices that engaged complex realities of social ordering itself within the socio-cultural community context. How did local mediators treat violence? Would the unorganized, seemingly un-systematized and yet implicitly defined efforts reflect a similar approach seen in the US violence interrupter model, or something different entirely?

Divergent claims to mediation and distinct priorities complicated the defining of such third party intervention practices, precisely because they were inextricably linked to patterns of violence and insecurity, not uncommon to urban spaces in Brazil and regional neighbors. The initial discussions about this called for exploratory inquiry about intervention work in these unique spaces.

The ethnographic approach emerges as a fruitful one, given the nexus of residents' own critically-oriented rejection of a conventional mediation practice model (within the scope of their life experiences and work of the CCEA), and the invitation extended to me to observe, comment, and contribute a return in some way to the *bricolage* of intervention practices being used to address everyday disputes in the context of periphery life. What would a deeper attention to detail reveal about mediation, or its dominant conceptualizations, garnered from this peculiar context? What distinctions could we draw about elements of practice presented by local intervention emerging in contrast to the wave Brazil's access-to-justice mediation initiatives that continue to evolve in periphery communities across the nation?

By pursuing these questions, this study offers original insight into the practice of mediation gleaned through the lens of residents' roles, goals, practices, and

views to conflict and violence from the perspective of living through them. Rather than taking up practices based on an *a priori* and uncritically examined set of objectives and assumptions about conflict, it attempts to discern and contribute a more locally coherent meaning of mediation, shaped by the contours of third party intervention practices at the urban margins. As Mendez (2008: 140-141) would concur, this 'critical' approach would draw attention to those voices that are "missing or marginalized from knowledge production, but also to how categories like 'community,' 'the oppressed,' or 'the poor' might obfuscate differences of power and perspective" while avoiding the patronizing endeavor of further rendering structural inequalities invisible.

A Hybrid Ethnographic Approach

Central to this interrogation, I would argue, are the relational processes of interaction inherent to the exercise of agency by citizens who perform conflict intervention work, in formal or informal roles, particularly with respect to analysis of those interactions with social reproductions of violence. Rather than a comparative study, the environment and initial discussions demonstrated a robustness from which to understand third party intervention work in a context that continues to be relevant for the Peace Studies discipline. As I contend in chapter one, the relative absence of such views to help inform our conceptualization of mediation and local agency, exercised in function of disputes in the periphery itself, provided further "critically-informed" impetus.

Ethnography about mediation would become "a research process of learning *about* people by learning *from* them" (Roper and Shapira 2000: 13), or attempting to define and depict the emergence of intervention practice and the dimensions of third party work by paying attention to "active involvement in social events as they occur in their natural setting". A hybrid approach can be seen as the fusion of Focused, Critical, and Engaged orientations to ethnographic research. Critical ethnographers, for example, strive to bring new data to bear, or present unique detail or perspective on smaller spaces, so as to begin to offer alternative claims about a bigger picture. This orientation would invite new perspectives on a particular set of practices, performed by a certain group of individuals. It is also aided in part by the existing gaps suggested by existing empirical studies in similar contexts. Arias (2006: 31), for example,

argues that research in smaller, detailed case studies under conditions of ongoing social violence must be conducted in order to grasp the larger patterns and political dynamics at work with respect to furthering democratic consolidation in Brazil and the region.

My approach was informed by three main factors, all of which compelled me to dig deeper in terms of data sourcing. This was true not only through the questions I posed during interviews, but also with regard to grappling with data that sometimes ran counter to, or contrasted significantly with some of the conventional characteristics that defined what I knew as 'outsider' conflict intervention practices: 1) The lack of (and therefore impossibility of studying) mediation work through the lens and experiences of an organized or institutionalized community mediation practice model that residents used to engage with local disputes; 2) The explicit invitation made to me by *morro* residents and CCEA staffers during my pre-2012 fieldwork, to contribute in some substantive way to the local conflict intervention work in a complex urban context of insecurity, and; 3) The challenge of conducting an ethnographic study and analysis about third party conflict intervention in a context and language with which I had some, but relatively little in-depth experience. These points dovetail with Soyini Madison's (2012: 5) criteria of appropriateness through a critical ethnographic eye, whereby:

> "The conditions for existence within a particular context are not as they could be for specific subjects; as a result, the researcher feels a moral obligation to make a contribution toward changing those conditions toward greater freedom and equity. The critical ethnographer also takes us beneath surface appearances, disrupts the status quo, and unsettles both neutrality and taken-for-granted assumptions by bringing to light underlying and obscure operations of power and control. Therefore, the critical ethnographer resists domestication and moves from 'what is' to 'what could be'".

While a *Critical* orientation helped to ground the inquiry, *Focused* ethnographic instruction became useful in guiding how I planned and carried out the work, delimiting the boundaries of research by emphasizing a particular sub-group under focus, and allowing these to be nurtured and balanced by perspectives from non-sub-group subjects over time. Building on this, rather than an approach that sought to comprehend or explain a larger field, Focused

Ethnography offered more detailed instruction for interrogating relational processes on a smaller scale. In my case, it oriented me to focus on ways that language, action, interactions, and intervention episodes, involving a group of key informants, shaped the phenomena of mediation and social ordering, vis-a-vis third party intervention.

Although locals' non-violent conflict intervention work was already in motion well before my arrival, a FE oriented methodology presented me with a means through which to organize, illuminate and speak to the nuances of third party interveners and their work in these contexts. This aided in the gradual shaping and focus of fieldwork, helping to discern useful starting places and scopes for original data sourcing. It also allowed the positing local knowledge as central to any contribution that this inquiry would make to the fields of peace and conflict studies, which continues to grapple with and become redefined through emerging micro-level studies such as this one.

Focused Ethnography

Focused Ethnography (FE) has origins in the health care field, in particular nursing, to investigate beliefs, practices or processes held by patients and practitioners, and as a tool used to gain understanding of "the experiences of specific aspects of people's way of life and being" (Cruz and Higginbottom, 2013). It aligns with the study of subject matter regarding "cultures and sub-cultures framed within a discreet community or phenomenon and context, whereby participants have specific knowledge about an identified problem" (Higginbottom, Pillay, and Noadu, 2013).

Whereas all qualitative research looks at *everyday* context, and traditional ethnography at entire communities and cultures, Savage (2006: 2) asserts: "there is wide agreement that the [FE] methodology is eminently suitable for exploring sub-cultures or groups of people within complex, pluralistic societies". The methods and analytical techniques "reveal the meaningful way that [people] think and act within the framework of their lives" uncovering "'taken-for-granted normal routines and the 'contradictions between intent, meaning and action' (Street, 1992 cited in Shapira and Roper, 2000: 27). My experience closely

follows Field's (1989 cited in Roper and Shapira, 2000: 27) elements of the Focused Ethnographer's role:

> (1) Interacting with variety of people in different circumstances, and for collecting data; (2) Application of careful listening and verbal and nonverbal communication skills in order to later extract meaning, in part based on larger context; (3) Observing and interpreting on various levels simultaneously - considering internal and external factors of influence (refined over time via experience) later leading to retrieval and analysis, and; (4) Intentional use of self-reflective processes to situate the practitioner in context and become more aware of one's interactional patterns, assumptions, internal state and reactions to situational contexts, while also attempting to understand more ethically, the presenting scene at hand.

A focused ethnographic approach makes it possible to interrogate intervention practices within a broader, lived experience, rather than researcher foible of asserting external meanings (Knoblauch, 2005). Using this approach would contribute to findings based on a point of departure that many contemporary mediation studies tend not to accommodate.

One of the goals of research supported by the FE approach, was thus "discerning and uncovering the actual facts of [people's] lives and experience, facts that have been hidden, inaccessible, suppressed, distorted, misunderstood, ignored" (DuBois, 1985 cited in Bergen, 1993). FE proposed sound guidance for engaging analytically with how individuals dealt with disputes or approached conflicts under daily living conditions of insecurity, as well as the meanings they assigned to a world that propelled, permitted or undergirded their thinking and activities in the absence of an explicitly identifiable set of guidelines.

FE achieves subjective adequacy by giving attention to seven particular dimensions. Amongst its principle characteristics, the methodology presents: the orientation of a single researcher; a "focus on a discrete community or organization, or social phenomena"; the "involvement of a limited number of participants"; research that is "problem-focused and context-specific"; emphasis on subjects or informants who hold "specific knowledge"; and 6) participation observation that is "episodic" (Savage, 2006: 3). It employs a qualitative

"inductive paradigm to gain in-depth understandings" as a "mini-ethnography" that may best describe "problem-focused and context-specific attributes" (Savage, 2006: 17).

FE-informed questions tend to take the form of first-level questions focused on the *what*, such as *what are the shared beliefs, values, and practice patterns* (of a specific population) in a specific setting, or *who have a specific condition*?" Other primers focus on characteristics, relationships between, or asking 'what is it like to X or Y.' Secondary questions may relate to ideas such as "what facilitates, constrains or sustains", or "how did (particular group) engage with (particular group)" (Walsh, 2009).

Proponents argue that literature on existing clinical practices can help determine an appropriate question to generate new findings that are relevant and useful for the service environment (Higginbottom, Pillay, and Noadu, 2013). Data sourcing thus pushes boundaries to understand practices informed by the way their agents construct and engage them in response to their environments – one in which experiences of democracy and citizenship are constantly being shaped by conditions of violence and insecurity (Wheeler, 2012).

Seeking guidance from existing mediation and third party literature, I located but few studies (Picard and Melchin, 2007; Sargent, Picard, and Jull, 2011; Schwerin, 1995, Maiman and Schwerin, 1996) that employed grounded or 'learning-oriented' approaches to research about mediation in a community context, or the influences of conflict intervention practice more broadly. These studies often focus on process-specifics within North American contexts, drawing from data collected in the confines of institutionalized programming, or from 'captive' pools of practitioners who subscribe to a pre-existing, and explicitly organized model of mediation practice within the four walls of a conventional community mediation center.

Such approaches strayed significantly from any attempt I would undertake to interrogate innovations in intervention work on the *morro*, offering little in terms of guidance for analyzing the relationship between intervention work and violence, insecurity that constituted part of the local social ordering processes. In this situation, Savage's (2006: 387) view that FE is "particularly useful where

information is new and unfamiliar, or when the information required is too subtle or complex to be elicited by questionnaires or similar techniques," proved to be "effective in uncovering the tacit skills, decision rules and subtleties in [work] labeled as routine, unskilled or deskilled, or even trivial".

Engaged Ethnographic Research

The very purpose of living and conducting research *on the Maciço* was to discern a range of experiences and practices of conflict intervention and third party agency, as they emerged, as well as their connection, if any, to reproductions of violence in the context of everyday life. Living full time in Mont Serrat, in addition to my participation in community events with diverse groups, or forays into spaces and at times that would be realistically limited to other outsiders, privileged organized and impromptu conversations and experiences with a variety of informants.

This presence, which I elaborate upon further below, would position me to more strategically source data, and develop a more coherent comprehension of these issues as they were initially problematized by the very neighborhood residents attempting to adopt its practices into their lives and work. Analysis would require the simultaneous development of understanding how and what residents *emically* identified as scenarios of neighborhood tensions, disputes, or conflicts, rather than departing from my own etic, or *a priori* assumptions based on professionally or externally constituted beliefs alone. Thus the data generated about intervention had to be considered and analyzed in light of locally influenced and generated logic and actions.

The Engaged orientation to ethnographic research is one that helped guide how I viewed and managed my actions and identity as an individual with an increasing presence in the Mont Serrat and other communities, as well as my pledge or commitment to the organizations or individuals, such as Vilson, over the course of the research. Scholars describe engaged or activist anthropology as that which moves beyond the limits of social science to explore the possibilities for contributing to the societies under study and sometimes performed in collaboration with subjects, whether or not subjects form an organized group with a unified goal (Goldstein, 2012: 35; Hale, 2008).

Skidmore's (2007) inclination is to propose a more complex reflection for the researcher, querying how it could be possible to *not* engage, somehow simultaneously justifying a research approach based upon the determination that the 'turbulent lives' of research subjects would be somehow peripheral to the research questions.

In my study, the conflicting possibilities contained within the origin story of this research point to the core of why a change-making process toward a more refined set of intervention practices was already in motion, well before I arrived to perform analysis and discuss such themes. The very act of pursuing the research, based on the initial working assumptions that our existing knowledge about these issues remains incomplete, can be viewed as an engaged or activist venture.

Defined broadly, engaged anthropology boils down to that of sharing commitments of those held by research subjects, which can be identified as having some form of political goal. At a minimum, the goal was forwarding a non-reductionist, research-based pursuit of drawing from original data that would contribute to a broader understanding of third party intervention. Although this was being practiced regularly, it was to my knowledge, unaccounted for, or under-analyzed, in conflict intervention literature under the particularly set of conditions within which local actors had been exercising their *mediative* agency.

Using Fine's (1994, cited in Soyini Madison, 2012) categories of ventriloquists, voices, and activists, my positionality as a researcher falls along the border between the ethnographer's focus on *voices*, and that of an *activist* role. Whereas Fine's *voices* defines the orientation to raising up indigenous meanings and experiences in opposition to dominant discourses and practices, an activism stance is characterized by the ethnographer taking a clear position in intervening upon hegemonic practices and advocates in exposing material effects of marginalized locations.

Whereas my research process offers transparency in terms of data collection and features that offer rigor and soundness, the decision to pursue indigenous meanings by drawing upon local knowledge, in full view of the possibility it could

interrupt a local status-quo with respect to dominant definitions of third party mediation work in Brazil, must be identified as an inherently activist oriented proposition. The mere proposition that there had been little, if any real empirical, systematized work conducted around non-violent third party intervention agency and approaches and the confluence of violence experienced by periphery residents, would thus effectively underscore this study.

While I did not proactively take on the activism stance so as to promote any type of practices or advocate for a particular violence-informed approach, the very practice of being 'critical' was a way of shaping how I listened, what I listened to, as well as then raising up, including, scrutinizing, and analyzing some of the less "visible" or what some might call "relevant" processes and dynamics at work in a community. This guided me in a range of activities, whether facilitating discussions with teachers about school-based challenges around violence and disputes, to discussing experiences of race and lived injustices amongst a dinner table of residents at Dona Uda's home.

In many ways, an engaged stance was fundamental for research rigor, allowing me to test and feel out negative or less useful hypotheses or explanations, and supporting data sourcing and trust-building efforts, rather than impeding them. In this way, positionality as an ally in meaningful discussions to residents allowed me to engage with actors and community dynamics in ways that would temper and enrich the emphasis on key informants.

Critical ethnography is complementary to an engaged approach in that the line of inquiry allows a researcher to draw from data beyond one's immediate frame, illuminating organic intervention practices amidst the larger context of periphery life, vis-à-vis observations that bring to light "underlying and obscure operations of power and control" as new data is brought to bear on a particular phenomenon (Soyini Madison, 2012: 5, see also Thomas, 1993: 6). This is accomplished through researcher activities that reveal patterns below surface appearance, disrupt a status quo, and unsettle neutrality and assumptions (Thomas, 1993).

Here, what would be unethical would be to disengage or somehow 'control for' an understanding of practice that did not analytically appreciate the way that key informants engaged in these performances in this context. Where voices of a select group may be absent from informing the evolution of knowledge about an arena of practice such as third party intervention, researchers operating from a critical perspective are compelled by the "ethical responsibility to address processes of unfairness or injustice within a particular lived domain," whereby the "conditions for existence within a particular context are not as they could be for specific subjects; as a result, the researcher feels a moral obligation to make a contribution toward changing those conditions toward greater freedom and equity" (Soyini Madison, 2012: 5).

As Mendez (2008: 140) explains, *engaged* research is that which rejects the disinterested researcher, and seeks ways to become politically relevant in the world, by attempting to forge "an admittedly fragile and difficult coalition" between the local, grassroots and experiential knowledge, and conventionally considered "scholarly" knowledge. I adopted a critical activist approach to research precisely because its initial working assumptions (and ultimately its findings) could not be disassociated from actively contributing to a refined set of claims, definition, or understandings about non-violent, local-agency driven third party intervention practices, particularly given the dearth of nuance or critical perspective seen in existing approaches to studying non-violent mediation or conflict intervention practices in urban and often violent settings in Brazil.

The very fact that I was not formally conducting research before the formal fieldwork period in 2012, but rather, built initial foundations for relationships based on my status as a foreign professional and conflict resolution practitioner, indicates a formal shift in my identity that could have had implications on the research. Navigating that reality is a question of fundamental importance for the academic community when it comes to ethical concerns and viability of data, whereas the community's concerns and interactions were much different in the face of an outsider coming in to "ask questions" or possibly provide useful analysis or reflection about their efforts. Where this gap exists, the activist or engaged stance became a helpful orientation to guide my actions more intentionally.

In the hybrid approach, questions about how to treat ethical questions, or reflect upon my positionality and engaged status were present even before the research began, and would continue after the main stage of data sourcing was more or less completed. My relationship with Vilson[29] for example (discussed further below), must be viewed with respect to how I was able to gain access to people and spaces, in a relative short period of time. What would this entail, and what type of expectations would be placed on me for simply endeavoring to conduct this type of research?

Contextualizing his experience of researching insecurity at the urban margins, Goldstein's (2012: 37) writes that:

> "In such a context, people require some kind of return for their time and willingness to share the details of their experience… but it seems particularly important in the wake of neoliberalism and its destructuring effects on local communities. Additionally, when the topic of investigation is one that is of great and immediate concern to the people being studied, they have a vested interest in seeing some sort of return to themselves and their community from that research. In other words, giving back to the community was not an option for me, but rather a precondition for doing research…"

Initially, being conscious of "giving back" became a matter of what I could actively build in terms of trust, reliability, confidentiality, as well as an opportunity for subjects to reflect in conversation on their work in the presence of a good ear. Giving back was also an ethical commitment to keep data secure, respect requests for non-attribution, and consider possible impacts, harm, or actions that might generate insecurity or undesirable consequences for me or participant.

Indeed, discerning mediation practices and their impact under conditions of insecurity was a process of attempting to understand and explain how people in

[29] Certain indicators did help me establish criteria for knowing when a blurred line was in fact helpful, rather than harmful. For example, Vilson had initially extended his support to me through his social network, in exchange for my pledge to volunteer with the CCEA or IVG on an as-needed basis. Nevertheless, Vilson would later tell me that my short visit in May of 2010 helped to confirm his sense of trust in my commitment to seriously research a theme that he thought would be deeply valuable for the community, ultimately compelling his further support.

a particular context treat the urgencies, emergencies and associated issues that come with managing conflict and disputes in their everyday lives. These offer a new way of understanding mediator roles in contexts with similar conditions, which present distinctly from implicit and explicit understandings underpinning conventional mediation practices and the reason for which institutions and organizations most commonly use them. Along these lines, data collection and inductive analysis went hand in hand, permitting a "natural triangulation of investigative approaches on the same phenomenon" are possible vis-à-vis the researcher as an instrument themselves (Roper and Shapira, 2000: 12-13).

Fieldwork Research Timeline

Between May and October of 2012, I lived full time in Mont Serrat, conducting dozens of interviews and participant observations in formal and informal community spaces across the *Maciço*. My initial weeks were spent familiarizing myself with people, neighborhoods, CCEA projects and staff, and daily routines of the community's young people involved in social education programming, or "the projects". In this time, I also came to understand the function of the newly minted IVG.[30] I would return to Florianópolis twice after this 6-month period, once in 2013 and again in 2014, to conduct research and participate as a moderator and speaker at two RACDCA seminars. The first of these took place in April 2013, on a research trip funded by an EU/Marie Curie Peacebuilding fellowship while I was working at the University of Coimbra.

Between October 2012 and April 2013, Santa Catarina had experienced 114 total attacks on public and private buildings in 37 cities, with a total of 43 bus burnings. Florianópolis (and other cities) fell under a siege of bus burnings and attacks on police stations, allegedly by PGC traffickers, in response to allegations of prisoner torture taking place at *São Pedro de Alcântara* Prison. An investigation by municipal legal authorities, months later, would reveal the veracity of such claims. The attacks on buses and police delegacies lasted for two weeks, effectively holding the city hostage. In total, 68 attacks occurred in 16 cities around Santa Catarina, including some on the *Maciço*. Approximately

[30] Though Vilson resisted the name, he ultimately conceded to the IVG under the logic of increasing donor recognition). The IVG was created to provide financial and strategic support for the eight independently operating NGOs and educational hubs that comprise the IVG network throughout Greater Florianópolis' peripheries. For more detail visit: http://www.redeivg.org.br/rede-ivg/ [Accessed 15 September 2015]

27 buses were burned between my first and second fieldwork experience alone. [31] Notably, for various reasons, the prison uprisings and attacks interrupted an ongoing initiative by local mediators that I was accompanying with the *Descoberta* neighborhood traffickers, with whom dialogue had been initiated in September of 2012.

The second trip in November 2014 was funded by a non-affiliated NGO in Florianópolis, which hired me to give a workshop. Taking advantage of the time, I spent the remainder of the month focused solely on conducting more research. Two years after the 2012 mayoral and municipal elections and the formation of the RACDCA network, and two months after another round of statewide PGC-ordered attacks, I returned to *Floripa* to participate in a third RACDCA seminar and conduct follow up interviews.

On this trip I was able to arrange a discussion with the city's new military police commander, as well as observe some of the planning and post-event discussions around the IVG/ACAM *Mocotó-Cor* project, which was argued by Vilson as the beginning of a process that would constitute an initiative similar to Rio's UPP, though entirely civilian-driven. Importantly, these visits permitted a modicum of longitudinal reflection vis-à-vis interviews and discussion of ongoing analysis.

Overall, the study was greatly enriched by the ability to engage in new and reflective discussions about the impacts of local political changes**,** municipal investments on the *Maciço* since the 2012 elections, rising tensions and conflicts on the *morro* communities, and RACDCA network experiences. During the 2014 visit, a monumental Federal Police investigation had revealed widespread corruption amongst key political figures from the city's council members, and reaching deeply into the city's executive and legislative offices, implicating political leaders and lawmakers alike. Investigatory and judicial processes at the time of this writing were ongoing.

[31] See, http://diariocatarinense.clicrbs.com.br/sc/policia/noticia/2014/09/linha-do-tempo-a-historia-dos-atentados-em-santa-catarina-4610392.html [Accessed 15 September 2015]

Data Sourcing

My research activities on the *morro* involved significant amounts of participant observation. For this, I developed a consistent presence in community and street life, including private-family or by-invitation occasions ranging from formal and informal meetings, gatherings and conversations, to events such as celebrations, births, or deaths. I also participated in CCEA projects and activities like the Procurando Caminho (ProCam), which ran its activities daily out of the newly renovated Espaço Seu Teco space*,* and the CCEA headquarters located behind Vilson's house. It was here that I came to know staff and observe daily operations, often sitting in staff meetings, engaging with young people participating in the projects, or chatting with neighbors, visitors, and volunteers alike.

Developing a presence in the community often meant accommodating requests to participate in activities. Many of these proved fruitful for participant-observation. My own participation as a volunteer ranged from church accompaniment projects and activities involving physical labor, or feeding the homeless, to facilitating group meetings, and conducting primary school in-service workshop for teachers, once at the MS school, and another public school on the continent.

For example, over the course of early 2012, I shadowed Gelson and Edson, teachers and 'community articulators' who were piloting an outreach initiative for families of school children, while also facilitating a participatory process to build student leadership and a co-existence code amongst students and administrators. The closeness of involvement permitted me rare experiences and insights into various moments of daily life on the *morro*. This often led to opportunities to invite semi-structured interviews, or spark impromptu, if sometimes in-depth, conversations with neighbors, teachers, and administrators. Similarly, my participation in IVG activities such as a moderator during the formation and dialogue activities of the RACDCA network, which began during a seminar organized by IVG in October 2012, afforded me observation time with state and city authorities, as well as interactions amongst these officials, NGO staff, and *morro* residents.

As Goldstein (2012: 45) asserts, “fieldwork does not, in fact, occur in a laboratory, in which the investigator can be hermetically sealed off from the subjects of his or her research”. Working with unfolding scenarios and rich data becomes a complex and “messy” process, in which “all flexibility and a willingness to respond creatively to the challenges that arise when working with people who may be much more interested in the practical realities of daily life than in the concerns of one’s research” speaks to the experience. As a participant-observer, I engaged daily and over the months with dozens of subjects and scenarios. In this context, “the idea of detachment is laughable” (Goldstein, 2012: 45).

My attempt at maintaining a non-interruptive presence at meetings, conflict interventions or strategic discussions, led me to practice a cordial, yet low-intensity profile, at times to simply track the conversation or record or remember key moments or interactions. At times when somebody invited me to comment or in some way contribute to, or participate in the situation at hand, I strived to use neutral observation communication tactics such as naming, reflection, and open-ended questions, diverting attention back onto the individual or group, and thereby avoiding the adding-to, or influencing of, substantive content. This was particularly relevant in the examples of the RACDCA meetings, retreats such as one I attended with the *ProCam* staff, but not limited to strategic planning sessions or even conflict intervention scenarios to which I was privileged.

Increasingly, I observed these as well-suited opportunities for research to learn and engage with different individuals or groups to reflect on issues of local conflict, intervention, violence, and related themes. Attempting to structure my participation through the competent formulation of reflective questioning could facilitate rich discussions for individuals who were, admittedly in many cases, typically caught up in simply managing day to day issues, without much room for reflective thinking. I discuss this tact in light of my own professional expertise, further below.

For example, the half-day teacher in-service sessions that I conducted, once on the *morro* and once in a *Monte Cristo* neighborhood school, inevitably raised discussions about violence in the communities, creating a space in which teachers endeavored to use the time to elaborate and exchange their

experiences. Discussions included violence and conflict between and amongst students and administrators, teachers' fears, behavioral issues, debates about restorative justice practices, and community politics.

On these occasions, I endeavored to follow an elicitive, rather than prescriptive approach, which is less facilitator-directed, and locates the idea of 'expertise' as inherent to the group and interaction, rather than the facilitator as expert (Lederach, 1998). Using the elicitive orientation, I continued to structure sessions that I was asked to lead as a facilitator in ways that would foster spaces of exchange, wherein a more participatory learning environment would bear fruit for all present, while also offering me a chance to also learn from them. I argue that the generation of data through such experiences, which tapped into complex issues and group interactions, could not have been achieved through individual conversations or interviews.

I performed participant-observations during less usual occasssions as well. Evening rounds with Vilson through the *Maciço,* which I labeled *night walks*, were physical incursions on foot into neighborhoods and trafficker-dominated areas at night, inevitably encroaching upon caches of drugs, guns, or production areas, wherein receiving, packaging, weighing, and distributing activities were sometimes on display.

For the most part, traffickers gather in places where few non-residents are privileged to go, and where many residents avoid if they can at certain hours of the day or night. As an unknown quantity, you must have a good pretext to show up or trespass in certain areas, or risk severe consequences for your intrusions. Night walks thus form part of the local intervention repertoire of non-violent, non-dominating mediative tactics. Vilson often contended, as in the later Mocotó-cor project, that such walks foster a presence that symbolically counter the Rio's more militarized approach to initial UPP phases, with which *morro* residents young and old were not only widely familiar, but in some areas also anticipated could occur by the Florianópolis security forces.

Conducting Interviews

Vilson's home and its centrality proved to be a critical hub for witnessing spontaneous meetings, mediations, or strategic planning and discussions, all of

which helped to augment and complement interviews and data analysis. His home was also considered a safe space for gatherings or conducting interviews in private. This was particularly at times of high tension or risk, or at times where confidentiality was paramount, particularly for discussions about violence with concerned residents. Vilson's home as well as the community churches in *MS* and the *Alto do Caieira* (*Caieira*) neighborhoods, for example, also served as sites for 'case intake' and informational exchanges, where I could observe intervention planning, and interventions or dialogue sessions amongst residents and key informants, including those with, or about leaders of local trafficking gangs.

Regular exposure to, and greater trust that I built amongst *morro and non-morro* residents led to increased frequency of content-rich discussions. Scheduled interviews were often complemented by post-script conversations about community life. Both organized interviews and impromptu conversations took place with numerous types of people, including but not limited to: self-identified mediators, socio-educational project staff, public and Marist-school administrators and educators working in periphery-based schools, state authorities from social services, members of the Polícia Militar (PM) high command, human rights and youth affairs judges and attorneys, restorative justice practitioners, current and former trafficking employees at various leadership levels (from lookouts and sellers, to *boca* managers, bosses, strong-men), individuals involved in the PGC, *morro* community leaders and residents, including local council members, and those referred to as *referências* or respected, on the *morro*.

Organized interviews typically lasted between one and two hours, with a handful extending into three or more. In 2012, I recorded 45 individual and group (two or more people) interviews, accompanied by countless informal conversations and numerous field-note journals. In 2013, I conducted eight new and follow-up interviews, adding twelve more in 2014, atop more field notes. The majority of 2013-2014 interviews followed up with specific *morro* residents, CCEA staff, or state authorities, and were helpful in particular with the analysis offered in Chapters 5 and 6.

A handful of key internal informants provided two, three, and sometimes more, semi-structured interviews. In this thesis, I present data and fieldwork experiences using thick descriptions (see Geertz, 1973), to contextualize and give voice and viewpoint to the reader with as little disruption possible through my singular interpretation. It should be noted that I did conduct 100% of the interview coding, analysis, and translation from Portuguese into English. For the most part, these snippets remain in their original format, if at times abridged, or have been reproduced as faithfully as possible after conversations in which a request for non-audio-recording was made, or where safety concerns trumped the sensibility recording.

In 2012 alone, I recorded a total of twelve semi-structured interviews with Vilson. This averages to approximately two per month, all of which ran between one and three hours. Our informal conversations merged often into ongoing dialogue. Gradually, Vilson, and other key informants, became more likely to point out or share their views and reflections with me spontaneously at key moments, in order to highlight something that we had previously discussed. With Vilson, this was most pronounced after *night walks* or post-conflict interventions (see Chapters 5 and 6), in which I endeavored to reflect on the experience immediately following.

Conducting interviews with *morro* residents did not always run smoothly. As a researcher, I had to quickly adapt to nuances when somebody would accept my invitation to get together to chat (something Brazilians notoriously will almost never directly refuse), and knowing how to engineer the script of actually assuring they'll show up. Work schedules, family demands, and the rapid pace of periphery life meant that 30 minutes to sit and talk with a relative stranger was often a luxury. Privacy in the midst of crowded community spaces, where public and private often blend through thin walls, was at times also difficult to ensure.

In this way, making space for informal conversations at key times began to replace, and prove more viable and enriching, than the possibility of formal interviews. This also helps explain why, for example, some of the most informative conversations I had with Vilson were recorded in his car, while I accompanied him on errands or activities. Conversations and interviews with

informants occurred in a wide range of spaces, from automobile and bus passenger seats, to high-rise government offices, *morro* stoops and livings rooms, and even once the floor of a *Candomblé terreiro*,

My proximity to IVG and CCEA staff was also critical for my witnessing of the development of the RACDCA network[32] (see Chapter 7), and contact with state authorities and institutions. Over time, my participation in RACDCA activities[33] gave me the opportunity to further and informally discuss issues, as well as conduct follow-up interviews with political and judicial authorities, as well as institutional administrators and staff. During my follow up fieldwork visits in 2013 and 2014 as RACDCA efforts were gaining steam, I used post-meetings or post-event moments to initiated discussions regarding emergent themes or concepts linked to my ongoing analysis.

Most informal discussions, whether with *morro* residents or authorities, offered the chance to invite a more structured interview at a later time. This achieved, in part, what Savage (2006: 387) describes as

> "The advantage of allowing [participants] a rare, and often highly valued, opportunity to talk about the complexity of what they do and to formulate and pursue problems in their own terms through discussions with someone who is genuinely interested. The value placed on this kind of opportunity can be evident… in the way that interviews are not quickly terminated by participants, but often last longer than intended and sometimes only end because of exhaustion on the part of both parties."

Observations and interviews proved to be highly complementary. On many occasions interviewees reflected that interviews were helpful, as they offered a rare chance for critical reflection and taking stock of certain issues. This was true as much for *morro* residents as for those working in the judicial sector.

Secondary sources such as media coverage, newspaper reports, and conversations with people outside my immediate circles also provided me with perspectives that helped frame information to which I had been exposed.

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[32] The Articulation and Connectivity Network for the Rights of Children and Adolescents

[33] The IVG would organize two open seminars for public officials and civil society organizations to discuss public policies through the work of the RACDCA. I was invited to serve as a panel moderator and speaker at both of these events, in April 2013 and November 2014.

Certain data derived from interviews could also be (anonymously and with careful attention) run through secondary sources or other individuals for verification. My approach can therefore be described as “a curious kind of cross-eyed vision, one eye roving ceaselessly around the general context, any part of which may suddenly reveal itself to be relevant, the other eye focusing tightly, even obsessively, on the research topic” (Hirsch and Gellner, 2001: 7).

Shadowing Key Informants

Shadowing informants significantly facilitated my reach into new community spaces, allowing me a chance to observe daily goings-on and movements throughout *morro* neighborhoods. Vilson in particular played a unique role as a key informant, often in crossing boundaries both external to, and internal to the *Maciço.* This included attending events, meetings, or duties related to his work as a Catholic priest in diverse city spaces. In his early 60s at the time of this writing, Vilson is widely considered an important community leader, having dedicated himself to advocacy for public policy development, and establishing numerous social local programs together with *Maciço* as well as residents from other periphery community in the capital. More than just a key informant, Vilson became an important gatekeeper to key people and interactions, which I would have had difficulty accessing on my own.

Upon his ordainment in 1981 and heavily influenced by Liberation Theology, a young Vilson (who is of German and Italian descent), defied Church leaders’ wishes, moving to the predominantly Afro-Brazilian *morro,* living first in Mocotó and soon after, in Mont Serrat. Where there had previously been no Catholic Church presence, Vilson and neighbors eventually built *Nossa Senhora de Mont Serrat* Chapel. Later, Vilson would play a catalytic role in the creation of ACAM, CEDEP, CCEA, and the other organizations which today fall under the IVG umbrella.

Resisting the dictatorship and engaging as a leader in local activism for anti-discriminatory public policies during the 1980s and 1990s, Vilson would resist active participation and subordination to the mandates of the conservative Catholic establishment. Only recently has he begun, if cautiously, to re-engage with the church’s organizational functions and activities, participating for example as a coordinator for theological conferences and in-services, serving

as a point person in caring for aging priests, and in a special advisory role to the Bishop.

Demonized for decades, labeled as communist and radical amongst Florianópolis' generally conservative political, social, Church, and business elite, Vilson today senses a gradual warming, enjoying wider support from diverse sectors in the city, including the media, which often refers to him as the "Father of the favelas" (*o padre dos morros*). Such warmth was not always immediate:

> *Field Notes 06/04/13:* Vilson recalled today a powerful Polish family in Mont Serrat, the only white family at the time, who lived on the *morro* during his early days as a resident. They owned a small store that he thought seemed to operate with a slave-master mentality. The patriarch was a man who commanded local power, often subjecting neighbors and workers to verbal abuse and sometimes physical violence. He was also politically intimidating, attempting to sway votes in local campaigns. Vilson clashed often with him. Power has always been an inescapable piece of Vilson's presence and understanding of the *comunidade*; for him, to lead a congregation is to involve himself in people's intimate lives.
>
> His own presence as an outsider was met with some resistance by neighbors. Arriving in Mont Serrat 30 years ago, his now trusted confidant, Carlos, was the first resident then to show up at his door, demanding rather bluntly: "What did you come here to do?" According to Carlos, Vilson handed him Eduardo Galeano's *Open Veins of Latin America*, and replied: "read this, and then you will know why I am here." Lest the exchange sound cavalier, it was the beginning of a conversation that would form the basis of solidarity, resistance, and informal political leadership of resistance, aimed mainly at public policies and rights for improving local living conditions, as well as an emphasis on community youth, including resistance to trafficking.

Trusted today by generations of *morro* families, Vilson's 'gatekeeping' connected me to key people and conversations, opening doors to ethnographically rich opportunities such as invitations to participate in gatherings, events such as masses, organizational, staff, or crisis-intervention meetings, and discussions with donors, local politicians, judges, clergy, business and civil society leaders. These interactions, as well as shadowing opportunities, occurred at diverse times and locations, in the *morro* and *centro* alike. Nevertheless, my particular relationship with Vilson, given my status as an outsider living full time and conducting research on the *morro*, provides an

important segue into a more robust discussion of my data sourcing experiences in light of researcher positionality.

Positionality, Relationships, and Ethics

Beyond a value-neutral fieldwork model, a researcher must critique not only the notion of objectivity, but also their subjectivity. In this way, as Soyini Madison (2012: 8) observes, the subjectivity of the researcher has to reflect "upon its own power position, choices, and effects. This 'new' or post-critical ethnography is the move to contextualize our own positionality, thereby making it accessible, transparent, and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation". Similarly, scholars must grapple with the dilemmas associated with their roles, without the illusion that these can be contradiction-free. As Mendez (2008: 137) observes, we must reflect upon internal power dynamics based on race, class, gender, and sometimes nationality that have flavored and shaped … strategies, practices, and coalitions.

How did my positionality in Florianópolis, and relationship with a small group of informants (particularly Vilson) frame the way I was able to access and analyze data? And to what extent could my presence (for better or worse) influence data through the legitimacy *ascribed* to me simply by accompanying or developing relationships with key informants, like Darcy, Guga, Lia, or Vilson?

I remember recalling, for example, that while some literature often casually refers to as a "snowball method" of identifying interviewees or research participants, my data sourcing activities were not simply a neutral process. Who you know, whom you contact, as well as what you discuss, become a matter of security. This forced me to grapple with the dilemma of needing to get close to key informants, while also preserving some sense of objectivity. In a context of high risk, it was similarly difficult to identify what was *not* being said or shared, particularly if I was only led by "known" informants to speak with other known persons. In this way, I had to ask whether and how I might be getting a wide-enough interpretation, or simply talking with people who shared similar views. Because of the inherent risks, how did my initial need to rely on certain individuals, particularly Vilson with whom I lived, influence the viability of my data, findings or claims?

As noted, living on the *morro* full time was essential for building trust, ensuring safety, and creating viable avenues for access, which would allow me to interrogate the primary objects, and interface with subjects, under study. Being present to witnessing relevant moments, movements, interactions, discussions, or interventions, as well as being able to understand these as part of a system or ongoing process, would not have been possible through limited, shorter, daytime-only involvement, or by using interviews alone.

But my involvement was not simply as a passive observer. While I dedicated my initial few weeks in Mont Serrat to creating visibility for myself, and feeling out the ebb and flow of community life, I stood out as a foreign white male in a *predominantly* Afro-Brazilian community. Alessandra's (17/09/12) comment to me was exemplary:

> "it's funny, now that I'm older, my three best friends are white, but I have changed too. If you came to me back then and said *'there is a white guy from North America who wants to speak with you'* – I would never have done that – I changed due to my experiences. Vilson helped me with that. But then I would have thought – what does he want with me, what does he want to take?"

This forced me to rely upon certain individuals to at least help mitigate the initial mistrust of being an outsider, and would gradually allow me to be more intentional about fanning out in my data sourcing activities. Still, it quickly became clear that maintaining confidentiality was a critical element for building trust, and in fact the only basis upon which some key data sourcing could have even occurred.

Morro communities are tightly-knit places – not just through kinship and social networks, but also literally in the way that noise and voices travel. People's senses are likewise highly attuned to changes or the abnormal. My own movements and conversations with residents, even in the public view of the street, were at times subject to scrutiny, suspicion, and prejudice. At times, these surprisingly prompted potentially detrimental rumors. On more than one occasion, I was also 'tested' by residents who would later become key informants. This happened through subtle, almost imperceptible cross-examinations and wire-trips, which I later understood as ways some individuals

gauged my intentions, reliability, and credibility. Over time, I realized that this was not just about me, but one of the elements central to the mediative work and effectiveness of key informants.

Like noise, information on the *morro* travels quickly, and can have positive and negative consequences.[34] Researching ethically in an environment often characterized by insecurity and violence prompted me to initiate organized interviews by explicitly raising the issue of confidentiality, as well as clarifying my intentions for the use of information. I also openly invited interviewees to give input into how they might like me to use, or not use, the information they shared during our discussion. While few interviewees elected to abstain from audio recordings, these individuals often gave permission for me to take hand-written notes. In these instances, I attempted to reproduce conversations and quotations as faithfully as possible, abiding by my commitment to non-attribution and confidentiality.

Over time, key informants were more forthcoming in discussions. I also began to notice when information was more sensitive or important than others. Given the potential harm and consequences that leaks can cause, sensitive information was received and safeguarded with utmost confidentiality. Over time, I also began to notice a shift in the content of revelations within conversations, supported, I contend by my gradual building of a reputation and presence, which afforded me an elevated degree of trustworthiness that supported the research.

As this thesis discusses, key informants engage in protecting and defending individual lives, putting themselves at risk in various ways. Much of this work is connected to violence that is linked to the world of trafficking and organized crime. Nevertheless, it is the assuming of risk through interventions by local mediators, that constitute the basis of social impact that I argue these efforts to have. To be invited into this world, gaining critical points of access and privileged conversations could only have come with the strengthening of

[34] In a lighter example, one Saturday morning I was in Vilson's kitchen, lamenting aloud about the lack of ice in the freezer, as we were preparing Caipirinhas for the arrival of lunch guests. By the time I had existed the door to walk down a few steps to the neighbor's, *Seu Toca,* he had already filled a small bucket and was literally waiting to hand it to me through his window, despite his bad knee.

relationships over time. In this way, it came as no surprise to me to observe that the majority of the most in-depth interviews I conducted with key informants were done in the latter half of my 2012 fieldwork period, only after many months had gone by.

Researcher Role

Though my first entry into the *morro* (amongst other spaces) was by invitation, I entered first into discussions not through the eyes of a researcher. The journey of relationship development began, thus, through my identity as a professional, invited to learn more about community life and the work of the CCEA.

As UK-based doctoral student who was born and raised in the northeastern United States of America, I also continued to earn a living over the course of my research working in conflict resolution consulting[35]. It was my professional experience that helped me to initially observe and identify significant difference, convergence and divergence associated with the local intervention practices and orientation interrogated within this text. Ultimately, there were advantages and disadvantages to performing research with respect to this professional identity.

This role offered advantages and disadvantages with respect to the demands of my researcher role. For example, whereas confidentiality was a familiar overlapping professional code to be upheld, an ethnographic approach required me to grapple with, and attempt to set aside a rigid set of assumptions or 'expertise' regarding what I understood about intervention practices, particularly mediation. This meant being more explicit with myself about my assumptions during interviews, coding, and analysis, and attempting to assess emic perspectives.

Focused ethnographic instruction, which emphasized the *'what'* in a particular setting (i.e. what are the beliefs and values or means of practice, in context) was helpful in this regard, as it primed me to seek to illuminate forces that facilitate, constrain, promote interaction, or sustain the patterning of those things (Higginbottom, 2013). For example, early discussions regarding local violence

[35] This role includes facilitation, mediation, conflict and executive coaching, climate assessment, training, and targeted intervention support.

and negotiation practices discussed earlier in the study's story of origin, revealed contrast in the types of issues and influences involved in shaping dominant models of third party conflict intervention, (particularly mediation) to which I had been exposed. This forced me to confront the challenge of 'seeing' intervention practices (ways in which residents proactively involved themselves in disputes) for what they were, not as I had necessarily envisioned through my professional outsider tropes and lenses. Relying on the language of key informants, discussed further in Chapter 5, was also helpful in making this shift.

My professional training proved significantly advantageous in helping me engage individuals and information with sensitivity. Part of my work requires me to maintain a physical, though non-interruptive presence, listen intently while tracking conversations and multiple narratives. This served me in various data sourcing activities, particularly at times highly emotional exchanges or moments, becoming critical during formal conversations and interviews in which people shared personal and often trying experiences of conflict, violence, and associated traumas.

Such experiences were not dissimilar to scenarios that I had confronted regularly in my non-researcher professional role. The poise one learns to bring to such exchanges can be characterized by not only attending to emotional cues, but also letting time and space to define the conversation's flow, rather than attempting to guide, push, direct, or inquire in ways that focused on what I thought I needed to hear for my own purposes.

Exercising emotional intelligence, staying present, and attending to emotional cues in the face of an accounting of trauma, pain, or fear was also helpful in that it allowed me to more carefully comprehend nuances of residents' disempowering experiences, which becomes a salient organizing concept within the text. Whereas somebody less familiar with these types of more intimate, interpersonal exchanges may have stopped an interview, even on the basis of ethical caution to avoid causing harm, my decision many times to sit with heavy issues or emotions and continue in an interview was based upon a constellation of factors and ethical considerations that straddled a difficult line.

There were times when this could be understood as a disadvantage, whereas I was more prone or prepared to continuing rather than disengaging. In any

interview, one must analyze and act upon these observations and make decisions in the moment. Whereas emotions were often on display, my approach also proved to solidify a sense of solidarity and trust with more than a few individuals over time. I measured this in part by those who inquired and invited me back for subsequent conversations, during which more relevant research data would often emerge.

As an individual with professional dexterity in listening and related communication skills, as well as experience as a dialogue facilitator, I drew often on these competencies as a researcher, utilizing them strategically as a way to build genuine connection with people in formal and informal spaces, as discussed earlier. This effectively generated data in spaces or conversations, that may not have been possible otherwise.

In part, this was not dissociated with fulfilling a commitment to the community to give back in the way that Goldstein's (2012) discussion of *engaged* anthropological work has clearly addressed, as many of them had simply never told many details of their stories. Not only did it allow me to gain trust, and give back, but also opened the door to meeting new people, entering into and learning about spaces I had not intentionally aimed to learn about when constructing my research proposal. One example of this is my accompaniment of the Marist school coexistence code process, which ultimately served as a window into a key world and set of interactions in Mont Serrat.

Accessing Key People and Spaces

My outsider identity must also be seen in the light of how it was used to access certain people and spaces. Certainly, questions about my perceived legitimacy and influence, as well as my ability to access key people and spaces, are central to my positionality. Rather than a clear-cut, obstacle free track to gaining insight into local norms and practices, I saw my role as one that was in some ways inherently, but not irreparably compromised from the beginning, vis-à-vis the perceived power or influence I may have been ascribed in terms of my accompaniment activities, or living situation for example, with Vilson.

When it comes to transparency about my positionality and the material I was able to access, a few key issues arise. First, as noted earlier, my privileged access to certain information, and sometimes particularly sensitive information, occurred first through who I came to know, and with whom I built trust. Any individual proactive inquiry without doing so, would certainly prove insufficient, if at times dangerous in particular spaces. An anecdotal example of such limitations was clearly on display during a meeting in which a *Caieira* leader, Mary, spoke of a voicemail she had received from a journalist, who was inquiring on the premise of interviewing Mary about restorative justice activities she had intended to pursue.

When Mary returned the call, the journalist told her quite bluntly that he was uninterested in the restorative justice issue at all. Rather he had called to ask whether Mary could get him an interview with traffickers from the *morro*. Mary's cordial reply was that she would be happy to introduce the journalist to her neighbors and friends who were working hard to improve the conditions of their community, but with his particular request she could be of no service. Despite Mary's regular involvement with traffickers and community members as a mediator in the *Caieira,* her position clearly demonstrates how insiders can scrupulously manage the perceived extractive efforts of outsiders. Mary never received a return phone call.

Instead relying on second hand data, or remaining distant from relationships with the people in this study, my orientation to mitigate these potential pitfalls was one that unfolded over time, tempered by the only way I could under the conditions – to utilize the access that my connections afforded, while endeavoring to keep in place a system of checks and balances regarding data and analysis.

Given the unavoidable, my strategy consisted of comparatively observing movements and interactions of key informants with individuals or key identity groups such as neighbors, traffickers, or authorities, by day or night, in the street and in other spaces. This was perhaps one of the few ways by which I could more accurately account for external influence on behaviors and discussions I witnessed in off-limits spaces or over which my very presence

could have held sway.

I discussed this conundrum early on, specifically with Vilson, whose usual and universal introduction of me to people like judges and traffickers alike, was: “Jared, a North American professor here learning about our [CCEA/IVG] work”. Following his lead, despite the clear association drawn between me and the CCEA, I soon realized that without spending perhaps years in the community, this challenge would have to be one I would live with in order to accomplish other goals. Nevertheless, I also took steps to ensure viability of data to the best of my abilities.

Aside from the added benefit of my ability to engage anybody fluently in Brazilian Portuguese, I purposefully engaged a wide variety of individuals rather than just key informants, taking advantage of repeat interactions with community members with over the time that I had. In this way, I attempted to move realistically beyond simply being a “professional outsider” (Agar, 1996) and into a role that would allow me to access more intimate spaces and information through a *diversified* group. This is reflected by the diversity of data-sourcing methods I employed, as well as my wide-berth of interactions with research subjects, writ-large, over multiple research visits.

While my affiliations and friendships with key “gatekeeping” individuals or institutions like the CCEA could be viewed as influencing the nature of data or people’s behaviors (whether in formal interviews, street-life interactions, or the way I was perceived), there were conscious actions I took in order to mitigate bias influences. One of the principle issues was how to deal with my ‘outsider’ or ascribed local status through said gatekeepers by creating a more regular presence in daily community life.

The conscious strategy of taking the time to develop broader contacts and participate in a variety of engagements with community members, beyond the relative few ‘interveners’ or key informants served many purposes. On the one hand, this tactic helped to nudge me in the direction of what Denzin et al. (2008: 6) call an *allied* role in the eyes of some. On the other hand, time and presence in different spaces helped me to gauge whether or how

the behavior and interactions between key informants and key actors in the community were somehow distinct when they occurred without my direct presence, or occurred in different spaces or times. As any rigorous research practice would reflect, I remained faithful to welcoming data into analysis that did not always seem to reinforce working assumptions or conclusions.

The complexity involved in ethnographic research, in which an author must comprehend the interaction of diverse perspectives, as well as weave together micro and macro discussions in a legible way, is often reduced by the use of a central individual, group, or idea, that can offer more coherence to readers (for ethnographic work in Brazilian periphery communities, see for example Goldstein, 2003; Hautzinger, 2007). One of the most central figures to this story is Vilson Groh, without whom I would not have been able to initially access as many people or spaces as quickly or deeply as I did. Vilson thus became a central gatekeeper, as well as a channel or vehicle that helped me pursue and accomplish research objectives. Still, he, like other key informants, were not without their critics.

Attempting to move beyond immediate circles meant including voices that would necessarily stand out in more significant ways from the key sub-group of informants indicated by my methodology. When these voices shared criticisms regarding key figures in this study, I attempted to draw them out and comprehend them, integrating them into my analysis. In this regard, I was encouraged by criticisms rendered by interviewees or interactions that criticized key informants and their work (often forthcoming). Criticism was leveled by close friends, as well as the very staff working in organizations like the CCEA.

Lia, for example, had to deal with fierce critique from within her own family and home, as well as the ever-present social pressure of neighbors. Vilson's critics were more public and plentiful, in part because he was also one of the most public and active leaders involved in the history of the CCEA, which had also come under fire from certain community leaders in light of a series of administrative decisions and organizational development issues at the time.

Despite no longer being active in any formal way with the CCEA at the time of my first fieldwork visit in 2012, Vilson and other community leaders, who were nevertheless symbolic figures identified by community members as linked to the CCEA's history, were held to expectations to act, based upon community frustrations, even if they had little ability to do so formally. Vilson's personal management of such criticisms helped me to more accurately understand the ways in which people like Vilson chose, or refrained from, exercising power and influence locally.

Many, including close friends, critiqued Vilson's activism and engagement with young traffickers. If present, critiques were often cordial and objective. For the most part, however, such debates were an open part of discussions that close neighbors and friends exchanged consistently, if sometimes privately, with each other. To me, this also informed the research with respect to the social and political commitment made by local mediators like Lia and Vilson, whose actions and reactions indicated their sense of role, despite how some important figures in the community perceived them, not to mention their assuming of social and other physical security risks involved.

Extraction and Return

Throughout my fieldwork, ethical safety concerns were diverse and everpresent. These ranged from dealing with the expectations of giving a 'return' to the community that had welcomed me, discerning or seeing visible and invisible risks, dealing with data-security concerns, and considering strategies to manage scenarios of possible or actual physical altercations or violence. Perhaps the most challenging were the unforeseen incidences that would nevertheless inform the research, including one time when I narrowly avoided being caught in a surprise PM raid into a heavy arms-dealing neighborhood, late one night.

Looking more broadly at how a sub-set of people within a community interacted in everyday contexts, rather than relying on observations and discussion about intervention practices alone, would help me to envision, understand, and categorize intervention patterns and practices more clearly. The actions and narratives of a few key people began to reveal underlying logic and ordering that could be subjected to ongoing articulation and testing over time. This clarity

would also aid in considering what claims and extrapolations that could realistically be drawn beyond those proposed by *a priori* prescriptions of conflict intervention work discussed in Chapter 1. But this was not without its ethical implications, which I learned to handle with care and appreciation.

From an epistemological viewpoint, the importance of my "attached" or embedded presence became clear through the visible interaction and behind the scenes discussions I observed in comparison to other researchers who entered, or had previously come to study on the *Maciço*. Locals' experiences told of distinct and sometimes frustrating engagements. The production of knowledge, like any other product, must be viewed in some ways as a process of mining and extraction. Sometimes, this occurs without a returned sense of cooperation or appreciation. In this way, residents expressed to me their willingness to simply give researchers "anything they want to hear". In this way, my experience contrasts to other researchers or academics whom I observed during my time on the *morro*.

Community members young and old take very seriously the sense of extract and exploitation without return. The sense of distrust and divestment plagues the building of closer relationships between insiders and outsiders, as perceived exploitation on the part of *the researched,* can result in barriers to cooperation or unreliable answers to questions about individuals or networks (Liamputtong, 2007: 5; also see Heckathorn, 1997). This has epistemological implications as well as social ones when it comes to defining center-periphery relations. As one *Caieira* resident shared with me as we walked together one day, "*academics come to the morro asking questions. We tell them what they want to hear, and they go on their way. We don't ever see them or hear from them again*" (Field Notes, 01/06/12).

Another interviewee, whose story unfolds in Chapter 3, spoke to her perception of the consequences that the resulting divisions and distance creates. For example, this social distance added to her own eroding sense of trust and political calculations. Despite years of advocating for and encouraging *morro* youth to pursue higher education, she could *"no longer support the universities that did not educate outsiders such as university students, who could later become politicians, to invest here in the community"* (Teresa, 2014). In this way,

Teresa characterizes the deleterious relationship between periphery communities and institutions of the state, including the Federal University (UFSC), defined by a strong sense of distance and distrust on the part of *morro* residents.

In various examples that I personally observed, researchers from the disciplines of law (including mediation), urban architecture, and anthropological violence studies tended to maintain utilitarian-oriented relationships with communities on the *Maciço*, which generated and sustained resident resentment or disaffection, ultimately generalized and attributed to state authorities and outsiders writ-large. In some ways, this pattern speaks to the failure of João's original community mediation initiative, amongst other well-intentioned efforts.[36]

Data Security

Securing data is primarily rooted in safety concerns for research subjects. Likewise, my decision about sharing or attributing identities, either during fieldwork or at the time of publication, is perhaps more complex than the technical responsibility to properly store and protect digital files or writing. While no person's data can be entirely *unattributable*, or kept 100% safe, one can do much to reduce or protect individuals through the decision of where and how to store information. This includes actively removing, coding, or avoiding the use of identifying information, using pseudonyms, and altering non-relevant details (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001: 341). Performing research while living in a context of insecurity forced me to actively confront these decision-making challenges over the course of the study.

Similarly, subjects or participants can be wounded or harmed as much by what gets written, as that which gets left out, or left undescribed about the totality of a person or experience. This can cause further offense, hurt, or harm to those about whom much has been shared or exposed (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001: 341). This contemplation led me not simply to honor non-attribution requests,

[36] In another example, in a restorative justice program proposal presented to CCEA by UNISUL students for a periphery neighborhood located on the continent, which I was asked to review, I noticed the characteristic bibliographical references drawing heavily from northern literature. As I shared directly with the proposal's author, my surprise was to see that zero deposition, observation, or information that indicated that any 'close to the ground' research, interviews, or information at all had come from people living inside that particular, and troubled, community (Suelen, 08/10/12).

explicitly inquiring with informants to gain consent in most cases, but also to ask if there were particular messages, information, or pieces of their stories that subjects would like to reach a wider, or particular audience. In the immediacy of an interview, this also helped me gauge what was most relevant, or potentially off-limits to publish.

Physical Risks

Navigating the more visible physical risks meant paying attention and minimizing them where possible, despite the ultimate uncertainty and inability to control any and all unanticipated scenarios. The acknowledgement of these risks, however, also informs the research in terms of the attitudes and experiences, including about the value, dangers, and risks inherent to intervention work, as part of local mediators' repertoires and thinking. The uncertain realities of trafficking violence and police incursions lead to a sense of (in)security that ebbs and flows on a daily basis. It is something that I along with other researchers working and living in these areas (see Soares, Bill, and Athayde, 2005; Penglase, 2014; and Goldstein, 2003) experienced, in ways that are both similar and distinct from residents.

My own approach was to follow what Goldstein (2014) and others working in and writing about violence describe (see Baird, 2009; Wheeler, 2009a, 2009b; Lee and Stanko, 2003), as an ethnographic approach to violence - treating it as an object of study, and paying close attention to the way that informants and friends engaged and behaved in different circumstances, times of day, and spaces. On the one hand, I was subject to imminent dangers like anyone else. Still, my privilege to be selective about when, where, and how to move about on the *morro,* or live under Vilson's roof, afforded me comparative safety. This recognition again informs the research regarding the nature of non-dominating power that local interveners like Vilson, has built over time, which I visit in Chapter 7.

Because the research involved intervention and a context of insecurity and violence, learning how others defined and dealt with their concerns about safety also became an important dimension in understanding mediation on the *morro*. Risking one's personal safety by pushing boundaries of existing territorial

dividing lines, both physically and socially, emerged as a hallmark of intervention practice. Discerning the where and how certain residents crossed boundaries provided insight into local efforts to counter and interrupt violence. Similarly, where, why, and how people gathered to discuss interventions and plan, revealed dimensions about process, including who and what roles might eventually be involved or excluded as residents sought to engage with the urgencies of territorial disputes.

The very spaces in which people convened, or wherein antagonists had the chance to meet on special occasions, speaks more generally to relevance of ways by which mediation presents as a strategic effort, intended to produce shifts in power and reconfigurations of relationships within the community context. To this extent Vilson's home was an important 'middle ground' itself for discussions about sensitive or risky situations, as the chapters will explore. Located geographically at a mid-way point between two major trafficking areas (*Caixa d'agua* and the *Nova Descoberta*), the co-location of his home, the CCEA, and the Mont Serrat Chapel is a historically complex space of convergence - more than just a convenient place for mingling, socializing, youth-project meeting points, a bus stop, and a church, it was also a location in which many deaths took place during the heavier periods of violence such as in the early 2000s.

Given the co-location of the CCEA and church, this space also provided a physical and symbolic sense of protection, shelter and safety for people to exchange or disseminate information about happenings around the *Maciço,* such as trafficking violence, police raids, negotiation, or reconciliation. Individuals could communicate or gather there unsuspectingly, under diverse pretexts, convening casually in small groups without raising red flags. A verbal invitation in passing to 'get together for coffee and converse' could indicate something much more significant.

Being mobile in neighborhoods and creating visibility was important for purposes of reducing risk and increasing safety. My safety, I believed, was supported in part by forging personal connections amongst residents amongst whom I was clearly outsider with initially unknown intentions. Personal

affiliations also informed and opened doors for research about physical and community spaces, which in turn facilitated new relationships and observational arenas, including with some individuals who had engaged more regularly in violent acts. In this way, again, my experience conducting ethnographic research was not dissimilar from those cited earlier.

Conclusions

The hybrid ethnographic approach to this study afforded me a unique perspective on methodological planning and strategy. The fusion of critical, focused, and 'engaged' ethnographic guidance from scholars was fruitful in helping me to manage both expected, as well as unanticipated issues with respect to data sourcing and ethics.

Given the origins of my involvement on the Maciço, my experience as I discussed it, also raised some interesting challenges with respect to ethical decision making in right vs. right situations. By delving more deeply into researcher positionality, which prove to offer little, if any, clear or objective answers or solutions, I sought to render the research experience more accessible to critics and casual readers alike. What is critical for any researcher is to be self-reflective, advancing transparency about their role, strategic decision-making, and observation of possible pitfalls. In this way, the viability of the study at hand can be more readily judged and assessed by scholarly peers.

While none of the concerns, challenges, or risks were 100% resolvable, all of them help to inform the study in significant ways. Similarly, the chapter that follows attempts to delve more deeply into exploring the particular experience of *morro* residents, underscoring many of the concerns that I faced, found, or confronted as a researcher.

CHAPTER THREE

Conflict and Insecurity on the *Maciço do Morro da Cruz*

Jared: *(reading a billboard advertisement aloud) "Beautiful, Saintly, Santa Catarina"*[37]
Vilson: *(in sarcastic retort) "It's beautiful alright; a beautiful bunch of government propaganda."*

Introduction

Brazil's transition from dictatorship to democracy has produced consolidated democratic institutions, stable national electoral processes, a robust political and civil society, and a vigorous and internationally competitive commercial sector, propelling the country as a regional leader on the global stage. The 1988 Constitution, hailed by international critics, ushered in an era of citizenship rights and protections previously unseen. New legal charters, including the Statute of the Adolescent and Child (ECA), together with national emphasis on participatory policy making, for example, provided examples of progress for those most affected by more nefarious political and social actions undertaken during the dictatorship.

Despite promising advances, Brazil's democratic present and future are confronted with significant challenges. Almost three decades after the end of a 21-year military dictatorship, Brazilians still broadly experience what Pinheiro (1998: 14) called a "paradox of rigorously defined constitutional guarantees yet very weak citizenship," which can be traced to widespread patterns of corruption and misrule of law, segregation, fortification, privatization, racism, illness, and violence. As Holston (2008: 271) explains

> "Brazilians feel less secure under the political democracy they have achieved, their bodies more threatened by its everyday violence than by the repressions of dictatorship. At the same time, moreover, that a generation of insurgent citizens democratized urban space, creating unprecedented access to its resources, a climate of fear and incivility also came to permeate public encounters. These new estrangements produce an abandonment of public space, fortification of residence, criminalization of the poor, and support for police violence"

[37] The tourism advertisement plays on the dual use of the word *Santa*, meaning *Saint* in Portuguese. *Santa* can also mean *saintly* or *holy*, thus referencing the projected image of *Santa Catarina* as not only geographically beautiful, but also a safe, protected haven or destination, *blessed* perhaps, as the message intends, with beauty, prosperity, purity, and peace.

Perhaps nowhere is insecurity felt more acutely than in the lives of periphery residents, who find themselves caught up in the mix of competing efforts of criminal and state actors to assert influence and control in geographically consolidated areas. In these scenarios, which occur broadly in Latin America's urban settings, Colak and Pearce (2009: 11-12) have observed the

> "Weakness of the state security response has contributed to a gradual erosion of the idea of security as a public good, as well as loss of faith in state security provision. Many people already depend on private and informal forms of security and justice provision. Wealth and poverty determines the choice: private security firms on the one hand and local gunman on the other."

Dagnino (2004: 153) explains this as part of an authoritarian and hierarchical social ordering in Latin America, to be poor signifies material and economic deprivation, alongside "submission to cultural rules that convey a complete lack of recognition for poor people as subject-bearers of rights." These dynamics, alive and well on the *Maciço,* set the backdrop for how people experience social conflict, intervene in disputes, and pathways to negotiating or resolving problems that frequently involve rather complex dynamics.

This chapter presents a view to the complexity of local conflict and disputes faced by Maciço residents. It explores details, sources, and dynamics of conflict that individuals face in their pursuit of resolution to both public and private or familial problems, which are intrinsically linked to the same conditions and actors that fuel citizens' deleterious experiences of violent social ordering and insecurity. The inseparability of such experiences challenges the conventional proposition of how and why community mediation and facilitated negotiation are used, as everyday disputes coalesce around a series of extremely complicating circumstances and dynamics.

The link between everyday 'neighborhood' (public) or family/interpersonal (private) disputes and social, economic, and political forces that help perpetuate local insecurity, complicate and constrain the effective, non-violent management of conflict. This is observed whether or not residents pursue resolution to their problems through direct (or facilitated) negotiations, or leveraging of resources or rights necessary to accomplish their goals. Residents are also compelled at times to enter into negotiation scenarios under highly asymmetrical terms,

sometimes as a matter of survival, if unsatisfactorily, with a lesser of two evils in order to manage neighborhood or domestic problems. Given these circumstances, conventionally facilitated negotiations are often unrealistic or unviable options or processes for residents to pursue.

Nevertheless, residents are extremely active in exercising agency, taking steps to contend with local problems or manage interpersonal conflicts. As examples demonstrate, however, the nature of insecurity in the context of social and community relations can also expose residents to further risk and violence through their resolutionary endeavors. This is particularly true in acute disputes that involve traffickers, or scenarios in which residents must decide whether or not to enlist state institutions or agents as allies in these efforts. Such interactions can lead to exacerbation of their problems, making the exercise of rights a more dangerous or risky proposition.

Lest traffickers be monolithically labeled, this chapter also highlights the complicated ways in which young people's involvement in the street-market, however ephemeral, often presents as a source of internal family conflict and insecurity, or catalytic of public or community tensions. As Wilding (2012: 733) cautions, one must take care in

> "Categorizing an actor as either offender or victim, since actors may find themselves in the position of offender in one instance and victim in another. Similarly, Robben and Nordstrom argue against this 'distorting dichotomy as if one is, by definition, passive and the other active', pointing out that the front lines are 'much more volatile and inchoate, with violence being constructed, negotiated, reshaped, and resolved as perpetrators and victims try to define and control the world they find themselves in'".

Family conflict and neighborhood tensions generated in connection with the involvement of youth in the street-market workplace are not infrequent. Debts are owed, and mistakes are made, while consequences or *correitivos* (correctives) are levied, sometimes violently. The disputes and stressors produced from the routine functions of the periphery's most accessible local employment industry for youth, generates employee disputes like any other licit workplace environment, albeit one with higher stakes. Bullying, intimidation, and coworker disagreements in a stiff hierarchy often lead to escalation and

instrumental use of violence. These produce destructive ripple effects, giving rise to public insecurity and personal or private indignities or disempowerment for families and neigbhors of those involved.

Similarly, examples below depict how and why state agents and institutions are seen, in the eyes of many residents, as provocateurs and antagonists, rather than allies for constructively addressing local complexities of tensions and conflict. Where issues of heightened tension involving collective security, or the pursuit of individual protections are concerned, citizens remain unhappily tied to, and often disillusioned with, the involvement of authorities, grappling with how to engage them as partners or resources to leverage negotiating positions or secure resolution to their problems.

I characterize the totality of these observations and constraints of decision-making around conflict resolution *and* intervention agency as a dilemma of *Democratic Disempowerment (*DD), or the compromised position into which residents fall, nevertheless endeavoring to find answers amidst the complex challenges of localized conflict. In this way, I link disputes more appropriately to the priorities they entail. Much more than simple negotiation of interests, these involve the preservation of security, quality of life, and citizenship rights.

Domains and Sources Conflict and Dispute

This chapter focuses on asking what is the basis of conflict, and how do local disputes arise? Where and how must people negotiate in the midst of conflict, and what is the connection between conflict, violence and insecurity? The answers, I contend, come through an understanding of overlapping, complex issues.

Physical Infrastructure

The extreme, visible contrast of urban development in Florianópolis is a channel through which periphery residents often express their perceptions of injustice and inequality. Such views are compounded by the rising cost of living, and environmental and security policies, which have deprioritized the *Maciço's* impoverished communities, and benefited exclusive real estate speculation across the capital.

As Chapter 1 observed, the decay of *morro* conditions and infrastructure in many ways generates conflicts in community life. Everyday discussions are dotted with disillusioned reminders of government corruption, perplexing (or lack of) public investment in *Maciço* infrastructure, augmenting the perception of discrimination. While on the one hand this can reinforce a sense of solidarity and social cohesion in community, these conditions and experiences also interact and predispose residents to situations in which everyday disputes regularly and easily arise.

Until recently, investments in *Maciço* infrastructure have been slow, or off the radar altogether. Between the end of 2013 and early 2015, with the aid of federal PAC investments, [38] new developments including roads and a public park, were constructed by the administration of Cesar Souza Jr., elected in October of 2012. These 'improvements' were not without issue during their construction, as residents indicated detrimental to physical safety risks they faced due to the delayed and piecemeal nature of the projects' completion.[39]

While community improvement projects and public investment works on the *Maciço* are welcome and have shown improvement to physical conditions over time, they have also demonstrated to be at times illogical, or precarious at best in the eyes of residents. For example, during 2012, the municipality built 10 multi-family housing units in a space across from the school in Mont Serrat. The housing structures, finished by my departure in October, would offer housing

[38] For more information, see: [All files accessed 10 November 2014]
PAC: http://www.pac.gov.br/obra/25262
PAC: http://www.pmf.sc.gov.br/noticias/index.php?pagina=notpagina&noti=12097
Health Center: http://www.hashtagnoticias.com.br/noticia/2014/10/cs-do-monte-serrat-fica-pronto-ate-final-do-ano/
Illegal Demolition in Pastinho: http://www.hashtagnoticias.com.br/noticia/2014/10/construcao-em-area-de-risco-e-demolida-na-serrinha/

[39] Unjustified delays without public hearings in which "social" and "environmental" issues were to be discussed, but never did, became a frequent problem. When initial work stopped, residents were left in worse conditions and at greater safety risks. For more on unfinished PAC promises, see:
http://ndonline.com.br/Florianópolis/noticias/87097-inacabadas-obras-do-pac-deixam-para-tras-projeto-de-casas-populares-em-morros-de-Florianópolis.html
http://saude.hagah.com.br/especial/sc/qualidade-de-vida-sc/19,0,2300168,Obras-do-PAC-em-Florianópolis-estao-atrasadas.html
http://ricmais.com.br/sc/jornal-do-meio-dia/videos/obras-do-pac-no-macico-do-morro-da-cruz,-em-Florianópolis,-nao-tem-data-para-terminar/ [All files accessed 10 November 2014]

through lottery selection. While the construction of the homes was funded, they were left unfurnished, lacking a basic standard of things such as electro-domestic appliances. This rendered a problematic situation for qualified applicants who were most in need, as they were unable to afford the necessary investment to make the housing livable for potential inhabitants.

Similarly, newly paved roads were constructed, linking the southern facing *Caieira* neighborhoods with the western facing *Descoberta* area of Mont Serrat, facilitating transportation and access to the *Saco de Limões* neighborhood and the highway leading to the city's southern areas, and airport. The utility of these new roads was questionable for residents, as most do not own cars, nor were bus lines added after their completion. Cida (21/11/14), a *Descoberta* resident, explained how these improvements also brought adverse local effects. New roads provide *Descoberta* traffickers and taxis accessible routes to transport narcotics and arms. At the same time, Cida and her neighbors felt their children now run the risk of harm, should the unfortunate scenario occur in which one of them accidentally damages traffickers' cars while playing in the street.

Basic public services such as electricity, water and sewage are better in some areas, while non-existent in adjoining areas of central Mont Serrat. Off the main road, housing and infrastructure conditions are run down and precarious. Private construction is often illegal and unsafe, sometimes prone to landslides that can occur under heavy autumn rains. Stone sidewalks are broken and crumbling. Running water, electricity, and public lighting, available along the main corridors that run over the *Maciço,* extend selectively beyond eyeshot of the roads, whose original construction was built and paid for not by the city, but by residents of the once unregulated neighborhoods through *mutirões,* or collective public works in the late 1950s and 1960s (Seu Teco, 2012).

In *Mocotó,* whose main entry point lies a few hundred meters from the State Judiciary and Legislature, massive garbage piles up in an open landfill proximate to the *Hospital da Caridade*, which shares the northern side of the area's natural geographic boundary. *Comcap*, the rubbish collection service in Florianópolis, services only up to a certain altitude in the steep topographic range. Attention to common public infrastructure repair or renewal by the city

services is lackluster at best.[40]

A more precarious example occurred on the IVG's second inaugural day of the *Mocotó-Cor* project (see Chapter 7 for full description). That Saturday morning, a live electrical wire had fallen along one of the main stairways that vertically traverse the neighborhood, partially blocking passage and landing directly on top of corner that serves as a trafficker checkpoint. The young men at work on the corner situated the wire behind makeshift scaffolding, warning the heavy flow of *Mocotó-Cor* project volunteers and resident passers-by to take caution.

Despite calls to CELESC, the state-subsidized public works organization, residents were told they would have to wait until Monday to get the situation resolved. As volunteers gathered later to eat lunch in the ACAM cafeteria, Vilson relayed the situation to Judge Alexandre Takachima, who was volunteering in the project. After lunch, Judge Takaschima put in a call to CELESC presenting himself as *Juiz-Corregedor*, to request that someone attend to the wire. Within an hour, as Vilson and I arrived back to MS, Bea from ACAM called Vilson to tell him that the repair had been made (Field Notes, 08/11/14). What becomes salient here is that the neglect of infrastructure, viewed also historically, while at once shaping local perceptions about the state's involvement in periphery life, *also* compounds local insecurity and entrenchement of power amongst certain more violence and instability-prone actors.

Internal Community Relations

As a whole, conflicts seem to emerge at the convergence of difficult conditions and relationships through which pathways to resolution unfolds. As Alessandra (Field Notes 17/09/12) once described, these encompass a wide variety of interconnected issues and pressures linking economic and structural concerns, which can exacerbate relational pressures and tensions amongst community

[40] For example, in September of 2012, a large pothole had opened up in the middle of the main road leading from the Mont Serrat church up toward the school. It was there over a month before being repaired just before elections in October of that year. As a precautionary measure, residents fill the hole with an orange construction cone and bamboo sticks. By contrast, a mere minute's walk to the middle-class residential area that borders the Mauro Ramos, a similar size pot hole that I frequently passed on my way to the supermarket, took less than five days to fix (Field Notes, 15/11/14).

actors:

> "People don't have a lot of time. There are school conflicts, you have a lot of early pregnancies, single mothers raising kids. People live repressed lives here in the community. They aren't treated well in the *morro* because they are black. They get frustrated - Money doesn't come in or the government doesn't process papers properly. And when we complain, we are treated without dignity. These frustrations grow. They don't take people's life history into account. People have low self esteem through experiences in schools – [white] teachers call them idiots, they have trauma from this, so this affects the way they learn afterwards from there on out.
>
> We also have *Alto da Caieira* neighborhoods I *and* II now, [with so many] people migrating, so we have territorial issues, problems where the houses are too close together, so water comes through the ceiling into my house from the neighbor's place. I have this problem. The buses are full of people from the *Caieira*. There are black buses, and white buses now.[41] I frequently have to walk [to work]. Down [at the terminal] you see which bus to get on – '*is that our bus?'* And then you wait.[42] At the health center or at the *crèche*, there are no more vacancies. We are running out, so we have problems. People get agitated. My daughter has to go to the crèche all the way down on Mauro Ramos Avenue, instead of up here next to my house.
>
> There is a big demand [for mediation], principally [for] the institutional question, to speak to the challenges we face with the state, about access and rights. People come to me to resolve things. They get treated like dirt just for [claiming] things they have rights to have! This is so common. People get fed up, and many end up getting wasted on drugs or alcohol over time…. Things like this are what academics studying [the *morro*] don't want to see, or ever do anything about. They don't want to leave the academy to come deal with this.

Aside from a strong descriptor, Allessandra's statement is most revealing in her contention of how state institutions play a key and often conflictive role. In this way, the use of the term territorial antagonist becomes part of the way that residents perceive and label state officials and related outsiders.

Struggles of daily life and disputes that arise in Florianópolis under conditions of

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[41] Here, Alessandra refers to the general division of through her observation of who dominates a particular city bus on the singular route that traverses various Maciço neighborhoods. Whereas Mont Serrat is a predominantly Afro-Brazilian area, the Alto da Caieira is predominantly inhabited by white migrant families from Santa Catarina's interior lands.

[42] Alessandra arrived 1.5 hours late for this interview. When I rang her 45 minutes into our scheduled time, she was still waiting for the bus.

depravity and exclusion are similar to what Sussekind (1999) and Davis (1998) have identified as content of local disputes in Rio. These include family and child custody issues, consumer rights, police violence, and protection of crime witnesses, property and ownership rights, land appropriation or construction, and frustrations that lead easily to aggravated assaults or domestic violence.

Alessandra's statement is noteworthy in linking frustrations and tensions amongst neighbors to community conditions, as well as the associated sense of exclusion and vulnerabilities. Importantly, her statement indicates the resentment that builds from feelings of state agents' seemingly discriminatory interactions with them. As examples below depict, state agents' selective interaction with, and responsiveness to elements of social, physical and economic security concerns of periphery citizens, render it an ineffective and unrealistic partner and resource when it comes to *morro* residents' efforts to resolve conflict. This is in part due to a lack of reliability and trust, catalyzed by the constant possibility of inviting greater danger by calling on state agents to assist in addressing local conflicts, thus inviting the opportunity for increased mediation with the state.

Nowhere does this become more acute than in disputes involving those in the street-market economy and organized crime. As the stories in this chapter show, such cases present common security challenges subjecting residents to violence or intimidation. On top of the lack of basic delivery of goods and services such as security, state agents perpetuate animosities through law enforcement approaches to trafficking and situations involving those working the street-market economy consistently subject residents to danger of shoot-outs and invasive measures during raids. Because police maintain little consistency in patrolling or staying present in *Maciço* neighborhoods, such behaviors serve to increase fear, unreliability and mistrust, a common occurrence documented throughout Brazil (Soares, Bill, and Athayde, 2005; Alves and Evanson, 2011).

Contested Social Domains: The Mont Serrat School

Local social vulnerabilities are inherently connected to the rise and engagement

of tensions, conflicts and disputes[43] in public and private spaces. At the Mont Serrat School (MSS), such challenges became routine. As infrastructural conditions declined over the previous decade, traffickers also increased their presence. Absenteeism by students, and then publically paid teachers, soon followed suit, while fear and uncertainty was on the rise. The lack of public investment or intervention that could have mitigated the decline of educational delivery as a public good, was taken advantage of, according to school administrators and community members, by a ready and willing group of traffickers who effectively took up residence inside the school, selling product, and intimidating teachers (Katia, 12/05/12).

According to residents, the state had all but abandoned the school, which had been originally built by community members themselves. The physical and intellectual integrity of this critical social domain was crumbling. Conditions were untenable. There were feces on the walls in halls and in the bathrooms, classroom desks and materials were destroyed, and the general grounds were in a state of disrepair. One former administrator described it to me as "*a regular Gaza Strip"*. By November of 2011, MSS had only 82 students attending regularly. Teachers, too, had begun to skip school.

Between 2007-2011, the state would close four schools[44] that mainly served impoverished communities of the capital, three of which were primarily attended heavily by *Maciço* youth. When the State announced the MSS closing, representatives from the CCEA and Marist Group[45] intervened. The closing of this school along with others posed a very real potential for a gap in education for children of the *Maciço*, whose families would face real obstacles of getting them to schools geographically distant from home.

In 2011, a partnership was negotiated between the state, the CCEA serving as an interlocutor, and Marist Group,[46] to keep the school running under a unique

[43] Violence may be experienced by way of bodily harm and the instrumentality of violence, or its threat, which can have lasting psychological and physical impacts.
[44] See: http://desacato.info/santa-catarina/governo-catarinense-fecha-escolas-em-Florianópolis/ [Accessed 15 September 2015]
[45] The Marist religious is highly active in south Brazil, funding and administering numerous educational institutions, from primary to higher education. They are often lead partners, and funders, of CCEA projects.
[46] Investing approximately R$2million

partnership, roughly equivalent to a Charter School model. Enrolment would remain public, while the Marists, working closely with the CCEA, assumed the curriculum delivery and administration. Physical and school-culture renovation efforts began in late 2011, and the school opened after holidays ended in January 2012. Enrolment rose from 82 (in late 2011) to over 300 in 2013, approaching 400 by November of 2014.

Details of the school's transition illuminates some of the compromising impacts and tensions that staff members (many locals), and administrators alike faced, as traffickers continued to make physical incursions onto school property, provoking disruptions and disputes. For example, as part of the renovation, doors to the recreational '*quadra'* area were locked after renovations had been performed. Before the school's security gate was installed, traffickers identified as being from the *Escadaria* area repeatedly entered the grounds to use the *quadra* to play football.

Finding the door locked, gang members interrupted an administrator's meeting, and demanded access for their game. When Katia, the new Director, refused, two of the young men threatened: "*Then we will destroy everything*". Feeling powerless, Katia replied: *"it's up to you, but you realize that such behaviors have consequences,"* as they walked out. Luckily, no damage occurred (12/05/12). Traffickers, however, continued to show up. Subsequent to this, one of the educators, Gelson, negotiated a schedule for them to use the *quadra* at night, as long as a school official was present (Katia, 09/04/13).

> *Field Notes* (20/08/12)**:** At a public debate over the 'privatization' of the Mont Serrat school, Vilson clashed with a Marxist professor from the UFSC, who lashed out at him – *"she tried to debate me about being a Marxist"* he later chuckled out loud, reflecting wryly on the moment. The professor had accused Vilson's support of being "incoherent" with his life's work given what she called his instrumentality in the MSS 'take-over' by the Marists.
>
> Vilson remarked: "Jesus helped me better comprehend Marx, and Marx helped me better understand Jesus, but Marxism is outdated. The 19th century European landscape does not account for the complex realities of the favela. She was completely arrogant, an academic – she spun a wonderful web of

> information and talked beautifully about the socialist mind, and yet she was completely disconnected; in the classroom, the ivory tower."
>
> "'So now, *senhora professora*, I listened to you, now you can listen to what I have to say. How would you talk about Marxism from the point of departure of doing over 80 funerals in one year alone for *children and adolescents who died violent deaths*?' How does one speak of Marxist rhetoric [in terms of] watching a father, whose son's body, stabbed dozens of times and lying in a box, lift his lifeless, bloody body *out* of the box and *walk* back up to the community with his body because the police would not let us do a funeral since conditions in the community were too tense amongst the gangs, when [the father] decides, *'then I'll take the body and do it myself?'*" I was the only one there [what else could I do?]." The professor replied: "You should get the traffickers to stop," to which Vilson replied:
>
> "We'll stop trafficking when the *Beira Mar*[47] elite stop sniffing product. Trafficking grows in the absence of economic opportunity and a state that hasn't produced that opportunity. Where were you when we were working to rebuild the school? How are you combatting trafficking? We work upon this pain and lack of resources. These are our realities."

The double-edged nature of insecurity and abandonment places citizens' rights of basic education and security in jeopardy. The example of tensions that teachers, students, and administrators face in the school demonstrates the complex nexus of conditions and community relations that often subject residents to unanticipated but no less urgent moments of confrontation or disputes, in which they must engage in compromised negotiations with locally violent actors who whole asymmetrical positions of power. This example also demonstrates, however, that despite these circumstances, certain individuals are willing to step up to that charge.

Democratic Disempowerment

The compromised position from which residents engage in negotiation of their disputes and managing conflict creates lasting social, psychological, and civic impact, leaving residents with more than a sense of hopelessness. I have come to term the experience of *democratic disempowerment* as that which reflects the compromised position into which residents are thrust due to their perseverance

[47] *Beira Mar* or "Sea Side" is the coastal facing area of the city center, lined with wealthy high-rise residences.

to resolve local disputes, conflicts, or threats, wherein their endeavoring to locate solutions to problems results in continual erosion of security and personal safety, as such efforts simply further exacerbate their problems. As Morton Deutsch (1973) might have affirmed, *avoidance-avoidance* would be the only reasonable solution in the face of this type of disempowerment.

Takaschima's Narrative

In the following example, shared with me by Judge Alexandre Takaschima, he illustrates the dynamics of this dysfunctional conundrum through a personal and professionally illuminating experience in real terms:

> "I can share a practical example about how I learned that the Maria da Penha law[48] was no longer being used by women in the favelas. Driving late one night by car to visit my girlfriend in *Joaçaba* I came upon a woman walking with an infant on the side of the highway. I stopped and asked where she was going. We ended up taking her to *Chapecó*, where she was headed on foot. She left from *Biguaçu* very early that morning due a situation of domestic violence, abandoning everything, grabbed a few items of clothing, and left out on foot. She couldn't go to the *Delegacía* near the favela in *Biguaçu* because traffickers kill anybody who denounces domestic violence to the police.
>
> I learned this, and how much the system creates a situation in which the people who are in vulnerable situations end up always having their rights violated even more. And on the other side, [the state] creates this 'protective' system in which the child cannot legally travel without some identification. She couldn't travel by bus because when she left home she also left without the child's birth certificate. Our entire protective system for kids traveling by bus [without documentation] was exactly that which was creating vulnerability for that woman. She couldn't travel by bus and had to go by foot, hitchhiking, putting her and her child at an even greater situation of risk than if she had taken the bus. All the legal apparatus in these situations ends up creating more risk instead of protecting people.
>
> I think the baby was about two or three years old. While I was speaking with the mother, I was in doubt, thinking to myself – '*damn*, is this woman *really* the mother of this baby?' At the time when I approached her, the baby was

[48] The Maria da Penha Act establishes special courts and stricter sentences for offenders, but also other instruments for the prevention and relief in cities of more than 60,000 inhabitants, such as police stations and shelters for women.
For more information, see: http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/8/maria-da-penha-law-a-name-that-changed-society [Accessed 21 May 2015]

> sleeping. While I was calling my girlfriend on the phone, I saw that the baby had woken up and started to interact with the woman naturally. She even started to breastfeed, so of course, it was hers. If it were kidnapped, the baby would have responded differently. We took her to *Chapecó* where she was going to stay at her mother's house.
>
> Along the way I asked her "and what about the *Conselho Tutelar?*" She responded: 'the *Conselho Tutelar* takes kids away.' It's that whole thing of the state always being the enemy in these situations of vulnerability, and honestly I can't disagree with her. Because what she lives with, in her community, is that the *Conselho Tutelar* is the entity that takes kids away. It's not an entity that protects. It takes kids out of situations of misery, but it leaves parents in it. It's these questions that we need to discuss and debate more in depth in terms of our practices. And in the [RACDCA] network I see [pauses to think], *thank god*, all the people participating in the network had this perspective, and these hopes and dreams, where nobody was satisfied with their [institutional] practices. What we need to do now is channel these disconformities and indignations, to make lemonade out of lemons.
>
> The distance she was walking was about 600km. By comparison, São Paulo is about 900km from Florianópolis. That's the distance that she was walking, at night. I found her right about here [pointing to a map], and we picked up my girlfriend and drove yet another two hours to *Chapecó* to get her out of that situation of risk. That was a situation that I passed by chance, on the road in the middle of nowhere. I imagine these situations are happening. Imagine, a woman and a baby at night, hitchhiking. That's a very rural area. There isn't even a gas station. No hostel, lights, nothing: A situation of real risk created by the system" (20/11/14).

Takaschima's narrative illustrates a common circumstance of insecurity that residents face as they exercise agency and capacities to make decisions and take steps resolve domestic disputes in the face of urgent or precarious situations.

The term *democratic disempowerment* more accurately describes the compromising reality that limits the effectiveness of individual agency to achieve peaceful resolution to their conflicts, amidst the quiet constructs of power and social ordering that shape periphery residents' lives. In the pursuit of dispute resolution or management of conflict, or any action in service of achieving and negotiating security and safety needs, individuals and families engage in what

can nevertheless become a *dangerous* exercise of agency.

It was in these circumstnaces that I observed citizens frequently subjected to scrambling in an unsafe middle ground. Caught between a rock and a hard place created by the nexus of competing social ordering processes of the rule of law and the "law of the hill" (manifested through behaviors of state and non-state armed actors) their ability to navigate the narrow channel of possibilities for resolution without instigating further escalation was significantly influenced and inhibited.

Democratic disempowerment occurs, too, as residents grapple with the certainty of uncertainty. If, or when, state agents become seen as a recourse, sometimes of last resort, they may be sought after, or called on to intervene in situations of conflict, dispute, interpersonal or neighborhood issues in which residents have become incapable or unwilling to handle. Here, the certainty that residents held about their inherent rights often clashes with their perceptions of uncertainty regarding what the involvement of traffickers or state agents, is likely to bring. As discussed below, residents express a longing for a more robust, respectful, and consistent state involvement, often having to choose the lesser of evil potentials (see Cardoso, 2013).

Democratic disempowerment as experienced by residents, provides an opening for non-violent third party intervention, which engages in situations where insecurity is elevated or causally linked to disputes, wherein mediative tactics deployed in service of supporting the involved parties either through negotiation or advocating for residents, or both, are seen to emerge. Here, the dysfunctional relationship between state agents and periphery residents plays out either through violations and abuses that police for example, may inflict upon parties to a local dispute (youth in particular), or through the disempowering, threatening, or escalatory potential that the invitation of police into the community can provoke.

Takaschima's example of his passenger's treacherous trek embodies various elements of this experience. Her dispute was not simply that of violence experienced in the domestic sphere. This experience is compounded by her

exercise of agency to seek safety in the face of these consequences, and the uncertainty and risk her decisions entail as a result, pitting her at risk not only with local traffickers, but also against a the legal system of protections that exist in function of supporting her and her child.

Such complexities conform to the cycle of competing social ordering that subjects residents to increasingly difficult-to-manage scenarios for even simple negotiations (discussed below). These challenges are also often lost on even the most discerning and critical observers and advocates, as Takaschima (a staunch advocate for childrens rights and protections, often openly criticizing Brazil's System of Rights Guarantees, or SRG) himself acknowledges. The frequent and rather unsavory flavor that residents must stomach after interactions with state agents and institutions are trying for citizens of the Maciço, who often struggle with the uncertainty and the real potential for risk or danger interactions and invited state interventions can unleash.

Nevertheless, my observations also contend that Mont Serrat residents did not often, or systematically, opt to access traffickers to play third party roles in resolving neighborhood problems or disputes. In the case of Takaschima's passenger, however, we find a clear example of the restricted way in which citizens often find themselves both at the fringes of state laws and protections designed to manage and protect domestic abuse victims (in this case, the protections afforded by the Maria da Penha law), and the complex and complicated scenarios and obstacles they must face, which arise as a result, often times stimulating further conflict or dispute.

Behind this unexpected encounter is the symbolic distance between strangers who inhabit the same city, while inhabiting extremely different worlds. Symbolically speaking, it took an informal encounter on the middle of a highway, at night, for Judge Takaschima to become familiar with the nuanced nature by which such challenges impact citizens. This scenario also reveals the real impact of what periphery residents experience as a type of entrapment, wherein their attempts to deal with a dispute and/or violence in private spaces[49] can

[49] Ultimately we do not know the circumstances in which the woman left her home, other than perhaps she was being abused, yet domestic abuse was not atypical for women of all ages,

further instigates public and private risk and insecurity, such as the young mother's risk to place her and her child in conflict with the law. In some ways, this example exposes the quiet bias of the state agents who tend to remain distant, disconnected, and generally unfamiliar with the conditions and social networks that help perpetuate disempowering experiences for Maciço residents.

State agents are also often unable or unwilling to familiarize themselves with the ways in which disputes and insecurity intertwine and influence citizens' behaviors and responses. As González Bustelo (2015: 28) notes, the very "fact that criminal violence in Latin America has tended to remain outside the 'radar' of peace and conflict studies has also prevented learning the lessons of engaging criminal groups in conflict settings." This general resistance proves to be one of the challenges associated with re-imagining legal and institutional practices.

Together with the real distance, or complacency of state agents, stigma and unfamiliarity with complex realities of disputes and local tensions in periphery life ultimately render state resources and agents unrealistic, insufficient or sources of last resort for citizens when it comes to facilitating resolution of local disputes. As observers of domestic disputes in Brazil have observed (Hautzinger, 2008), new formulations and forms of engagement are necessary to materialize a more just, peaceful, and nonviolent democratic experience for all.

Democratic disempowerment also reflects urban periphery contexts more broadly, akin to Goldstein's (2012: 29) observation of Bolivian periphery dwellers' "dual modes of outlawing – negative inclusion and perilous exclusion – [which] represent different ways that the state produces or perpetuates insecurity in the marginal barrios, even as it establishes a certain kind of order on its periphery". One of the distinguishing characteristics between Bolivian and Brazilian periphery experiences is the nature of *certainty* about their rights,

married or unmarried. While domestic violence or abuse may certainly have been present in this case, some abuse is tolerated and more socially acceptable so long as it remains in the sphere of the home (Leandro, Alessandra, Lia, Ivone). It is likely that traffickers in this case engage in violent behavior not simply for purposes of control, but also due to the need to limit police involvement when denouncements by individuals are made. See Davis (1998) for more discussion about the proclivity of the rule of the hill to punish locals who abuse other locals in gang-controlled areas.

about which Brazilian citizens, particularly periphery residents, tout awareness and expectation of fundamental guarantees under the current democratic regime.

Whereas Goldstein observes uncertainty as a key element of periphery residents' resopnses to local disputes, I observe that the struggle for Brazilian citizens in periphery communities remains contingent upon their overwhelming certainty and expectations given the unresponsiveness and distance of existing democratic institutions and public policies to uphold their rights. Rather than occurring in a vacuum created by an overwhelming sense of uncertainty, democratic disempowerment is punctuated by a regime of certainty with which democratic citizesn experience the state's inability or unwillingness to protect them, impinging upon residents' ability to willfully engage with state resources for help in resolving local conflicts.

While security and law enforcement are present in periphery zones, they are also absent in their consistency and selectivity. Despite this, police are the most consistent state presence for the 7000+ families living on the *Maciço.* Goldstein (2012) cautions about the tempting notion that such dynamics represent a failed state. Instead, he notes that the *phantom state* maintains control an *absent presence*. Failure would imply a

> "set of intentions gone awry, that the state somehow intends to have a particular effect but for whatever reason – incompetence, corruption, lack of resources, neoliberalism – cannot live up to these intentions. The state clearly does fail to live up to the expectations that *barrio* residents have of it, but that does not therefore mean that the state –its functionaries, leaders and institutions- ever shared those expectations and assumptions about the role of the state, its obligations to its citizens, and the possibilities for its positive intervention in people's lives and communities" (Goldstein, 2012: 82).

Residents of Florianópolis' peripheries confront the consequences of these divergent assumptions. Their responses is attuned to the combination passive and active, but often hardline, and militaristic behavior used by law enforcement. As this chapter and others demonstrate, the fragmented, reactive, and seemingly disconnected way by which law enforcement, judicial, and social service agents engage with residents, is one of the principle and quotidian

contributors to residents' sense of disempowerment and insecurity. Not only does this promote confusion and a sense of incapacitation when seeking answers to their problems, but it also erodes confidence and trust, perpetuate an ever growing sense of uncertainty. [50]

In the eyes of many residents whom I interviewed, the dysfunctional relationship between citizens and the state, which plays out through public policy problems and interpersonal interactions, renders state interventions across a range of areas, ineffective and unwelcome at best, while perceived as being dangerous at worst. This observation, shared by diverse residents, also influenced their behaviors in the disputing scenarios that I accompanied during fieldwork.

Often, the experience of the state's engagement for residents was that which was carried out through piecemeal, rather than sustained and preventive approaches (along with non-violent tactics deployed for the purposes of upholding the rule of law and exerting social control). Rather than a mere absence or inaccessibility of the state, this solidified the perception of residents that institutions and agents were both undesirable and precarious options or resources for use in addressing their conflicts or redressing rights violations. This confirms related rearch about democracy in periphery areas of Brazil (see Arias, 2006).

In the narrative that follows, pieced together by field notes, two interviews with Teresa, and informal discussions with Teresa's family members, Ivone, and Vilson, I present a view to the complexity and insecurity with which dispute management unfolds for Teresa and her family living in the *Alto da Caieira* neighborhood. In particular, the example highlights the complex link between insecurity, family disputes, Teresa's engagement and perceptions of the state as an involved antagonistic actor, while examplifying some of the damaging

[50] Confusion is created in many cases when social and judicial services are juxtaposed to police actions, which may occur any time of day or night. Not atypical was an early April 2015 police raid in Monte Cristo, in which over 600 children's lives were put at risk as they gathered on the grounds of CEDEP to celebrate Easter with teachers and volunteers. A sudden police air and ground incursion, beginning around 15h local time, became a full-fledged shoot-out between police and traffickers on the streets adjacent to CEDEP. The IVG responded with a press release to local media, entitled "Easter with Eggs and Bullets" (Páscoa com ovos e balas) which can be read, along with photos posted on the IVG Facebook site online: https://www.facebook.com/RedeIVG/posts/833921823360437 (Personal Communication, Karla Martins 04/02/15).

implications that citizens' interactions with state agents can produce.

Dona Teresa and Danny

Dona Teresa is 75 years old. Born in rural Santa Catarina into a family of German, African, and Italian ancestry, today she counts herself as a long-time resident of the *Maciço*. Migrating to Florianópolis over 30 years ago, she worked most of her life as a primary school educator before transferring to a municipal office that dealt with participatory budgeting.

Mary, one of Teresa's eight children, adopted Danny at birth. Around age 12, Danny was baptized into the organized crime faction, becoming a faithful, dues-paying member (a monetary cost of roughly US$50 per month). Danny began living with a crime boss in the *Vila União* neighborhood located in the north of the capital, an area which boasts the capital's highest *Primeiro Grupo Catarinense (PGC)* concentration.

Danny started as a *servidor*, working his way up to administering a *lojinha,* or store, and making the occasional arms smuggling trip between Florianópolis and Paraguay. In mid-2012, however, Danny fell in dispute not uncommon to the realities of young traffickers working in the street-market economy, which ultimately resulted in family turmoil. Picked up by police for possession, his product was confiscated. This put Danny into conflict with his employers, in a rather inauspicious workplace for those who make mistakes. Unable to repay his debt, Danny fled the *Vila União* and returned to the *Maciço*.

In time, his involvement in local trafficking placed him in separate and additional debt over drugs, a handgun, and even some jewelry he held, which had been stolen from inside his home, presumably by an uncle. Without means to repay, Danny tried unsuccessfully to take over the local *boca* by force. Unable to return home for concerns of safety, owing money to both the PGC and *Caieira* traffickers, Teresa afforded Danny shelter in her home, located in a different part of the *Caieira*, assuming responsibility for his and her personal security, as well as the obvious risks.

During this time of heightened tension, family conflict emerged over Teresa's

decision, as family members grappled with the risks and insecurity proposed by Danny's situation. A major rift opened up between Teresa's children and spouses, including Danny's parents who also had a toddler, over a disagreement with Teresa's choice to shelter her grandson. Embroiled in conflict, Teresa's children moved to have a judge declare Teresa mentally unfit to keep custody of Danny, seeking a restraining order and disallowing her to continue hiding Danny.

At this juncture, Teresa phoned Vilson to explain her issue. Vilson offered to mediate a discussion, but Teresa's children refused. In her defense, Vilson assured Teresa that if this were her decision, he could arrange to get her an objective psychological evaluation, so that she could counter their threats with the possibility of processing them for libel. Facing a hardline negotiation, the family rescinded, despite the fear and trepidation of insecurity in the powerlessness to do much else. Teresa's conflict did not end there. Having facilitated Danny's adoption, Teresa's actions seemed coherent with defending his life, despite great risks, not to mention the perseverance in accepting a degree of insecurity and a family dispute by doing so.

Teresa is also, by all accounts, a civically inclined and locally outspoken community member. As Vilson recalled, Teresa often voices opinion during mass at the *Caieira* church, with politicized statements about community youth, at times even interrupting his homily to do so. She would criticize the state frequently in interviews about her struggle with Danny's plight, expressing not only a sense of despair, but also abandonment and mixed treatment by authorities to whom she actively sought after for help.

As a civically minded individual, Teresa's discontent was not only personal, but emerges amidst the conundrum of vulnerability and insecurity presented by the inability to access state-guaranteed protection for her family: *"Where are the legislators? Where are the police? They are supposed to be the intermediaries. Where are they? They don't come here at all, ever,"* she once remarked (Teresa, 24/04/13).

Teresa's frustrations were correlated with a marked, serious and untimely decline in her health as the situation unfolded. In other occasions, her interfaces with state authorities have been positive. Teresa noted for example: "*the Ouvidoria*[51] *really listens to you*" referring to a complaint she once lodged against a school security guard who was physically abusing children at recess while the teachers were out of view having a smoke. She also declared that the "police who investigated that stoning incident [a random attack on her home on evening, perpetrated either by traffickers, or an addict, she surmises] treated me well" (Teresa, 24/04/13).

Six-months after Danny went into hiding, the CCEA was able to officially begin what Ivone described as a "marathon defense" for Danny's life. Connecting through Vilson, the CCEA and their CRDH program[52] were able to support Teresa by taking her and Danny to live together outside Florianópolis. During their time hidden away in a city far from *Floripa*, Danny again screwed up, this time over a gun payment, forcing the pair to return to Florianópolis. Back in the capital, Teresa's health and heart condition took a turn for the worse, forcing her into the hospital for treatment.

While she was away, Danny was picked up by the police and charged again with possession. Upon his release, Teresa, now home, decided to take matters into her own hands. Herself a strictly law-abiding citizen, she giggled and half-scolded herself when telling me how she 'disobeyed the law,' borrowing a neighbor's car to drive to the continental area of *Floripa* without a license to put Danny into hiding at a hotel.

She could pay for no more than a storage area, a room approximately 1.5m x 2m, in a place where Teresa trusted the manager would not sell information about Danny's whereabouts. Still at odds and without support of family, Teresa prepared and shuttled three meals to Danny everyday. Between food and R$30 cost per night to hide Danny, Teresa went broke, at which point she prioritized Danny's protection over her own need to eat. One evening, Teresa reluctantly resolved to call Vilson to ask if he could help, as her efforts to preserve security

[51] Ombudsman
[52] CCEA's Human Rights Protection program - For more information, see: http://www2.ccea.org.br/blog/crdh-lages-e-joinville/ [Accessed 15/10/14]

were leaving her hungry.

Teresa's initial contact with the state occurred at the *Promotoria*[53] in a meeting over Danny's criminal infraction. This was also Teresa's first point of contact through which she inquired as to how the state could help with the threats to Danny's life. The attorney told her that there was nothing that they could do for his situation, beyond dealing with the criminal possession charge. Teresa's experience at this meeting was one she recounted with mental anguish, frustration, and anxiety, provoking nervousness and a sense of helplessness in the face of the response of the official:

> "There is no where to go – the state doesn't have anybody who comes here [to the community] – they don't have our salaries, they don't eat what we eat – they don't know what it's like to survive like we do. The judge appeared to be illiterate. He asked questions that had nothing to do with the situation [about Danny's threat, from her point of view]. If your child doesn't have a criminal case, how can he get help for this" (24/04/13)?

Speaking with Teresa one year later in November 2014, she downplayed the emotional anguish borne from this interaction, while reasserting her critique of the state. When I asked Teresa why it was that she initially opted to leave *Floripa* through the CCEA assistance instead of pursuing other state resources for support, her response defined the problem succinctly: *não achei lugar*. She literally, "could not find the proper place" for help. Despite the urgency, Teresa was unable to locate the resources to properly deal with the complexity of the threat to security that her family was facing.

I inquired with Ivone about Teresa's situation, as she had been instrumental in workin with Danny in the case. Why had Teresa and others like her not approach authorities like the *Polícia Civil (PC)*, to request protection or help? In these cases, Ivone (21/11/14) suggested, two factors are common. On the one hand, there is a perceived lack of trust by residents in the authorities. Despite their urgencies and emergencies, deciding whether or not to contact the police becomes a problem in itself. On the other, Florianópolis officials including members of the PC are often uninformed and unfamiliar with avenues for

[53] State Prosecutor's Office

safeguards like the PPCAM[54] minors' protection program.

A misdirected request made to a judicial or law enforcement official not only raises anxiety, but can literally jeopardize security by placing the burden of security back onto residents at increased personal risk. Requests can also incur anything from greater humiliation or abuse, to a critical loss of time, the combination of which presents approaching or involving the literally and figuratively distant authorities as an unrealistic option.

This obstacle underscores the disempowering certainty of uncertainty citizens face in managing security issues, as well as deciding what steps to take in pursuing pathways to resolution of a series of disputes which, in Teresa and Danny's case, are inseparable from dynamics that both originate from, and also feed insecurity. Teresa's reflections about her experience with the *Promotor* also expose the impact of the judicial system's fragmentation. As crime and violence grows in the city, the system of protection in place has been slow to mobilize, despite the routine perseverance and cooperation in law enforcement and prosecutions.

On the one hand, state agents including the *Conselho Tutelar* and the Police demonstrate themselves to be an imposing presence, apprehending and processing subjects for protection *and* infractions. These same institutions and their agents are selectively unresponsive when it comes to supporting situations like Teresa's. This is further complicated by residents' perception of involving institutions established to protect youth while under state care and custody, given their history of abusive conditions and violent treatment minors experience. These factors present a nuanced reality that shapes citizen behavior in the face of disputes, often resulting in risky and deleteriouss undertakings such as those identified by Teresa's attempts to manage (or avoid) further family conflict, while also hiding Danny. Such efforts came at great personal, but also civic costs to citizenship.

[54] PPCAM (Programa para a Proteção da Criança e Adolescente) is Brazil's Federal Program for the Protection of Minors and Adolescents. Because Santa Catarina does not have a permanent PPCAM office, a temporary council made up of the civil society and state representatives must meet to determine whether the case merits taking further steps to pursue support from Brasília.

When I asked Teresa (25/11/14) what security meant to her, she replied that security was not just about police, but also about health, education, and prevention. She went on to question the sensibilities of federal spending on the import of Cuban doctors for service in rural Brazil, while her own community in the middle of a capital city lacks health clinics and medical personnel. These gaps entail other economic burdens, which become a source of frustration and concern for *morro* families.

Since the process with Danny began, Teresa also decided to stop voting. She has further rescinded her long-time support for the state-university, citing that if the police cannot even protect the rights of students there (referring to a series of sexual assaults on the UFSC campus in late 2012), she could no longer encourage young people to participate, alongside such little return for the community.

When I inquired as to why Teresa did not approach the *Conselho Tutelar*, she pointed to the widely held claims and perceptions regarding abusive tactics used by *Conselheiros*, whose tactics "make enemies" by removing children from homes. Minors, who have come to recognize the punitive nature of CT actions, have at times called the CT in rebellion to non-abusive parenting:

> "The police beat kids, so why can't a parent discipline without being penalized? I went to the *audiência pública* in the ALESC where the *Conselho Tutelar* was getting an award. I went down there in my sandals dressed just like this. I don't mind! I got the microphone and expressed my opinion – *'you all have diplomas, I don't, but you don't know what is happening in our streets. Our diplomas are the tears that fall.*' They make enemies in families because they abuse kids' rights while the parents can't even raise them properly."

As we chat, Teresa shares other sources of fear and mistrust, her voice dropping into hushed decibels. She calls a neighbor's recent abandoning of the community with her young daughter after a local trafficker was murdered, and his 18- year old girlfriend brutally beaten and shot twice, surviving:

> "The police also killed an 8-year old and threw his body into the brush down a bank, just over here [in the neighborhood]. My biggest worry for the community is how many kids are dying in Brazil. Police kill kids, or beat them, and then

> make the kids lie at the *Delegacía* that they got in a fight amongst themselves. They are too overburdened at the *Promotoría* [to do anything]. Where is the money from public authorities for prevention? This *atendimento* should be more preventive. People like you [Jared] from outside, the PUC students who came once, they do more; *at least they come to listen*" (Teresa, 24/11/14).

Teresa's advocacy is underscored by the personal fear and frustration with state agents, triggering anticipation and anxiety about simply getting the proper message across to state authorities when the time had finally come. As our conversation in April 2013 came to a close, Teresa was preparing to "write everything down so that I would know what to say" in her next meeting with the *Promotor*:

> "I will say to him: *'I didn't go to the university, but I have a degree in anguish, sadness, tears, and reality*,' and they don't have that. They stay inside their four walls."

The CCEA initiated the process to pursue PPCAM support for Danny.[55] At the first meeting, held on a Friday, the council decided to make a formal request for support from Brasília. Despite the urgent sensitivity for taking action, Federal authorities said that their travel to Florianópolis to formally attend to the case would take place at earliest by the following Tuesday, as they waited on their budget to be approved (Ivone, 30/04/13).

Direct access to services and funding of the federal PPCAM is not yet a reality for *Catarinenses*, despite the recent data that ranked SC as that with the second highest increase in security spending amongst Brazil's 26 states and federal district of Brasília, to the tune of 500% between 2012-2014 alone, the period bookending my fieldwork. In light of the growth of the PGC and the rising rate of confrontations in the capital and throughout state prisons, this indicates the directionality of future strategies. In a closed communication, Ivone laid out the challenge around the state's action as understood by the CCEA:

[55] At the meeting, Teresa later said about Danny that *"the boy had an audience and was at first reluctant to speak… his mother than basically challenged him – then why are you hiding out? Afraid to go outside?* A decision was apparently made to move him out of state, but not immediately. When they left the building, a car full of men, presumably PGC members slowly drove by. Out of a cracked window a man yelled: 'so that's where you've been, mister big-mouth?' *(o seu boca aberta, esta aí, né?)*

> "The Public Ministry made the formal request. Their lack of knowledge about this policy for the protection of youth threatened with death postponed a solution for a total of two weeks. Still, it was the involvement of a number of people who helped in obtaining the protection for this child, so that his dreams may continue. We need to create spaces in which the Public Ministry and the *Conselho Tutelar* can appropriate these policies and take advantage of what they offer in order to save the lives of our adolescents.
>
> We cannot be satisfied with responses of: *'I don't know, it won't work, I can't do anything.'* We need to mobilize ourselves and mobilize the municipality and the state to deal with these situations of violence against children. According to the Adolescent Homicide Index in Brazil, 32,568 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18 will be murdered between 2008 and 2014. We cannot remain quiet, nor at peace with this situation. Solutions exist" (Ivone, Personal Communication, 12/12/12).

Teresa's story highlights the complicated and intertwined nature of private disputes and public and private sources of insecurity. This problematic nexus is further perpetuated in symbolic and material ways through selective and sometimes discriminatory state interventions that citizens may request, or attempt to avoid in their exercise of personal agency, placing themselves and their families at higher risk. Despite existing services, educated officials, and her own proclivity to engage institutions and participate as a public citizen throughout the course of her 75 years, Teresa's situation was one in which she could not *find a place*, and leaving her in an extremely compromised situation.

The interwoven actions are clear. Facing a compromised situation after exercising her own agency, Teresa sought the mediative roles eventually undertaken by Vilson, Ivone and other CCEA staffers, who supported Teresa through formal and informal ways. These were all instrumental in serving a variety of negotiation needs. This included advocacy with the *Promotoría* to get Danny into a rehabilitation program outside of Florianópolis for treating addiction, rather than pursuing incarceration. Teresa eventually borrowed money to pay off Danny's debt to local traffickers, allowing him to return to the *Caieira* where he stays today in her home. By 2014, Danny had successfully completed rehab and was entering into the CCEA's *Jovem-Aprendiz* program.

The Assault on Dona Dida

The case of Dona Dida, an 87-year old *morro* resident, became of particular concern for local mediators in September 2012. Dida lives in the Descoberta, near her daughters, who both married police officers. Dida's three grandchildren also participate in the local *Descoberta* gang. Because of the concentration of young traffickers at the *boca* near Dida's house, there is often loud music playing into early hours of the morning. In the past, complaints have been lodged anonymously by neighbors, and police have been called, with varied results.

One Saturday night, around 2am, Dida went out to confront and negotiate with the group directly. The group ignored her request to turn down the volume, and stopped only after police arrived forcing the group to clear the area. After police departed, traffickers destroyed Dida's roof, effectively caving it in under a barrage of stones, terrorizing and terrifying her. This moved Vilson to comment openly to me the next day: *"We have to move on this. Now they have her marked".*

Physically unharmed, Dida nevertheless showed up at 6am mass awake all night in a state of shock, contemplating leaving the community. Though Dida insisted that she had not been the one who called the police, her consideration to leave the community in fear raised many concerns. Dida has strong kinship ties to the *Caixa* area of Mont Serrat. Despite the existing truce amongst gangs in the *Maciço*, tensions remain. Dida's sudden departure could trigger escalation of tensions or territorial conflict, not least at a time of rumors about a Descoberta takeover of the Caixa.

In this case, the involvement of police had escalated a neighborhood noise issue common to communities, exacerbating conflict and tension amongst neighbors. Here, the dispute can be considered within the overarching hegemonic disputing context that implicate social relations *and* ordering which unfold through violence on the *Maciço*. Engaging in a noise-related dispute directly with neighbors would be an otherwise uncomplicated, yet not an unreasonable risk for Dida to take herself. In full knowledge that antagonists in this case were traffickers, she nonetheless engaged in attempting to negotiate

the issue. With the arrival and swift departure of the police however, Dida became a target of trafficker retaliation. Traffickers pinpointed Dida as the one who phoned the police, thereby breaking the social code of the neighborhood.

The consequences of this scenario raise potential for additional manifestations of conflict, violence, and collective, social impacts in the neighborhood. Leaving both Dida's personal wellbeing as well as the larger implications of community stability uncertain, were not risks that mediators were willing to overlook. I observed the events unfolding that week as particularly troubling for people like Vilson. It was one of the few times that I saw him and other community leaders visibly preoccupied. Vilson was extremely reflective over the days following the incident, frequently discussing the situation with me if we coincided for a coffee.

Unlike routine shootings, stabbings, political advocacy or struggle, and daily interfaces with conditions of misery present in the periphery, this incident produced a great deal of unexpected uncertainty into Vilson's typically steadfast decision-making. Reflecting on the nature of the potential escalation, he uncharacteristically once half-humorously remarked:

> "It seems like there are periods of exposition of violence, and we're in one now – sometimes it's peaceful, but not now (sighs). I gotta pray the whole week for this" (Field Notes, 23/09/12).

Though police are often called anonymously, their presence can escalate a presenting conflict, or invite and ignite wider tensions. Given the ephemeral presence in community, they are not a reliable source of protection, and may only increase risk for residents who are left feeling relatively powerless to negotiate.

Powerlessness, the risk of getting caught in the crossfire, and the risk of unjustified abuses by law enforcement, including youth arrest or incarceration (also abusive) during raids, particularly for uninvolved individuals caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, all pose daunting decisions for residents. Often, people like Dida are left with options to capitulate or negotiate at great risk, both of which can be risky or damaging in an asymmetrical negotiating arena.

Dida's situation, and others like it, demonstrate key challenges that residents face in contemplating how to leverage community or state resources when involved or swept up in disputing scenarios, or must make decisions regarding the conflicts that impact neighborhood-wide. Here, Teresa's experience with democratic disempowerment is clearly evidenced by her action and reaction to the inability to find an appropriate modicum of support through state agents with whom she interacted. In some ways, this is a case in which Danny's situation and the complexity of interwoven disputes involve, like many others, falls through the cracks of state resources or support systems.

Mediator interventions in Dida's case and the Caixa noise dispute that follows, both prioritized a social-capital building approach rather than involving state authorities, in an attempt to address and quell future violence. Curiously, mediators in this scenario also bypassed any notion of a conventional mediative or restorative process option that could account for the property or psychological damage that Dida experienced. Chapter 7 offers insight into the conclusion and resolution process, in conjunction with the discussion of non-dominating power, which I suggest that mediators used in pursuit of 'transformational' objectives through this everyday conflict.

The Caixa Noise Dispute

On a Tuesday around 8pm, just after dusk, three men gathered in Vilson's living room in meeting they arranged at last Saturday evening's mass. They have reached their limits related to problems with the group of traffickers who also blast music late into the night, this time in the *Caixa d'agua area*.

For months, *Caixa* families have withstood the weekly barrage of polemic *funk*[56] emanating from two large speakers on the Vieira da Rosa,[57] positioned in front of a newly opened bar where traffickers gather. In the evenings, the scene

[56] Funk music, widely played across favela communities and by traffickers at neighborhood parties, has been the target of a variety of security policy initiatives and bans in many cities. For more information, see: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/silencing-brazil-baile-funk-20146301330202459 89.html [Accessed 01/02/15]

[57] Rua General Vieira da Rosa, a street named after Florianópolis' mayor during the first years of Brazil's military dictatorship (1964-1966). It traverses Mont Serrat, running from the *Descoberta* past the Mont Serrat Chapel, into the *Caixa*, and past the Mont Serrat School on the way up the hill to the *Alto da Caieira.*

unfolds like many across the *Maciço*. Between 20 and 40 young men and women gather to socialize, unleashing music at top volume. Sound echoes loudly throughout the neighborhood, as its vibrations are most acutely heard, and felt, by the residents whose homes rise up the hill toward *Pastinho*, shaken by the lyrics and the bass in the immediate pathway of sound. Having personally passed this scene on foot and in a vehicle, I could only verify the strength of the decibels as being extremely demanding on one's senses.

In hushed voices and reserved, contemplative looks, the three men recall increasingly aggressive encounters and multiple impacts of this, now neighborhood-wide problem. The men are middle aged, and each is well respected as 'references' in the community. At the time, two held positions on the MS *Conselho Comunitário*. Their tone is somber and worrisome. Confidentiality here is paramount, as leaked information could bring retaliatory consequences to any one of them, their families, or their neighbors. "Keeping things quiet," is reiterated many times out loud.

Speaking softly, *Celso* discloses his attempts at confronting the issue on his own. Fragility in his voice suggests an air of defeat under the weight of growing micro-aggressions on the street, as young men have begun to intimidate him now proactively, on their own volition. Just the other day they refused to clear the way as he attempted to enter and leave the parking area of his home. Other neighbors have also experienced verbal aggressions, abusive language, and threats, heightening tensions. This has effectively disallowed any further direct efforts at dialogue.

Apart from the insupportable, palpable volume that literally shakes homes and shacks, *funk* floods forcefully into otherwise quiet family quarters late into the night. As fathers and husbands, these three men feel insulted and impotent to respond to what they feel are highly offensive lyrical content:

> "This sound is everywhere, all the way down to where *Teco* lives, and *Marlete*. *Teco* sleeps through, but nobody else does. It's *funk proibido*. Nobody sleeps, and we can't keep our kids' ears covered the whole time. All this is happening in front of you and you can't do anything about it. The speaker towers give them a platform and empower them. It's anguishing. It's an indignity to the whole

> neighborhood. And we can't even approach them or… (*His voice trails off, shaking his head*)" (Field Notes, 18/11/14).

They also note that two young men, Lucas and João, have also been seen hanging out in the group. In late 2013, João, Vilson's godson, committed a homicide on orders from his *dono*, while he was still underage. As minors, younger traffickers may be used by adults to commit more grievous crimes, as they receive less time in prison, if caught or when forced to turn themselves in. Having been released from custody, now part of the group blasting the music, João hangs out directly in front of the house of the family whose son he murdered only months prior, further augmenting the tension for residents in that particular area.

Tensions and anguish, weekend upon weekend, month after month, have reached peak levels. In their words, the men feel offended, disrespected, and abused in this ongoing "destitution of values and disrespect for the families" (Field Notes, 18/11/14). Held hostage, captive to traffickers, one solution they raise is to physical remove the speakers by day, though this could also escalate the situation. Vilson proposes speaking with Lt. Colonel Graça, with whom he and I at the time had recently discussed community policing as an option to bring the police constructively closer to the community.

The option Vilson made received a lukewarm response, causing visible unease and hesitation, which wass unsurprising given the history of police behavior.[58] Throughout the conversation, comments indicate that involving the police remains sensitive and a begrudgingly unrealistic option for both the short and long term:

> **Gaúcho: "***Once in a while the police will come and patrol the avenue, but they don't do anything. They come in and [traffickers] all escape on foot up into Pastinho. They come in, rob them of drugs or small belongings, but that hurts families too because like it or not there are lives that are [financially] sustained*

[58] On the Friday prior to this meeting, around 6pm as I was returning home through that area, I saw PM vehicles with neighbors and onlookers gathered around. The PM were searching around and underneath a house, possibly for contraband that had been stashed as traffickers escaped the raid on foot. Residents lament the frequency of scenes like this when police make raids but rarely operate upon a more constructive, preventive basis.

by that. I think up in [Pastinho] it's less so today, but in this group here are also a lot of thieves, and there are more robberies these days [around here]"

Celso: *"We used to have police here, under Lt. Ari. They were reasonable. They talked to people. Just talked, unarmed, really reasonable. They were more connected, going around on foot. We need this. But they lost all that connection"*

Roberto: "*Around the time of Luis Enrique,*[59] *they changed the government and the community wasn't worthy of getting protection. Politics changes everything. They took everything away. And now we are left with this."*

Vilson: *"It's true we've lived for a long period of time now without security*".

The conversation ends with a reiteration amongst the four to maintain confidentiality, solidarity, and restraint in the face of intimidation. The ultimate rejection of Vilson's offer to contact Lt. Colonel Graça is not surprising, but does speak to weight of the preference the men chose (discussed in Chapter 7) over the alternative. Direct negotiation efforts with traffickers in this context brought about increased open intimidation. These efforts constitute quiet reproductions of symbolic violence of the hegemonic context, as part of traffickers' imposition of power. Likewise, the social ordering of police incursions has also made their influence felt.

State authorities pose an insufficient and potentially dangerous option to support residents resolve community disputes. Just like the case of Dona Dida, past noise complaint calls have led to more violence, as well as invitations for corrupt policing, as many profess how authorities have invaded homes and stolen from uninvolved residents, further constraining their suitability in delivering security as a public good.

Vilson comments that dialogue might have been easier, or the group more responsive, had it been comprised of older traffickers. For now, the men will look into what local laws might support a forceful removal of the speakers due to

[59] Luiz Henrique da Silveira of the PMDB party served as Mayor of Joinville (SC), state and federal deputy, Minister of Science and Technology, and two terms as Governor of Santa Catarina between 2003-2010.

noise disturbance, as this could be an opportunity to invite and help control and less uncertain, and more strategic police presence.

Sergio and the Caieira Church Break-In

For *Maciço* residents, negotiations with neighbors living in densely populated areas often occur in spite of known power imbalances and associated risks. In many cases, it is not uncommon for residents to engage each other, even if this means interacting with more volatile neighbors. Under the pretext of intervening in, or resolving local tensions or disputes in a context of insecurity, making decisions about where, how, or with whom to engage, involves a series of careful calculations. Such as was the case of a meeting amongst leaders and staff of the *Alto de Caieira* church on rainy midweek afternoon in November 2014.

The evening prior, the church's main door had been broken by the force of a body, exposing a jagged length of wood between the floor and the handle. Inside, chairs were knocked over. In the small office room, drawers were pulled out, with paperwork, musical equipment, shelving, and other items strewn across the floor. Nothing seemed missing or purposefully damaged. The significance of the meeting however, did not focus on the mess, nor the losses, but around the possible scenarios and security issues that such a break-in was liable to foretell. Why had it occurred? What would it entail for the community? What should local leaders do?

> *Field Notes (18/11/14):* Nine of us, church leaders and administrators, mostly *Caieira* residents, sit in chairs arranged in a circle before the altar, as the meeting unfolds. The tension is palpable. Initial exchanges calm nerves, lighten the mood, pass information and reiterate solidarity and camaraderie amongst those gathered in a time of uncertainty. It's a rare occurrence that coincided with the sudden and unexpected departure of Sergio, the church treasurer, from the community last Saturday.
>
> Mery, a local shop owner, breaks the ice with a story about her neighbor who, exclaiming aloud from her window amidst the shouts emanating from the Evangelical mass next door: "*Hey Mery! It's good to be Catholic, in'it? Hey* [yelling out to the worshipers]*, Jesus in't deaf ya know!*"

> No stone is left unturned in analyzing the break-in, which is also a time for reflection and rumination, reminding those present of the concrete gains and conquests of past. As Tereza[60] recalled: *"Remember, we used to have two to three people dying here per week… remember how it used to be, and now all the work that was done?"* Mery more casually conveys the story of a 13-year old in catechism, who, after being invited to a party in '*Morro do 25'* last weekend, witnessed the police shoot somebody's dog dead in the doorway, to punish traffickers for the noise of the party. The girl attested that because of this she would become a trafficker to hunt down police. The circle agreed that the *time was now* to act.
>
> Tereza hands out a flyer for a gender-violence workshop being sponsored by the Prefecture in partnership with the *Caieira's Conselho.* Vilson rhetorically remarks with a smirk: "*you have to get the men to go*," to which Tereza laughs: "*Well the women don't beat themselves, do they?*!"
>
> They concur that more outsiders have been coming through on the roads, since they have been paved little by little over time. Could it be somebody from outside? This is a crew who has seen their share of violence. One hypothesis for the break-in was traffickers acting in retaliation for something to do with Sergio.

Sergio, who is of indigenous origin, lived until recently in the *Caieira* with his wife Dircy, of German heritage. Like many families, they are rural migrants, moving to the *Caieira* from western Santa Catarina, residing long enough to have raised a family. Sergio, the *Caieira* church treasurer, is no stranger to conflict. He has a history of confronting traffickers at the local *boca,* not only about high volume music, but also in his frustration at 'vagrancy' and 'harassment' behaviors he considered disrespectful to the community.

On the morning of the break-in, Sergio had phoned Vilson to tell him that he would be back to return money he was holding for the church, and that he couldn't explain everything on the phone but that he would call again later this week, saying only that conditions weren't right for him and Dircy to stay in the community any longer. Those gathered at the meeting knew that tensions had existed for him for some time. In 2012, Sergio was shot at six times in the street, though none of the bullets hit their mark. Following this, he hid out in the brush

[60] Tereza is a different woman from the earlier example, whom I distinguish using either a 'z' or 's' in their names.

and with accurate marksmanship, put three traffickers in the hospital with rounds in the foot, leg and abdomen of the young men as they sat at the *boca* (Field Notes, 23/09/12).

Around 7am on the Sunday following the church gathering, Sergio came knocking on Vilson's door. Dawn afforded him a relative window of safety, as most trafficking activity ceases by that hour of the morning on weekends. Sergio and Vilson talked for about an hour. Sitting at the infamous kitchen table, he recounted that on the previous Saturday morning he had asked 40 friends and relatives to come early in the morning, armed, into the *morro*, to set up at lookout points. He and Dircy packed their belongings into the family truck in front of their home, and left. Sergio promised Vilson that he would be back, but that for now he must leave, and that their decision to depart suddenly was based on the ongoing dispute and animosity between him and local traffickers. Attitudes and open hostility, including physical threats and increased risk of being shot were enough. The notion of living in fear and tension was simply no longer affording them a good quality of life (Field Notes, 23/11/14).

Symbolic Violence and Seu Conrado

Another theory for the break-in was a scenario of retaliation this time involving a different neighbor, whose home construction project without an official permit had recently earned him a steep fine by the Municipality. Seu Conrado, the church's handyman and local community leader, raised the notion of retaliation by this neighbor as a possibility. To do so, however, Conrado subtly leaned in to whisper this thought into Tereza's ear. This action caught my attention, and recalled a previous dispute involving Conrado that I learned the year prior. Leaders dismissed this retaliation scenario after somebody confirmed the neighbor found the culprit to be a Municipal Authority who, unluckily passing through the area, noticed and reported the illegal construction along the ridge.

Precarious housing conditions and topography of the morro give rise to various types of disputes. Disputing scenarios that result can force neighbors to engage with more dangerous counterparts in asymmetrical and risky negotiations, facing the possibility of threats and intimidation, or worse. This can position residents in debilitating, disempowering, or dangerous circumstances as they

pursue resolution, protection, or claims to justice, even when attempting to pursue resolution to problems on amicable terms.

In early 2013, such a dispute arose when a church water pipe burst, unleashing a stream onto the roof and into a neighbor's house located under the back ridge of the church building. As the church repairman, Conrado was tasked to manage the issue, which meant approaching the neighbor to view and repair the damages. Upon doing so, the neighbor, a *Caieira* trafficker, responded with verbal abuse and intimidation. This was not a surprise for people like Tereza, as this neighbor's wife had approached her previously, confessing frequent abuse at her husband's hand.

Negotiating the logistics and financial details of the water damage was not terrifically complex. Where the problem was solved, however, Conrado's experience with the violent encounter would persist. As Vilson once reflected: *"Seu Conrado negotiated for the church. They have to pay for the repairs, but then he comes to us (church leaders) to vent – and this man, he cries, he cries tears of anger. We learn from these things in terms of mediation - we need to enrich the existing ways of negotiating"* (08/04/13).

In this example, negotiating an otherwise resolvable problem of water damage and plumbing unfolds with symbolic and lasting psychological marks. Conrado's subtle whispers and shivering tears that Vilson recalled and recognizes as relevant, may well reveal the visible traces of the impact that local power players' intimidation asserts over neighbors, complicating the course of negotiating or managing otherwise minor problems.

Such experiences are marked by larger social ordering involving local power holders. These interactions constitute micro-aggressions that may occur in everyday disputing, or otherwise simply problem-solving interactions. Conrado's experience is emblematic of the impacts of *symbolic violence*, which is a term described as

> "Relations and mechanisms of domination and power which do not arise from overt physical force or violence on the body. Symbolic violence clearly lacks the intentional and instrumental quality of brute violence, and works not directly on

> bodies but through them" (Morgan and Bou, 2006: 443 citing Bourdieu, 2002; also see Bordieu and Wacquant, 2004).

As Topper (2001: 48) observers, "extending the concept of violence to the symbolic domain, Bourdieu spotlights an often unnoticed mechanism for instituting or reproducing relations of domination. And to the extent that such mechanisms go unnoticed they remain outside the purview of political deliberations or remedial action." Impact occurs "through a process of misrecognition [wherein] 'power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are, but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eye of the beholder'" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, cited in Morgan and Björkert, 2006: 448).

The power of symbolic violence resides precisely in its lack of visibility — in the fact that for those exposed to it the doubts and the fear engendered by it cause them to question themselves. Acting or responding under habituated compliance, victims are left uncertain and confused as to what, exactly, is happening and unable to articulate to themselves or to others what they are going through" (Morgan and Björkert, 2006, p.448). I contend that Conrado's very subtle, yet highly meaningful decision to whisper into Tereza's ear, particulary in contrast to others' open discussion of similar issues, was not by chance. In fact, I suggest that this action indicates a shift, an impending decline in the way that an otherwise strident community leader has come to express and engage with localized conflict. Becoming ever compliant instead with violent rules of domination, transmitted through his experience in disputing engagements that he faces on a regular basis, Conrado's behavior is increasingly closed even in the company of confidants, conferring critical information almost passively.

Over time, Conrado has grown cautious and increasingly quiet, as repeat experiences of violence, intimidation, and threat become a norm in everyday life. In this way, a localized interpersonal dispute regarding property or repairs to be negotiated can no longer solely be understood through the narrow issue itself. Dynamics of interpersonal violence linked to the way that certain actors exercise power in their social spaces are revealed, presenting here as a

slippery slope toward the embedding of symbolic violence in a particularly important community inidividual.

Symbolic violence foments the disempowering experience of negotiation in a context of insecurity, where violence and abuses manifest in the confines of public and private spaces. As Bourdieu (1990: 128) argued, "in specific contexts (public or private/stranger or intimate), several forms of violence can co-exist … often, one form of violence may be supported and nurtured by another form of violence." Such is reflected in Conrado's past experiences of quiet intimidation in closed spaces, or away from public eye.

In this way, Bourdieu's analysis contends that 'the harder it is to exercise direct domination, and the more it is disapproved of, the more likely it is that gentle, disguised forms of domination will be seen as the only possible way of exercising domination and exploitation" (Morgan and Björkert, 2006: 444). This is further reflected in the consistency of residents' who at once recognized, yet seemed to offer little willingless to intervene in domestic disputes between partners, often employing the adage *entre marido e mulher ninguem mete colher* (between husband and wife nobody goes sticking their spoon), whether or not attempting to prevent physical or symbolic violence from recurring.

In the end, the community group concluded the break-in was likely committed by crack addicts, and not retaliatory neighbors. They judged so based on various markings that resembled what some recalled from a more recent theft at CEDEP in the Monte Cristo in July 2012, where it was discovered that two addicts broke in while high, stealing two large cooking pots to trade-in and exchange for drugs.[61] In the case of the *Caieira* church, whoever had vanalized the door to break in, had swiftly departed after locating nothing of exchangeable value. Nevertheless, Vilson's closing comments affirmed the ongoing insecurity everyone faced:

> "As leaders, we have to remember that we fight for a cause, and that cause is

[61] This information came directly from the community, after the local children began their day at CEDEP on Monday morning and were sent home by the directorship to tell their parents that they could not eat that day due to the cooking pots being stolen. This made it impossible to serve the children's meals until the staff could arrange to acquire new ones. Within a matter of hours, the pots were returned to CEDEP.

> community. Time will tell about the fruits of our work, but we need to stay alert, despite this false alarm, for persecution. We are living in a minefield,"

Lúcio and the Violence-Disempowerment Nexus

Residents of the periphery consistently navigate and must think carefully in attempting to preserve their own, their families' or their community's safety and well being, in attending to what might otherwise be easily resolvable disputes. In *Maciço* communities, as examples have shown, conflict scenarios amongst residents, neighbors or families, frequently involve individuals who make up the backbone of the city's illicit street-market economy.

Noticeably, in making decisions about how to approach local disputes involving traffickers, non-traffickers must contend with the im/possibility of involving third parties, and often must very carefully consider their responses. Even peaceful efforts undertaken to resolve conflict can easily generate personal risk. Such activities can facilitate less visible transmissions of violence as residents engage with counterparts or antagonists who would not hesitate to enforce capitulation to social scripts and codes that sustain the quiet overlay of their power in community.

Young traffickers, predominantly, but not exclusively young males who become involved in the volatile, unstable, and uncertain street-market world, can become sources or catalysts for public and private tensions amongst family or neighbors. Young traffickers themselves often become victims of the rigid street-market codes in a workplace system shaped by ordering that demands obedience, submission, and sacrifice at the consequence of physical harm, torture, or death.

As noted, residents who seek out support from state agents or institutions as resources for leveraging solutions to their problems or disputes, which often include a component of insecurity, can complicate matters. When it comes to periphery youth, the state is seen to behave in strangely selective ways. This is evidenced by the way actors and institutions choose to support, protect, or punish under the law, particularly under Brazil's highly progressive constitutional framework that upholds the rights of minors, for which the country has been

recognized globally.

This is particularly relevant for interactions amongst youth, residents, and the police, where the state's *de jure* responsibility to protect minors tends to cede to the *de facto* realities of antagonistic interactions on the hill, and the efforts by the police to prioritize and enforce arrests for criminal infractions. While the state purports to uphold the rule of law that is well known to citizens, actions of state agents make its intentions clear through swift and decisive activities that often employ violence or intimidation instrumentally in their attempt to shape local lawful order for communities.

For families and young traffickers who become victims of intimidation and criminal infractions as a result of their participation or linkages to the volatile trafficking workplace, democratic disempowerment can also be seen at work. Here, actors from either group seem willing to ensure the delivery of *non-violent* security as a public good. Such is the experience for Ana, the mother of 17-year old Lúcio, a *boca* manager, who was shot in both legs 10 times by his boss Tico, [62] one Monday morning in September 2012. Vaunted as the *morro's* most powerful trafficking leader, Tico was a former army sharpshooter who entered trafficking to avenge the murder of a friend. It is rumored that Tico was responsible for starting the heavy arms trade on the *Maciço* through his connections to the Brazilian military.

Lia described how Tico had come to the *morro* that morning around 10am, to speak with her about *Procurando Caminho*, and CCEA support for getting information about a distance education program. Conversing in the alleyway near her home, Tico suddenly excused himself, walking around the bend to Lúcio's house and putting five bullets in each of his thighs before returning to chat with Lia:

> "We were talking about the [course] and I said to him *'look it's not gonna happen right away, but I'll talk to [the CCEA]*.' I was chatting with him naturally.

[62] Tico is known by various names. He and his two brothers are in charge of the *Caixa/Escadaria* network. His brothers are rumored to be associated with the PGC, although Tico himself remains unaffiliated, which provides a type of power balance in the Mont Serrat area. Neither Tico nor the Descoberta crew actively participated in the November 2012, or the August 2014 bus burnings and police station attacks at PGC orders, which ravaged the state.

> It was as if the whole thing was normal, as if he had said, '*I'm gonna go grab some cigarettes, be right back.'* It's complicated, but what could I do? [When he returned] I continued talking with him. You can't be afraid in that moment even though he just went and shot the guy, but what can you do?! You keep talking about the issue at hand and not mention the [shooting]. The truth is that I wanted to scream at him, but he knew in that moment that I wouldn't. And he knows that I know, and that I don't approve. We just try to do what we can" (Field Notes: 27/09/12).

A trained sniper, Tico purposely avoided doing any permanently crippling damage in the application of the "corrective" measure (*correitivo*) levied upon Lúcio, who was an otherwise trustworthy and loyal manager. Lúcio incurred Tico's *correitivo* for his role in shooting a man at a party the night before, after Lúcio's cousin had accused the man of having raped her. After a few nights at the hospital downtown, Lúcio eventually returned home to heal.

Later that same Monday morning, a 12-year old named Victor, whom I had been teaching to repair a bicycle at the time, approached me in the street, looking pale and unnerved, very unlike his usual self. He explained to me in a disheartened tone that his cousin had been shot, while another had been killed the night prior at a party. Rumors travel fast in the *morro*, and can often be unfounded, despite the stigma or fear that they often provoke.

Contrary to Victor's fear, nobody was killed that night at the party, though one of the rumors that did persist was that Lúcio himself was responsible for committing a rape. Later that night, I accompanied Vilson to visit with Ana and her daughters at their home, and later, Lúcio in the hospital. Vilson would make repeat visits to the home as Lúcio recovered, not only to extend his personal support as a community member, but also indicate the Lúcio that he had opportunities with the CCEA, if he would consider that now would be a good time to leave the trade once and for all.

Like Conrado, Ana felt the impending constraints of her environment, caught between the desire for a just-resolution to what had suddenly befallen her family, and the realities of the security situation. Not long after the shooting, Ana went to Tico to negotiate that no further damage or physical harm be done. The

family had suffered enough in recent times. A year prior, Ana had lost a nephew to a stray bullet at a party. The victim's mother, Ana's sister, had fallen into despondency, depression, and drugs, later joining the evangelical church. As a single mother of three, Ana continued to work hard to build her small business baking *salgados,* street-food style snacks, selling them on foot in the city center. It was a job for which, like many *morro* mothers, Ana would leave each morning with the sun, returning late in the evening after being on her feet all day, making the long trek up the hill to her home. Speaking with Ana at her home, I was reminded of the various sources of fragility to which the shooting incident had exposed her:

> "Yes, (Lúcio's) alive, but what hurts most is when I was coming home from working, there were people on the street looking and pointing, saying – 'look there, that's the mother of that guy who tried to rape that girl' – That hurts the most – but there's nothing we can do."

As a mother, Ana bears witness to this sudden, paralyzing and insecurity generating traumatic event, while also being forced to face the social consequences that follow. Despite her standing as a well respected member of the community, Ana is nonetheless immediately impacted by swirling and pernicious rumors about her son as a rapist, which reflect upon, compromise, and damage her own dignity and reputation.

Cautiously, and perhaps rhetorically in the confines of her kitchen, Vilson inquired whether Ana knew who it was that had shot her son. She shook her head and replied, "*no, no idea*", despite everybody in the room knowing the answer. Ana's unwillingness to finger Tico for the shooting is a logical decision made in function of safety and survival of her family, and part of her negotiation strategy she assumes in order to protect her family. To complicate matters, Lúcio's two girlfriends, one of whom was pregnant at the time, both showed up to care for him when they learned about the incident. This provided additional fuel, if rather innocuous and dramatic knock-on impacts and interpersonal stresses, agitating everybody at a time of heightened tension.

On the other hand, protection or redress that the state could provide for Lúcio (a minor at the time) under Brazil's Constitutional Principles of Children's Health,

which guarantees to “guard them from all forms of negligence, discrimination, exploitation, violence, cruelty, and oppression” (Soares, 2009), was notably impotent, if not absent. More than week after the shooting, I ran into Ana on the street near the supermarket. She had calm, ‘overwhelmed but managing’ look on her face. She said that the police had gone to the hospital to suggest that she file a *Boletim de Ocorrência* (BO), or police report, officially documenting the incident. She confirmed that neither the *Conselho Tutelar*, nor any other state authority or social service agent, had been in touch with her (Field Notes 28/09/12).

Violence subjects Ana to little recourse, further provoking and agitating disputes and positioning people like her in near impossible situations in which they must nevertheless engage in a variety of negotiations -often literally- albeit in positions that are constraining and compromising from multiple angles. Over time, keeping one’s head down and out of trouble reinforces the law of silence and forced ‘harmony’ of the hill, whereby traffickers firmly exercise and grow their power in quiet, symbolic, and ultimately debilitating ways. Residents like Ana and Conrado go along to get along, suffering deep emotional traumas in these processes over time in the face of diverse and intersecting sources of vulnerability, interwoven into community and domestic spheres, which continue to catalyze escalation of disputes and conflict.

Precarious State Interfaces

Selective state presence subjects its agents and institutions to perceptions of being undependable, suboptimal, or untrustworthy as allies, which can ultimately reinforce trafficker power and facilitate transmissions of localized violence on the *morro*. Likewise, this absence contrasts with the rather abrasive approach by which some actors, including police and CT *Conselheiros*, engage in what residents describe as militaristic-type operations. Despite these actions, which are performed in function of law enforcement strategies and/or judicial orders, the manner in which they are done are eroding of residents’ trust and proclivity of reliability.

Ultimately, residents who contemplate attempts to access state resources while navigating emergencies or negotiating their urgencies, find, as Teresa did, that

state representatives are inviable, unrealistic, or ineffective partners, in whom residents can find little support to effectively face the complicated, insecurity infused challenges, problems, disputes, and conflicts that arise in the ebb and flow of daily life.

General Perceptions

Residents' perception of policing in the periphery is polemic at best. At worst, the variance and inconsistency in the approaches and behaviors of police as a whole on the *morro* are abusive, creating confusion, raising tensions, and ultimately fostering animosity and mistrust for state authorities, writ-large. The uncertainty posited by ephemeral and violent police actions also diminish their credibility as legitimate or dependable resources for helping residents manage local conflict or assert their rights.

This should not detract from the constructive experiences that do exist, nor confuse the fact that residents do call upon the police in times of non-conflict related emergencies, or to anonymously provide them with crime tips and information. In fact, many residents expressed the overwhelming desire for, if accompanying disillusionment about a presence they could depend on.

Despite police leaders' expressed theoretical support for improving upon their community policing models, the micro-interactions between officers and *morro* residents seemed to grow more troubled over the course of my fieldwork. Little if any of the theory that police leadership espoused seemed to have been put into practice over the course of three years on the *Maciço*, to the lament of residents.[63] The bewilderment, and in many cases ongoing resentment, further strains and inhibits constructive engagement between community member and state agents as a whole.

Police Incursions

Periphery residents and CCEA staff are voluntarily vocal about the way these abuses have significantly impacted their lives. Police raids for example, are common, and mistreatment widespread. The sense of injustice is almost

[63] This despite even the co-authorship of a book by two high ranking officials, released in April 2012 entitled *Overcoming the Myth of the Scarecrow: Preparing Police for the Resolution of Problems in Public Security*. http://www.insular.com.br/product_info.php/products_id/697

palpable, as individuals feel they, or their children, are often unjustly criminalized and put at great risk. During police incursions, youth of all ages are often forced into the *paredão*, stop and frisk street line-ups while on their way to or from school. Carolina, who grew up in the *Vila União* area, now a social worker at the CCEA, relayed this as a common experience, describing how she has been mistaken for a trafficker by police, who subsequently split her head open by force (Field Notes, 12/04/13).

From an institutional perspective, Sabrina, a social worker at the CCEA's *Frutos do Aroeira* project, speaks to the challenges this treatment presents to the project's mission of supporting youth formerly 'in conflict with the law' to build professional skills and strengthening self-esteem through post-incarceration transitions:

> "Violations? So many. Many happen in the peripheries with police, like the kids at *Frutos*, the boys – I say boys because they are the majority, right, but it happens to girls, too! Kids who live at [*Frutos*] during the week, who are working or taking a professionalization course, changing their lives, going to school, etc., they go home on the weekends, and when they are there, you know, to the police they are like any other kid. [The police] don't know [these kids] are going back to school, studying, changing their lives, whatever.
>
> For the police, [they think] that boy or girl is still connected to trafficking, so they don't even pick them up or arrest them – they just beat them. They humiliate them, *paredão*, searches, abuse and humiliation. And that's what they end up talking about during the rest of the week" (20/11/14).

Exchanges like this, overheard one day between an elderly resident and Vilson while waiting for the bus on the steps to the Mont Serrat Church, are not uncommon:

> **Female Resident:** *"They cracked a little boy's head open last night, he was bleeding everywhere."*
>
> **Vilson**: *"My goodness, how is he?"*
>
> **Female Resident***: "Oh, you know, Padre, we're managing".*

Reporting, Relations, and Disrespect

A statewide statistical crime reporting mechanism was established by the PM in 2010 (Nazareno, 28/08/12). While this research did not collect first hand data on crime statistics or police violations, incidents of homicides and non-lethal violence, which occur with some frequency in periphery communities of the capital, would seem to contradict official statistics kept by police. The CCEA refers to independent and international data for tracking sources of incidents.[64]

Lethal and non-lethal violence linked to organized crime and trafficking, as well as police-related deaths, does not always become officially recorded. Deaths resulting from confrontations with police are typically classified as 'resistance resulting in death of the opponent" (Perlman, 2009: 54) going unchecked or investigated. Although Santa Catarina is one of Brazil's safest states statistically-speaking, killings by police of children or minors does occur, going mostly unreported, particularly in the case of children living in the street. Multiple *Maciço* residents, as well as non-residents, shared this view with me in confidence.

Like other experiences in Brazil, classification of youth killed in confrontation with SC police has also gone unrecorded or properly categorized (Takaschima, 2014; see also Wilding, 2012; Alves and Evanson, 2011; Krug et al., 2002; Heise et al., 1994, or non-lethal injuries during police raids, wherein an individual may later expire as a result of their injuries. My direct inquires with police officials about this were frequently met with less than direct or unclear responses.

Young people killed in confrontation with police, which do not always go reported or recorded, is particularly relevant to non-lethal incidences of direct violence involving police and traffickers on the *morro*. Ivone lamented over the CCEA's challenge with the state's history of reporting. In order to index lower homicide statistics regarding youth crime and police violence, authorities can ascribe dissimulated causes and therefore keep numbers low.

Balancing books may mean simply transporting a body to be registered in an alternate jurisdiction within Greater Florianópolis. This speaks to the greater

[64] This includes a variety of Brazilian and International Human Rights Reports

absence in SC of fundamentally guaranteed, federally constituted rights advocacy and protections, such as the PPCAM or even the Public Defender's Office (see below). Together with extraordinary actions undertaken by some public authorities to keep undesireable statistics low, clear priorities are set in service of sustaining the state and capital's revenue-generating images as peaceful international tourist destinations.

Where leadership in the Polícia Militar cautiously concedes to excesses, abuses, and corruption within their ranks, such inferences were also relatively downplayed, even during private discussions. For example, when I asked a PM Major Martinho (30/08/12) about general corruption in the ranks, his comment misdirected and comparatively minimized Santa Catarina in the shadow of Rio de Janeiro:

> "Of course, you get bribes like 'hey, can I offer you a *cafezinho'* and in Rio, that works 90 out of 100 times. But here in SC the corruption is more the opposite: In 10 out of 100, it works. *It's not that we're not bad, it's just that [Rio Police] are really bad*".

Swarming helicopters and night raids by 'shock' or *choque* police units are also common across the *Maciço*. In this excerpt from my field notes (15//09/12), I describe my first experience witnessing a raid unfolding, which began minutes after finishing a night-walk one Friday evening in *Morro do Horácio*:

> "Entering by car, we stopped a few times to walk about. Vilson indicated a heavy arms cache area, where weapons from Paraguay or Uruguay, a *Zona Franca,* are brought here to distribute throughout the city and beyond. Munitions are stored and sold in another *morro*.
>
> We chatted with a man in his 20s, Mario and Felipe's cousin, who approached quite intoxicated and stumbling over. There were probably a few hundred young people, from adolescents to 30 year olds, gathered on the street socializing, between three or four selling points as we made our way up the hill.
>
> I drove as we departed, passing the last lookout and climbing out of the neighborhood up the Maciço road. Suddenly, barreling down the hill came between 12 and 15 *Choque* vehicles, lights off, in tight formation. Smaller squad cars followed behind. They were bearing down directly into the mix of hundreds,

> surely to *bater*. A wave of distant whistles from lookouts indicated the arrival. We briefly entertained turning around, but decided against it. It hit me viscerally: *All those kids are in for it*. Surely they know the routine. Vilson, who remained silent almost the entire way back to Mont Serrat, murmured only once: *'this is the state's answer to the drug problem'.*

Closer to home, the second night of my fieldwork in May 2012, police entered Mont Serrat neighborhood around midnight and raided Jon's bar, a common trafficker hangout in the *Descoberta*, injuring many with rubber bullets. Hardline unanticipated approaches like these, as Vilson discusses below, not only perpetuate insecurity and rights violations, but also intensify community mistrust, particularly when no arrests are made, or when no clear objective comes to light.

The CCEA takes up rights-based stance to denouncing the violence of police actions, which serves in part to sustain a non-confrontational relationship with traffickers in the tension-filled territory. As Ivone (21/11/14) once described, the CCEA as an organization engages trafficking as "strictly an organization to organization relationship". The following exchange with Vilson articulates this approach, as well as elaborates upon the elastic identities with which residents see traffickers. It also suggests how police actions, far from asserting a peaceful rule of law in community, constitute the type of violent social ordering that erects obstacles to constructive state-citizen relations.

> Vilson: The police swarmed from one moment to the next. There was no noise no nothing, and no incident. They shot people with rubber bullets. There was no need for that in that moment. People were inside the bar, just drinking. They beat everybody without motive. They were traffickers, but there was still no right to do that, they have no argument. So, [the CCEA] got a lawyer for them, so they know that we, too (CCEA), have our hooks in both sides, and they know we are there to defend against those things. And the complaint was sent to the police department.
>
> Jared: So you're defending rights.
>
> Vilson: Independently of trafficking, they have rights. We believe people have rights. Another time, we fought against the police when they invaded near the house just below the helipad, put up a fence around it, and appropriated the

land that didn't belong to them. We had meetings, we had protests, with press, with a lawyer - he was a good guy, now a legislator. The owner of that house came here to me crying that the police had invaded. I said, *'no, they are not gonna stay, they can't do that. How can they do that? You are the owner of that land.*' So you've got to tune that into your analysis. We had meetings and all the women came from the families – mothers, sisters, wives, and girlfriends. It's all one big family. And we went against the police – they stole land that belonged to trafficker's families. And they finally moved off that area.

Jared: Did police make threats?

Vilson: Yes, they threatened, and we confronted them openly. The police commander came to me and said, *'I'm gonna finish off the whole lot of you.'* It was a very difficult moment… That's when we entered into discussion with [PM Commander-General] Nazareno, directly. The operation leader was a guy who, if he had his way, he would have flown Ivone and me over the ocean, put two shots in our heads and tossed us in.

He used to speak out publically against us, accusing us of the people who help *bandidos.* He got irritated with me, didn't like my way of doing things with traffickers. Last year in October, the 12th, it was *International Children's Day.* He called me and said 'I'm going to *Mocotó,* to ACAM, to distribute gifts for the kids.' I said, as far as gifts, great, by all means! I called ACAM staff to tell them. Almost immediately, I got calls from neighborhood residents: '*[special forces] are closing off everything around the Morro,'* while down at the entrance the Press is behind him with his gifts.

Jared: He called you to tell you he was bringing presents?

Vilson: Yes! It was a ploy to get into the *morro*. On one side he was coming up with presents, distracting everybody. On the other side, the *BOPE* was coming down invading the whole area. Staff called me terrified because they started to realize what was happening. I said *GO! Run* and tell the press that I said to suspend the gifts right away. The commander was so angry, he cursed me out – *'that son of a bitch priest, he colludes with traffickers,'* and the traffickers talk about this, and they accept me' (22/09/12).

Lia, one of my central informants, describes her sense of community perspective about police-community relations:

> "If [the police] want to be respected, they have to show respect. It's about character. You think a mother and father who hits their kids is gonna have respect? No. They have fear, but not respect. That's really hard to change. But even if they change a little, there can be transformation. If the police went there and were like – '*hey, go home*' it would be different. The law has really failed. The community doesn't share the vision anymore that police protect. It's easier to say that traffickers protect you more than police ever do.
>
> If the law weren't so broken, those [murder] trials of police in Rio and São Paulo wouldn't exist. Here, they invade the *boca*, take drugs and money. The police, the corrupt ones, they all have nicknames - they are regulars. It's always the same men. *They go into houses and steal!* They go into houses, or get bribes at the *boca*, steal money, and leave. Contraband gets confiscated and reported by half, while police take the other. Respect? It doesn't exist. It's easier for youth to respect me, Vilson or Ivone, than the police. They don't accept justice or police because to the law, a trafficker is always gonna be a *bandido*. Within the police there are corrupt ones *and* honest ones. But today, which one is winning? The corrupted.
>
> [Traffickers] don't respect the police because they are scared. Do you think just because you put on a uniform, you have respect? If the police are corrupt, why should I change? If I have money I can buy you – if you are coming in to take half, half is not worth going to jail! People involved in trafficking have this view of justice: My attorney gets R$20,000, pays R$5,000 to the judge, R$5,000 to the investigator, and they only submit half the evidence to the court. It's all broken. The trafficker who goes to prison is the one who can't pay, or who gets nabbed by non-corrupt police. Imagine a father who comes home to beat his wife and kids - is he gonna be respected? They're never gonna get respect.
>
> That's how we enter the world of traffic – Respect. And we know that today, I'm gonna get in. They'll debate me and disagree with me, and then [again] tomorrow, they're gonna listen, and the next day, more. Then, finally, they are gonna come [to the PC project].

These views posit defining experiences of state-community relations experienced by residents at the margins, which filter through the populous by word and experience, skewing the possibilities and objectives of the state's rule of law intentions, and democratic institutions. They foster scenarios in which the police become recourse of last resort for most any situation. At worst, the invitation of police or other authorities into the community, particularly in support of local disputes, is often a dangerous or deadly proposition.

Police Authorities' Perspectives[65]

As noted earlier, residents' decision to call on police involves a series of decision points and risk calculations. Nevertheless, calls get made. For example, one officer with whom I spoke frequently checked, and eventually silenced his mobile phone during our conversation, as a continuous stream of SMS messages from *Mocotó* residents one night reported the location of shots being fired as traffickers tested a shipment of heavy weapons. This very officer's delayed arrival to the interview happened because the police vehicle in which he was riding up through the *Morro do Horácio*, unexpectedly startled a group of dealers who then opened fire and fled, leaving behind them nine kilos of marijuana.

Abuses linked to PM operations on the *Maciço*, and in particular the treatment of youth in their custody, come to define residents' perspectives and relations between police and the majority of *morro* residents who are uninvolved in trafficking. This ultimately renders the work of the PM and PC problematic, particularly in terms of being used as constructive resources for non-violent conflict intervention.

Officers' visions of operations and community policing vary, demonstrating what seemed to be skewed or detached knowledge about everyday *morro* life when compared to needs and interests expressed by residents. One role imagined by the PM Major envisioned a more engaged form of social control whereby the police patrolling on foot could use technologies such as an iPad or tablet to regulate the presence of children in the streets, for example, redirecting kids to school such that they could be more effective in reducing absenteeism. As one officer commente: *"policing is not a science. Medical professionals ask: What is happening here? Here, police do not."*

[65] Between 2012 and 2014, I spoke on different occasions with three of the state's highest-ranking PM officers, including the State Commander-General, the Lt. Colonel in charge of the state capital command, and a Major from the State PM Command. In the case of the Commander-General, our talk took place amongst a group of staff and officials while seated in the control room at PM headquarters in Florianópolis. The other two conversations unfolded while sipping soup at Vilson's kitchen table, dressed in civilian clothes, with Vilson making the invitation and accompanying the discussions that lasted into the early hours of the next morning.

Like community residents, however, police perpsectives are colored by the limitations they also experience in political and operation ways. For example, the Lt. Colonel I interviewed, who was also an advisor for Rio's UPP project, linked policing to his own sense of disempowerment in relation to strategic and tethered use of his department, to political decisions and institutional collaborations around the city's peripheries:

> "My role is to give space for the community to breathe so that they can decide together with the public leadership what they want. Then, people with solutions can come [into the community], and open new pathways, but you can't bring in new solutions and pathways if, when you go to buy bread, you run into the guy who's sticking a gun in your face. You can't. You can't educate a kid who's gotta walk to school passing ten *bocas,* and guys with guns are sitting out all along the way. There's no way.
>
> You can't educate a child who's gotta walk down the steps and detour to avoid the addicts spun out on crack. Am I wrong? There's no way. But we can't give that space unless there's continuity in public policy. It's about resources. However, if the context doesn't change, (shrugs)? How many times have the police occupied *Mocotó*? I wouldn't' have to do that, if we had some type of continuity."
>
> Jared: "So you have no part in influencing the context? Theoretically, police have a part in this?"
>
> Colonel: "We don't have sufficient forces to do this! We can't do this. It's also because the work of repression, toward which we're being pushed more and more, reduces our legitimacy more and more. We become delegitimized."
>
> Jared: "So what *is* your preventive work?"
>
> Colonel: "Let me tell you. Our preventive work, it's an epidemiological approach. We work with a triangle. We have the environment, the offender and the target. And I say target, because the 'victim' might not be a person. It could be a thing – a value, or a hate crime for example, but not necessarily a person. But there's also no ability [for us] to count on a system of protection [if we make an arrest] that guarantees that [a dealer or user] won't be back on the same corner the next day, in the very same situation of risk. We are conscious of these factors. If we pick up a kid and return him to the street, but nothing is done about his school, his family, or these factors, what can we do?"

> "We may be the *last* hope, because amongst all the state agencies, the PM are the ones with the *most* freedom and yet are the *least judicialized*. That of course can also lead to our excesses, and can be dangerous. But we aren't the paper pushers or judicialized like the rest of them. We are the only component of the system that is *non-elite*. Our highest leadership doesn't have the renowned last names of the city. Our officers are not from the elite class. We are *proletariat*. I often ask myself, why can't I take control of a situation (*tomar providencia*) and go and question the judicial official about why they let a kid go back to the streets?"

Whereas some police leaders recognize their actions as delegitimizing in the face of the community, few municipalities in Florianópolis, and in Brazil in general have set out to more create more constructive ties amongst police and periphery residents. Though not all agents of law enforcement engage in abusive practices, they are the most consistent or closest interactions with the state that periphery citizens have. Where their work also concerns the protection of citizens, the contradictory manner by which police operate in periphery communities often sustains the narratives of social conflict between the state and society at the margins, complicating notions of functional partnership and disallowing constructive engagements by law abiding citizens.

System of Rights Guarantees

For residents, it is not simply the code of trafficking, but also the police who shape, and often complicate the way disputes are handled. In many ways, police involvement represents a "*known-unknown"* - a particularly unpredictable resource for navigating local disputes often infused with elements that render intervention unsafe or risky. This posits the precarious and consistent dilemma of whether or not residents choose to involve police as resources for leveraging negotiations in situations of tension or conflict on the *morro*. This wariness derives in part from the dangers associated with unintended consequences such as youth arrests, which pose additional problems for young people and family, who experience physical, psychological, and other rights abuses at all stages of passage through the legal system or in state custody.

Violence and violations experienced through raids, arrest, internment, and release, renders police a simple vehicle to place law violators into a system so unsavory, that many residents tend to be more willing to engage with or even

confront traffickers, than engage with state resources and authorities in the face of local conflict. In this way, as Judge Takaschima (11/11/14) once reframed: *"can we really speak of the phrase 'youth in conflict with the law'? Or might it be more accurate to say that the law is in conflict with the youth?"*

Minors taken into the custody of the state, whether for criminal infractions or protection, such as through arrest or judicial orders carried out by the *Conselho Tutelar*, are protected and afforded particular rights established under Brazil's Child and Adolescent Statute or ECA.[66] Brazil's System of Rights Guarantees (*sistema de garantia de direitos or SGD*) consists of societal and governmental institutions tasked to serve and protect rights under the ECA. Despite this, young citizens often experience a series of unsavory experiences under state custody in which their rights, and often times, physical bodies are subject to violation. Ironically, this occurs in a system with a fairly progressive legal architecture designed to enlist and combine forces of governmental and non-governmental institutions to protect them (see Chapter 7).

Common experiences of violence faced by youth begins during arrest and processing, after the PM makes an arrest and a subject is transferred to the Polícia Civil (PC) at the *Delegacia,* social services, or the Public Ministry. As interviewees observed, youth can be interrogated several times by different legal actors about the same issue. During interrogations, police are notorious for using tactics to taunt teenagers in custody:

> "They say '*oh we know who your girlfriend is, and I'm going to call my cousin and have him go sleep with her.'* And this sends the kids into a state of revolt, which then gives the police a *reason* to beat them" (Cristina, 30/10/2012).

According to Sabrina (20/11/14), youth who commit infractions are also frequently strip-searched, once at the station, and once again at their location of internment in cases of immediate privation of liberty, without ever having left

[66] Signed into law in July of 1990, the ECA seeks to preserve the rights of individuals moving through the developmental stage, from adolescents to adulthood, of their lives. Article 4 of the Statute reads: "It is the responsibility of the family, community, society in general, and that of the public authority to ensure, with absolute priority, the delivery of rights to live, health, nutrition, education, recreation, leisure, professionalization, culture, dignity, respect, liberty, and family and community coexistence".

direct police custody. Such tactics subject individuals to confusion and humiliation. Using the word torture to describe the abuse of children in police custody, Lilian (18/11/14) for example described a myriad of psychological and physical violations:

> "The kids tell us that they get blindfolded and taken to unknown places, before going to the *Delegacia*, to locations where police torture them. They use electric shock devices on them, and the kids have no idea where they are because they get blindfolded. Many, many adolescents have reported this."

This information would be one of many reasons for which the RACDCA network dialogues endeavored to establish a more transparent and integrated cross-institutional operating procedures (*atendimento integrado*). These abuses were not only expressed by concerned CCEA staffers, but was also noted by judicial officials when restorative justice staff began to observe a pattern of diminishing youth presence at *Delegacies* during processing visits. This suggested an inconsistency between arrests and cases being reported, and numbers being communicated to the court by the state's attorney, indicating some type of delay between the transfer of subjects from PM to the PC, thus raising the question: *where were the kids*?

> "They were being shady. The state is the biggest violator of rights It's an institutional violence - When [the state] takes in or interns an adolescent, or applies any form of treatment, they deposit a young person in an institution and don't guarantee [their] rights. They deposit them and forget about them. They don't offer schooling, education, they beat them, they mistreat them, punish them. They don't have rights to have rights" (Lilian, 20/11/14).

Santa Catarina's Public Defender

The existence of the Brazilian Public Defender dates back to 1897. With the advent of the 1988 Constitution, Title II of Fundamental Rights Guarantees assures that the State will provide free legal assistance to those who do not have resources to pay. Despite this history and contemporary constitutional provision, Santa Catarina was the very last of Brazil's 26 states to establish a *Defensoria Pública*. The SC/DPESC[67] was stood up after legislative approval in

[67] The DPESC boasts 23 centers throughout SC state, and is a "modern institution which gets bigger each year… with staffers and public defenders, and legal professionals who have been

August of 2012, three months after I began my fieldwork research.

This is relevant given the dearth of public legal aid[68] to meet the high volume of arrests of periphery citizens for nonviolent offenses like drug possession. Ironically, the struggle to pay legal fees has led to recidivism, as adolescents and young adults report reconnecting to the drug trade as one of the few means to pay legal costs. The situation for the defense of minors is even more complicated. As Sabrina (20/11/14) argued:

> "The adolescent isn't a deposit being made, before [RACDCA's *fluxo*] it was arrive, be searched, go to the cell. Now it's arrive, get special attention and explanation about what they are doing there, what it's going to be like throughout the process. Many kids are being interned for six months without any movement in their cases, and without even knowing what's happening, and it's their right to know and to have progress! Either people don't act in the institution, or the justice process is simply backlogged.
>
> There is no *Defensoria Pública* for youth in the state of SC. It's starting, well, I mean, last year, since the *Defensoria Pública* was established here in Florianópolis, there's still not one for youth, but they started to think about this. Now at least young people have an attorney from the adult branch. But here in the capital we only have that *one* attorney who was named to do initial intake, and he must focus on *all the families* and [is responsible for] *all socio-educational institutions. It's impossible*!"

Social Services

The Centro de Referencia de Assistencia Social (CRAS) and the *Conselho Tutelar* (CT) are social services agencies working closely in collaboration with the judiciary and law enforcement. Beyond the PM, these services are two of the more prevalent state agencies or institutions with which periphery residents

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approved by passing a rigorous competition of testing and qualification, who are responsible for the defense of the citizen who is in need". For more information, see: http://www.defensoria.sc.gov.br/ [Accessed 16 September 2015].

[68] Before the DPESC, the Order of Brazilian Attorneys (OAB) managed public legal aid under a state contract, fighting tooth and nail for decades against its establishment. Consequently, during the DPESC's initial period of operations, after the OAB lost its contract, its existing members quietly withheld support and participation, further impeding the decentralization of DPESC efforts into periphery communities of *Floripa*, contrasting innovative initiatives like Rio's *Balcão de Direitos*. These examples are indicative of private interests directly impeding upon democratic rights and the ability to exercise and distribute resources in a way that responds appropriately to the state's needs.

have regular contact. Whereas the CRAS is the agency tasked to attend to general issues for citizens of all ages, the CT is technically an independent body that functions in support the rights and protection of children within the purview of the ECA.

As noted above, residents consider CT *Conselhieros* as a policing arm for judicial officials, sent to pick up, remove, or shuttle youth between homes, agencies, police stations, and protective custodial spaces such as the city's shelters or *abrigos,* on official order. As an independenly functioning body, *Conselheiros* have jurisdiction to enter into private domestic as well as public spaces such as schools, which they often do without needing to ask questions, through highly intrusive, physically forceful, and unwarranted manners.

In Mont Serrat for instance, these behaviors became so concerning that administrators at the MS School and the Darcy Brito *Casa de Acolhimento,* that the CCEA, through the RACDCA network, eventually negotiated a stop to unimpeded CT entry into these spaces, arguing that forcible removals of children provoked wider disturbances and a growing sense of fear amongst other youth. Many times, *Conselheiros* respond to allegations of child negligence in periphery neighborhoods. CCEA staff argue in many cases that accusations that initiate CT deployment and policy to remove of children must be re-evaluated in light of conditions of deprivation and poverty, which are distinct from situations of gross negligence that often gets reported.

Marlene's comment is illustrative. A Mont Serrat resident today in her late 50s, Marlene (05/10/12) has lost two sons, a husband and various relatives to trafficking violence. In citing these losses, she expressed to me a sense of guilt about the ramifications of her economic circumstances, which inform her losses: *"I used to work two jobs, from 6am to 10pm. It wasn't to dress my kids well: It was to feed them. I lost myself because I worked too much".*

As Ivone described, the lack of communication and silo-ing amongst agencies, despite operating in tandem, induce violating, inauspicious challenges and troubling scenarios that win them little community support:

"[Negligence] for example could be because a parent burnt their child with a cigarette butt, but the majority of these negligence cases would not have even registered if other social questions were attended to preventively by social services. If parents had enough money to pay rent, to eat, conditions at home might be different, but they have to go to work. There are 165 kids in *abrigos* in the capital. Of that number, 91 of them are there because of [claims of] family negligence, which often means there was a complaint that mom left home and left the kid alone. The majority of those kids will stay in our foster care up to three months."

"The *Conselho Tutelar* doesn't ask anybody any questions. They are activated through a judicial order. They remove the child from the home and bring them [to the *abrigo*]. And the team from [the *abrigo*] is the one that has to go out to investigate what's going on. And the mother says – *'I left the child here because I went to work cleaning houses.'* That's not a question of *negligence*, that's a reality of impoverishment, because that woman has to work, and if there's not a *crèche* in the community, or if there is no more room, what can she do? Our team at the *abrigo* has to then go and justify to the judge about why the mother left the child alone, because there were no openings [in the *crèche*] so that the child can be returned home. But then they get removed again, this time taken out of the *abrigo*. You see?"

"If the state were more proactive, it could avoid this trauma for the child, the impact on the mother, the judiciary getting more involved, the team having to spend their time out investigating. In Brazil, we have a problem. There are ten CRAS centers around the metropolitan area. We were talking about this recently. If the *Conselho Tutelar* went directly to the CRAS to try to resolve the issue when they receive the complaint, the child would not have to enter the *abrigo* in the first place. Generally, people don't go to the CRAS because they don't think they are going to get anything solved. And the CRAS doesn't go out into communities because they complain that they don't have a vehicle, or sufficient staffing, or resources."

"The *Conselho Tutelar* will tell you that because they were pressured to follow-up by the judge, they didn't have time to interface with CRAS. And then it's made worse. This still happens today, and even if the *Conselho Tutelar* goes to the CRAS and tries to get help in order to not have to remove a child, the CRAS can position itself and say, 'if an act of violence has already happened, then it's not our problem or responsibility, it's a CREAS[69] issue, and the CREAS is a

[69] The Centro de Referência Especializado de Assistência Social is responsible for offering special support, attention, orientation and accompaniment of individuals and families with one or more of its members in situation of threat or violation of rights" (Assistência Social, n.d.).

more preventive body."

Conclusions

This chapter has presented the ways in which conflicts and disputes in the lives of periphery communities are inextricably linked to conditions and relationships that perpetuate insecurity for individuals, families, and communities at large. Whereas it is common for residents to assume personal responsibility for and exercise agency in addressing or resolving their problems by facing disputing scenarios head on, the overlay of insecurity and dominantly influential social ordering processes in motion tend to complicate and expose them to scenarios of greater risk as they go about making decisions or pursuing pathways to resolution. This includes times when residents must negotiate with more nefarious neighbors*, or* seek out state agents to leverage their power in an asymmetrical negotiating environment. These options leave people locked in a rather unpleasant bind.

As examples demonstrated, this bind can be linked, in part, as a Catch-22 to Brazil's progressive legal frameworks and infrastructure. Whereas citizen rights and protections on paper suggest a safe environment, the materialization of rights through public policies and the actions undertaken by state agents and institutions are often experienced in risk- or violence-generating ways, felt acutely by periphery residents of all ages through the perpetuation of violations, trauma, or violence. Such experiences have become the norm and expectation fundamentally impinging upon a constructive, trustworthy partnership, and positions residents in difficult positions when considering how to make decisions about addressing domestic, interpersonal, or community tensions or conflicts.

Saudade of the State

Despite some well-meaning intentions on the part of state officials and agents, legal resources and opportunities, and even basic rights, become questionable at best in the face of a myriad of injustices that people experience. This is particularly acute for young people involved in a legal system that was designed to protect them, which I discuss further in Chapter 7. The disempowering and disillusioned sentiments, which feature clearly into dispute-related decision

making expressed by residents, is what I call the *saudade* of the state, or the bittersweet recognition by residents of the state's absence in physical presence, in function of protecting and defending residents' rights, free from violating experiences under the rule of law.

Below I present a series of excerpts from a conversation that I organized with six female Mont Serrat residents, to illustrate this notion. As local leaders, professionals, mothers, wives, and daughters, some of whom were founding members of the CCEA, their voices span three generations living on the *morro*. The statements below suggest a larger narrative of *saudade* as families struggle and grapple with local violence and insecurity. In light of horrific details of abuse, discrimination and unjust treatment by authorities, the comments reflect an incredible strength, conviction, and determination in the face of adversity:

> Sonia: "Justice exists here in theory, but not in practice. It doesn't work. They don't know our reality, and they don't come here. They would have to come and develop partnerships, to understand what that kid is doing there in that moment, and *all* the things that happened up to that moment to put him there in a given moment; to ask, why is that young person there? There would have to be people, from the center: attorneys, police, prosecutors, to come here and get to know the community – to come here and develop relationships with the community, to really understand why that kid is there – to offer solutions, so that maybe our youth can have a dignified life in doing what they want, because *they* don't want to be there, involved in trafficking. *They* don't want to suffer. *They* don't want to see their families suffer".

> Marlete: "We want to be closer to the police. Why don't they come search us out? They are always so punitive. All we get is the helicopter – it blows everything around, wakes up the kids, and they start crying! The police have to come here and converse with us, to meet with groups, a group of mediators like us, so we could tell them – *'We don't want you to only come here only to pick up and arrest our kids, we want them to be re-educated, and re-socialized if they go to prison, so that they have something with which they can come back to society after they get out.'* Theoretically that's what it should be, but that's all just theory."

> Nana: "We want our kids to be re-educated! You see this thing with São Lucas?![70] What's this whole thing with just picking them up and tossing them in there? They have to re-orient, re-socialize, re-educate! That's seriously lacking."
>
> Rosa: But you know, the police, you should see them. When I get out of mass over in *Prainha* (*Mocotó*), they're all there, holding onto their huge guns, so I just walk past them [*laughs*] and I say '*boa noite, god bless*'".

Brazilian political figures have long asserted, as did former governor of Rio, Sergio Cabral, that *"favelas large and small are communities from which the state has been absent, where some people… do not even know what the state is and where criminal groups may rule and impose a law of silence and obedience"* (Alves and Evanson, 2011: 127). This is also a view consistent with, as expressed to me personally countless times in conversations during fieldwork, the understanding of many officials, as well as middle and upper class *Florianópolitanos*.

As this chapter has shown, however, citizens are extremely aware of the state, and their rights, despite experiencing them both often in destructive ways. Research from Rio's peripheries have contested this as well, illuminating the perverse networks through which violence, as much as any other part of daily life for residents, presents a much more complex picture: as a phenomenon which is sustained through deep state involvement with illegal armed groups (Arias, 2006). In neighboring Bolivia, Goldstein's (2010) ethnographic work has shown how the absence of the "phantom state," which regulates in its ghost-like presence, generates a great deal of uncertainty.

Observations in Florianópolis suggest, too, that state presence helps reproduce insecurity and contributes to violence in ways that present a troubling relationship between citizens and the state. While this fosters a great deal of frustration it is not uncertainty but rather the strong certainty and recognition of troubled state-society relations by which residents consider agents and institutions as impractical or suboptimal allies for the supporting engagements in localized negotiations or crafting approaches to problem-solving. This reality is

[70] São Lucas was the Florianópolis metropolitan area's largest youth internment center, which was closed for allegations of fetid conditions and torture in 2010. Vilson recounted to me once how during a surprise visit accompanying a State Attorney, they found instruments of torture including bats and whips which had been labeled with names such as "The Constitution", "Human Rights", and "ECA" (Field Notes, 09/11/14).

reflective of the propositions presented by Pearce, McGee and Wheeler (2011: 3), which underscore what they assert as the making of the perverse state in Latin America:

> *"Proposition 1*: Violence interacts perversely with democratic institutions, eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness. Democracy fails to deliver its promise of replacing the violence with accommodation and compromise, and democratic process is compromised, with citizens reacting by withdrawing from public spaces, accepting the authority of non-state actors, or supporting hard-line responses," and;
>
> *Proposition 2*: Security provision is not making people feel more secure. State responses to rising violence can strengthen state and non-state security actors committed to reproducing violence, disproportionately affecting the poorest communities."

A cautious view to state institutions, and the knock-on effects for addressing conflict or seeking justice, is not a new experience for those inhabiting urban periphery contexts. Faundez (2003: 54) found "deep misgivings" by residents regarding intervention into internal affairs of the community, proven to be "meager and seldom reliable. Similarly, "support by local NGOs – often acting on behalf of external donors – is also often resisted either because it has not been solicited, or because it seeks to impose solutions that are unfamiliar, or inconsistent, with local expectations."

In the face of interpersonal, family, or neighborhood tensions, residents express a desire, but cannot realistically depend on formal or informal state involvement or services at the periphery to support their own exercise of agency. While citizens enter local negotiations to resolve conflict on a regular basis, this lack of reliability, couched by clear awareness of individual citizenship rights, constitutes a disempowering democratic experience, underscored by the longing or *saudade* for a more just, and robust state presence. This ultimately reduces or limits confidence, security, and negotiating power in an asymmetrical context, rather than enhancing the ability to resolve issues non-violently.

In light of these experiences, the following chapters explore the role of local third party interveners, *morro* residents and CCEA staff members, and their exercise of mediative agency in the face of these complexities.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Logic of Third Party Intervention

"There are few training manuals on how to rebuild shattered selves, confidences, futures. There are few theories on how to heal the cultural casualties of war and violence. There are few courses to teach people how to care about a school that has been built, how to believe in the future of a crime ridden-community, how to stop ongoing cycles of violence that last long into the post-war years"

- Carolyn Nordstrom (2002: 240).

"We aren't just people who work; we are human, we fall in love, we hurt, feel, transform, we have a cause, and we are in it. The winds [of change] are blowing over this continent"

- Vilson Groh

The Murder of Diego

Around four o'clock on a balmy February afternoon, just down the street from the Mont Serrat Chapel, a group of masked men surrounded Diego and put 50 bullets into his body as he sat at the wheel of his parked car. Moments earlier, Vilson had also pulled up in his vehicle, parking a few car lengths from where the ambush on Diego occurred. The moment of the murder coincided with Vilson exiting his own vehicle to walk up the long stairway toward his home. His trajectory placed him virtually next to, or at least in clear view of Diego's attackers as they opened fire, sending him running up the stairs and inside to take cover.

When I asked whether his escape was out of fear of a stray bullet, he explained that as one of the few people on the street within eyeshot of the murder, Diego's assassins were liable to shoot him as a possible witness to the event. In a social context where trust, loyalty, and certainty are often negotiated by force, Vilson reminded himself as he ran that no matter how much power, respect, or legitimacy that he or other local leaders might accrue, nobody in the neighborhood is 100% invincible.

"They came out to see the body," Vilson recalled, recalling the curiosity and

surprise that drew neighbors out of their homes to view the corpse in the street. As the first day light assassination to take place in almost nine years in the immediate vicinity of the chapel, Diego's bloody, bullet-riddled body was an oddly familiar spectacle as it lay slumped at the wheel, bleeding out onto the heat of the hot concrete.

Whereas public violence and homicide had once been more commonplace in Mont Serrat, the young man's murder seemed estranged from recent neighborhood memory. Vilson's (06/04/13) recollection of neighbors' behavior that afternoon, to him, indicated a generational shift: *"People weren't sure what to do,"* he remarked about the hours following the shooting: "*they no longer reacted in the same way as before, almost as if they had forgotten what a point blank assassination was"*. Though lethal and non-lethal shootouts occur less frequently today on the *Maciço*, Diego's murder was clear vindication that the routine, at least for many, had changed.

Locals' reactions to the shooting signaled a significant distinction, a behavioral shift, given what they had become accustomed to living. For families who bore witness to rampant street violence less than a decade earlier, Diego's fate[71] as the first person killed in the immediacy of the Caixa area, contrasted starkly to the 80 odd funerals in 2002 that Vilson alone had performed after the violent deaths of periphery youth. Ironically, in the midst of this brutal street slaying, as neighborhood reactions would signal for Vilson and others, Diego's murder revealed something of a measurable indicator by which activists could compare to earlier times, almost a reminder of the relative absence of the violence they had once come to expect. Perhaps the presence of socio-educational projects and mediative efforts, among other things, was helping to materialize their theory of change, paying out the dividends of a lower murder rate.

Despite the overall reduction in public violence, the idea of measuring progress toward peace by a reduction in homicide statistics alone seemed somewhat odd

[71] Diego, who went to the *morro* that day to collect money from his Descoberta crew, rumored to the tune of R$13,000, was ambushed (as many had suspected), by members of his own crew, at least two of whom, Falso and Pu, would eventually be tried for his murder. Though Pu was acquitted, Falso was convicted to 18 years in prison. He, Diego, and presumably the unidentified others involved in the ambush formed the group of *Descoberta* trafficking leaders with whom, just a few months prior, I, too participated in a series of meetings as an intervention that was organized and carried out by mediators to address the assault on Dona Dida's home.

at first, incongruent with some of the loftier conceptual objectives of violence prevention. Yet, none of my key informants appeared overwhelmingly concerned or primed to engage in a violence interrupter-style intervention to prevent Diego's killing, or possible retaliations. In what way did local mediation intervention 'fit' with this scenario of localized violence? Were trafficker killings simply unavoidable, or perhaps somehow acceptable? Was the idea of interrupting retaliatory, gang-related violence even on the radar of local mediators?

Mediators performed no intervention in the immediacy of Diego's death. This came to me as a surprise since some of my key informants had recently taken critical steps to develop relationships with the traffickers who had now just murdered one of their own bosses (see Chapter 6 and 7). By contrast, the attack on Dida's home (by members of the same trafficking crew) only months before had catalyzed a swift intermediary response. To suggest that these same mediators simply *accepted* the violent fate of yet another young trafficker would be inconsistent with CCEA discourse and the very premise for which staff and residents sought to adopt 'mediation' to support the CCEA mission.

Diego's murder as a public act of violence initially presented me with something of an inconsistency in what I assumed might occur. Their non-action was incongruent with the way that urban mediators elsewhere were middling their way into the violence and street tensions in US cities like Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, or Los Angeles. If mediators' focus on violence was not revealed in the scramble to intervene in, or act to prevent street-style killings like Diego's, then what orientation to violence or logical framework would their efforts and intervention decision-making reveal?

This chapter seeks to articulate local mediators' orientation to their practice. Drawing from fieldwork data, it inquires into the way that mediators frame their roles and intervention practices within a context that generates the complexity and blend of insecurity, violence, and interpersonal and neighborhood conflicts. It clarifies how mediators define their purposes, objectives, and the projected outcomes that they associate with the exercise of their unique brand of *mediative* agency. The examples discussed will help articulate where, how, with

whom, and why interveners do (or not) engage in situations with respect to both the risks, as well as opportunities, proposed by insecurity and violence from which conflict is often sourced.

In contrast to the absence of immediate mobilization around Diego's murder, I look at how the orientation of mediators is informed by a more complex and strategic territorial analysis of interdependent *violences.* This analytical dimension supporting the mediator repertoire shapes intervention behavior by linking the urgencies of micro-level interpersonal conflict to the influence or presence of macro-forces, and the nature of social ordering on the *morro*. This signals a framing of conflict and dispute that recognizes how

> "Social order creates power through predictability in which actors reconfirm the structures which emerge [and] concede the tacit consensus of the dominated. [Here] a discursive consciousness of power would mean that actors have gained the capacity to re-describe their relationship to power and the social rules which underpin it and potentially change those rules" (Pearce, 2013a: 644)

This analysis, informed by living in a context of insecurity, is one by which local tensions or conflicts are seen as a way for interveners to support both the urgencies of individual decision-making in conflict, as well as strategically drawing upon conflict scenarios to generate power and engineer change in relation to local social ordering.

Interventions that aim to prevent or interrupt street-style killings amongst traffickers, for instance, are not necessarily prioritized over less visible, if subtler mediative engagements, which can be understood as strategic movement that aims to interrupt or obstruct violence's transmissions in a variety of ways in both public and private realms. Recognizing the impact of violence and conflict *beyond* flashpoint events like a street-murder, mediators rarely sought to facilitate negotiations in conventional terms, nor to pacify, artificially settle, or somehow compartmentalize a dispute from its larger implications. Instead, mediators capitalize upon conflicts and disputes as prisms, portals, or opportunities through which to generate strategic presence, developing relationships with key individuals from key identity groups on the *morro*

(including victims, but also perpetrators of violence) through non-confrontational means. These establish positions from which to counter-act dominant social ordering, codes and scripts that sustain transmissions of violence.

My analysis illuminates a distinct approach to conflict intervention, one that is informed by mediating or *middling movement*, revealing tactics and processes informed by adaptations to life in a context of insecurity. This, I argue, augments mediators' 'discursive consciousness' (Pearce, 2013a), which emerges from their framing of the *Territory in Dispute* (TD) by which they characterize the antagonistic environment in which they intervene and assist neighbors manage conflict. This framing illuminates how mediators understand violence and its reproductions, integrating local knowledge into the way intervention practices unfold.

Drawing from Wilding's (2012) view and critique of violence's hierarchy within the Brazilian periphery context, I suggest that local intervention practices favor strategic, if small, tangible, and process-oriented gains, or what Barreto-Henriques (2013) identifies as *peace of little nothings,* over time. By doing so, mediators give attention to violence's transmission more broadly. Rather than focusing their energies on preventing one-off direct violence incidents like Diego's murder, intervention is framed around a careful, if slower, mediator legitimacy building, performed within the *morro* context (and beyond, see Chapter 7), impacting local social ordering through non-violent means.

To illustrate this, I discuss the complex and traumatic aftermath suffered by Cida, Diego's mother, clarifying how local mediators mobilize to 'mediate-with-one' (Personal Communication, Irvin Foster, 06/13/12). The array of intervention behaviors address Coser's (1956: 49) distinction between 'realistic and unrealistic' conflict, exemplified in the *morro* context, the latter of which signaling "the other party is itself the object of the conflict," rather than "the issue in contention *between* the parties." Through Cida's role as both a perpetrator and victim in interconnected conflict scenarios, I examine more closely the way mediators materialize their intermediary roles, arguing that their actions reflect intervention at Dugan's (1996) 'structural sub-system,' as well as methods that tend to resemble Mayer's (2009) concept of creative non-resolution.

Framing the Territory in Dispute

Mediators frame their efforts and interventions broadly, viewing their practices through the lens of interactions with actors and self-positioning within spaces in the territory of the *morro*. Unable to shift global or historical patterns that help generate and sustain localized violence, mediators nevertheless intercede in relationships and spaces through which actions facilitate transmissions and reproductions of violence as part of interpersonal and neighborhood conflict experiences. This unique *middling* role is borne from mediator attention to strategic opportunities through which interventions and interactions are used to foster and build power and legitimacy.

In the following passage, Vilson and Katia (Groh and Madeira, 2013: 2) characterize mediators as change agents who take a broader view to the complexities that define the rise of local problems:

> "Reflecting upon the reality of these territories means seeing mediation processes as spaces of articulation, acts in which rights are constructed, and struggles that forward political movements in these urban spaces are taken into consideration through how we conceive of more just and equal cities; it is to hold the processes in which reproduction of social life unfolds, as central, and the understanding that this reproduction occurs as profoundly unequal, transforming cities into places of financial speculation and the mercantilization of social life.
>
> In our experience, the consequences of this unequal process transpire throughout everyday life in this territory, translated into structural unemployment, underemployment, poverty, urban violence that feeds fear and insecurity, destruction of the environment, and the State's shirking of responsibility. It is thus that these territories become *territories-in-dispute* amongst the presence of the State during electoral periods, narcotrafficking in their militancy campaigns through activities of organized crime, and the locally based organizations that strive to re-weave an extremely fragile social fabric".

The clear recognition of social conflict amidst the competing actions and interactions that define social ordering processes on the morro, provide the backdrop for interveners' analyses or reading of the territory, molding the middling roles that mediators construct.

The context of violence's reproduction and local insecurity propose an

unavoidable challenge of contending with disputing and intervention through the understanding of the intersection of micro and macro patterns, informing how mediators engage, shaping and moving their practices toward possibilities for pursuing changes in the way these patterns reproduce. The canvas of a territory is one still in formation or process of definition, to which multiple actors contribute. Borne from a highly contextualized reading of the territory, these efforts seek to re-configure the patterns and transmissions of violence in critical spaces of politicization and socialization. Vilson's articulation during a meeting with educators at CEDEP one afternoon crystalizes this view:

> "We have to think about various dimensions of mediation in the territory-in-dispute, which is one of conflict. Territory is not the same as a neighborhood (*bairro*). A *bairro* is a place where we all know each other and are working toward common interests, etc. Territory-in-dispute is not that. It is a place in which I dispute, a place in which there many interwoven disputes, and conflicting interests: the dispute of trafficking; disputes of the politicians more intense now in the election cycle, in which the territory is disputed in order to secure votes; there are disputes between the Pentecostal Church with the *Terreiros de Condomblé*, wherein the *Terreiros* are now being forced to close down by the state because they make animal sacrifices.
>
> And if you get a prosecutor in charge of the process who themselves are Pentecostal, or have Pentecostal tendencies, they are going to unleash all the legal firepower possible in that process in order to shut them down. So now tell me, who can say that a *culto* that's been in operation for five hundred years is now wrong, because they sacrifice a pigeon during a ceremony to baptize their kids into their community?
>
> Disputes are the cultural processes and patterns that constitute and construct the identities of groups in the periphery. As a mediator, we have to think about, for example, how to spread out into the community, to a school. A school that's in that territory has to deal with all that, and they're going to punish kids if they don't understand these processes – because if a kid is a child of a Pentecostal family, s/he has a certain way of behaving. If he or she is a child of *Candomblé*, they have different norms of behavior.
>
> And if they are a child of a mother or a father who survives off trafficking, they also have their own way of interacting. How we mediate is directly linked to these differences - is mediation a possibility here? In these places, mediation can be an instrumental space in which to touch the very heart of the question -

> the interests involved, because our kids have diverse interests, so how can we engage with those interests when it comes to the desire of that young person to become involved in trafficking, or in school, or in terms of a professional work capacity, etc. So I think that thinking about mediation beyond the table, but rather unleash those processes in terms of mediating in community is supposedly what we are getting involved in (Field Notes, 30/08/12).

Residents recognize that influence on the *morro* flows through people, as well as the way in which larger processes and institutional relationships beyond neighborhood borders, shape periphery life. Mediation is discussed as a way to 'think' the territory, not in conventional process terms of intervening in conflict, but rather as "an instrumental space" or way that recognizes, and shapes, social life, behaviors, and interactions on the *morro*.

This brings attention to the nature of conflicts involving institutions as well. Darcy's commentary after two hours of quiet observation of the discussions amongst social workers and judicial officials during a biweekly RACDCA meeting, highlighted the dilemma that institutional level relations present in the territory:

> "It's interesting. You all are looking for a focus, while the community, [pauses] you are becoming alert to the difficulties that, up to now, have been invisible to you. Now, things are revealed. This work is complicated. We get frustrated here in the community losing our teenagers. While we were at work all these years, little has been done [by the state]. The anguish is not only on your side, but also on ours. This is our life's work. It's important to perform studies and create reports, but meanwhile, our work [here] continues. What you all are talking about here, we do it every single day. Kids are denied affection every single day. This is a daily struggle we have been carrying out for years. All the difficulties you can imagine, we face everyday."

> "Self esteem is what they need – it has to be developed everyday. *Everyday*. This is what social workers know in theory, but find challenging to actually do in the middle of violent reactions in a school, for example. For 20 years the [Mont Serrat] school was slowly abandoned [pointing her finger up the hill]. Three schools were closed around the community. We, the poor who live here -I raised my kids here- and when one thinks of them going to university, you sit and do the, what's the word? You do the *mathematical calculus* of the difficulty that you went through [to see them through to university]."

> "The teacher abandons the school, and then they ask why the child is violent - because of hunger, and because of cold. Hunger pangs in the stomach; cold burns the skin. They get home and they don't know what it is to hear *'I love you'*; All of that hurts. Iron bars don't fortify a home. Sometimes we as a community organize, we set things up, we establish relationships and the government mucks everything up. It's so frustrating to have made a plan and see the government suddenly intervene to stop it. People here are hungry. They suffer. Go out there. Take a look around for yourselves. Our mission is complicated."

As a life-long resident, founding member of the CCEA and former member of CONANDA, or the National Children and Adolescent Rights Council, Darcy's comments draw upon a long history of experience contending with the consequences that dysfunctional institutional relations, resource allocation, coordination and divestment create, despite institutions working toward similar goals. Darcy (24/04/13) would later suggest that it was not uncommon to see a hard-fought local CCEA project wilt and staff members leave, due to withdrawal of funding or delays in disbursement, despite the state's contractual obligations, ultimately diminishing and complicating trust, but also operational legitimacy of one of the few local community organizations in MS.

Ivone (21/11/14) explained the micro-detriment that these conflicts of constraint placed on the community by challenging the operating procedure of local programming for youth, with adverse impacts on the CCEA's local peacebuilding efforts:

> "The learning in the ProCam is *very* good. Youth have to go about finding their rhythm. But the time allotted by our funding contract doesn't cover the timeframe for a young person to find their way [while making change] in this context. It's going to improve with the [municipality's] new regulatory framework in place. But to sign a [time-bound] contract is not the same as the investment in the life of the child, in order to turn that child's life around. [The CCEA] must sign the contract and abide by its stipulations. *That time* is not the time it takes to invest in *recuperating* the life of a young person so that he or she doesn't wind up being killed in trafficking. That's a different timeframe altogether. And it's unhelpful to want to push this process because if we force it, it won't work" (*speaker's emphasis*).

These perspectives illuminate some of the tensions and sources of disempowering experiences that affect community individuals and families. It demonstrates in some ways how local initiatives undertaken by an NGO like the CCEA, are presented with debilitating realities to the success of their programs, and consistency of administering programming and staff. This contributes to the broader animosity and sentiment of conflict both internally in the morro (if programming for children stops because of a lack of funding) for CCEA with its funders, as well as between CCEA staff and state authorities who they believe are toying with their funding.

Mediators consider conflict expressions of this nature as those that shape life in the territory in the way these tensions inform how interveners and activists build local legitimacy in contrast to other territorial actors. Conflict is viewed through the territory in relational terms and connected to, rather than limited to, a static event or acute dispute between individuals or groups. In this excerpt, Vilson (25/09/12) speaks to the implications of these challenges in terms of violence related to youth identity generation:

> Vilson: "[Youth involved in trafficking] are produced violently because those youth did not just fall out of a helicopter here as violent people. Those kids have learned violence during their lifetimes. Their youth was *generated* violently because they had it practiced against them, they were violated and now *they* violate" (speaker's emphasis).
>
> Jared: "If interveners always face the vulnerability of violence, trafficker power seems difficult to deal with. Do you think about this creatively?"
>
> Vilson: "There's vulnerability. For example, we can easily be killed. A fourteen year old with a pistol in hand, a bit of smoke or coke in his nose, well, he's ready to pop you off. A 30-year old has more ability to reason. He's going to talk with you. Think about those three young guys we saw earlier at the *boca*. If Tico tells them to go kill, they kill. That's why [interventions] are fragile, because trafficking is fragmented. And those three – if they say go kill, [subordinates] will go kill."
>
> "Our efforts have to be thought about in terms of how we face that reality. Young people are part of a system. They are not the enemy. Javier,[72] for

[72] A CCEA employee, ally, and former PGC member.

> example is part of that system. That's why I think [CCEA] programs have to be articulated in a network, to connect micro neighborhood realities to larger macro ones. We have to create conditions and pathways to diminish violence and generate opportunity. The network permits the diminishing of violence."

Conversations with community leaders revealed a multitude of challenges linking interpersonal, group, or inter-institutional conflict and tensions, with experiences and reproductions of insecurity or violence. Acutely resolvable issues within a dispute, while sometimes difficult to tease out, nevertheless produce a felt impact. Left unresolved, these disputes could grow to perpetuate insecurity, such as the case of Dona Dida, or business-as-usual that tacitly legitimizes more violently applied alternatives, such as in the case of Dona Teresa.

For concerned residents or CCEA staff, confronting this reality suggests a broader role for exercising mediative agency, materialized not least through the way they could engage territorial antagonists proactively, rather than reactively, catalyzing possibilities of convening, intervening, and advocating in ways that would promote changes in spaces where inaction might simply enable or offer more space for the exercise of violence or dominating power by other groups.

Mediation, framed in light of the social context of the *territory-in-dispute*, becomes less about a practice of third party intervention oriented solely toward more micro, interpersonal, acute disputing scenarios. Rather, key informants reveal a vision of their mediative roles as those exercised to facilitate intermediary impact in key territorial spaces and relationships, from which constraining conflicts are sourced or reproduced.

This conceptualization enables mediation to be a force for peace and change, vis-à-vis the influence that mediators generate around critical community issues with implications for violence, such as youth subjectivities, and territorial relations. Such activities include an emphasis not simply on strengthening local relationships, but also breaking-down and interrupting dominating interactions between individuals in key social groups, such as residents and traffickers, or between youth and police (see Chapter 5). In such conflict scenarios and interactions, interveners also demonstrated a shared a proclivity for raising

awareness about rights through educational-type discussions, as a cornerstone of intervention work.

For example, Carlos, founder of the *Pinheiros* youth program in MS and civic activist during Brazil's transition to democracy, was an influential community leader on the *morro*. His work with youth in the 1990s pre-dates the CCEA, and was a precursor to the *ProCam* program.[73] Carlos framed the territorial context as one in which struggles and tensions emerge amongst actors at the nexus of internal and external encounters, in competition for ordering over the terrain. Through numerous conversations, Carlos drew on the concepts of language and space, as ways by which interveners framed something *possible* within seemingly *impossible* circumstances, as a way of confronting somewhat intangible limitations produced at the nexus of interaction amongst territorial actors:

> Carlos: "Those of us resisting the discriminatory public transportation system at the time had to have that vision, that visibility, to participate - and to accomplish what? If we want to advance collectively, we have to be present in those spaces and put those arguments forward. So that's what I'm saying, to attack these structural issues, you've gotta be able to bring that language to bear."
>
> Jared: "So, language invites change. Is this possible with trafficking?"
>
> Carlos: "I think [what was missing was] a lack of integration [between state and community] around that issue. Trafficking it made things difficult to integrate efforts."
>
> Jared: "Meaning, there was no supportive policy, like security?"
>
> Carlos: "None at all. The police would enter to you know, just harass or beat people. Police would come in guns blazing. What most impacted me was the way they threw everybody against the wall, without any trace of dignity. *C'mon people, have some civility!* And then, imagine this; *they* wanted *us* to become informants! We would be getting ready to go to an event and they would come

[73] In the early 2000s, Carlos' resistance to narcotrafficking and political co-optation on the *morro* earned him a hail of bullets one night as he and his wife slept in their bed. Though Carlos was not shot, his wife Mary was hit twice. Despite self-exile from Mont Serrat shortly thereafter, Carlos' influence on local young men, some who became community leaders now in their 30s, remains strong.

> in – here we go again, up against the wall! How does one *work* around that issue? We were doing all this work to keep kids out of violence, yet the kids are now caught in this physically violating situation."
>
> "It's even more difficult for the internal conflicts, because everybody's related, so it's harder. And Mont Serrat with its historical context, things are very embedded. Who defines the norms, the laws, the social coexistence, are the figures who have the most power – the public authorities, the boss on the *morro*, a church or religion, etc. Here, language cannot get left behind. You have to work, to struggle, to circulate that language of rights. It cannot remain subordinated. Local teachers could also help define this at school through education."
>
> "I always think to myself, when I deal with people talking about '*oh my lord, what happened to him, he was such a good kid, he had everything, and now he's involved in this trafficking mess,*' I say '*that kid circulated through ALL our community spaces'.* So, who has failed him? It's also the territory, because our kids go through catechism, the crèche, the school, the church, etc. So who was it that failed? *Those spaces* failed. Their trajectory failed. You can't just look to the state in that moment."
>
> "It's the same like the circulation of rights-language. The failure is that we look at that individual in a given position in any given moment. It's the same with the rights discourse, that whole thing of political discourse saying, '*we're going to create this and that.*' That's an entirely segregationist approach! And after all this time and struggle, it leaves me deceived and disillusioned – but I'm not going to lose that historical perspective" (Carlos Interview, 24/06/12).

Carlos' statement ultimately highlights various pathways and spaces in which mediative action is relevant on the *morro*, not least of which through thinking that rewards integration and cooperation, rather than fragmentation and antagonism. For interveners, it ties together the challenge of engaging with disputes sourced from relations amongst all actors, including traffickers, non-trafficker residents, and state agents, whose actions or inactions structure life and citizenship in the territory.

Like Darcy and others, Carlos evidences his view on key spaces and ways by which local change efforts find opportunity. The broader framing of intervention within the territory, based on local knowledge and unique entry points for local

actors, permits mediators to exercise intervention capacities to address conflicts borne from relational, transactional, and institutional premises.

Conflicts on the *morro* propose opportunities to address issues, convene actors, negotiate problems, and support locals' decision-making. This is done in scenarios that are both horizontal, and vertical, meaning that mediators engage in situations where disputes occur amongst actors who negotiate based on relatively horizontal, or balanced terms of power, as well as in situations where asymmetrical power defines relationships. Such a protagonist reflects Schoeny and Warfield's (2000: 266) *social instrumentalist* mediator, a role wherein

> "The reflective practitioner understands intervention as a long-term and *collaborative* process where, operating in the mode of a public steward, she or he seeks to bring together institutional actors, individuals, and groups to determine just outcomes and the processes used to get there. It may be that complete integration of means and ends in social conflict is beyond the scope of practice of any individual or team of reflective practitioners operating within a finite time span. Rather, it can be seen as a process where 'generations' of practitioners intervene, each attempting to push the process of integration forward a little further."

Interventions are framed and shaped precisely by weaving together spatial, relational and temporal dimensions. Such framing proposes disbursed or decentralized physical movements, and tactics that are informed by a theory of change that emphasizes a re-configuration of how people understand relationships and space in the territory, thus broadening the mediative scope of actors' roles and objectives. Lederach's (2006: 96-97) Moral Imagination, defined as the capacity to transcend cycles of violence while still living in them, is a helpful by which to describe the propensity of local mediators and their efforts to draw from an interconnectedness of spaces and relationships:

> "Social spaces broaden and deepen the purpose of transformative intermediary design and action. By broader I mean the many sectors and points of interdependent interaction between social collectives affected by division, which go well beyond what is usually included in a political negotiation. Deeper proposes that there are many people, relationships, and actions that need constructive, transformed and sustained interaction well beyond a handful of key leaders … political negotiation is not the primary, nor the exclusive measure of the mediative capacity of a conflict-ridden society to promote this broader

> change processes that must take place. Sustained change, this approach posits, lies with the capacity to mobilize the web."

The web or systems view to the complexity of conflict and interconnectedness of actors in the *territory-in-dispute,* suggests a peculiar set of mediation practices, shaped not only by violence, but also by opportunities to pursue a "larger beacons" of change beyond resolving the presenting issues, which may focus exclusively on individuals at hand (Boulding, 1988; 1995). With this view, what do mediators realistically hope to achieve? In what way do they contribute to change? How do Mediators account for the complexity of power, and in what way are intervention practices shaped or borne as a result of these intersecting manifestations of violence?

Little Peaces

Violence in Brazil, as Soares (2000) has argued, results in insecurity as a democratic sentiment. This sentiment becomes part of many residents' conflict experience, accompanying them as they seek pathways to resolution of problems. While fear and insecurity are near universal for urban denizens, these phenomena are experienced in very different ways in different social contexts and classes (Holsten and Caldeira, 1999).

Morro residents are particularly vulnerable to violence in its various forms and manifestations, often in less visible ways to observers than first meets the eye. The erosion of security or full enjoyment of rights and protections in Brazil's democratic system often occur in small, but compounding ways. This is not lost on local mediators, who paint intervention with broad brush strokes. I observed these key informants to be selective and purpose-driven when deciding to engage with, or manage what initially seemed to me as disconnected or less visible issues, in the same way they were adept at dealing with the more visible or attention calling challenges.

Decisions about when to intervene, or what steps to take when doing so, are informed by a larger social system and community dynamics on the hill, which leave no resident untouched. Mediators must, thus, take care in attending to small, seemingly insignificant pieces of everyday life in strategic change-

inducing ways. They do so, I argue, through unique actions that pursue *little peaces,* often in function of structuring a less violent or volatile social environment, which may take priority over negotiating a quick settlement to a given problem. That is, where an incident of violence may call attention, mediators operate with a broader range of considerations about violence and its transmission behind their pursuits of convening dialogue or facilitating negotiations around a given problem.

Vilson and others' reaction in the aftermath of Diego's ambush was to accept the event as unfortunate, but not, as other street-intervention models prescribe, to target this event – an event that was determined by community discussions to be an intra-gang power-struggle. Entering into such a fray would be counterproductive at best, despite efforts made by local leaders with the same crew, including Diego, who ended up murdering him (see Chapter 7). On the surface, this example of preventive in/action by interveners seemed to contradict the notion of 'doing what you can, with what you've got' to prevent violence. Careful observation revealed that despite some notion of the potential for this murder, this was exactly what mediators did. Their intervention efforts instead focused on Cida, Diego's mother. Cida's loss of this particular son also implicated additional challenges, including additional interpersonal risks and community tensions around which interventions eventually coalesced.

While Pearce (2010: 291) contends that across Latin America the 'main comparative quantitative measurement of violence is the level of homicides," such metrics offer a limited view, failing to account for the range of *violences* and impacts occurring locally in communities, including "violence which does not result in death" and the way that "not all intentional killings are accounted for by the term homicides". Though no direct intervention was made around the murder of Diego's homicide, Cida's case demonstrates how homicides as a form of public violence, can distract and draw attention away from less visible, if more perniciously embedding transmissions and reproductions that prove more deeply impactful on micro and macro levels over time.

Interventions involving Cida, which I discuss below, offer a view to the strategic work of mediators, whereby their interventions not only capitalize on

opportunities to interrupt direct violence, but also assert a strategic presence and exercise of power within the context of an ongoing power-struggle taking place in the *Descoberta*. This confirms Penglase's (2014: 18) accounting of how "urban violence has increasingly generated a set of discourses and practices that are reshaping how Brazilians think about and experience their social universe," such that interventions may provide returns that are not always initially what they seem, despite the way they shape, erode, construct, or constrain values and relationships of life in the urban margins.

Such actions are not by default, but rather those that seek 'little peaces,' or supporting shifts in the unfolding and production of local social life as residents negotiate the impacts of violence. Barreto Henriques (2013: 123) defines a "peace of little nothings" as that which becomes part of the landscape gradually, over time. In his words, these *"essentially, 'small peace' expressions, [are] 'micro-peaces' built and developed by the transformation of conflict expressions on a micro scale. Therefore, they allow the contemplation of peace and its building, to be subsumed under a different logic, more social than political, more horizontal than vertical, more local than national."* Discussing Colombia's Peace Laboratories, Barreto Henriques (2013: 124) considers that peace in contexts of chronic violence is better understood as a multivariable equation:

> "Peace here acquires multiple colors, tastes and scents. It rises as a concept conjugated in the plural. It is based on various types of social processes and dimensions. More than just one peace, there are 'peaces' at stake. In these processes, peace is conceived, built, and understood in several ways by the communities, and acquires meanings and materializations of its own. It is not mistaken with the political peace and absence of war, which drives political realism and conflict management theories. In the grassroots cases within the Peace Laboratories, to some, peace is having something to eat, to others it is to have tranquility or to be listened to."

Local mediators approach intervention practices of little peaces by recognizing the uneasy economy of (in)security of their disputing environment. Whereas the territory in dispute brings to bear the larger forces that shape local violence and conflict, *little peaces* provides strategic orientation to micro-interventions that build toward macro-impact.

Engagement or intervention in conflict involving antagonistic actors occur in less confrontational ways. These can nevertheless materialize into mediator interruption of local social ordering processes, as they tangle with existing power exercised in key spaces, relationships, or interactions that help sustain violence.

This would suggest that interveners develop and draw upon learned social tactics to structure mediation practices, as Penglase (2014: 8) contends, "an elaboration of a deep cultural repertoire, [as] a way of living with insecurity that… urban poor have elaborated for generations". In Florianópolis, these 'ways of living' are elaborated in some ways through the repertoire of mediators, who exercise a certain degree of caution and non-confrontational approaches to disputants. They do so all while keeping focused on the interdependency of impact of the many *violences* in ways that do not limit or confine their endeavors to a more rigidly defined process of conflict management.

In this way, mediators envision conflict as strategic opportunities, along the lines of what Mayer (2009: 11) proposes as *creative non-resolution,* whereby mediators become realistic about *staying with enduring conflict* over the long haul. Mediators engage strategically not by pursuing immediate answers or resolution to any given event, but instead by working to create influence through actions that will help position them to be interruptive of interpersonal or intergroup actions that sustain or facilitate transmissions of violence, such as the ways in which local traffickers consolidate their power over time. These mediative practices can be explained by a type of logic suggestive of transformative principles, which engage immediate issues while also promoting longer-term social change. Empirical observations resonate with Lederach's (2003) description of peace through a conflict transformation lens, which

> "Views peace as centered and rooted in the quality of relationships. This includes both face-to-face interactions and the ways in which we structure our social, political, economic, and cultural relationships. In this sense, peace is a 'process-structure,' a phenomenon that is simultaneously dynamic, adaptive, and changing. … Concerns about violence and justice suggest that we need to develop capacities to engage in change processes at the interpersonal, inter-group, and social-structural levels.

> One set of capacities points toward direct, face-to-face interaction between people or groups. The other set underscores the need to see, pursue, and create change in our ways of organizing social structures, from families, to complex bureaucracies, to structures at the global level. This requires a capacity to understand and sustain dialogue as a fundamental means of constructive change."

Mediating Visible and Invisible Violences

As evidence from *morro* communities elsewhere in Brazil suggests (Penglase, 2014), insecurity shapes the way that residents manage and confront everyday life, including scenarios of intimidation, which is used actively and instrumentally by traffickers to sustain local power. In light of this, Diego's death provides a prism through which to understand mediator approaches to local conflicts in ways that permit them to engage in *interrupting violence beyond its more visible and direct manifestations*.

Despite the bridges that local mediators had built the previous October (2012) with Diego and crew, the same men ultimately commanding the area and individuals responsible for the assault on Dida's home, no particular effort was being undertaken to engage with these same dangerous intimates in relation to Diego's murder. Contact theory and the use of mediators' social capital to increase "influence" of legitimate actors over traffickers, would seem insufficient or incomplete in terms of explaining this non-intervention, despite the clear value that mediators had placed on dialogues convened to preventively de-escalate rising community tensions. If this was the case, why enter into dialogue in the first place?

In October of 2012, local leaders had scrambled to mobilize and take advantage of an opportunity to reduce local tensions by narrowing the social distance with trafficking leaders (see Chapter 7). Ostensibly in this case, the actions of local conflict interveners sought to replace silence, fear, and intimidation with possibilities for building trust and increasing strategic proximity to key violent actors. At the time of Diego's murder only a few short months later, non-intervention suggested that there was no immediate indication that these same mediators had sought to use their social capital to collect returns on their hard fought and risky intervention. The inconsistency of seemingly conflicting events

or logics (laced with my own assumptions) led me to finally ask – if not for preventing escalation of street violence where a window of opportunity clearly exists, then what is it about violence that local mediators intend to interrupt?

Answers to these questions were not immediately revealed. Nevertheless, it became instructive to see over time how buying time in the face of a tension-filled short-run time frame meant using non-intervention as a tactic for gaining ground in the long run. That is, non-intervention was not a response for fear of intervening or danger per se, but rather on hedging bets on something distinct and related to transforming the violent impact of gang activities on the community. Mediators did not respond to Diego's death as an *event,* to be negotiated or resolved, as if to pacify growing neighborhood tensions. They did not mobilize to interrupt retaliatory or other subsequent homicides related to an intra-gang power struggle. Instead, interventions turned away from the visible violence, attending to the less visible reverberations that unfolded in its wake.

Whereas no direct intervention was undertaken to interrupt further homicides in the context of those who might retaliate against Diego's murder (Cida aside), mediators worked to undermine trafficker's further exercise of power and use of intimidation during this time in the *Descoberta.* While Diego's murder was not the event in focus, approaching the question of Cida's experience of impending violences did constitute the focus of key intermediaries.

Selecting-out a particular expression of violence on which mediators might focus their energies seemed odd. In this scenario, however, which would eventually present numerous interconnected disputes and tensions involving Cida, her family, and her neighbors, interventions reflected David Dyck's (2006: 530) "radical" proposition of taking "a long-term, process-oriented approach to our everyday troubles." Actions corresponded to Mika's (1989, cited in Dyck, 2006: 530) proposal for practitioners to take a "longer and deeper vantage point, [as opposed to] a tendency to define problems in shallow, simplistic, linear, cause-and-effect terms. This, in turn, leads [practitioners] to 'pathologize' particular individuals, usually those in trouble with the law, as the problem to be fixed". This pathologizing, despite my own assumptions at first, was exactly what mediator activities seemed to reject.

This approach also speaks to Penglase's social tactics and the resourcefulness of *morro* residents, who are often forced to do more with less, and locate multiple purposes behind any given endeavor or energy expenditure. In this case, doing 'less' on the front end of a violent event followed a logic of non-confrontation, while interventions that materialized over time would treat conflict according to the context of insecurity and violence in which they emerged. This meant strategically avoiding facilitated negotiation while supporting Cida to make decisions in other ways, to pursue alternative pathways to resolving the conflicts at hand.

The distinction between interventions as actions that respond to an event, versus attention and patience levied in response to growing tensions, which mediators anticipated unfolding over time, speaks to the way that mediators account for the interplay between more public, instrumental acts of violence, and the repercussions and impact their peripheral ramifications have in private spaces, in less visible ways. Such things become relevant in the case of Cida precisely because they give rise to knock-on, secondary type of disputes that manifest in family or community circles in times of stress and insecurity, albeit emanating from a single source.

The logic underpinning mediator actions in the face of violence have some commonalities, as well as important contrasts or distinctions in role and function discussed in part in the introduction to this thesis. In my observation, *morro* mediation contrasts to violence intervention efforts like the popular epidemiologically based *transmission-interruption* approach of the Chicago Cease-Fire violence-interrupters. Whereas both approaches observe systemic challenges as sources of violence that reach beyond 'gang-related' issues, both intervention methods privilege what Tio Hardiman, Cease-Fire's manager, calls a *boots on the ground* or embedded intervener presence, operating on "the front end" of violence where legitimacy can be build in order to prevent shootings, rather than attempts by outside interveners to parachute-in (The Interrupters, 2011; see also Lopez-Aguado, 2013).

Hardiman and epidemiologist Gary Slutkin, the program's creator, suggest that interrupters mediate to save a life as their primary goal, rather than operating in-

service of dismantling gangs. The temporal view to violence as part of an overall strategy for change and development in community, assumes a somewhat distinct perspective. As Slutkin affirms:

> "Reducing the violence is not a Band-Aid, it's actually an essential pathway immediate violence is also a vital pathway for a neighborhood to develop, for the schools to be able to get better, for the kids to get rid of their stress disorders, for businesses to feel safe enough and well enough to be able to come into these neighborhoods" (The Interrupters, 2011).

Whereas the Chicago interrupters operate on a platform of stopping the transmission of gun-violence to prevent retaliatory killings, Mont Serrat mediators evidence critical differences in intentionality and corresponding roles. In MS, mediators intervene and deploy tactics without the underlying assumption that preventing more visible street violence (or risk thereof) will necessarily invite external resources to support local development. While this may be a secondary step, their first inclination is locally relational. Instead, interventions ascribe to a temporal framing that recognizes the value of incremental, but lasting change opportunities that must necessarily engage with the power structures and social ordering that help sustain violence locally, in which they and their actions, from an internal standpoint, play a fundamental role.

Interventions tended to prioritize[74] less visible repercussions and ripple effects made by visible violence and the local conflicts this sparked, in association with both trauma and an internal power struggle that brought tension to the community, having wider impact on neighborhood life. This suggests an important distinction in the way intervention models employing negotiation or mediation skills are deployed in service of saving lives, and reinforcing security non-violently.

Intervening along a Lower-archy of Violence

Examining studies across Latin America, Benson, Fischer and Thomas (2008) caution that it is often "easy to pass the blame for the current levels of insecurity

[74] An exception is Javier's insider-mediator role in which his internal role facilitated the negotiated reduction of a PGC 'hit list' of 70 youth marked for death in Monte Cristo. See chapter 7 for more discussion.

onto delinquent young people under the catch-all of 'gangs'." The reality of much more complex, whereby insecurity and violence are sustained by a number of interacting variables, processes, and dynamics. Such dynamics manifest on the *morro* through interactions involving multiple actors, rather than contained within the existence or growth of gangs alone. This reductionist view denies and overlooks the elements and larger forces involved in the trajectories of families, as well as decision-making undertaken by young people in an often times more influential and vulnerable time of their growth.

Pearce (2010) has argued for example that political and social categories of violence in the Latin American context offer an insufficient binary for analysis. Given the way violence has been transmitted through time and space through the democratic transitions of state formation in the region, political and social relations instead emerge and co-construct one another. Today, violence can be observed to be characteristic of the state formation process itself, whereby

> "new elites who emerge through illegal accumulation, in which permanent violent engagement with violent 'others' plays into the broad project. In the process, categories of people are 'sacrificed,' particularly but not only, violent young men, while legal and illegal accumulation of wealth lubricates and sustains this violent (dis)order" (Pearce, 2010: 289).

Violence practiced by the state on its citizens entails the search for the state's control and legitimacy, not on the basis of preserving its monopoly on the use of force or violence, but rather as violence practiced response to its lack of it. Public disorder offers rationale and justification for violent state responses in order to reinforce its authority, contributing to a violent process of social ordering. Here, Pearce (2010: 289) suggests,

> "The poor as well as the wealthy are drawn in behind this project; the poor because they are the major victims of chaotic *violences* and the wealthier because such responses enable them to further ring-fence their world. The gendered dimensions of the transmissions of violence are ignored and the cultural change in favor of reductions in interpersonal violence is obstructed. Support for public, equitable, efficient, and non-violent security is lost, along with meaningful participation in social and political life for the poorest.

The use and perpetuation of state-practiced violence, however is not always

carried out through direct means. As Bourgois and Schepher-Hughes (2004: 4) assert, attempts to understanding violence in less visible forms may

> "Misrecognize the extent to which structural inequalities and power relations are naturalized by our categories and conceptions of what violence really is. They also fail to address the totality and range of violent acts, including those which are a part of the normative fabric of social and political life".

Violence manifested through visible events also belies the transmission and normalization of patterns of intimidation, dominance, and social ordering that assert themselves in cultural (Galtung, 1990) or symbolic (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004) forms, particularly when individuals struggle against both local and larger societal forces that help sustain violence's presence in their lives. This includes everyday scripts of violence discussed in Chapter 3, encompassing Ana's anguish in the aftermath of Lúcio's shooting, the disempowering interfaces between Sergio, Conrado, and their nefarious neighbors, or Teresa's challenges with State institutions.

Similarly, Wilding's (2012: 729) research of violence in Rio's favela communities, observes "links between urban and private violence, and the way in which relationships and trajectories of influence cross and re-cross both spheres." In this way, Wilding contends that while "male experiences of urban violence are undeniably important, they alone fail to provide a comprehensive picture."

Focusing attention on Diego's violent death alone, for example, would mask the ways in which mediators were awareness and attempted to intercede in ways that violence is reproduced in less visible ways, impacting lives beyond the space of public spectacle. Such violence is also highly gendered, Wilding (2012: 733) asserts, with differential impact rendered upon the involved and affected "both within the home and in the more public arena of the street". Ethnographic accounting from Brazil's urban peripheries contend that

> "Challenges the implicit assumption that private violence is less important than the more visible violence on the street. Demonstrating that all forms of violence intersect and overlap in terms of actors, impacts, processes and inter-relatedness not only strengthens this argument but also adds to our

> understanding of the ways in which violence reproduces inequality and oppression along gender as well as class, ethnic and other axes" (Wilding, 2012: 744; also see Pearce, 2010; Wilding and Hume, 2015).

Intervention work is gendered, visible not only through the way that gendered-mediators engage differentially with local actors (see Chapters 5 and 6) but also in the way that intermediaries give priority and attention to less visible ripple effects and transmissions that impact gendered disputants differently in public and private spaces. As an "antidote to the male frame of violence and insecurity," intervention logic on the *morro* operates with the "imperative to prioritize normal and everyday experiences" of violence (Wilding and Hume, 2015: 93). As Wilding and Hume (2015: 94) argue, "if violence is to be tackled holistically, we must acknowledge its multiple interconnected manifestations and the factors that facilitate it. This involves looking at violence both materially and discursively."

Discerning an intervention orientation or logic of periphery mediation that is informed by *violences* and their transmission offers us insight into how and where mediators may impact the social fabric of a community, and beyond. The logic of local mediators aligns with this view by privileging a range of activities that comprise middling-roles and intervention practices beyond the proverbial table. The complex case of Cida, as a resident-subject and 'party' to the tensions that force her to make critical decisions, demonstrates how mediators prioritize issues at the lower levels of a hierarchy of more visible violence primarily associated with life at the margins, amidst multiple manifestations and reproductions.

Cida's Story

The name Cida derives from the last four letters of *Nossa Senhora da Conçeicão Aparecida,* Brazilian Catholics' national patroness of the Immaculate Conception. In Portuguese, the word *aparecida* comes from the verb *aparecer,* meaning to appear, or become visible. The sporadic visibility of Cida, who would appear often in her daily routine about the *morro*, at the CCEA or Vilson's home, seemed to fit her well. Despite owning a home in the *Descoberta*, Cida's lifestyle emulates what one might imagine as street-residence, or homelessness, whereby she cobbles together her means of survival as a way of day to day living.

To an outsider, Cida's lifestyle and physical appearance embody the notion that Phillipe Bourgois (2006: xi), citing Walter Benjamin, posits as: 'everyday is a state of emergency' for those who suffer an increasingly violent and abusive Democracy. Here, visible circumstances and conditions mask the "outcome of global patterns of oppression at the level of the individual" wherein "progress, science, development, democracy, and the individuation of responsibility have rendered an ever larger proportion of citizens disposable, and have institutionalized lumpen abuse".

For decades, Cida worked cleaning office buildings and residences in the city center, returning home only to suffer severe domestic violence at the hand of her husband. Cida had a total of ten children, approximately half of which had been, by the time of my 2012 fieldwork, killed in drug related violence. As her eldest children became teenagers, involving themselves in trafficking, they succeeded in expelling their father from community for his abusive behaviors.

Sustaining a home alone, Cida began selling drugs in Florianópolis' public market, where she was eventually apprehended and imprisoned, though released early for good behavior. She was hired thereafter to work in a woman's home as an *empregada,* dismissed only after her employer discovered Cida's history of incarceration. Remaining close to her children, this was the second time Cida began selling drugs, as well as using. During an intervention with Cida in November 2014, she would confess to Darcy, Vilson, and myself, of having used cocaine every day for more than 20 years.

In the following transcript (26/04/13), I draw upon Vilson's view about Cida's life, as a key intermediatory who I got to observe working often with her. Her history, which Cida would recount in bits and pieces to me directly, was not unlike the more complete stories relayed to me by other residents - those who, surrounded by circumstances that co-conspire to sustain the emergencies of everyday life, face near impossible challenges. Here, I use Vilson's more succinct, if opinionated version, to illuminate some fo the central dimensions:

Vilson: "Cida was depersonalized by the power of violence."

Jared: “And drugs?”

Vilson: “No, the drugs were a second step. She became depersonalized first by her husband. She used to work hard, but was extremely violated by her husband. That dehumanization opened Cida’s pathway to trafficking. She was broken down over the years, the fruit of violence’s destruction, mixed up in these processes. She did not become a violent person, but as a result of these situations, she has also lost her perception of things; she doesn’t have self-control. Her neurons are completely destroyed in terms of a person who acts with reason. She has reason of course; she takes very good care of Lucas, for example. But her situation is very terrible.”

“Cida was totally violated. She was violated by the state, by her husband, and by society. She lives two simultaneous movements - one in constructive relationship with us, and another of vice. She is a person who, if we look from a perspective of the context of her family, and a State that was extremely negligent in the sense of supporting or defending her rights, she should just sue the state.”

Cida’s sporadic appearances to beg and banter were an everyday reminder of the difficult past that cannot be changed, no matter how many overtures or opportunities might be presented to her. Preferring a life of begging, collecting, and years of small-time involvement in trafficking over any steady licit-economy employment, one cannot but marvel at the calculated agency Cida exercises to survive, while by all accounts taking good care of her youngest son Lucas (age 5).

Her daily routine included taking Lucas to school, collecting recyclables, delivering drugs, or doing small favors for traffickers to earn money or product. I observed Cida in these moments, as well as lost in innocent others, ensconced in the playful attention of Lucas, playing hide and seek as they made the steep trek up the hill. I also observed Cida while she observed me, at first with caution and uncertainty if we crossed paths outside the context of the neighborhood, or if I called her name to say hello while she mingled with neighborhood acquaintances.

Cida’s survival seemed to draw heavily on the affective links she maintained in community, spending time selectively and building trust with particular people.

Despite efforts by confidants like Vilson or Darcy to encourage and connect Cida to formal employment or social circles, Cida, in her addictions, refused. These conversations were rather direct, if supportive, and would regularly occur around lunch, or an afternoon coffee, at times when Cida would regularly show up looking to feed herself or her son.

Despite this, Cida is also an extremely observant and clever individual. I watched her eavesdrop intently into peripheral conversations around her, as well as share information selectively about neighborhood happenings. Such information is a valuable commodity for local networks engaging in youth work and peace activism, such as Darcy and Vilson, who strive to keep their fingers on the pulse of the community.

Lest one assume a utilitarian relationship, my observation of the affect amongst them toward Cida far outweighed any conscious strategic imperative. This affect underscored a key characteristic that my key informants seemed to share - the idea that in the periphery, all lives matter, one person at a time. This became resoundingly clear after Cida lost yet another son to trafficking, facing a time in which sadness and trauma dominated her days, and whereby the interactions with key informants like Katia, Vilson, and Darcy, in the privacy of their homes as well as in public spaces, revealed escalating neighborhood tensions, and curious interventions, as the weeks went on.

The advent of Diego's murder revealed mediators' efforts of *staying with conflict* in relation to Diego's death, and Cida's survival, despite already living a life that embodies vestiges and sources of social conflict most prevalent in the periphery. For mediators, staying with Cida and the conflicts she faced was facilitated through simple affect, communication, and caring treatment of *bom acolhimento*.[75] These elements formed a basis of trust and understanding that would critical at various moments in which mediators mobilized.

Following Diego's murder and the conviction of one of his assassins, Cida and Lucas came under threat. Despite the prosecution's central testimony for the

[75] *Acolhimento* or *acolher*, is a word often used to indicate the action of receiving a person, good treatment, acceptance, giving refuge, welcoming or greeting.

trial being provided by Diego's wife, Cida became a target for traffickers amidst the new power configuration in the *Descoberta*. This set of circumstances subjected Cida, Lucas and neighbors to heightened tensions and conflict.

> *Field Notes (10/04/13):* Since I arrived, I have seen Cida sit many times, day and night, on Vilson's steps. She cries, with the occasional unintelligible outburst, raising her voice to nobody in particular. She shakes, shivering and reliving the death of Diego, caught perhaps between reviving him, and letting him go. It cannot be easy to be neighbors with your son's supposed assassins. It's tremendous to watch somebody suffer like that.
>
> Days before the murder, Lia had been informed that something was brewing, based on rumors of a possible push by the *Descoberta* crew to takeover the *Caixa*. Lia had warned her: '*Cida, look, your son is no saint*.' So it goes on the *morro*.
>
> Today Cida showed up at the CCEA kitchen around lunchtime. Visibly disturbed (*perturbada*), she's been really high all week, it came as no surprise to anybody when she grabbed a sharp knife from the kitchen counter and ran to attack one of the young women currently residing at the CCEA's *comunidade ambiental,* which houses and works with former street residents, many of them have experienced physical and psychological vulnerabilities and trauma. Katia, the new MS school director, at the CCEA for a meeting with staff, physically intervened to stop the attack. Cida later told Katia that the woman Cida had targeted had once been Diego's girlfriend, and that there had been tension between them. Lingering tensions of a domestic dispute unfolds into a potentially deadly scenario.

Katia's intervention to stop the violent attack was followed by a stern talk with Cida. Given the potentially deadly possibilities, this at first seemed dismissive. Katia's actions, however, unfolded under a restorative logic, whereby Cida's aggressive behavior was interpreted as lashing out in vengeance to defend her son's honor, while suffering in a state of great trauma. Resolution to this incident meant no police report was filed, nor did any sit-down discussion 'resolve' the details of the lingering dispute between Cida, Diego, and the young woman.

Katia's intervention also sent Cida off the CCEA premises. As a former social worker who already knew Cida, Katia's energies were directed at refocusing Cida back to her responsibilities as a mother to enroll Lucas in the local crèche,

and later the school. While Cida's trauma is no justification for her attempted stabbing, the intervention suggested a distinct course of action on the part of Katia who intervened, based on her reading of the scenario and knowledge of an ongoing tension or dispute between the two women, in which trauma suffered by both women begged a non-punitive, though also non-restorative course of action.

To pursue legal punishment against Cida would have also placed constraints upon her and the care of Lucas, whom she still cared for responsibly, and in whom she was continually willing to invest affectively. To invite a formal restorative conversation in function of the young woman's dignity, safety or for preventing further erratic or violent behavior by Cida were infeasible - not only at the knowledge of her heightened emotional passage, but also because of Cida's consistency of being inconsistent with all things predictable or organized, in function of her very means of survival.

The peculiar rationale underpinning how interveners engage in these moments of crisis management, similar to Dida's case, suggests that interventions into scenarios of interpersonal conflict or violent acts are supplanted by a wider set of priorities deemed to be at stake. Individual resolution of issues was supplanted under superordinate considerations of the collective, acknowledging as well that circumstances in which facilitated peacemaking amongst disputants, would have been effectively impossible.

Perplexed about this, I inquired into Vilson's view, to which he replied: "coexistence in the community is not a choice." Nor is it something that anybody can afford to disregard. Mediators did not see coexistence as something they had to promote, but rather, help manage with regard to violence. Despite the potential ripeness for a facilitated conversation, a conventional mediated discussion between the two women was not pursued under the guise of achieving an ill-conceived harmony or romanticized reconciliation. Notwithstanding an attempted stabbing, an action observed by key intermediaries as otherwise highly abnormal for Cida, Vilson concluded: "*coexistence is more important, because Cida will be back tomorrow*".

In some ways, coexistence on the *morro*, albeit, though at times tension filled, is a given - a condition or assumption that defines the scope of mediator interventions in the realm of social conflict and local disputes. That is, coexistence itself was not an objective targeted by mediator interventions, whether or not disputes involved violent acts. The juxtaposition of immediate and superordinate issues at stake informs mediator thinking about the potential for accomplishing what is possible against the backdrop Nordstrom's (2002: 226) tomorrow of violence, which:

> "Isn't a passing phenomenon that momentarily challenges a stable system, leaving a scar but no lasting effects after it has passed. Violence becomes a determining fact in shaping reality as people will know it, in the future. Part of the way violence is carried into the future is through creating a hegemony of enduring violence across the length and breadth of the commonplace world, present and future. The normal, innocuous, and the inescapable are infused with associations of lethal harm."

> "The main tactic is the use of ordinary everyday items in the production of terror. Kitchen items, household goods, water sources, and tools become weapons of torture and murder. … Main thoroughfares, community centers, religious sites, public parks, schoolyards, and markets become places where the war is 'brought home' to people. Places traditionally associated with safety, and items traditionally used in the production of the ordinary, are recast not only as lethal but as inhumanely so. When a kitchen knife is used to mutilate a family member, or a post office becomes the site of a massacre, kitchen knives and post officers become attached to the production of violence in a way that will last far beyond the conclusion of the war."

Cida's own subjectivity, constructed in part by violent experiences, informs the logic of intervention, which emerges as responsiveness without proclivities to seek resolution to a given event or dispute. Her situation is symbolic of the way that mediators face everyday disputes and tensions that embody "historical and contemporary inequality [that] has material and symbolic effects. These effects interact with other factors to produce different conflictual perceptions, attitudes/behaviors and situations. These interlock to produce, inform and/or provide a context for a variety of conflicts at different levels of society" (Henkeman, 2010).

Vilson's reading of Cida's life and the approach that he and colleagues take to supporting her own negotiation of violence, or participation in it, are instructive for discerning how the logic underlying local intervention is premised on an understanding of mutually reinforcing micro and macro forces that carve the contours of local disputes. This does not dismiss individuals' agency, but rather, compliments it as individual residents seek to achieve their goals:

> Vilson: "In certain moments [Cida] has acted. For example, in terms of her own house, when [the municipality] started that construction, she negotiated, presumably to not lose her own home when the new infrastructure was built. We have to understand from this perspective and here here is the question of the state being a violator of rights, a state that produces violations in all ways. Perhaps, because her kids never went to a *crèche*, or because there were no professionalization programs available, or because Cida's own family had to migrate from the interior."
>
> "In Brazil when we talk about the cultural subalterns, of slavery, these are anthropological histories that are very sad for me. In the background is the naturalization of violence. You make something natural that isn't natural - a culture of social inequality. It's a historical process, one that will take a long time to [reverse] to construct a pathway from the sub-citizenship (*sub-cidadania*) to citizenship."
>
> "Cida could present a case against the state, because the state abandoned her in all ways, from the *macro* perspective: A democratic state that upholds rights denied the right to life of a woman who bore ten children. If you don't see from that perspective, you end up penalizing Cida, saying, *'she's like this because she wanted to be like this. She had all the rights like anybody else, but she didn't want it.'* It's easier to victimize the victim than to look at her as a victim in the context of her own rights. Just like a mother at a funeral who says *'what was I incapable of doing, such that my son was killed?'* She has the sense of an incredibly embedded guilt to the point that she says *'what didn't I do that [Diego] died in this horrible way?*' And that's unjust."

He continued:

> "The materialization of rights is the way to break with sub-citizenship. But you have to *work* at the right to have rights. In Cida's case, she *has* rights, but the culture of having rights is at stake. Cida is representative of many Brazilians. Perhaps herein are the failures of the state, because the state does not know how to create a relationship of communication and interlocution with people in

these situations."

> "Perhaps the [RACDCA network] still can't understand a person like Cida. How much has Cida contributed by working and paying taxes in this city? She was employed. She paid taxes, produced wealth for the country. But she's also a Brazilian citizen, and the state's responsibility starts there. That's why I say she could sue the state because the state became negligent about her life. It's not [only] a question of communication. It's a question of the way that the state constructs a nation around its behavior. This community is not seen by the state because they are not seen as people. If you start there from that point of view, how are people seen? They simply aren't. *They simply don't exist"* (26/04/13).

Intervention can be selective, and tailored according to circumstances, rather than systematically applied. In this case, the premise of Cida's violent engagement as a solution to an interpersonal dispute was de-escalated and left alone in favor of what tomorrow held. By doing so, a small group of regular conflict interveners including Vilson, Darcy, and Katia, effectively 'stay with' Cida, knowing that interventions to help manage subsequent crises or issues would ultimately constitute a more advantageous approach.

As noted earlier, circumstances often require mediators to engage under the premise of *creative non-resolution.* When approaching the complex content of localized social conflict, Mayer (2009: 53) argues that mediators may have to

> "Learn to accept a story that has no neat or foreseeable ending as an essential reality and that we find a way to help those we work with accept this as well. We also need to maintain a sense of what can be accomplished, of the constructive potential that exists in a conflict that continues, and of the ways in which we can lead our lives and help others to lead their lives productively and even to flourish in the face of non-resolution."

Following Diego's murder, Cida was ensnared in various problems and disputes simultaneously. Not only did she perpetrate an attack against Diego's former girlfriend, but she was also the victim of intimidation and threats by Diego's assassins, who were also her occasional employers and neighbors. Though Cida refrained from ratting out the *Descoberta* crew to police, the incident raised fear and tensions in the neighborhood, particularly when traffickers attempted to

burn down her home.

Her circumstances do not offer an easily negotiable, or resolvable scenario for a number of reasons. Nevertheless, Cida continued to face a number of challenging decisions as she found herself the target of trafficker efforts to expel her. In the wake of such actions, Vilson and Darcy supported "what disputants need to do to stay strategically, intentionally, and constructively engaged over time" (Mayer, 2009: 237). Staying with Cida's conflict informs the mediator's task as supporting people to manage

> "With unresolved problems, unresolved conflict, and more questions than answers. A need for certainty and closure often gets us into trouble; it impels us to act as if we know more than we do and to solve problems superficially or ill advisedly, and it limits our ability to think creatively and broadly about difficult issues" (Mayer, 2009: 52).

Interventions in the Structural Sub-System

Whereas Cida's greatest struggle may rest with her own addictions, mediator interventions placed emphasis on small, symbolic, trust-building gestures. While at first outwardly perplexing, these afforded useful interactive possibilities for generating '*little peaces*' that would support Cida and her neighbors in the face of a growing and collective vulnerability.

In November of 2014, not long after the conclusion of Diego's murder trial, for which traffickers suspected Cida as the police informant, they made attempts to run Cida out of her home. For instance, a fire was set to the brush adjacent to her home, threatening other homes in the process. When this did not go as planned, traffickers then set fire to her and Lucas' clothes and bedding, which were hanging to dry in the afternoon sun. Ultimately, credible sources indicated that the order had been handed down for Cida's murder. At this juncture, Cida called upon Darcy and Vilson to perform a *meio-campo* in service of her and Lucas' lives.

While direct contact with traffickers was not pursued as an option to negotiate for Cida's life, she nevertheless had to make timely decisions about what to do. Without support of a family, vulnerable health, a 5-year old in tow, and the only

hyper-local, albeit illicit, economic foundations she had built, in the hands of her would-be assassins, her options were limited. Rather than negotiating amongst antagonists or disputants, mediators in this case focused on supporting Cida as she made decisions to ensure survival. This intermediary function eventually required contacting state agencies in support of that goal, emulating what Piper and von Lieres (2011) call a "democratic mediation" role, in which intermediary play a critical advocacy role in providing a voice for the voiceless.

When I raised the question about why Cida did not herself directly pursue protection through the state, the answer became obvious almost as soon as it left my mouth. With her downtrodden appearance, raspy voice, and a long history of unsavory experiences with the state, Cida's attempt to seek help when she began to feel pressure did lead her to the Civil Police station, though concern for her well being was met with virtual disregard by authorities in charge.

Instead, as Cida herself relayed, the *Polícia Civil* put Cida's personal security at greater risk, convincing her to help them during a raid, after which her own safety was subsequently disregarded. As Cida described to Vilson, Darcy, and me during an early morning meeting in Darcy's kitchen, the police clothed her in tactical gear bringing her along during a night raid into the *Descoberta*, where she would silently point out traffickers' houses or strategic points of interest. For her service, she was given a few cartons of cigarettes, sent away, and told to stay away for at least two days from the neighborhood.

Where the state took advantage of Cida to gather information, it would do little to protect her and her family in real terms as conditions worsened. For her part, Cida defaulted to her day-to-day routines in between the first and second fires, rather than pursuing additional help. Beyond the added distrust of authorities, she expressed, much like Dona Teresa had, that she knew of no resource beyond the police to whom she could turn for help (Cida, 21/11/14).

While it may strike the reader as strange to understand why one would have to negotiate with a person about her own safety, we must recall that Cida goes through the motions of a scripted lifestyle, underscored by addiction. Where MS

mediators demonstrate and express a clear pattern of non- open confrontation against traffickers, they instead worked with Cida to negotiate what she would need to do to materialize an exit strategy, supported by CCEA's help accessing official, state-sanctioned protection.

Cida's survival and the mediators' mitigation of a preventable murder, helped diminished the otherwise rising tensions and fears associated the threats to her life in the aftermath of the trial, which subsequently meant potential harm for *Descoberta* neighbors as well. The *meio-campo* by Vilson and Darcy showcases actions under a coherent logic of intervention in which mediative capacities are exercised in relation to 'unrealistic conflicts,' where aggression is the focal point between antagonists (Coser, 1956), but which importantly, shape social relations and order in the periphery.

The decision of when, where and how to manage the series of unrealistic conflicts associated with Cida in the aftermath of Diego's murder not only helped Cida avoid further persecution or direct harm by the hand of neighborhood traffickers, but also ensnared and undermined the destructive goals of traffickers, whose attempts to use intimidation and violence instrumentally to eliminate enemies and sustain local power, were in this case unsuccessful.

In this way, mediator actions create impact at the level of Dugan's (1996) structural sub-system, whereby a "larger beacon of opportunity" presents itself vis-à-vis the tensions at hand. A focus on the structural nature of what is unfolding around Cida, supported in part by her own historical pathway, is to look at the subsystem level, to see and intervene in Cida's circumstances that are symbolic of the way through which broader social reproductions of violence make impact on a micro-scale. In this case, this impacts the way local power of traffickers use violence to sustain their legitimacy.

Mediator's ability to *stay with* Cida in her enduring situation offered them a window of opportunity to create impact around local social reproductions in which the transmission and embedding of violence was effectively interrupted. In this way, attention mediators paid to the less visible ways that instrumental manifestations of street violence unleash ripple effects on the community,

reveals a type of creative non-resolution approach. It likewise affords mediators a chance to muddle into and interrupt the channels through which traffickers dominate locally, either through another homicide, or in their capacity to expel city violently and forcibly, from her home.

Conclusions

This chapter has contemplated and illuminated the spatial, relational, and temporal dimensions that construct interveners' logic and orientation to local conflict intervention. The interwoven nature of violence's reproduction and local disputes provides ample room for error, as well as numerous opportunities for strategic mediator mobilization.

Non-conventional mediation practices that support residents manage local disputes are seen as a way for mediators to grow power and contribute to non-violent social ordering under the premise of effecting longer-term social changes in local dynamics. This shifts mediator attention away from an interrupter model that emphasizes more visible forms of direct street violence, and instead onto some of the subtler ways by which violence destructively shapes individual as well as the collective neighborhood experience.

Drawing upon the lens of the *territory in dispute* defining the interplay of micro and macro systems as a functional unit of analysis, mediators reveal a peculiar scope of intervention tendencies that seem both viable, and necessary, for constructively and nonviolently operating at the margins. Approaching conflicts that are sourced from, and shaped by violence, begins with an appreciation, rather than denial, or the power and violence wielded by antagonists, which mediators must also somehow act to divert and deconstruct. This suggests a unique counter-balancing contribution to the way residents experience both violence and democratic citizenship eroded by conditions of violence, stretching the purposes or objectives of mediated intervention in community beyond the expectations fostering immediate resolution to conflict.

Mediators operating at the urban margins in *Floripa* offer unique tendencies from which much can be learned. As Brazilian anthropologist Luis Soares (2014: 12-13) writes, Brazil's *comunidades* are recognized as much for

> "the social dynamic as the cultural vigor, amongst other dimensions of this universe, that disallow a self-limiting disempowerment by playing the role of a victim. Youth, and not only them, along with women, though not them alone, have assumed an unprecedented protagonism, inventing new language, transforming inherited temples and the temples of legacy. A religious revolution is in process, with many contradictions, but carries an undeniably renovating force. Funk has arrived, while social networks connect through *LAN houses*, mobile phones, individuals, and new communities."

> "The modes of citizenship participation are in constant effervescence. In this way perhaps that which is permanent and shared amongst the 'favelas' is the impermanence and diversity, the dynamism and the surprising protagonist tendencies, disseminating a *Babelesque*, feverish cloud through their different languages, stimulating, at times restless and disturbing, creating an uncertain, unpredictable future, in the precise measurement in which freedom is introduced into the mix by way of subjects who assume its unusual sense of creative citizenship. There is no more silence. No longer does silence reign, emanating from the peaceful cemeteries, from the naturalization of inequalities, from stigmas and racism"

Similar re-positioning of lenses that invite new interpretations, Wilding's (2012) critique of "new" in the term "new violence" calls instead for a broadening of analysis about gendered, public, and private transmissions that do not always attract primary attention. This is reflected and revealed empirically by mediator actions with regard to the intervention logic revealed by examples in this chapter.

Rather than "selecting and omitting specific forms of violence and/or actors according to a perceived hierarchy of violence based on visibility, mortality statistics, or political pressures" (Wilding, 2012: 745), interventions performed by MS mediators suggest a unifying orientation based on an approach to the violence they witness everyday, if characterized by, or featuring, an initially perplexing or unusual set of actions in response to it. Local social intervention also responds to Wilding's (2012: 744-45) question as to whether the state, or other resources can be considered

> "Appropriate when attempting to tackle hidden, socially condoned and trivialized forms of violence, or is a greater focus on social power relations more useful for challenging norms and processes that facilitate the reproduction of violence? An alternative approach might give more weight to the social movements and

> organizations that advocate social justice and interventions, which strengthen the rights of those living in communities with high levels of violence".

Interveners are clearly aware that violence 'has a tomorrow' (Nordstrom, 2002). The practices and modalities of mediation they exercise as a result respond to the urgencies and emergencies of periphery life in ways that impact on a *sub-structural system* level. Here, mediators attempt not simply to find answers to problems, or negotiate away life's everyday dilemmas, but also to engage in ways that recognize where and how conflicts present them with strategic opportunities to foster larger social impact, which they carry out by shaping how territorial antagonists influence local social ordering. It is into the detail of my key informants' social mediative tactics that the following chapters turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

Deconstructive Interventions Used by Mediators

"Words mark the paths of our experience, separate what we can name from ineffable terror and chaos. At once public and intimate, language is a boundary between our vulnerable inner selves and the outside world. When, like skin, the language is bruised, punctured, or mutilated, that boundary breaks down. We have then no defense, no way to protect ourselves. What we knew, we no longer know; names born of the truth of shared experience ring false. On a mal dans sa peau – we are uneasy in our own skin"

- Marguerite Feitlewitz (1998: 62)

Introduction

Whereas a robust body of research has discussed residents' interfaces with power and violence in the context of Brazil's peripheries, the great majority of these accounts, save for a select few (see for example Schepher-Hughes, 1992; Soares, Bill and Athayde, 2005), remain focused on the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Unlike Florianópolis as of this writing, the consolidation of trafficking and organized crime factions has reached unprecedented levels. Likewise, these accounts tend to emphasize the ways in which non-state armed actors shape the social order of the 'favela' (Zaluar & Conceição, 2007), or the way that residents unaffiliated with armed actors build resilience and coping mechanisms.

Vestiges and impacts of these patterns, some of which are increasingly reflective of life on the *morro* in downtown Floripa, are extremely present in the lives of those who reside closest to them. This chapter uses empirical data to explore the way that social tactics used by non-state, unarmed residents in the peripheries of Florianópolis engage with actors who perpetuate social conflict and violent experiences. The approaches and tactics are likened to, and informed by what Penglase (2014: 175) describes as *knowing how to live* in a context of violence and insecurity, which he asserts

> "Both disrupts some forms of order and also constitutes others: creating particular norms, infusing spaces with particular meanings, connecting residents of distant communities through the dynamic and transnational flows of illegal commodities, and structuring new types of subjectivity, social practice, and urban form. And yet none of these effects are completely stable or naturalized, and are… all aimed at addressing the unpredictability and uncertainty that is generated by violence."

Given the heightened levels of violence seen across Brazil's vast and diverse regional urban landscapes, the proactive mediative or *middling* practices used by nonviolent actors suggest change-oriented ways by which these actors interrupt transmissions of violence by shifting the way that power is consolidated through conflictive interactions amongst antagonists. That is, mediator agency provides a counterbalancing disruption n to the way residents experience violence vis-á-vis disputing interactions.

A view to the way that intervention practices (strategies and tactics) serve to contest or actively resist intentions of power-wielding actors is largely absent in the literature. A significant gap remains in our understanding about where and how non-violent actors such as mediators proactively engage in forms of resistance, violence prevention or conflict intervention in strategic ways, seen to grapple or influence the nature of social ordering.

The data presented here depart from a 'place' of ethnography that includes diverse social spaces and interactions on the *morro*. The focus on mediator interventions reflects what Hautzinger (2007: 5) has described in her study of Brazilian periphery residents "locked in violent relationships," responding to "a people deeply disenchanted with the deadly costs of violent conflict searching for ways in which conflict can effect transformation toward social justice and gender equality, rather than merely sparking violence that further deepens oppression and inequality."

Hautzinger's study explored pathways that led abused women to seek out Brazil's women's police stations, considering "the possibility of the state's monopoly of force being put in service of some of Brazil's most vulnerable citizens." This chapter, in conjunction with Chapter 6, chronicles the intentional

non-state mediator efforts to circumvent and transform the way violence affects the fragile social fabric of the community, including its most vulnerable members. These creative and risky efforts contrast with violence-producing state institutions, agents, and traffickers whose actions, if at times benevolent, are observed to reproduce violence foster and insecurity.

This chapter begins by exploring the *middling* lexicon interveners used, which broadens or expands the conceptual notion of mediation as a strategic intervention modality encompassing multiple movements and engagements. More concretely, this lexicon dissociates mediation from its more structured and static cousin, or conventionally facilitated negotiation amongst disputants. Instead, middling activities and movements are disbursed and decentralized, underpinned by intermediary agency exercised to connect, convene, coach, and otherwise engage with conflict antagonists or parties to a dispute often involving overlapping challenges of violence. This sets up a critical second defining element of intervention, which underscores mediation defined by the *performative* processes through which its authors use deconstructive social tactics to interrupt social scripts that obstruct nonviolence reproduction, or "business as usual" in the ebb and flow of daily life.

Focsing on three examples, I use thick description to discuss the tactical ways in which mediators get in the middle of antagonistic actor interfaces, which represent, and are influential in shaping the social order of periphery life. These examples include: 1) a interaction between a teenager and undercover police on the *morro*; 2) dialogue between armed and unarmed residents at a funeral setting, and; 3) a school teacher intervention with at-risk youth at school. The examples articulate the peculiarities of intervention tactics, and how mediators' performances openly contest and problematize normalized expectations that consolidate social scripts. This, I argue, disallows or resists the way that social conflict reproduces writ-large as part of individual and community narratives, actively disabling democratic disempowerment, authority abuses, and the slow flow of youth into violent street market participation, and the antagonistic relationships that result.

The Language of Intervention

It was not by accident that key informants employed a particular lexicon, or the *language of the middle* to consider local problems and frame intervention possibilities. Guga and Ulisses, two CCEA staffers working closely with local adolescents, used the notion of the *unreal* to describe their efforts to manage conflict with youth and families, as the demand for rather creative methods did not come pre-prepared, existing only through their performance. In addition, *distinct worlds* and *other realities* were used with frequency when contemplating youth involved in trafficking.

A regularly recurring feature in Lia's discourse was her commitment to "not separate worlds or realities" as a way to develop trust with traffickers, while also affirming their subjectivities, and rights as citizens with legal protections. The use of these phrases indicates not only that mediators perceive the existence of distinct realities of morro life, inhabited by armed vs. unarmed residents, but also that those conflicting worlds and realities could be strategically crossed, or rendered less antagonistic, in some way, as part of the intervener's repertoire.

The notion of the *middle* itself is part of intervener lexicon that asserts a break from, or alternative to, the more technical jargon associated with formal negotiation, mediation, and alternative dispute resolution practices. So embedded is this jargon in the northern practitioner's conceptualization and parlance, Lederach (2002: 92) writes, that even modern technology actively dissuades us from creating new language to describe a practice in construction.

Defining *social mediative capacity* through his experience in the mediator role, he writes, tends to make "the expressions on people's faces grow lost and perplexed," while also challenging convention:

> "I note that my spell check does not like the use of the word *mediative*. Apparently this is not an accepted adjective in the English language. But I use it intentionally, having bumped across the term in Northern Ireland where my colleagues were trying to find ways to describe the kind of social responses they hoped to infuse in the groups conducting a wide variety of tasks in community work. These people did not see themselves mediators, but did see their responses as '*mediative'* behavior" (author's emphasis) (Lederach, 2002:

92)

In Florianópolis, the word *mediation* was used, albeit infrequently, replaced by terms more descriptive, performative language to describe intervention. In Goffman's terms (1957), that language of the middle described one's active positioning of oneself in the intervener role. Mediators used the language of the middle when making strategic decisions and formulations. This was marked when individuals or small groups registered and confirmed the need to act in the face of an emerging local tension or dispute, or discussed how to interface with a particular actor or disputing parties, or infiltrate a key social space in the community. Middling language was generally active, hinting at inclinations to effect change through the premise of involvement in a problem or dilemma, whether by physical, social, or discursive boundary crossing.

Contextualizing these intentions, key informants used utterances in conversation that called to mind an interactive effort, albeit with differential roles. This lexicon included making a move, or taking action (*fazer um movimento*), organizing or connecting (*articular alguma coisa*), getting close to someone, or some group (*aproximar*), playing mid-field *(fazer um meio-campo)*, the consummate Brazilian "*jeito*" of finding an informally acceptable way in the face of prohibitive or inaccessible official rules, or the more targeted proposals indicating a determination to engage someone in conversation (*vamos conversar com ele/ela; vamos ter uma conversa*) or 'going after him/her' (*ir trás ele/ela)* if something more pressing was afoot, in which mediators tracked people down. Youth in conflict with family members would often wind up in the street, at the *boca*, or in other morros with friends, easily facilitating integration into trafficking.

The language employed indicates *decentralized* movements into key social spaces with relevant actors, which presuppose encounters with antagonists. *Getting close to (aproximando) and connecting (articulando*) signaled the intentions of these grassroots mediators to enter into spaces with the objective of forging an initial connection with a particular individual[76] or group. The simple

[76] In this way, Guga, Felipe and Luciano's efforts with youth in the Procurando Caminho program, mirrored the US street-worker model (Chicago, Boston, Gang Street worker), such as

notion of inviting someone for a conversation often arose as a strategic means to an end, though that end was not always initially clear, but it was often employed in pursuit of information, discussions through which to gauge the viability of an entry point to open dialogue, or to address a specific issue.

This occurred with actors inside and outside the *morro*, including gang members, and informants, state authorities, and civil society elite. The latter Vilson had strategically courted, in strategic informal encounters. His unique role is worth noting, both because of Vilson's recognition across the capital, and because his work in the center and on the *morro* enabled him to move into spaces for relationship development purposes into which he had not always been invited, or which remained selectively off-limits to periphery residents. Vilson's role as a priest was strategic and useful in this way, which he used to his advantage.

During my first week of fieldwork in 2012, for instance, Vilson explained he was expecting a woman to stop by to discuss her wedding ceremony over which he would preside. Within minutes of her arrival, before the second cup of coffee was consumed, the conversation shifted from the wedding to almost an hour discussing new youth sentencing practices and the tendencies of particular judges working on cases involving young traffickers. I later learned that this woman was a state prosecutor, a group to which Vilson had been working to *get close* for strategic advocacy purposes. He wanted them adopt the ProCam project as a sentencing option. The following year, through additional relationship development in the judicial system, ProCam-youth cases would be reviewed by the justice system by Takaschima's legal staff in a more systematic way.

Playing mid-field (*meio campo*) often suggested getting in the middle of an emerging dispute, positioning oneself in the midst of escalation or tension. Dona Uda's question of "*how do we play a meio-campo*" was the first to arise during the initial meeting amongst a select few Mont Serrat leaders convened to manage the assault on Dona Dida's home. Ivone would often use the

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the case of Alessandre, whose "rebellion" at home in a dispute with his mother and step-father found him living in different communities and threatening members of the CCEA staff (Guga, November 2014)

expression of playing mid-field to describe her facilitating actions in supporting youth with whom she had developed ties, and who lived on the threshold of trafficking world and often found themselves under threat of violence.

Interveners used connective language when the primary focus was on youth participating in the street-market. This reveals the unusual work of intermediaries amongst their neighbors, moving between the worlds that coexist on the *morro*. Lia would *enter into their world*, helping others do the same to *reach them* (*chegar neles*). These constituted her efforts to build trust through presence over time. Gelson also used the phrase *chegar neles* referring to the challenges of building a connection with a group of volatile adolescents in the Mont Serrat School who were on the threshold of trafficking.

Carlos, and Guga too, whose youth-outreach efforts in Mont Serrat were widely respected, were fond of describing their efforts as *meios-para* (means-toward) aimed at broadening affective connection with local youth. This would give them a central mediative role in supporting youth to build political and social identities that would contrast to the challenging *morro* environment, as well as the subordinated roles in trafficking. For these two men, strategic meant doing what they could to "bring young people into new arenas," primarily through organized CCEA projects (for Guga), exploiting the youth's expectations, who grew up in the stagnant and sometimes violent realities of the hill, and helping them expand their horizons and participate in new forms of citizenship.

Middling movements were often creative acts, certainly ones that were not pulled from an instruction manual. It was often difficult to discern an end-point to mediators' initiating actions, as if they tended to expect the unexpected. In an uncertain and risky environment, interventions into local conflict or connecting with antagonists, often occurred without a clear pathway or end game in mind, indicating the willingness of mediators to get in the middle of complexity that provided no readily available solutions. Guga and Ulisses, both socio-educators with the *Procurando Caminho* project, described this sentiment in the context of their everyday work with the *morro* adolescents, targeted as being most at risk with many already involved if minimally in the drug trade, as a daily journey into the unknown at the nexus of violence and possibility:

> Guga: "The Mont Serrat of today is no longer one of fighting, but rather one of struggle."
>
> Ulisses: We deal with the *unreal* (*o irreal*), because it doesn't have a basis in anything. What we are doing doesn't show up in any books, it's not anybody else's history, it doesn't have a historical foundation in any other favela: We are living something completely new.
>
> Guga: It requires you to hold a belief that permits you to construct something to confront this reality.
>
> Ulisses: It's like this - Let me explain it to you. You watch television, listen to the radio, whatever. It's all got theory behind it. Music - it has a theory behind it in order to exist. It's got to have melody, harmony, and rhythm to be music. But you see those guys making *funk* music? *Funk* has nothing to do with theory. Musical theory can't explain it. It might have rhythm, but it's got nothing to do with harmony or melody, so it can't really be considered music. But, it exists, you understand?
>
> What we are doing, this *exists* on the *morro*, it's happening, but it's got no theory anywhere behind it. It doesn't have books that tell us 'you have to engage in this way or that.' We have to invent means (*meios*), and many times, invent things that don't even exist to be able to achieve our objective (20/09/12).

Mediation unfolds performatively in that middling roles are constructed through discourse and actions that do not always reveal neatly organized, or systematization. Middling roles linked to the ordering reproductions of dominating violence are also performative in their "subversive re-articulation" (Kotz, 1992) of mediation in community. Here I draw a conceptual parallel to Butler's development of gender as performance (see Kotz, 1992) wherein the idea of mimicking to displace conventional models, while "radically re-contextualizing" them, is a way of constituting new thinking. As Butler (Kotz, 1992) states,

> *"I accept the idea that gender is an impersonation, that becoming gendered involves impersonating an ideal that nobody actually inhabits…. Because symbolic positions —'man,' 'woman'— are never inhabited by anyone, and that's what defines them as symbolic: they're radically uninhabitable. And yet they have enormous force."*

In this way, mediators exist in ways that do not conform to conventional or even *a priori* definitions. Becoming a mediator 'involves impersonating an ideal,' which is in touch with the performance itself, denying a fixed ideal. Aspiring to middling roles is effectively symbolic, leading local interveners to inhabit and participate actively in the transformation of conflict *through* middling movements, rather than being fixed in a static role.

Breaking Silence

Another type of language in the *morro* is that of silence or *lei do silêncio*, familiar to many periphery neighborhoods as a defining element of trafficker power. As Penglase (2014: 32) describes, silence is "a crucial aspect of knowing how to live… which mandates that residents of the neighborhood must not speak to outsiders, and especially not to the police, about the activities of drug dealers or, more broadly, about any negative aspects of living…."

Limitations on speech and the danger of information and communication making their way across lines were clearly present on the *Maciço*. Indeed, as my own experience during informal interactions or during formal recorded and unrecorded interviews demonstrated, many individuals who had personally experienced direct violence, or were forced to flee the community on account of intimidation or direct threat to their lives, initially refrained from voluntarily speaking beyond general terms about the nature of their experiences with related conflicts prevalent in their communities.

The constant veiled threat of violence, subtle but ever present, shapes neighbors' responses to everyday disputes, particularly in relation to those whom Penglase (2014) aptly identifies as *dangerous intimates*. Even Sergio's sniper-like acts followed, however paradoxically, a form of hushed resistance, shooting silently from the bushes into the gaggle of young traffickers on the street. The power of silence is also indicated by the symbolic way in which violence permeated the experiences of Ana and Conrado, or in how it defined the hungry, solitary nights for Dona Teresa, or touched others who are forced to acquiesce to intimidation in the face of risk and impossibility.

Silence as a response to local tensions in community, such as between neighbors, to include the quieting of collective rights claims[77], is indicative of how adaptations to insecurity shape the way conflicts are expressed and managed. As Penglase (2014: 72) describes, despite the social intimacy of the *comunidade,* language, or silence, are calculated against the dangers of unpredictability:

> "Literally the product of local hands, residents also knew that the neighborhood was the site of potentially lethal and often unpredictable violence. As a result, the neighborhood was often experienced as a site of 'familiar danger.' Understanding how to live with the quotidian routine of daily life in a neighborhood where almost everyone knows everyone else yet where the possibility of unpredictable violence by police and local drug dealers is omnipresent, or inhabiting the state of (in)security, constituted a major component of knowing how to live..."

Importantly, however, silence on the hill was not practiced by everybody. As a form of communication, the desire to break with silence was discussed in various ways by key informants as an act of resistance. Those who bucked the status quo of silence did so through dialogical pursuits of middling, using communication skills in key moments, spaces, or across previously untouchable boundaries to invent new democratic spaces of encounter. This is a delicate balance to achieve given the real risks associated with perceived confrontation. While silence in the community can be seen as part of a larger pattern residents use in simply preserving peace and harmony, it is also a force that acts upon and facilitates the deconstruction of interactive processes that may help erode the local reproductions and impacts of violence.

Ethnographic descriptions provided by Penglase (2014) and others (Goldstein, 2003; de Jesus, 1962) which consider the use of language on the *morro* have

[77] Some lamented this silence, particularly against the backdrop of Mont Serrat's history of organizing. As small victories in the community have been won -piecemeal municipal projects like paving, electricity, or bandages to permanent, functional basic services- there a tendency for people to want to settle in and simply enjoy what they were 'given,' rather than continuing to pursue claims in pursuit of complex yet still wavering protections to basic rights (Seu Teco, 20/09/12; Carlos 24/09/12). Piecemeal infrastructural improvement projects, as some scholars have argued, are not an aberration, but rather, part of a pacification process by which *favela* and impoverished periphery residents have been 'integrated' into the larger purposeful planning of city development (Fischer, 2008; Wacquant, 2008; Davis, 2014).

posited that residents' construction of the *morro familiar* is a way to make sense of, and counteract insecurity, risk, and violence with which they live. In Rio, Penglase (2014: 71) explored how language is used "to carve out small spaces of autonomy, an example of what de Certeau calls social tactics," used not, however, in ways that "directly challenged larger structures of oppression". In the case of Mont Serrat, speaking out and declaring the home a place of conflict or dispute (Massey, 1994: 11) thus becomes an act of selection or choice. In this way, mediators use their language and communication quite deliberately to problematize local structures, adherent to their concern with the larger forces that shape community dynamics.

Script Interruption and Ad-libbing Interventions

Whereas the language of the middle fosters a unique scope of action for *mediative* roles, opening dialogue and breaking silence are used when local interveners endeavor to cross boundaries and infiltrate key social spaces in defiance of oppressive and silencing norms and codes. Mediators attend to social scripts, and language that interrupts their implicitly anticipated performances, when they are engaged in key interfaces between territorial antagonists, or in the context of local disputes, or other non-confrontational opportunities.

In van den Berg's view (2008: 67), a script or contextual cue is a social construct that is 'bound up in environments or situations that we find ourselves in or move between". Human beings use scripts to arrive at a definition of a situation, and these scripts can be explicit or implicit in their guidance of conscious or unconscious behaviors. Goffman (1959) referred to these as everyday-life interaction rituals, the totality of which make up the social order, since they form the basis of shared-cultural meanings. These micro-building blocks of human relations are born from

> "Processes of cultural dynamism in which people create ways of interacting, rules of conduct, legal prescriptions, and so on and so forth to facilitate the relations among participants in social connections and exchanges. Most of these processes … have been ingrained in our interaction patterns through gradual and unconscious socialization and have been integrated into our repertoire of roles in such a way that we cannot view our exchanges with others apart from them (van den Berg, 2008: 67).

Scripts are however, also not determinate. That is, “they could be labeled as ‘strategy-generating principles, to use a term from Bourdieu, principles that accompany people’s actions within given situations, but don’t determine these actions completely”. They are, thus, “both limiting and enabling,” while a situation, in turn, “can be defined as an ensemble of a specific meaningful locale (place), and a specific moment in time in which agents, their behaviors, and scripts come together to create a single 'slice of social reality” (van der Berg, 2008: 68).

Together, language and actions form the basis of a mediative script that posits new scripted encounters amongst antagonists. To get in the middle of the scripts and processes that sustain violence’s reproduction is a generative process, one that responds to the way in which violence is *generatively* valued and used by some groups for their very survival (see Edberg and Bourgois, 2013). To meddle into business as usual expectations and realities in an attempt to re-write social scripts is to change the way that people are *used to* seeing or experiencing everyday interactions around them, as well as reflectively illuminate one’s participation in them. To interrupt such things like silence as a social script, while an inherently change-oriented and power-contesting pursuit, often means assuming great risk.

From a tactical perspective, the interruption and re-writing of social scripts in a given social situation reflects Lederach’s (2006: 97) conceptual re-focusing of their efforts on using *mediative capacity* (discussed in this thesis’s introduction). A defining concept that turns interveners’ attention to building “social spaces for constructive change processes that have intermediary impact” (Lederach, 2006: 95), fiddling with social script breaking is a way by which mediators create wider impact.

Language and attention to social scripts are one of the most critical tactical tools available in the interveners’ repertoire as they operate in the midst of dangerous social orders. My observation of key informants deploying their mediative capacity thus speaks to an approach that “underscores attitudes, skills, and disciplines that include and engage the diverse perspectives about a conflict and a capacity to watch for and build opportunities that increase creative and responsive processes and solutions around conflicts” (Lederach, 2006: 95-96).

In the spirit of Goffman (1957), the exercise of mediative capacity on the *morro* involves an ad-libbing on the stage of social performance in everyday scenarios, in which intermediary actors endeavor to interrupt and deconstruct the scripts through which violence is transmitted. Ad-libbing as a means of deconstructing interactions that constitute *business as usual* amongst antagonists in the territory-in-dispute, seeks to strike an intelligent balance with the assumed risks. As Vilson once elaborated:

> "If I calculate too much, on the *ifs*, I end up doing nothing. I stay static, I don't move. I cloister myself within myself and there is no transformation into a pearl. To become a pearl, you have to let yourself suffer – suffer the grain of sand that enters into the closed oyster and pierces the oyster inside. And it bleeds, and through this process of suffering, a pearl is created. Without appropriating a process of suffering there cannot be processes of beauty, or the materialization of hopes and dreams, or of perspective, because the world is strongly marked by mercantilistic and invisible forces and relationships of exclusion; the annihilation of the human being."
>
> "We can't remain within a network and remain static and not say anything. We can't keep taking the risk of the *ifs*. We have to break with the processes of the present. However, we have to think intelligently. It can't just be the willingness of emotion that drives us. You have to articulate emotions and willingness with intelligence: with forms, and ways and instruments, heart."
>
> Jared: "Intelligence means calculation?"
>
> Vilson: "Yes, it means I use calculations, but intelligently. Look, we have various deals with the government. I can call out the government [on abuses], but if I speak to loudly, too prophetically, it's going to bring discord, break existing relationships, so maybe I don't denounce, or I make a statement in the face of running a bigger risk of the government closing us out, becoming more recalcitrant and hardened in response, even rude in terms of the relationship. So we have to be careful. But now, the network, which is the connections and intersections that can grab ahold of the knots, and construct a possibility – just like we signed the protocol in the [RADCA] seminar – now we can materialize and make a move forward."

The text now turns to the social mediative tactics used by local interveners through three examples in Mont Serrat. The sudden, spontaneous, social script-breaking interventions also constitute ways by which interventions oppose

existing hegemonic understandings of Brazil's peripheries as uniquely violent places held by outsiders or by the state (Holston, 2008). Instead, examples show how interventions by mediators break with normative social scripts. Interventions consist of physical and social *transgressions*. While these actions are not neutral, they do introduce a rights-oriented dialogue into common everyday moments in which violence *might* escalate. I argue that mediative tactics exercised by interveners contribute to a counter-current of non-violent democratic citizenship experiences at the periphery, through "everyday practices that, in different ways, empower, parody, derail, or subvert … agendas" (Holston, 2008: 47).

Criminalization Scripts

Ivanderson had been doing well to stay out of trouble, despite circumstances providing ample room for adolescent error. His mother, Gégé was a recovering addict, who had left the street that year to stay at the CCEA's *comunidade ambiental* for transitioning street residents. With Gégé herself working to stay out of legal and police troubles of her own during recovery, Ivanderson's four siblings were living either with relatives or in a youth *abrigo*, with one on the street. By day, Ivanderson participated loosely in CCEA sponsored activities and projects in Mont Serrat, and typically hung around after-hours as well as with educators like Ulisses.

Ivanderson was also limited in his movements. He had received a judicial restraining order after he once verbally threatened a CT *Conselheiro*. Now required to sleep at his grandmother's home in *Mocotó*, Ivanderson now also ran a direct risk of violence given an outstanding, unresolved rift with traffickers there. The safest time for him to enter that community in order to obey the order (which carried a penalty of imprisonment) was at dusk, after the afternoon selling rush had dwindled. Young, black, and with a few strikes already against him, Ivanderson's safety was at risk simply walking around on the street.

One mid-September evening, Ulisses (white male, mid-40s) accompanied Ivanderson as they both left the *morro*. On their way down, Ivanderson walked ahead of Ulisses, with a small speaker in hand listening to music. Suddenly he was brusquely approached and questioned by a plain clothed police officer.

Ulisses, catching up from behind, saw the unidentified man taking photos of Ivanderson's identification card with a mobile phone. The following day, as I interviewed Ulisses, Ivanderson sat quietly, almost contemplative, not his usual boisterous self, speaking only twice in mumbling reiteration that all he had been doing was carrying his radio and listening to music. Ulisses (18/09/12) recalled the scene:

> "Walking down the morro, just past the Caixa, I see this guy snapping photographs of Ivanderson's identification. I see he's got a small bag of weed in his hand, you know, so he can set [Ivanderson] up. I didn't know he was a police officer. In my view, he should have had that badge hanging from his neck, but he didn't. So when I approached him he turned around and got upset - he's not used to being approached maybe, but neither am I. So I said, *'hey, I just wanted to see what's going on, [Ivanderson's] with me.'* The guy started giving me flack. At that moment I wasn't irritated with the guy, I just wanted to know what was happening so that they didn't pull any bullshit on the kid."
>
> "At that point another guy came up to me from behind and asked what was happening. I said, *'nothing man, I'm just trying to figure out what's going on here.'* He said *'we're police,'* so I reached out my hand to shake and said, '*great, tudo bem*,' but he became abusive and pushed my hand away. I asked to see some identification or badge, and he got really mad: '*Oh you want to see my badge huh?'* and shoved it up in my face and said *'do I look like a criminal?'* I said *'hey, criminals don't look any particular way. If you don't have a badge, you could be anybody.'"*
>
> "At that point, I could have registered a complaint about so many things, discrimination, abuse of authority, and various other things, but this guy was just looking for trouble, really, and I was starting to lose my patience. He kept asking all kinds of questions, and I was responding – *this is what the kids do in the projects, what projects there are, etc.'* and I kept explaining. He was talking a lot of shit about it, and then he asked to see my I.D. and whether I had a criminal record. I don't, so I said no. And then he starts taking a photo of *my* I.D. And I said - did I give you permission to take my photograph of my ID? If you didn't catch me doing anything suspicious, and I didn't give you permission, you have no rights to do that. And he started berating me again. So then he said *'you're coming to the police station with me,'* and I said, *'cool, that's not a problem, let me just call my lawyer and we'll be off. You want a problem? Because I don't want any problems with you!'"*
>
> "Of course, I was furious, *fuming* inside. If I really had laid into him any further,

you know, I mean, any 10-year old with a revolver in hand is more [powerful] of a man in that moment than me trying to resolve the situation. If I had continued, the drugs would probably have been planted on *me*. So I kept cool, despite being enraged. In that moment though, I had to think not just about me, but about the collective. Imagine - a project educator getting into a fight with a policeman? As things were settling down, not really thinking much of it, I called him *'meu querido'*[78] and he exploded: *'I'm NOT your querido, I'm the authority!'* I didn't want any more trouble so I said to myself, ok, let him think he's the authority. And we walked away."

"Tomorrow I want to go down to the *Delegacia*, bring that officer here, bring together the [security] guard at the Caixa who was within earshot, and what I want is this: I don't want to deal with lawyers, that's a big mess. I want him to come up the hill, and I want to bring him here, to be a partner, to see the kids, the hill and the community as a partner. Because if not, [the police] down there are gonna keep picking up *negão* [Ivanderson] here, handing out beatings, taking people away, planting drugs, killing them even, and saying they're all criminals. And that's not what we want. So, I want to bring the police chief here, and have a conversation and explain - When you send your people up here to the hill, they need to get to know the community, get to know the people, know the projects that are here, so that afterwards you can develop your approach, which is not the one that we experienced. Until you have evidence, nobody is a criminal. But the way they work is very wrong. And yet we pay their salaries."

"What are you here for? You are here to keep law and *OR-DER!* And what you're doing here is creating disorder! I want to say exactly that, and have a conversation, and I want to bring that officer so I can put *MY* identification in his face and say: *'my name is Ulisses Gomes, and I am a citizen and I have rights.'* I could lodge a complaint formally, but I'm not going to do that. Instead, I'm going to offer you my hand to shake it, and call you *meu querido*. And if you can't come up here and be decent me, and to the community, then don't come up here.' We want to know the police that come up and help us and greet us, we invite them into our homes, [we want] a guy who on the side of the community. If he's being a policeman, be a policeman! Ask any kid around here, they despise the police because they're a threat."

Faced with the police's 'normal' script of stopping him for *walking while young and black* and then planting drugs on him, Ivanderson remains doubly

[78] *Meu querido*, or *querido*, my dear, (or my friend) is a common, informal term of endearment used by friends and strangers alike to address each other, for example, as between a shop owner or waiter attending to a customer.

disempowered by the very corruption that criminalizes him. With his pending record, he cannot risk a verbal altercation in his own defense, while a non-reaction forces him to allow police to plant drugs that would violate Ivanderson's judicial order, and most likely subject him to time in the state's socio-educative incarceration [youth detention] system.

In this exchange, Ulisses' intervention physically interrupts the criminalizing script in two moves. The first calls out the corrupted power wielded by a state authority, effectively advocating for his and Ivanderson's citizenship rights under the law. The second interruption occurs in the micro interaction of the attempted arrest-as-performance. The officer becomes agitated with Ulisses who, now fully aware that both he and Ivanderson risk consequences, mediates by firmly defraying verbal threats while contesting through non-confrontational ad-libbing and rights-affirming interface with the officers.

The Funeral Ritual

Vilson's unanticipated ad-libbing of the traditional Catholic funeral ritual introduces the notion of rights into the unfolding of a violent community social script. During a significantly traumatic spike in violent youth killings in Florianópolis' *morros* around 2001-2002, Vilson (10/08/12) realized that he could no longer continue to perform a traditional ritual that was "complicit in the silence of the system … *The traditional ritual did not take into account the reality at hand, because it was decontextualized"*.

As the community mourned another violent death, Vilson decided to re-engineer the norm. Like Ulisses, his ad-libbing is marked by a discursive consciousness that no longer permitted silence, challenging complicities in the face of power that silenced the mourners and the deceased:

> Vilson: "The ceremony went like this: I would speak with the mother, then with others such as friends and gang members, then with the larger family of the deceased. That conversation went like this – '*who* has the right to have killed this friend of yours?' Then that conversation was opened, and they would all say 'nobody.' So then I would ask, '*who* has the right to leave this place, and go kill another?' And then I would ask, '*who* robbed us of our dreams?' It was all to

say that we exist in a system, and we are [on the verge of] unleashing more violence, while we could be fighting against the system."

Jared: "Could that be construed as inviting more violence?"

Vilson: "No, because the pedagogical objective is to reinforce the critical consciousness within that question; Because it's not about going and shooting down the helicopter when it comes flying around here, or going to shoot up the Ministry. The conversation is about us having *rights*, and that we have to demand them and make sure we get them. And our rights can generate opportunities. Then, lastly, it showed that we have constructed a certain [alternate] pathway for young kids, to open another perspective, and that they could join up [CCEA projects] and be reinforced along this pathway."

Jared: "So you were creating a space in which all those people could reflect."

Vilson: "You're asking what was the objective of that conversation as the funeral ritual? First, it was to reinforce to the mother that she was not responsible for the death. Because mothers always ask themselves - *'what did I do wrong, that my son died in this [violent] way?*' It was a way to show that mother that she did everything she could. Secondly, it was to re-open a discussion [about the deceased] that it's necessary to fight and struggle for the rights to generate opportunities, and that those are constructed through public policies for the impoverished world. That is, such that the state's repressive apparatus becomes present in those spaces, and not just the repressive forces apparatus of the police, because that only generates more violence. A police force that constantly buzzes around the *morro* in a helicopter, used as a violent instrument, only scares people."

Jared: "These objectives then are redefined."

Vilson: "Objectives: First, the mother is not guilty of what happened; Second, acknowledge the culpability of the State, that the State also has a responsibility in this story of death, because it was incapable of performing actions in this territory to generate opportunities, while instead all they do is provide repressive policing."

Jared: "Any others?"

Vilson: "No, basically that is all. A third could be to show that revenge take upon the other side involved in this case doesn't have any meaning. From one point of view, murder is a stupid act. I proposed this with curiosity. Not the type of

> false curiosity that says I already know what answer I'm after. Rather, [I did so] with perplexity, because it was provocative, in the place at which we were all [literally] faced with death, where we could not react, because nobody could slander me openly, verbally. A youth's death caused an impact, so I made connections in that space, utilized that space, to work elements that were extremely provocative, as I knew that I would not be violated there, nor outside [of that space], because they knew that if I were - I have never refused a funeral. I was the one who would do them. I never refused a funeral in my life, except for Baga's."

Not only does the ad-libbed script-breaking intentions in the funeral ritual condemn violence, but Vilson's message also attempts to shift the burden of violence away from individual responsibility, particularly from the mother. Instead of reproaching the gang members involved in perpetuating street-violence, Vilson instead enlists those gathered, young and old, in an exercise of critical thinking and problematization, drawing on the death as an example in a key social space. He also shifts the focus away from death as an event, foreshadowing an alternate future – not only positing alternative pathways to a welcoming street-market, but also challenging those present to re-claim rights within a hegemonic system of order in which the violent murder-as-event had occurred, and for which some of those present might opt to prevent.

Another element in his intervention emphasizes the necessity of the state's presence to cross into the periphery boundary through focused public policies around violence prevention. In practical terms, Vilson's words break with the notion that a violent death is banal, given the conditions under which it occurred. For him, the premature death of a young person involved in the trade was, ultimately, a death that occurred as the fruit of a system, and was not *a given*.

If it was not a natural occurrence, but one that could be prevented, and if this particular scenario could serve to theoretically prevent others, here was a worthy space in which to engage *dangerous intimates,* if unexpectedly, in such a conversation. In doing so, Vilson breaks the silence that surrounds him, subtly contesting the power of local gangs, challenging those who are complicit, directly or indirectly, in the larger reproductions of violence.

Vilson's blurring of the lines between his own scripted performances as a priest and activist in a risky scenario introduces intervention as part of the ritual itself. Within a key social space - a captive audience of young gang members – his pedagogical objective, as he called it, draws upon the shared vulnerability of mourning to clearly condemn trafficking while also supporting the rights of the gang members as citizens. By asking '*who has the right to take another's life*?' Vilson openly problematizes the premises of the violent death as a way to confront and contest any and all actors' participation in its future reproduction, so as to disallow the banalization of the actions that led to it.

While performative in the way that discourse constitutes or structures action, such statements are also significant, as he suggests, for sustaining legitimacy as both a priest and activist. By speaking to the universality of rights in his attempt to generate critical thinking, rather than to directly dissuade retaliation for the murder, Vilson challenges those who sustain violent forces of social ordering without moralizing, or for that matter, attempting to control or change a future outcome.

The balance he strikes in breaking the funeral rite script, re-contextualizes the ritual in a way that not only challenges how violence is transmitted but also reveals one of the ways in which mediators carve out their *liminality*. Lopez-Aguado's (2014) work with violence interrupters in LA defines liminality as the condition carved out by interventionists through the blurry interactions and negotiations that seek to interrupt violence while maintaining legitimacy in the "precarious space between opposing spheres of gang life and law enforcement" (Lopez-Aguado, 2014: 187), the street and conventional society.

Liminality is the requisite condition, critical for building legitimacy, and often requires the toeing of a fine line between traffickers and the state, while at other times being less restrained.[79] Lopez-Aguado (2014: 203) contends that liminality is legitimized through a formula of deterring criminal behavior while also challenging criminal labels imposed on youth. I argue that here, the script breaking, ad-libbing interventions observed in both examples thus far accomplished a similar goal, while also subtly contesting and problematizing

social scripts that normally banalize and sustain violent narratives, in the absence of other non-violent challenges.

In these two examples, we observe micro-interactions at the community level in which mediators intervene performatively to 'make do' in key moments, which in turn disrupt business as usual. As Conquergood (1995: 137) proposes,

> "Performance flourishes within a zone of contest and struggle. That observation is as true for the everyday resisting performance practices of subaltern groups as it is for the performance studies programs. Life on the margins can be a source of creativity as well as constraint, what Michel de Certeau (1984: 29) described as 'makeshift creativity' and a mobile art of 'making do'…. Performance privileges threshold-crossing, shape-shifting, and boundary violating figures, such as shamans, tricksters, jokers, who value the carnivalesque over the canonical, the transformative over the normative, the mobile over the monumental".

Transgressions into key social spaces to interrupt scripts and contest business as usual behaviors offer constructive yet critical interactions. Rather than preventive courses of action, or conventional negotiations to manage conflict, mediators use tactics that address social scripts that disempower residents. They do so in part by re-asserting rights as a way to reject corrupt power-wielding, criminalizing tendencies, contest the banalizing of violence, instead calling into question violence more generally as a collective responsibility to resist. In doing so, each example demonstrates how mediators maintain a delicate solidarity by refraining from moralizing behaviors, or condeming discourse. This tendency can also be observed in Lia's comments (Chapter 3) when she refrains from admonishing Tico, despite her desire to do so, as he re-joined their conversation after violently *correcting* Lúcio.

Importantly, these intervention performances attempt to engage constructively with key groups of people in relation to the territory in dispute, rather than emphasise individualized cases of conflict or interpersonal disputes to be resolved. These interventions as performances, operate on a wider community stage of social conflict. For Ulisses, this meant capitalizing on a moment to interrupt the police trying to fabricate a criminal offense, and seek dialogue with higher police echelons. In the case of the funeral, Vilson's discourse linking

violence and rights invites young men and women to question their own criminalized identities, while capitalizing on the space of mourning to juxtapose death with tangible alternatives. Such practices are not always planned, nor are their details always exchanged amongst informal network of interveners. They remain tactics, rather than strategies, less organized and deployed in moments that are ripe, without necessarily relying upon a unified or systematized consistency.

Michel de Certeau (1984: 29-30) defines everyday tactics as “possibilities offered by circumstances,” that “do not obey the law of place”. Distinguishing between the strategies and tactics, Certeau furthers that while “strategies are able to produce, tabulate, and impose these spaces… tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces”. Such ways of operating, he posits, are “interfering kinds of functioning” that individuals use to create a unique space, one that produces “ways of using the constraining order of the place or of the language. Without leaving the place where he has no choice but to live and which lays down its law for him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of being in between, he draws unexpected results from his situation” (Certeau, 1984: 30).

Blauvelt (2003: 59) furthers that Certeau’s notion of *strategies* are those “used by those within organizational power structures, whether small or large, such as the state or municipality, the corporation or the proprietor, a scientific enterprise or the scientist. Strategies are deployed against some external entity to institute a set of relations for official or proper ends, whether adversaries, competitors, clients, customers, or simply subjects.” On the other hand, *social tactics*, illustrated here by script breaking, “are employed by those who are subjugated. By their very nature tactics are defensive and opportunistic, used in more limited ways and seized momentarily within spaces, both physical and psychological, produced and governed by more powerful strategic relations”.

Intervention and script breaking comprise unexpected forms of non-confrontational challenge and resistance, through which mediators build, or at least avoid compromising their legitimacy. Residents like Vilson, as well as CCEA staff, middle their way into unique social situations using mediative

tactics to contest existing scripts that reinforce the prevailing order, actions and intentions that are as much creative as they are risky. As the next section observes, they can also be adapted by mediators for use in the arena of a common social and community domain such as a school.

Gelson and Jair's Crew

When I met Gelson during my 2012 fieldwork, he was serving as an educator working alongside Edson, also an educator and Mont Serrat resident. The duo had been asked to be outreach workers (*articuladores*) for the Mont Serrat School, a piloted role to build closer relationships with families in the neighborhoods served by the scholl. In part, the team's role was to re-invigorate the low parental support and awareness of new initiatives, increase information flow regarding school issues, and rebuild the atrophied culture of schooling more generally.

Apart from the CCEA, the school is one of the few institutions on the *Maciço*, aside from trafficking, that provides youth with activities, identity and purpose in their lives. It is one of the extremely limited state resources physically present in the geographic territory of the *Maciço*. Re-energizing or mobilizing parental support was a critical goal for the *articuladores* as a means of getting children to go, and stay, in school. It continues to be an important counter-balancing action against the growth of localized trafficking, particularly given that how "street culture becomes a more important socializing force when fragmented families force children to take refuge in the street" (Bourgois, 2013: 260).

For a time, I shadowed Gelson and Edson to learn about their territorial educator roles. In doing so, I assisted in conducting teacher interviews about school-based conflicts, and helped to evaluate the participatory design of a process through which students would draft a school-wide coexistence code vis-à-vis the development of youth leadership councils. One morning, as I walked through the hall with Gelson, he seized upon an opportunity to intervene in what began as a classroom dispute that had erupted out between rival groups of boys and girls during an English lesson, in response to which the teacher decided to send the three boys into the hallway. Despite the selective nature of

the teacher's decision, what piqued my interest was the tactics used by Gelson in the face of an unanticipated opportunity.

During the 45-minute dialogue with the boys that followed, Gelson did not once mention the in-class dispute, nor did he pursue convening a reconciliatory meeting between the two groups as a typical school-based conflict resolution program may have prescribed. Instead, the meandering conversation brought the boys into a space of contemplation more generally about the interaction between their desires and scholastic participation.

Drawing from my presence during the session, as well as a reflective discussion with Gelson immediately afterward, I discuss this exchange to illustrate how the intervention at the moment of a flashpoint dispute in this critical social domain. In as much as the school can be seen as a type of battle ground of youth decision-making during a delicate and vulnerable stage or age, it is also a place wherein youth violence is commonly generated (Edberg and Bourgois, 2013). In this realm, Gelson's intervention presents as a unique set of tactics used by the intervener to avoid negotiating a resolution to the presenting dispute. Instead, Gelson's intervention capitalizes on a critical opportunity to engage with the social scripts expressed through the desire of the boys to leave school and entertain more dangerous options.

Here, Gelson's intervention deploys tactics of contestation and non-punition, without moralizing, striving to stimulate critical thinking, and contrasting sharply with their teacher's and other educators' expressed approaches to school conflicts that I witnessed through observations and teacher interviews that I conducted. Throughout the session, and in post-session reflections, Gelson problematizes the boys' decision-making, successfully building up a set of oppositional values (in this case, against alternatives to going to school). At the same time, he openly invites and then contests the boys', particularly Jair's, thinking about participation in trafficking, without attempting to thrust or impose alternative norms upon them.

For Jair, Manu, and Rui, leaving school meant the competing likelihood that their afternoons would be spent hanging out with friends involved in Tico's gang.

Given this option, when Gelson intervenes to invite them to a dialogue, he initially exercises his own power as an educator, before swiftly turning the conversation over to the boys:

> "So, there was a conflict internally in the class. Their classroom teacher identified what she labeled these so-called *problem* kids. I approached [the boys] in a polite manner in the hallway. I did not yell, I stopped to ask the teacher what had happened, and she said 'they were making trouble, so I am kicking them out of class.' I asked them to sit down to talk with them. At first they said 'no we want to leave,' and I said 'hold on, of course you can leave, but first let's talk about why you want to leave,' and that was how we sat down in the dialogue circle (*na roda*). In the *roda*, they talked about what happened in the classroom. Then we started to open up about what they thought about in terms of the future" (21/05/12).

Gelson's initial question asked what the boys wanted to do professionally some day, to which two replied, *professional footballers.* Gelson responded by saying *"do you know what footballers have to do when they get chosen? They have to train half the day, and study half the day!"* The boys pushed back, working through a series of alternatives for which they thought they could avoid education: construction worker, garbage man, carpenter, and so on. At each turn, Gelson was steadfast: *"Even the guy who collects the trash is a civil servant, so they have to take a civil service exam to get the job. And that requires schooling."*

> "I tried to understand what they were feeling and then what they thought about their own futures; to demonstrate the importance of them being here in terms of their future, educations, etc., the connection of education and their future, that everything you need requires education for what you want to do – *footballer*, ok, well, then you have to study, '*no I don't want to, so I will be a construction worker*,' but the civil service test requires you to study… '*no then, I don't want to do that anymore*,' they said" (21/05/12).

The boys argued back again stating that they could all one day be traffickers. Gelson asked Jair, the eldest, rhetorically "*weren't you into trafficking*?" Jair confirmed this. "*Ok, so let's go there. What do you do when you sell a bag and it costs X, and they pay you Y, what do you have to do then? What [skills] do you need?"* After a moment of silence, Rui suddenly blurted out: '*Mathematics*!'

Gelson continued, asking whether the boys knew that the local drug boss (*o*

patrão) was considering studying social work at the UFSC. For a moment the boys were perplexed as I imagined the cognitive dissonance trickled into their imaginations: "*Oh yeah that's right, he is*!" exclaimed Rui. The boys nevertheless, continued to challenge Gelson. At one point, they verified Tico's situation with Edson, who had popped his head into the room, and confirmed – "*yeah, I think he is*".

The boys raised examples of being firemen, and police special forces (BOPE), which Gelson countered the requirements by noting the terms of study associated with professional demands of policing - doing paperwork, writing reports, analytical skills, the basic ability to properly read instruction manuals, etc.

> Jair: *"I get picked up by the police. All they do is hit you. It's fucked. I'm just gonna go home and drink, sleep, eat, be a bum, and repeat".*
>
> Gelson: *"So if you get into traffic and then you get picked up by the cops, what do you think you'll have to do when you're in juvenile detention center? Study!"*
>
> Rui: "*Porra!* Shit! *You gotta study everywhere*!"

Post discussion, Gelson reflected on these unanticipated events, which ended with the boys agreeing to return to class as long as they were able to perform on stage at an upcoming school event:

> Gelson: "In that discussion I think we were able to identify what had happened. We understood that we had a mechanism of contact with them, which was the musical [performance]."
>
> Jared: "Right. They started to beat-box and rhyme at various points during the conversation."
>
> Gelson: "They said it was their way of being there in the middle of the mediation, too. One started to beat box and the others [started in with] the words. And out of that whole process, a relaxed situation really, an opportunity was born. The possibility only arose by having that conversation. And maybe that was, in the educational sense, what they need in terms of an understanding to come through the hip-hop opportunity. But the process was beautiful."

> "Based on the co-existence code that [the student body at large] started to build and establish, we [can say], ok, you can do that, you can record music and we can help, but what does that imply about your time in the classroom? You [previously] established some behavior codes. This is the very same group around which we [teachers] have been discussing how to get closer and connect to them (*chegar neles*). In the end, we got all that from a spontaneous dialogue."

Ultimately, the intervention unfolded far beyond the initial classroom dispute. The musical performance was not initially suggested by Gelson as a carrot or incentive to keep the boys at school, but rather emerged only at the end of the conversation in response to the dialogue's content. While it did translate into important value for them, enticing them to stay, it was more the icing on the cake.

Gelson's ability to subject the boys' professional aspirations to the realities of study and education, proved to be a critical piece of the equation that incentivized the boys to stay and agree to disengage in certain classroom behaviors. He did not infer who, or what they should be, nor what they should do, or not do. Gelson left it up to the boys to raise the details of the dispute that provoked their expulsion from class, which was quickly left behind. In the dialogue, which Gelson himself calls *mediation*, the boys gauge their options according to available choices against their rejection of wanting to study.

Gelson uses similar tactics of contestation and problematization, without confrontation or punition, without moralizing their actions, or holding them accountable for classroom behaviors. On the contrary, he invites the boys to think more deeply about, and participate in envisioning their futures within the current social order, not unlike Boulding's (1995) future's invention concept. Importantly, this mediation demonstrates how Gelson seizes unexpectedly upon the opportunity to contest the vocalized social scripts undergirding the boys' career proposals, in the space where he addresses the in-school dispute. In particular, he does so against the commonly scripted pathway for young people into trafficking, one of the few economic and socially attractive opportunities within reach for the adolescents on the verge of young manhood locally, apart from school.

The intervention ended with a reversal in these 'at-risk' boys' decision to leave. By problem-posing, Gelson's efforts help generate value for the boys to participate actively in school, while creating opposition to the likelihood of time spent getting closer to the street-market and corresponding social circle. The social tactics deployed effectively achieve the same quality of resolution to the dispute in the classroom, without direct negotiation of the incident.

The boys ascribe value to their participation in school through the incentive and status-returns. This will come from the results they anticipate from showcasing their musical talents before an audience of their peers, bringing them recognition they likely sought within the uncertain and risky social environment of the new school in Mont Serrat. I argue that this dialogical intervention achieves a substitution for the pull of the street-market domain in which the use of violence in the construction of a "risky-self" (Edberg and Bourgois, 2014: 193) is thus assigned positive value alongside the development of adolescent identities, evidenced by Gelson's intervention.

We do not know whether, or to what extent, any of the boys will ultimately involve themselves in local gangs, and/or whether such involvement would lead to practicing acts of violence. What we do know is that the disruptive collection of behaviors from these particular boys in the days prior to the intervention that I witnessed around school, tell a story of young men whose family situations, together with a rapidly changing school environment, create at best a difficult social scenario to navigate. The boys will nevertheless continue to negotiate their identities within the larger picture of community dynamics and experiences.

Whereas Gelson used the opportunity to challenge the narratives and scripts that the boys bring to bear on their future visioning, the dispute itself is used as an *entry point* to achieve other ends*,* rather than the focal point around which problem-solving or attention to the inter-group dispute in the classroom is performed. Mediation is that of interrupting pathways and participation in social spaces that often involve violence directly or indirectly through known risks associated with street-market economy.

In the socially insecure environment of this critical social community domain, I also witnessed how many teachers were unwilling, or willing but unprepared, to deal constructively with conflict amongst students, or the larger context, to include the violence that surrounded them. Other teachers both in the MS and other public schools where I conducted activities, indicated their attention to the fact that such approaches can provde detrimental to “afastar” kids at risk.

Where conflict can lead to swift expulsion, few schools have appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms. Conventional mediation may be a matter of luxury only until one considers the real consequences of where expulsion from class might lead: A strongly correlated pathway into precarious community spaces, and onto which the boys have already explicitly assigned value.

Conclusions

Drawing from original fieldwork data sourced through antagonistic actor interactions in the peripheries of Florianópolis, this chapter has considered the way that local agents use language to construct mediator roles, and further define the scope of their interruptive intervention activities. These are, in part, carried out through *deconstructive* social mediative tactics, ones that employ dialogical tools in an effort to break down and break with social scripts in key moments and spaces where interactions support transmissions and reproductions of violence. The use of language and its deconstructive potential is one of the ways through which interveners non-confrontationally exercise and introduce non-violent mediative capacities in order to contest patterns of criminalization, problematize individual and collective futures, and oppose the *normalization* of violence.

Mediators deploy deconstructive mediative tactics in times of tense interactions amongst antagonists, seen here in a series of vulnerability-generating situations. Mediators instrumentalized these moments as channels through which to break with business-as-usual expectations, and reduce the gap of power generated in otherwise asymmetrical negotiations. Tactics that contest, problematize, and ultimately challenge violence are exercised in ways that reflect a value-generation attached to rights discourse.

In the case of young community residents like Jair's crew, Gelson's intervention introduces a viable *substitution* value that affirms status and identity of the young men who face a socially vulnerable situation, both by staying at school, or along the predictable pathway of trafficking in which they locate an accessible alternative. Complementing these deconstructive tactics, the next chapter explores the *reconstructive* repertoire of local interventions.

CHAPTER SIX

Mediators' Reconstructive Intervention Repertoire

"I say to them [rhetorically], 'you didn't pop out of that black belly with a gun in your hand!?' No mother or father brings a child into this world to be a criminal'"

- Lia

"Dom Hélder Câmara, Paulo Freire, they lived this period of danger and clandestine situations, and when we were kids, that was something that gave us strength, to be challenged, and to challenge. Underneath it all, this experience informs how I live today - to opt for this idea of living at the borderline. To opt, in a concrete way, to work on the frontier, and if you look at my life's work, it has always been about opening those borders"

- Vilson

Introduction

This chapter explores the social mediative tactics of reconstruction. It discusses interventions that target non-state armed actors, mostly young community residents who participate as employees or *traffickers* the street-market economy. Complementing the deconstructive tactics discussed in the previous chapter, those which aim to interrupt social scripts reproduction of key interactions that normalize violence and violent social production in community, mediators' *reconstructive* efforts forge constructive connection with territorial antagonists. While intermediaries' efforts reflect the tradition of street-outreach workers, their approach is observed to employ dissonance and provocation within movements and methods that are socially *inappropriate*, and often risky.

It is important to note that youth involved in trafficking often experience a constant, heightened state of alertness for danger and threat. Given the potential police raids and incursions, this places them on high physiological alert, rendering their day-to-day and night-to-night activities vulnerable to the unknown and the uncertain (Falcão, 2006; Soares, Bill and Athayde, 2005). This fact alone makes mediators' reconstructive boundary-crossing incursions a

precarious proposal, albeit an effective one for building credibility, legitimacy, and promoting long-term change through interactions with territorial antagonists.

Mediators do not take advantage of these spaces to negotiate substantive issues or tensions in the community alone, nor do they pursue direct dialogue for the explicit purposes of increasing local harmony and peace. Instead, while mediators are non-confrontational, their movements demonstrate an unabashed, physical and discursive proclivity to provoke and disrupt trafficker subjectivities and social relations. These efforts materialize through a process in which mediators infiltrate off-limits social spaces, where few other residents do, in order to carve out and reconstruct a distinct quality of interaction with *dangerous intimates*.

In doing so, their interventions endeavor to create dissonance around youth participation and identities linked to the street-market domain. Crossing both physical and social boundaries presumed to separate or distinguish self-isolating traffickers from non-trafficker residents, these interventions are ultimately carried out with the aim of contesting and problematizing the street-market and youth participation in it, using non-confrontation methods.

A consistency of movement into the middle of these 'other world' spaces helps to build trust and safety, giving way to intervener's ability to pursue more critical interpersonal and group interactions, and augment cognitive dissonance around youth construction of their subjectivities. This chapter explores these assertions by examining the way that mediators perform *street talks* and *night walks* as methods that support strategic proximity between mediators and territorial antagonists, which are performed under the premise of re-configuring relationships and perceptions between traffickers and the community writ-large. I also show one way through which these methods materialize over time, in this case, to establish a dialogue between Tico's *Caixa* traffickers and ProCam project staff, which in turn formalizes an accessible pathway through which youth can begin to locate value in reconstructing their subjectivities and participate in actions away from the violence of the street-market.

In conjunction with informal intervention tactics, the chapter elaborates upon the organized *Procurando Caminho* (ProCam) project origin and activities, which effectively comprise the CCEA's disarmament and gang anti-recruitment initiative. Originally conceived to organize and facilitate young people's literal transition between the world of trafficking and the non-trafficking, I observe the mutually supportive interaction between ProCam and mediators' informal interventions. As such, *night walks* and *street talks* become critical tools through which local activists are finding ways to target some of the more at-risk community youth who typically begin ProCam activities with one foot already in the world of trafficking. Considering the project's logic and approach in light of new violence prevention research, I highlight how the mediative potential of informal intervention tactics are mutually reinforcing of ProCam activities and theory of change.

Street Talks

Lia moved to Mont Serrat when she was six years old. A recent grandmother, now in her 50s, her long history living in the community includes the loss of dozens of friends to drug-related demises from addiction and violence. As a young woman in the 1980s, Lia witnessed the advent and expansion of trafficking, which coincided with state-investments and community-generated development of local infrastructure. She estimates that amongst 40 odd close school friends with whom she grew up, only three remain alive today.

Mont Serrat's first trafficker, Baga, consolidated his power through corrupted municipal politics and local intimidation. Lia (24/04/13) recalls that Baga began smuggling drugs onto the *Maciço* through construction vehicles.

> *"When drugs came in, that was the destruction of our young people. Things changed, but I still live in the same house. With guns, the games turned serious. Baga was extremely aggressive. He thought we were invading his territory, trying to get rid of drugs in the community. When he was killed, the war over the territories began. I always said, 'the professor died at the hand of his own students.' Some kid that he brought into the trade built power in another morro, and that was it, they killed him."*

Like many long-time residents, Lia feels the pressures, impacts, and risks associated with the growth that the street-market economy has on daily life. Unlike others, however, Lia has a personal stake in dismantling trafficking and its widespread, negative consequences. Lia sets herself apart, believing that transformation requires an actively engaged approach holds more promising possibilities over rejecting, shunning, or ignoring traffickers, as others do:

> *"We lost a lot of kids, there was a lot of death (*her voice trails off*), lots of suffering mothers seeing their kids die at 16, 17, 18 years old. Tico was in the army as an elite sharpshooter. He got involved after his best friend Mino was killed. Tico brought guns into the community. Nobody else here had the money to buy those things! Somebody had to bring them in. Somebody bigger. That's when the conflicts started. But we manage to enter into conversations with them. Me, or people like Vilson; we have a certain respect"* (27/09/12)

Lia's stake is also personal, defined in part by raising three children. The youngest of whom, the only adolescent male, began to involve himself minimally in early 2013. When Lia realized, she sent him to stay for two months with relatives outside *Floripa*, according to her, to 'expand his horizons' beyond the *morro*. Lia's personal justification for involving herself with traffickers is to help reduce violence; her distress over seeing so many adolescents killed was agitated further by knowing that "they had no exit except death. And that's when I started to talk with them, basically to build friendship connections (*laços de amizade*)."

Lia's acquaintance with traffickers began over a decade ago. In the 1990s and 2000s, Lia operated a small bar out of her home, not far from the chapel, where she would attend to customers, which included a younger Tico, whose power was growing at the time. Lia's *street-talks,* however, emerged more recently, and somewhat organically.

Formally, Lia worked the night shifts at the CCEA's *Casa de Acolhimento Darcy Brito* in the neighborhood, though her involvement with local youth, many of whom she knows as sons and daughters of her own deceased childhood friends, also links her informally to the *ProCam* project. Lia's boundary crossing *street-talks* engage *Caixa* youth working at *bocas*, and serve a number of

purposes, with the added benefit of providing outreach for the ProCam project, as a visible and viable pathway for involved youth to access as an alternative to the trade. As she explained (27/09/12), the trust she builds through her intermediary role was critical for the realization of the ProCam project in Mont Serrat:

> Lia: "That trust is not built from night to day. I got closer to Vilson, and them, really through the bar that I used to have up next to my house. That room where you were sitting, it used to be a bar. I used to sit there with them and they would talk to me into the early morning. '*Damn, Lia'* they would say, '*Vilson takes projects out to the other communities, and they don't do anything for us.'* That was about five years ago. And they had that perception of Vilson. They also didn't let him get close to them."
>
> "So I went to Vilson and told him, and he said *'let's set up a meeting.*' So we came to my house, and that is where they saw that they had a chance to get closer, too. They, too, saw a possibility with Vilson. And that was the trust that was needed to reassure them that [the CCEA] won't denounce them and call the police. There was a transformation in that space, in that conversation. I had the ability to go where others could not go, talk to them at night, and talked about it with them – I would ask '*do you want to meet with him?'* And they said, *'you think he'll talk to us?'"*
>
> Jared: "It was risky."
>
> Lia: "Really risky. If you go up to the *boca,* they know that you will see the movement [production/selling], but they know I'm not going to leave and go violate their trust. We really just wanted to establish a friendship with them, and they saw that none of us separated the worlds."

Lia's intermediary role operates on the boundary of the divided, yet coterminous social spaces in which armed and unarmed residents coexist in community. *Street-talks* consist of Lia spending time in the *bocas*, *becos* (alleyways) or other selling points proximate to her home near the Caixa. Where it is rare to see residents communing at the *boca* who aren't purchasing drugs, or working for the trade, Lia cast off potential stigma in favor of a utilitarian logic that she saw could also benefit the greater good.

Her middling movement between two worlds forges trust and affective links through which she constructs a peculiar liminality. As Lia describes, this is borne of inherent curiosity amongst youth simply as to why she keeps showing up. Her incursions into these spaces are juxtaposed with an explicitly adamant rejection of any material participation or monetary gain from the illicit market, despite the regularity of traffickers' offers. For young people who live and breathe this world, Lia poses a provocative and perplexing contradiction of realities, one that embodies a type of power she exercises in non-dominating, relationship-building ways. In this interactional platform, a rarity on the *morro,* her tactics begin to poke holes in the vision and world that young people have constructed and occupy.

In the following passages, Lia discusses her role in penetrating closed spaces with actors who play key roles in sustaining social conflict in the territory. In doing so, Lia generates a non-*quid pro quo* dialogue, or what was frequently described to me by mediators as simply 'being present for presence's sake.' Lia employs social mediative tactics that get closer to youth in ways that few others in the community do, and yet nobody seems to understand why. What I describe as Lia's *connect-affect-critique-problematize* approach uses a formula that builds respect and trust in order to discursively deconstruct and create space in which youth reconstruct their own subjectivities and perspectives about the street market:

> "I never touch the subject of trafficking with them, unless I have to mediate directly [for somebody's life]. I put up a barrier: I don't need their money to buy a bottle of water, to show them that their money isn't of interest to me. Most times, I sit there and look for completely different things to discuss, apart from the drug-trade, because that's what they deal with all the time! What they see is police, drugs, guns, and trafficking. Sometimes a new guy comes in and glorifies it all, and they say '*bah, that guy's full of shit, it's always the same conversation*,' and they tire from it. I try to show them that this isn't the only thing out there in the world, that it doesn't make any sense."

> "They have a perspective, like, *'oh, we're traffickers so nobody cares about us.'* But that's how we are able to '*chegar até eles'* (to reach them). We show concern about them. It's a certain respect, you know? [Some think] my family doesn't care about me, but others do, the community does. They feel excluded, but when you get close to them it changes the way they think, that they don't

have to feel excluded, and that they can have a chance at changing their lives. We want to preserve lives, not lose them, and that's the message we give them. We want you to have a healthy life so tomorrow you can lift up your heads and go to work, sleep peacefully at home and feel protected if you want."

"Like with Lúcio, I said – '*hey man, look what trafficking is doing to you! Did you need all those bullets in your leg? You think that's a cute little present he gave you?'* But then afterwards I say: *'if you need me, you know where I live, you know I am here for you, to help, and from the moment you want out, to get a job and leave trafficking, I'm there with you.'* You have to show them the other side. You have to find different things to talk about with them. That's how you have to enter into their world: *indirectly*."

"We make them feel valued, despite other people thinking they don't matter. They know that despite them being traffickers, we respect them. It's part of the deal. They are citizens like any other in the community, even though they are doing bad stuff. And they know that if they want to move beyond trafficking, they have a pathway. Maybe it's that they don't disrespect us on account of that closeness we build with them. It's kinda like being a parent, and I think that's what they sense about us in a way, you see? If they're sick or in trouble we see if they're all right: we visit, go out there to see what's happening, just like Vilson and you did with Leo, you understand?"

"Lúcio already came to tell me '*hey, Padre Vilson came by, etc*.' and I said to him, *'hey man, you don't need to live your life like this, full of bullet holes, you think you're some kinda hero*? *[Tico] could have killed you, he didn't need to keep you alive, he could have done that from a distance'" (27/09/12).*

Lia's development of a non-threatening, non-moralizing, and non-exploitive physical presence subtly opens unique spaces and interactional dynamics of affect through which to more fervently critique the world of trafficking, as well as subject young people's thought processes to dissonance.

Her critiques, like others' in previous chapters have shown, are framed in terms of an invocation of citizenship rights,[80] while her techniques gradually allow her

[80] Lia once commented about her own rights: *"When the (turf) war was going on, I kept on going walking where I wanted to, I went up and down the morro, because nobody was going to take away my right to come and go, nobody can do that, and nobody has the right to do that to me, and thank god nobody messed with me, thank goodness, they would all say – 'My god Lia you're courageous! You're not afraid?' but nobody can take that from me. I'm a resident. I have rights. And you're not gonna take it. The day that they take away my rights, they might as well*

the opportunity to contest and problematize subjectivities and experiences linked to the street-market. Her humanistic interaction contrasts with police abuse and the shunning of social division, in which *morro* and other city residents adopt either a live and let live stance, or actively criminalize and discriminate against the mostly darker skinned morro youth. The connective-affective approach builds respect by engaging individuals as equals, worthy of the inherent dignity they posses, and as rights-bearers, something they often never consider.

Ultimately, her methods foster a constructive tension. Lia's parental perspective is not by mistake. A parental role becomes meaningful against the backdrop of the tactics that she deploys against the inviting or initially hospitable narrative of being in the trade:

> "You end up able to really reach them inside *(tocar neles).* They have this version of themselves that *'I'm a criminal and nobody cares about me.*' Today they know that even if they are criminals, they have somebody concerned about them. It's very clear to them. I think that I'm able to get into their world a bit because on the one hand, I bring laughter and light-heartedness. And then in a given moment, I can get serious with them. In truth, you can't enter into their world brusquely, no, they're not gonna let you, not directly. And you have to enter into their world without using drugs and without getting involved. Rather, you have to participate, get close to them, and let them get close to you."

> "It's a little freer, to create trust, because then they know they can count on me and that I won't report them to the police, or that I'll help in the way we can. I don't drink alcohol, but I go sit with them [at the boca] and talk, and they talk shit and laugh, but I sit there anyway and I think that they are starting to understand that we don't separate the worlds. They thought we would say *'they're traffickers, nobodies,'* and that we were superior and they were inferior."

> "You have to remember that their world is that taken by force. They can participate in our world without having to be strong. And in that way, we could enter into their world too. I am the same as they are, and they are the same as me. And sometimes I have to say *'hey man, stop and think a minute'.* I end up knowing about everything that goes on - sometimes I feel like their psychologist! Like, *'Lia, I gotta talk to you, did you hear about this or that?" (27/09/12)*

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kill me. What kind of life is that? It doesn't exist. I don't accept this as a human being, or because I'm the woman of so-and-so, I'm not allowed to go there."

On the one hand, her unanticipated social interventions in key spaces interrupt the expectations of involved youth, re-defining the possibilities of behavioral and identity scripts. In this way, she echoes Chicago's Violence Interrupter Ameena Matthews, who explained her approach with young violence-involved males to include "finding the soft -not weak- but soft spot, then getting him to laugh at himself" (The Interrupters, 2011).

In this way, Lia's intermediary actions are also instrumental as an envoy for the ProCam project, which offers a readily accessible pathway for young people who opt to transition through that reconstruction process. Here, Lia's tactics represent intermediary action on two levels, and organically reflective of the Spergel Model and US Department of Justice Comprehensive Gang Intervention Model (Spergel, 2007),[81] as both her personal outreach tactics and informal collaboration with a local agency or organization (CCEA). Unlike the Spergel model, however, Lia's and others' efforts firmly reject all suppression approaches as part of the overall strategy.

Contesting Identities, Problematizing the Trade

Entering the world of trafficking is a risky endeavor, which few perform. Local mediators move across boundaries and duly assume the risks. However, mere presence is not sufficient to produce change. Lia's tactics also subject youth identities to critique and question, stimulating cognitive dissonance by discursively deconstructing and critiquing the world of trafficking, linked to individual decision-making. In this way, she posits the possibility of reconstructing new identities beyond it:

> "I say to them – '*hey, you think that's cool what you're doing? You think that's the best way for you? You think you're bad 'cause you've been in jail, losing your freedom? You think that's cool?'* You gotta give them that message, that this isn't cool. Look how you came out – you got arrested, have a record, what example are you giving to your kids? You gotta think, you want your son to grow up like that? So they have to know that somebody is working on their conscience. They go in as kids thinking they run the world, and then they try to

[81] See also: https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Street-Outreach-Comprehensive-Gang-Model.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2015]

come out as adults and realize they are so buried in trafficking that they need help to get out."

"That's how you gotta do it sometimes. I say this to them, 'Myyyy God!' That's actually what they nicknamed me, '*My God*' (giggles). But I get in, so I can say that. If you are brusque with them, they'll reject you because they see you as invading their area and trying to take control of the conversation, or rejecting them. They're always on the defensive, being cautious. The minute you start recriminating, sending a message of, hmmm, how do I explain, that they don't mean anything to you? You have to show them that their lives matter" (24/04/13)

Here, the critical provocation is uncontested in the dialogical space she has fostered, which sustains relational conditions to allow her to nudge further toward a friendlier, if firmer, forms of contestation, always linking traffickers' micro perspectives to the larger forces that shape their lives:

"Sometimes I sit at the *boca* in the *Caixa* and look down over the city center and say 'the prisons are full, who is filling them? It's not the big wigs downtown. Not even Tico is the biggest. Somebody else is behind him. Do you guys know that the boss of your boss could be down there, living in that high-rise?' '*Damn, Lia, you're right*.' And they ask me - *'wouldn't you like to live down there?'* No, because here I know all my neighbors; down there in those buildings, I have to go through gates and checkpoints. I don't know if the biggest criminal is living right next to me with all that power. But when the police go on patrol, they come beat us here, not them down there. The big boss is gonna watch you go to prison on television, or get a call that says, 'the police rounded up a whole bunch of them and threw them all in jail.' And they say, '*damn, Lia, that's true*.'"

"And that is the way you can start clarifying things, putting doubts in their minds. If you start putting doubts in their mind, they will come to understand that they aren't in the right business. If you can generate doubt, it's the same as a seed. If you plant it, it will germinate, grow and become a plant. It's the same in the heads of these kids in terms of looking down there look at the higher power. [I say] '*the big fish travels by plane, while you take the bus. Depending on where you go, it takes longer. While you're still riding, he's already there, and it's gonna be two or three days before you arrive. And who's doing that? You are, always you, because you're the one risking your life up here.'* And I think that is what starts to change their world."

"You have to begin to say *'hey, your [involvement] pays for those people to have a better life – you're supporting the judge, the police, and the attorneys, because everybody gains through trafficking. The police come here, and everyone gets paid down the line*.' The way I see it is educating - if you can show them that their world really spins on top of a little egg, and it can crack, they can gain from that. I always say to Vilson that if we can kill the roots of trafficking in our community, then the leaves will start to wilt and die. It's up to them to leave it, to pursue a better life. From there, everything can change" (24/04/13).

Mediative tactics also privilege direct efforts at prevention. Lia (21/01/13) discussed how her presence sets precedence for her to intervene, influence, bargain, and at times more boldly contest the instrumental use of violence:

Lia: "It makes a difference, just sitting there at the *boca*. Many times they talk about [violence they will commit] and I say *'do you think it's worth it to leave that mother in tears?* That kid is young, he's got a lot to learn, go smack'm around a bit, give him a few taps, but don't kill him. Hey man, stop and think a minute. If you want, I can go talk to him, tell him he's on thin ice, screwing up. But think a minute if he's worth killing.' And they might go, but they wouldn't kill him."

Jared: "So this produces a change?"

Lia: "From their perspective, if a guy is ready to go kill, his friends will encourage him, saying, *'if you don't take that guy out, you're just a loser!'* It's different when someone else says, '*look, man, he's not worth it, stop and think, if you get another prison sentence, is that worth it? The mother won't cry, she won't suffer.*' That draws them closer to me – *'hey, Lia, you think I can get a job to get out of trafficking?'* They trust me. We've managed to get three big ones out. Today even the biggest dealer here in the morro completed university entrance exams [in December 2012] and wants to study to be a social worker ..."

Jared: "Which do you think is more powerful, your power, or the trafficking code?"

Lia: "I think my conversation is more powerful, to change their thinking and change the scene because if one gets sent to kill, and you get them to stay, then you started to reverse their history, you see? And that's a result."

Lia's street-talks play a symbiotic role with the ProCam project. Lia's middling movements have supported Caixa traffickers build trust by extension with the CCEA:

> Jared: "And your relationship between these conversations and the social projects?"
>
> Lia: "They see these projects as, well, they know that they need help. It's really grounded. They know that they have a point of reference, that the Project could give them shelter. They have to be protected in order to be able to change their pathways in life. And that only happens when they have a vision, and see a return. I know that there are always going to be those who take advantage, but it's not all of them. I think that's really it. We don't fight against them, like the police do. They see that we try to change their world in a different way" (21/01/13).

Street-talks are the social tactics of small gestures (*pequenos gestos*) that create and exploit critical cracks in the way that young people perceive their participation in trafficking as a community structure, and basis of dominant social ordering. As a matter of crossing-boundaries, street-talks are mediative in that interveners work iteratively to exploit entryways, deconstruct and interrupt, while then supporting a reconstructive, viable pathway under the premise of safe space. In the case of the CCEA projects, ProCam targets the most at-risk youth, though these encompass opportunities for legitimate market work, professionalization, and a formal chance to move away from criminality. In this final passage, Lia (24/04/13) reveals her thinking and implicit considerations behind her mediative efforts:

> Lia: "[ProCam] is going to bear fruit. I have faith. I trust that it's going to give a return. They move in and out, but now we are doing more to get closer. We show them that they project is open for them, and they've started to come back."
>
> Jared: "It's not an overnight thing."
>
> Lia: "No. Trafficking is very powerful. And it takes its toll on them. It takes their money. It's an illusion whose bottom falls out. One thing I make really clear with them: [The exit] is there, but you have to go get it. They have to feel valued; that they are worth something, that the project has an objective for them, too, and

> that's when they start to make changes. And if [the state] doesn't change the system, nothing changes. No opportunity: no change. Because today if I'm sustaining my family through trafficking, my kids are gonna do the same tomorrow. If I don't generate an opportunity to get out, it's like a current; one flows into the other."
>
> "They need concrete results. Theory is for the university. They know that what the CCEA does, and the basis of our trust is concrete in practice. They don't care about pretty speeches. They are very anxious because their world makes them anxious. They hunger for reality because their world is not real and they know that their world is not real; it is a fairy tale. They know that they are going to get older and there'll be younger ones to take their places. And if they go to prison for 10 years, they aren't gonna come back to what they once had. Their places will be taken. They are conscious of that. They talk about that. They know it. And we are there to hear them say it."

Night Walks

Like street-talks, night-walks were a social mediative tactic that I observed while shadowing Vilson. Night walks emerged through his role as a priest and social activist over the last 30 years in the periphery communities of Florianópolis. Through Vilson and Guga's experiences I explore these physical incursions into social spaces that were, like hanging out at the *boca,* socially inappropriate and off-limits to most community residents. Night-walks involved of course, incursions into a unique environment for interaction between intermediaries like Vilson, Guga, Gelson, and traffickers. These took place at *bocas,* production or cache areas with armed guards, or simply in places and spaces occupied by sellers waiting around at work, into which few local residents elect to go unless they must, particularly in the evenings or nights when or where the "movement" tends to be more robust.

Whereas Lia's street talks occurred mainly by day, mediator night walks took place when most residents are home, when the street-market and general movement of young people is more lively and thriving across the *morro*. From Vilson's perspective, night-walks allow him to keep a finger on the pulse of the community. As a community leader, this uncommon and solitary practice grew for Vilson as an extension of his professional identity and practice as a priest on the *Maciço*. Abnormal and risky, his interventions pique curiosities and, slowly, like Lia, build his legitimacy and credibility with insiders and outsiders alike:

> "My colleagues at the ITESC today were waxing eloquent about phenomenology of theology during a meeting to get the Institute credentialed. Of course they bring me in to comment because they know I'm the only one who can speak about these things in practical terms. I'm sitting there in the meeting saying to myself (his face twists in perplexity), *'how am I the only one here who is doing this in practice?' What are we doing if our work isn't grounded in reality of making advances based on the social reality? What good is this thought in a vacuum? What good is a priest who doesn't walk about and see how things are going in the community?* It's good for me to go walking, so that I can stop by and say hello, see what's happening. And yet, *I'm* the one estranged to my colleagues?" (07/09/14)

I shadowed Vilson regularly on night-walks during fieldwork, traversing streets, moving into unknown alleyways and up crumbling stairs leading into less visible street-market domains, interfacing along the way with young people who occupy and work on the *Maciço* by night. Vilson's movement through the *morros* was at once a process that fostered contact, and one of learning. For him, and me in the process, they are a type of living laboratory through which to observe young people, trafficking, and behavior, and an experiment as to whether trust could be built amongst strangers. Vilson, too, endeavored to create a quality presence based on unanticipated encounters in unexpected spaces that inevitably led to interactions with territorial antagonists.

His (and my) mere presence contested a gamut of social rules, regulations, and implicit boundaries that are tacitly accepted by *morro* residents, rendering common social connection off limits, reinforcing territorial divisions even in a time of truce and peace, that people had no explicit business or demonstrated need to cross. Vilson's transgressions fostered unforeseen, though non-threatening contact, provoking questions, breaking scripts, and cultivating an instrumental, liminal legitimacy.

> *Field Notes (24/04/13):* Vilson was energized tonight, though he typically goes unaccompanied, he has invited me to join him: "*It's not for everybody*," he says, '*outsiders don't go. But every time I do, I am more convinced by these walks*.' Residents we run into along the main roads, moving up or down on our way home, have been surprised when we tell them what are doing. One or two have commented that maybe we are a bit crazy.

> There is safety involved in going alone. We walk without belongings, save for my pocketed notebook, often through areas of darkness, or the jungle-like thickness where brush and trees have grown to dominate the now decimated formerly intact, concrete walkways. If this isn't a metaphor for trafficking here, I don't know what is.
>
> At the Caixa we met two lookouts, both of whom were at last week's meeting amongst Tico's soldiers. They were surprised to see Vilson following up. Among other devices, Vilson asks for directions to get to 'so-and-so's house,' even though he doesn't need them, often simply to kick off a conversation. He asks '*how's the movement tonight*?' In other words, how is business going? The elder of the two spoke more. His court case is pending information being sent from Brasilia for his attorney. Charged with trafficking, he was caught with R$200 and 30 grams of weed, only recently returning from jail. Vilson responds, *"well, that could be seen as for personal use,"* perhaps alleviating some trepidation. Before we walk on, Vilson builds more solidarity by offering support: *"We're around, give a shout if you need it".*
>
> This is not an uncommon exchange elsewhere. Despite traffickers' surprise, there are no hang-ups. Night walks are fluid, but somehow interruptive. You go, you chat, you depart, leaving questions behind. But you also learn and listen, and this seems to create bonds. This presence is what Vilson calls a *presença gratuita* or a non-exploitive presence, being there for presence's sake, to build relationships, proactively defying expectations.

In less familiar *Maciço* neighborhoods, Vilson's ice-breaker might be to inquire about a family he knew lived in the area, or ask about the families of the young *olheiros* keeping watch out for police, attempting to locate somebody, some name, anybody, in common to bridge the gap of showing up uninvited. Such methods were used as pretexts to explain our arrival; going to see an old acquaintance or a known community leader; *Dona Neusa*, the priestess from the *Terreiro de Umbanda* in Mocotó, or *Dona Gloria* in *Morro da Pentenciâria*, a co-conspirator from more militant times in Florianópolis' urban occupation movement.

If someone recognized Vilson or his name, he might speak of his ties to their neighborhood's history, or CCEA social projects in them, if only to assuage security concerns that he wasn't a cop. He of course introduced me as an object

of curiosity, the "North American professor learning about *morro* life." Visiting neighbors was not just a convenient excuse to afford him safe passage. If it was not too late, Vilson work was two-fold, knocking on doors to chat with individuals, learn community updates; always keeping his finger on the pulse:

> *Field Notes (24/04/13):* Through the muddy, thickly covered swath beyond the *Caixa*, one bright bulb half illuminates the path toward Ana and Lúcio's house, which is the midpoint between two areas. We walk over a wooden door that now bridges a creek. It's eerily quiet, like being on a dimly lit movie set, after hours. We arrive to the top of the *Escadaria*, the broad public stairway with hundreds of steps leading down toward the city center. Tension arises as the first guard initially sees us. His eyes tack immediately toward the tent off to our right, under which three young men's hands are deep into heaps of green herb, weighing, and bagging. In my peripheral vision, one man walks quickly away. Another, whose back faces toward us, keeps bagging.
>
> We chatted up the standing guard. Vilson asks him about surfing and working with Guga. He's fresh faced, and already informed about the new football option, and ProCam surfing. The man whose back was mostly to us looked quite a bit older, and a bit more run-down, though he cannot be much older than me, early 30s. Age takes its toll in this business.
>
> I realize how normal and closed-off the territory is. It is impossible to move from the Caixa (with road access) to the top of the *Escadaria* without knowing that somebody is coming, despite little visible communication channels from that side to this. The shacks that dot the area belong to the *patrão's* family, cousins, aunts, and dependents. The operation unfolds openly in a fortified site, with a clear view to any ground incursion or raid. Minimal infrastructure allows swift movement. In the Caixa we were not followed, as in other *morros* like *Penitenciâria* and *Horácio.* Perhaps here, where Vilson is more familiar, he's already a lesser threat.
>
> Continuing down the steps we met a group of ten sitting young men, all between 15 and 20, I estimated. Vilson asks if they've heard about surfing. They have, but they haven't approached it because they have to work at their posts during the daytime. He says – *'well, we'll look into something on the weekend, what about Saturday?*' The response is half hearted, as if none foresee themselves realistically taking part. The eldest amongst them then asked: '*Aren't there any studies offered?'* To my surprise, he adds that he had once participated in the now defunct state-funded *Aroeira* initiative. Vilson

> recognized his face, and says he will come back with Guga sometime to chat more, and asks where he can find them.
>
> Boredom casts over their young faces, which are lit by the dim glow of the orange streetlight. All affirm they'll *'always be here at this time,'* as if just punching their time cards and waiting for time to expire. Before departing, Vilson comments about his cousin who lived in the house that stands just next to the concrete block on which they're all huddled. That was 33 years ago, and the eldest replies that there isn't anybody here anymore much older than 25.

The walks remind Vilson of how fragmented and divided that physical access really is across the *Maciço*. They recall the significance of connectedness, seemingly lost in the territory with the onslaught of trafficking. By going to where *they* are, Vilson learns and reflects. He analyses movements, security, tendencies, behaviors, etc. About some things he's assured, while others surprise him as he bridges the worlds, entering the times and space that belongs to *them*, where even he, despite his lifetime of activism, remains relatively unknown:

> Vilson: "They weren't hostile. That was interesting. It impressed me. They have every reason to say to us – *'Get the hell outta here, what do you care about our lives? Who are you to ask us questions and get into conversation? We don't know who you are. We don't know what you are doing. What do you want here in our area?"*
>
> Jared: "But it wasn't like that."
>
> Vilson: "There was no hostility. You see that in the *morro* there are different ways of living – and these walks demystify the notion that all the *morros* are the same, as much geographically as culturally. Social dynamics are diverse. That's what I'm saying in terms of the relationship between center and periphery – people [from the center] would be challenged getting drugs from the *Morro* da *Penitenciâria*. It's distant and difficult to access."
>
> "In *Mocotó* or *Horácio,* more densely populated with their overload of drugs, are closer to the center. You've seen that. It's very paradoxical. Between the center and the *morros* that are more visible, there could be more possibilities if there were more presence of public services internally, banks or state agencies. *Presence*. I think that would open another opportunity from the point of view of relationships in terms of us here in the territory."

> Jared: “Would that push trafficking to other areas?”
>
> Vilson: “To an extent yes. Or perhaps they would reinvent selling. They would sell differently. Tonight, when we went to the *Serrinha*, you saw the different selling configurations, more hidden. Each *morro* is different. They keep vigilant about who is coming, and they know how to watch. But if there are still consumers, selling would continue. A reinvestment could mean reducing violence, but the sale of drugs, well, if sales go down, violence could go down, but you’d have to attack the economic process too. It can’t just be collective, social interventions. You have to have economic channels for [market] insertion and involvement into the work force” (04/09/12).

For local mediators, night walks promote strategic, *intermediary impact* (Lederach, 2006), used in a sense as a means to catalyze multiple objectives. Though risky, this activity fostered trust-building and interruptive value, ultimately giving way to acute opportunities through which mediators could, at times, later levy influence over local actors in lasting ways. Similar to street-talks, Vilson’s intermediary role during night walks embodies constructive and atypical engagement across antagonistic lines. His spatial transgressions propose a set of non-exploitive overtures. Just by showing up, these pierce an almost untouchable façade of the insular reality through which young traffickers construct their street-market subjectivities, a process in violent behaviors can be rewarded.

The tactical approach that begins with muddling into this territory, coupled with the content of the dialogue initiated by intermediaries, constitutes a unique mediative exercise. Their border-crossing characteristics provide the premise under which to initiate youth identity reconstruction through ‘outreach’ for the ProCam project. It further offerred an opportunity for mediators to build legitimacy which they draw upon during interventions into more tense, or precarious neighborhood conflicts:

> Vilson: “[Nightwalks] are not disconnected from the territorial dispute. A frontal-facing fight against narcotrafficking isn’t possible. There is no way to do that. You have to create spaces for dialogue. And in those spaces, you negotiate, based on experiences. Trafficking networks spread over the island and the continent. In those violent processes, you have one of two options.”

> "Being a presence within community, carrying forward ideas, and talking about these situations makes you go outside your comfort zone, obligatorily, because you feel the indignation of living and facing this reality. In truth, for my conscience, it's after going to the cemetery to bless a cadaver that is the fruit of, no, which is the *consequence* of a violent structure, that maturity emerges - by leaving your comfort zone and heading out on a pathway of insecurity."

> "It was in that way that we started to work on resistance and resilience. For me the idea of resilience is a *mediative* concept, within this larger confrontation [territory-in-dispute]; The capacity to advance [alternative] propositions along that pathway of extreme adversity, one that is completely inhospitable, paved by difficulty and suffering; one that runs over with blood, and blood that runs over your feet, intensely. Within that arises the substance of negotiations of this process that has to be articulated in the territory and within the interfaces beyond the territory in conflict, in order to find solutions [to violence]" (04/0912).

By early 2013, night walks and street talks coalesced to reveal an important indicator in Mont Serrat activists' theory of change, reaffirming their value and the legitimacy that traffickers afforded them. This opened the door to participation of *Caixa* traffickers in the Mont Serrat ProCam project.

Procurando Caminho

Literally *Finding Pathways,* Procurando Caminho (ProCam) is a cornerstone initiative of the CCEA. It's a project established to play a mediative role itself, supporting youth decision-making and transition from street-market participation to the 'other' social world and licit economy in the city at large. The project's mission serves to:

> *Support adolescents and young people in impoverished communities within Santa Catarina that are involved in criminality and narcotrafficking to find other opportunities in their lives and help them become protagonists of their own histories. The majority of youth involved who become involved in the project have dropped out of school, carry no working documents, live 'at the margins' of their own families, and have developed strong involvement in trafficking. From the project's inception in 2007, to 2012, over 1402 youth have participated* (CCEA, 2012).

Due in part to funding, but also a strategic emphasis, in late 2012 the project organizers decided to target the most at-risk *morro* youth, and expand its activities. Today it provides one of the few organized alternatives to trafficking in the disputed territories. ProCam programming includes educational, cultural, and adventure sport initiatives, under a logic that seeks the disarmament and dismantling of trafficking.

The following section explores the ProCam logic and activities as an important space for promoting a shift in the local social order. Its mere existence supposes a kind of mediative identity; an invited, sustained, territorial intervention that gets in the middle of violent and non-violent options for youth, engaging traffickers through non-confrontational ways that elicit new encounters and new dialogue, subjecting young people to question the social scripts in which they participate on a regular basis.

Project Origins and Approach

Formally launched in 2007, ProCam originated to facilitate safe passage for young people between communities at a time of heightened violence in the Monte Cristo area on the continental side of the capital, in the area where CEDEP/IVG, and the CCEA's administrative hub operate today. It emerged from conversations amongst CCEA staff, community youth, and one public school's teachers about how to deal with increasingly violent experiences in the *Bairro Chico Mendes*, where harassment, assaults, threats, and murders between rival gangs were prohibiting movement across territory, including access to and from school.

Initial CCEA activities literally shuttled young groups of traffickers out of the periphery on a tinted window minibus. Today, ProCam organizers still use minibuses to take youth on social, cultural, and sometimes political activities around the capital and beyond.[82] The initiating dialogue, convened by the CCEA's Ivone, fostered the opportunity for youth to proactively initiate

[82] Most recently, for instance, a panel of ProCam leaders with origin in different *Florianopolitana* communities shared the stage to discuss the transition process out of the trade, alongside the *Comandos de Afro-Reggae,* in a panel to educate public authorities on the nature of their experiences. For more, see ALESC RACDCA seminar: http://agenciaal.alesc.sc.gov.br/index.php/noticia_single/seminario-discute-garantia-de-direitos-de-criancas-e-adolescentes

resistance to participating in, or becoming victims of, the rising violence engulfing the community.

ProCam is just one of many CCEA projects albeit sorely underfunded. Others include the federally funded *Jovem Aprendiz* and CCEA original spin-off *Ritos* initiative, which both help professionalize and prepare young people to transition into higher studies and the workforce. ProCam became a platform through which young traffickers could also cross-boundaries back into licit markets and educational pathways, which the CCEA endeavors to make available or accessible to periphery youth. Well beyond adventure sports, ProCam logic and activities strategically complement CCEA efforts to support young people make the nuanced and often challenging transition away from the street-market, building up their identities, economic prowess, and social status at a young age.

ProCam has grown to include its own micro-industry, in conjunction with the *Jovem Aprendiz*, where young people are employed to produce and repair surfboards that can be sold, but also used in the project. The workshop sits in the basement of today's central CCEA office, located in a room in the former city-owned building that authorities used to conduct homicide-related autopsies.

> *Field Notes (04/09/12):* Standing alongside the cold-storage lockers still in place, Javier and Vilson explained that t*he building was unused, so the CCEA, through an acquaintance, pursued and initiated a partnership with the city in order to lease it. As Vilson said: 'We changed the meaning behind the space. Before it was a heavy place, a source of pain, weeping and death. Now it stands for life, entrepreneurism, and learning.' Javier chimed in: 'On these [workshop] tables were the cadavers of young people killed right here in this neighborhood, in trafficking and by police. Their blood would run onto the floor. Now it's hot surfboard wax resin*".

Asking why it is that the mediative capacity generated by the ProCam project has been locally effective, is aided by new discussion based on research (Edberg and Bourgois, 2013) that connects macro structural forces to micro-level youth violence. This, as well as empirical studies of masculinity development (see Baird, 2012; Barker, 2005) argues that the use of violence by adolescents involved in the street-market domain can have constructive

resonance in the context of their daily lives, with respect to adolescent (gendered) identity formulation.

It is here that Edberg and Bourgois (2013) offer an important but subtle distinction in thinking about the use of conflict resolution in terms of violence prevention. They argue against the effectiveness of conflict resolution skills intended for use in order to replace "violent" norms, which many associate with the use of violence by young people. An emphasis on CR skills targeting re-creation of norms may be less than effective.

More effective would be efforts that seek to *substitute* or *mimic* the value that are assigned to violent behaviors in context, which emerges as part of the *generative* process of adolescent identity construction in these spaces. Creatively or strategically substituting value offers something distinct from skill-building, which can in many cases feel or appear unrealistic, as "there is something about violence that forms a meaningful dimension of identity. It commands a moral valence," or as the (Edberg and Bourgois, 2013: 196) observe:

> "Viewed from a generative perspective… 'supportive norms' are no longer a distinct risk factor among others but an integrated element of risk behavior that is embedded within a pattern of living, such that one can no longer simply 'change norms' as if they were discrete, fungible objects".

Distinct from disseminating conventional conflict resolution skills or mediation training (both typically associated with local peacebuilding efforts involving youth programming), interventions or projects that treat conflict or violence would focus on the generative identity process and motivations which must be understood through the way that value within a particular social domain is ascribed:

> "Thus, instead of implementing a present school-based curriculum that teaches conflict resolution based on a risk-factor assessment that identifies skills as lacking, a generative approach understands that conflict resolution may not in fact be a meaningful goal in that particular context. The normative goal may be dominance, publically asserted. The program solution would therefore focus on

> developing an intervention component that sought to change the terms by which dominance is defined" (Edberg and Bourgois, 2013: 198).

As Ivone confers, the street-market domain or involvement in trafficking is a highly *seductive* space for young people who experience marginalization, multiple sources of deprivation, contending with scripts that criminaliz them whether or not they are involved in crime, which can be highly damaging, particularly when perpetuated by members of their own communities and close families. Given these factors, violence- and change-oriented intervention logic would seek not to simply replace 'violent' norms or educate on 'non-violent' ones, but rather approach intervention through the cultivation of influence over particular choices and dispositions that require youth to decide whether or not to engage, or remain involved in perversely seductive spaces.

Baird's (2011: 214) research on gang-involved youth discusses violence reproducing qualities in young men's masculinization processes, through which accessible and violent social structures enable exaggerated instruments for masculinity development. These provide masculine capital returns, to be enjoyed in the eyes of young peers and larger social collective. Wherein a disposed habitus of youth who participate in gangs and violence is structured "beyond the grip of conscious control and therefore not amenable to transformations or corrections" (Baird, 2011), the locus of attention on violence by the ProCam project, vis-à-vis youth identity formation, is not specifically based on teaching or preaching against local structures. Rather, emphasis is placed by staffers on fostering a working *dissonance* about youth identities to develop non-violent reconstructive possibilities.

Sport, culture, and music-related programming for youth with emphasis on violence prevention are widespread in Brazil's favela communities (Gomes, et al., 2006). Ramos (2006) has labeled such initiatives like Rio's famed Afro-Reggae group as the 'new mediators,' emphasizing improved police relationships and transforming images of criminalizing stereotypes. Despite the prevalence of these programs, I discuss how the ProCam project offers explanation for why and how such work can be effective, and scaled, beyond the objectives of occupying youth's time, or re-formulating and de-criminalizing

images. This, I argue, would be linked to the way ProCam *interrupts* street-market oriented youth identity development.

Working with youth who are labeled as 'dangerous intimates,' is one way to more effectively mediate and ultimately contest the dominant practices of social ordering that shape life on the *morro*. Mediators accomplish this through individual efforts, as well as through organized projects, which share in actively deconstructing subjectivities, creating dissonance, and sparking questions as to the social returns or value placed on violence-related and trafficking activities. Substitution and mimicry principles, rather than moralizing or norms assertion, undergird these efforts. At ProCam, this is realized through activities that invite youth to make decisions about whether to remain involved in a criminalizing street-market environment, or not. This is a subtle process, and a way in which the project's logic challenges how traffickers sustain their dominance and control. It does so by supporting adolescents to instead "explore different models of identity and construct subjectivities that are not based on domination and subordination" (Pease, 2004: 42).

Rather than focusing on a substitution of norms or manipulation of narratives to combat criminalizing stereotypes, programming invites youth to confront these constructions. As staffers explain, the ProCam adventure sports component facilitates this process for this age group. The surfboard, for example, contrasts to a weapon, in the way that it challenges a young person. As Vilson (24/06/12) said, *"holding a gun provides adrenaline, but that's easy. A surfboard provides adrenaline because it challenges them back - They have no idea how to handle it".*

Not unlike examples such as Viva Rio's boxing club, the mediating value of the ProCam project creates, rather than harmonizes conflict between two spheres of seduction:

> Ivone: "In *Procurando Caminho*, the challenge is to attract [young people] to other opportunities, in a way that is enjoyable and so that they keep showing up. Eventually they enter into a moment of confusion [asking] 'should I stay at the *boca*, or at the project?' They're going to have to give up the *boca*, or lose this here."

Jared: “So it’s provocative.”

Ivone: “Yes, it generates confusion. The individual enters into crisis. Igor for example, had no limits. The judge, the defender, nobody knew what to do with him. He wouldn’t settle in anywhere, and he was a prime candidate for being killed. So we started to seduce and seduce; seduction was total. But he kept going and going. Suddenly, he has to decide and position himself. He started to spend less time at the *boca*, and more time at the project. He starts to see how big the change inside him was. And each time this happens for one, that one attracts another” (21/11/14).

Participation remains voluntary, which is key, as Igor’s transition experience highlighted above demonstrates. More importantly, as a way of generating non-violent, non-dominating power, ProCam is not externally imposed, while influence also ricochets and ripples out into peer circles:

Ivone: “It’s principally the kids themselves who make the request, we don’t go hanging a shingle. We use adventure sports because they’re found in our region, and we have to develop partnerships first because transport and equipment are expensive. More expensive still is keeping a young person imprisoned. More expensive than that, is to keep a young person in the *semi-liberdade*, which today averages about R$4000 per head. Cost for a surfboard, rafting, even rappel equipment, these ‘elite’ sports, don’t even come near R$4000.”

“The young person who traffics, carries a gun, and circulates in that world - their own group is the one that changes the patterns, because influence occurs from the inside. Sometimes it generates a greater impact because it starts to change the way they are *seen* in the community – no longer just a trafficker, but somebody who’s involved in something cool. It affords an opportunity to leave the community, too, a chance to break with control internally, and the internal change causes a swifter impact as they no longer solely identify themselves as involved in trafficking, but as having the capacity to position themselves otherwise, doing something different. This posits a space in which dissonance germinates and grows.”

“Once they identify with the sport they want to participate in, we develop our work further. Afterwards, they themselves identify other needs. At first we would like them all to have working documents to be able to get training and a resume

> for work, because they want money too. Each person's beginning is different." (21/11/14)

Staff efforts *to get close to* and support youth in emotional and psychological ways, to consider decisions through mediation-with-one, are a critical piece of transition effectiveness. Traffickers often *"show up with a gun in one hand and a ball of crack and a scale in the other*" (Ivone, 21/11/14) while confusion and dissonance have woven their way into their thinking, at which point educators remain poised and present to 'listen and figure it out' by drawing on emotional intelligence and contextual sensitivity to help young people manage their process:

> "That kid will open up and cry when we talk to him, from stress and fear. Sensitivity to these [new beginnings] and the understanding [staff] has are things that *contract funding* and timelines don't account for. This is one of the biggest fissures in public policy [on security] that has to be improved. Look at the news that came out this week about rising security spending.[83] The cost of repression is the price of lives, and what's scary about the report on youth deaths released today. Many of these are not deaths caused between traffickers" (Ivone, 21/11/14).

Change isn't a given, but nor is it forced. Hard work goes in to initiating and sustaining activities that make the ProCam theory of change a viable approach to resisting and dismantling local trafficking violence, despite funding and other limitations. Its notoriety has a knock-on effect that widens contact and increased interest in other regions and neighborhoods, and organizers are beginning to link it to the judiciary as part of an alternative sentencing opportunity. It has been awarded CUFA's *Prêmio Anu* recognized as one of the 27 most socially innovative in the country.[84]

Fostering connections with traffickers through boundary crossing and reconstructive activities, such as the ones local mediators have built in Mont Serrat over time, have led to decreased tensions, while increasing the ease with which residents like Lia, Vilson, and others, are able to negotiate with

[83] The 500% increase in security spending in SC was the second highest increase amongst Brazil's 26 states and federal district, between 2014-2015.

[84] See: http://ccea.org.br/blog/index.php/2013/02/22/projeto-procurando-caminha-e-premiado-como-uma-das-27-melhores-iniciativas-sociais-do-brasil/ [Accessed 15 September 2015]

antagonists on a number of violence-related issues. These range from the occasional debt payoff, where interveners facilitate transactions for weapons buy back to prevent code enforcements or negotiate formal exit for young traffickers, to more complex local disputes.

In a world of limited guarantees and certainties, mediators maintain a strict practice of honoring their word. Breaking a commitment to meet or show up, even if their counterpart did not, was an unaffordable mistake in the process of building trust and respect, despite inconsistencies on the other side: "*they have their own code in the gang, which is the code of trust. If they give you their word, their word is going to stand, and yours has to stand, too"* (Lia, 27/09/12).

Interveners play supportive roles in general, often building trust by aiding or attending to the sometimes messy circumstances of young men who called upon them in times of need. According to two of my key informants, small gestures of support, including first aid or care following police raids, which sometimes include nursing young people back to health in the privacy of homes and safe spaces, were significant for bolstering legitimacy.

These less visible, influence-building actions forge critical affective ties in spaces of vulnerability, permitting interveners to more boldly engage in the more intimate and risky conversations. This behavior further extends the exemplary and positive treatment that underscores the inherent value that mediators demonstrate openly for young people, both in word and deed, crossing into their realities and being present with them on their time first as *people*, rather than shunning or labeling them as criminals, as many others do, and for which they are often criticized.

Trafficker Dialogue

Micro moments build to bigger ones. During my fieldwork, the fruit of night walks and street talks, spatial transgressions, script-breaking and subtle contestations in Mont Serrat materialized into a formal interface with Tico's soldiers; an encounter not simply between one or two individuals, but this time as a collective.

During my April 2013 stay on the *morro*, a meeting occurred between ProCam staff and a group of twenty or so young men. The meeting marked a sense of accomplishment for interveners, reaffirming their social mediation tactics of strategic outreach, which had in turn generated a new type of encounter. Here, they would emphasize and capitalize on the reconstructive potential of youth identity by proposing alternatives to the tedium (*mesmice*) of trafficking life.

Where social mediative tactics no doubt contributed to catalyzing this encounter, three additional circumstances likely conspired to help materialize this meeting. On the one hand, the exercise of street talks and night walks in Mont Serrat increased from late 2012 to 2013. Along with Vilson, Guga increased his participation in boundary-crossing incursions. As an Afro-Brazilian male and former professional footballer for Florianópolis' *Figuerense FC*, his mere presence carried its own weight amongst local youth.

Similarly provocative, was the local assassination of Diego in early 2013, which shook Mont Serrat amongst rumors of territorial conflict. This coincided with a prison-torture scandal and series of bus burnings and attacks on police and police stations throughout Florianópolis and cities statewide. In the midst of these events, however, Mont Serrat saw no overt violence or related destruction, though the adjacent *Caieira* area did. Finally, Lia also moved homes, occupying a new home closer to the *Caixa* area, allowing for a more proximate contact with this particular group. This 'spatial coup' in some ways re-distributed or increased local influence as access to Lia was significantly enhanced over those months. While it would be impossible without further research to discern the causality of the meeting, the direction of influence is still remarkably correlative.

Sitting in the *roda* or circle, the eldest of Tico's soldiers, as if speaking for all, expressed interest in participating in the ProCam project. The dialogue that unfolded was neither entirely transactional nor transformative. It entailed talks about collaboration and new codes of coexistence. Interveners recognized and affirmed affective links, and the identities of the young men *as part of* the community. The ambience created is anticipated to open the door to a respectful participation by young traffickers in ProCam activities.

At the meeting, nerves were palpable, even amongst ProCam staff, who sat in the CCEA's *Espaço Seu Teco* annex, together with the young men. Save for one young man who moved to Mont Serrat eight years ago, Vilson had baptized every one of them. I would later learn that none of the boys have living fathers, as all had been killed or died from addiction. Toninho, the ProCam coordinator, invited each of them to say their name, and their neighborhood. Vilson then inquired into what it was that made them organize, and show up, asking why they wanted to be involved in the project.

In their own words, the young men spoke to a variety of change-oriented desires to the *mesmice* or monotony and sameness of their lives in the trade. They wanted to '*change their daily routines; find a change of scenery; to do something different; to get a change of pace.'* Vilson once asked who amongst them had children, and '*what does having a child mean?'* in the context of their lives. Replies came in muffled utterances of '*responsibility*,' and '*makes you want something better*.' Saying it out loud almost further problematized the way the young men contemplated their employment. Their responses seemed to arise less out of shame, and more in focus of their own considerations of legacy, as well as the ability to reflect on the tedium in their lives, or even whether or not some would live long enough to be parents.

Each staffer took a different approach in negotiating new relational terms that would form the basis of their participation in the project. While Toninho moderated, Guga proposed a challenge. He was firm in outlining his expectations of a social contract, inviting co-responsibility onto the young men when working together:

> *"I've never turned my back on anybody. I went out after you guys. Now here we are together. I am not gonna go chasing you screaming - 'hey, you guys, the bus is leaving'. But don't risk the reputation of the project for a bag of drugs that will get us all pinched. Look, you guys do what you do, that's part of your life. But when we are together, this is* ours*,* we *earn this,* we *built this – give respect to be respected. No showing up baked or strapped (raising his shirt as if to reach for a concealed weapon). That's not how people know me around here."*

There were no moral inquiries, no explicit mention of neighborhood tensions, past or present. Vilson's own opening words posed a new direction: *"We all have some past relationship, but what remains now that we have here in this common space is our connection through the territory."*

As in night walks, the general approach by all was in unique ways inviting, leaning on a shared recognition of history, and oriented those present to a reaffirmation of trust. Vilson approached the territorial question by invoking the connectedness through the territory they cohabitate, which defines them and binds them, and through which they literally cross pathways daily. Inspired more by solidarity than religion, no scripture was quoted, despite, to my surprise, Vilson's invocation of baptism toward the end. This particular encounter, he suggested, was like the act of passing water over the head: *"it indicates that each of you here, have to find your way".* Many of the young men in that room continue to participate today.

Conclusions

So far, thesis has ethnographically examined the complex mix of conflict and violence on the *morro.* In discussing the way that residents experience local disputes and tensions sourced from the nexus of competing violent social ordering processes, we have seen how antagonistic actors and their interactions help sustain the daily sense of insecurity and disempowered citizenship in the context of resolving even everyday problems.

Simultaneously, residents do not always remain silent or static in the face of their problems. Amongst those who exercise this agency, third party mediators exhibit a dynamic and strategic set of interventions to help resolve problems, but also reconfigure relationships, perceptions, interactions, and subjectivities. The variety of socially mediative tactics that mediators use, derive in part from their orientation to territorial dynamics. These tactics interrupt social scripts during exchanges between antagonistic actors in key spaces of social production, attempting to mitigate the way by which insecurity, fear, and violence transmit into the lives of residents on the hill.

Mediators also cross boundaries as part of their mediative repertoire, strategically interrupting, problematizing, and contesting, in non-confrontational ways. This ultimately reconstructive repertoire provokes new encounters, builds constructive connections, and fosters both individual and collective reconstructive possibilities involving antagonists who play an important role in sustaining the violent social order on the *morro*.

As research on violence, and anti-gang or prevention practices have demonstrated, change in such patterns does not happen either over night, nor in a vacuum or in isolation. Focusing all attention on localized efforts would ultimately fail, for example, to create a shift in the way that residents experience violence and insecurity. Rather, shifts are more likely to occur where and when proactive and strategic efforts reach beyond fragmented individual, interpersonal, or relational levels to foster an intersection of these realms. In this way, we must ask how social mediative tactics used internally, also look beyond the periphery, to the intersection of actors and forces that are not necessarily present or operational on the *Maciço.*

Understanding mediative efforts of morro residents and their implications on social change thus begs inquiry into whether or how these intermediary tactics become useful or create impact outside the morro, to influence violence's reproductions. Where previous chapters have observed internally oriented intervention practices, the following chapter examines the influences of mediative tactics, particularly boundary crossing by Vilson and others, with a focus on Florianópolis' state actors and civil society elite. It explores these external, as well as internal examples of how this form of mediation has cultivated non-dominating power to foster social change on the *morro.*

CHAPTER SEVEN

Mediation as a Practice of Non-Dominant Power

When we act in the world, we are not just operating within structural constraints. Rather, we are also determining the nature of those structures through our actions and interactions. The structures which oppress us, then are not only contextual. They are also constituted through our actions. This means that we can challenge those arrangements by engaging in 'inappropriate' behavior".

- Bob Pease (2004: 45)

Introduction

The previous chapters have evidenced how mediative practices, or the social mediative tactics carried out by local activists include a unique and catalyzing intervention repertoire. These find mediators intervening in situations that range from escalatory community tensions, to interpersonal or intrafamilial disputes. Intermediary roles and activities also infiltrate the interactions and internal realities of territorial antagonists like traffickers. Such intermediary activity, while strategically accomplished, can be characterized by risky, deconstructive, inappropriate, and reconstructive behaviors.

Though non-confrontational, mediators are nevertheless openly oppositional where they can be, based on prior efforts to create and take advantage of constructive tensions. This is part of a process through which key informants build mediative legitimacy in spaces predominantly held by local actors who use coercion and intimidation to complicate residents' lives when they attempting to address social conflicts and localized disputes.

While this study did not initially or specifically aim to make or measure any definitive conclusion regarding the broader effects or social impact that local interveners might make, original data from Florianópolis suggests that interventions do presuppose very real and strategic possibilities for effecting social change in a context of urban violence. Interveners accomplish this in the exercise of their mediative capacities, through which they are seen to cultivate

non-dominating legitimacy. Using conflict, disputes, and the existence of territorial tensions as platforms, mediators play strategic peacebuilding roles through their participation in non-violently shaping the local social order on the *Maciço.*

Building on this analysis, this chapter explores the socially transformative effects that I claim social mediation tactics to have in facilitating critical shifts in the way that existing structural and interactional dynamics perpetuate patterns of violence and insecurity in Florianópolis' *morro* communities. To do so, I drawing from Jenny Pearce's (2007, 2013a) development of Non-Dominating Power (NDP), each of which I explore (though not in linear order) alongside fieldwork examples that evidence the materialization of Pearce's six NDP propositions. I reinforce these ties by tracing these examples back to the orientation, logic, and social mediative tactics discussed previously in this thesis.

In my discussion, I place particular emphasis on the role and figure of Vilson, whose boundary-crossing role and mediative presence, I observe, are used to strategically engage and build legitimacy with key actors, politics, and institutions of power *outside* the city's peripheries. This work resonates with ripple effects to internally impact the social transmission of violence. In this way, interventions are employed to facilitate impact on two interdependent levels: internally, to resist, contest, connect and thereby assert non-violent, non-dominating power into dominating and violent social ordering, and; externally, through the convening and construction of critical spaces for dialogue that promote civic as well as political action, also serving to contest and problematize state and civil society actions, or omissions, that reinforce social and economic vulnerabilities and insecurity.

The empirical data that I use to argue this claim are based on the totality of interviews and narratives of *morro* residents, civil society actors, and state agents, complemented by fieldwork observations bookended by the longitudinal period between May 2012 and November 2014. Examples that demonstrate the non-dominating nature of mediative capacities include: The story of Javier, a former PGC council member, currently employed with the CCEA; the shifting

relationship amongst trafficker an non-trafficker community leadership, focused on Mont Serrat traffickers and Vilson; Outcomes of local mediation efforts to manage community tensions in the assault on Dona Dida, and the *Caixa* noise incident, and; The RACDCA justice network and *Mocotó-Cor* projects. These last elements are examples that evidence how mediation and dialogue helped to introduce and sustain concrete changes to the way that *morro* residents, and particularly young men and women in conflict with the law, will heretofore experience sources of violence, exclusion and deprivation in relation to interfaces with the state system designed to protect and uphold citizenship rights.

Non-Dominating Power

Pearce's (2013a: 641) development of non-dominating power (NDP) defines is as that which "nurtures cooperation and capacity to act but which also impacts and generates change." Drawing from Mansbridge (1996, 1998, 2001), Pearce uses empirical experiences to explore NDP and "counter mainstream understandings of power which might revitalize and sustain agency for change and ultimately democracy from the 'bottom up'."

Based on the "emancipatory family members (power to, power with, and legitimate power over)," Pearce (2013a: 642) posits six propositions, each of which I discuss in turn, which are all founded on the notion that "out of oppositional discourses and cultures emerges the potential for replacing existing cultures and instruments, potentially offers a framework of inquiry beyond empowerment".

In this thesis, I contend that social impact of mediator activities can be observed when mediator engagements foster shifts in the way that antagonistic actors exercise, cultivate, or violently deploy their own legitimacy and power. Comprehending mediators' potential for fostering social and possibly even economic impacts beyond an individually empowering orientations (such as mediation ideologies I critique in Chapter 1), requires us to trace the ways in which mediative tactics are used to deconstruct and transform the way that oppressive or dominating forms of social control, rendered through codes, policies, and institutional structures, facilitate violence and insecurity.

This potential can more accurately be defined as the way that mediators use "co-active" power (Follet, 1924, cited in Pearce, 2013a). I suggest that co-active power is applied through interventions with key actors that catalyzes or facilitates diverse outcomes from the anticipated norms or expectations. This includes the leveraging of influence by certain key informants based on their insider-legitimacy, in hopes of assuring or promoting non-violent outcomes during negotiations with territorial antagonists who this thesis observes to employ violence or escalate conflict as a way to sustain their power.

Cultivating Internal Power

Javier's World

The story of Javier is exemplary in demonstrating how mediators' relational influence on young traffickers can catalyze their opting to transition away from violent subjectivities. Javier's story is one such case, which illustrates Pearce's third proposition (2013a: 650) that "power that is non-dominating strengthens the capacity of oneself and others to act and impact on the world."

Javier, who in 2012 deduced during our interview that he was around 31 years old, worked as a youth coordinator, at the time of this writing, at the CCEA's *Jovem Aprendiz* program. As a teenager living in the *Chico Mendes* neighborhood of the capital, Javier (29/08/12) saw many of his friends murdered, including some at point blank range. His brother was also assassinated in trafficking, and his mother died shortly thereafter from a health condition induced by what Javier described as situational depression.

A former trafficking leader and member of Florianópolis' PGC council, Javier was also a founding member of the CCEA's original *Procurando Caminho* group. Between 2012 and 2013 fieldwork, Javier and others like him would discuss their shifts away from trafficking, and into legitimate economic and non-violent social roles in their communities and lives. In Javier's case, he ultimately started along a pathway to become an insider-mediator who engaged local antagonists, after only a few months of involvement in the ProCam project.

Through our discussions, Javier reflected about the risks and value of boundary crossing that he himself had performed, which helped to reduce unforeseen

levels of neighborhood violence in Chico Mendes in the late 2000s. These recollections were intertwined with reflections about how he, too, went through a reconstructive identity process, in ways that diminish the value he had once associated with trafficking and the use of instrumental violence in the street-market economy and organized crime, which had nevertheless brought him status as a local leader:

> Javier: "*Chaleico's* mom, who drove the first bus and accompanied us during [ProCam] activities, eventually got into drugs. After some time, Ivone realized she was an addict, and asked me [to lead the group], almost from the beginning. So I organized, got everybody together, scheduled the pickup and supervised the guys at the beach so they wouldn't smoke too much or screw around. I became responsible."
>
> "We stopped selling and started to show the other groups that we could change. There were no shoot-outs during that time. The other groups [in the area] were like '*what*?' We were setting an example, even for the other groups that wanted to kill us. One day I got up the courage and went in *Novo Horizonte*, me and another project leader, and we talked to the guys there - *'hey we are so-and-so and we want peace. Listen man, we don't want more conflict with you guys, we want to get dignified jobs, we don't want to carry guns anymore.'"*
>
> Jared: "That was courageous."
>
> Javier: "It was! We could have been killed! But I mean, we got done with the project one day and we were like, *vamos*! After seven months we decided to go, after basically seeing the change we'd made in [our] guys. So what did we do? We were able to make peace with the guys from that community, basically like, if you don't come over here, we won't go after you. So kids started circulating more freely, and not just in those areas."
>
> Jared: "So you made a deal?"
>
> Javier: "We made an agreement, and we started to show that other groups that we were changing. We stopped smoking, we were in better shape, we were changing, going back to school, etc."

Javier's literal boundary-crossing actions, facilitated in part by his ProCam experiences, are consistent with Pearce's (2013a: 651) third (as well as fourth) proposition of non-dominating power, the first of which posits power in the

possibility of changing social structures, positing a distinction between domination vs. that of activity and achievement, arguing that "ableness, activity and achievement are key elements of non-dominating power, combining capacity to act, and also to impact on the world". Javier's participation over time in the ProCam project impacted his manner of acting, quite literally, when he took it upon himself to try to impact the local power and violent behaviors of the the street-market and organized groups. However temporarily his achievements may have been, his actions served to shift and interrupt local violence dynamics, while restructuring norms amongst his peers, whose worlds had been so violently shaped while growing up.

As Javier himself noted, his mediative proclivities and emerging identity as a local non-violently oriented leader assigned unexpected social value to his own exercise of non-dominating mediative agency. While this both surprised and encouraged even him and his peers (not to mention their antagonistic counterparts) it also speaks to the way that small, risky boundary-crossing gestures can make a wider impact on the territory. Although this negotiation helps establish a cease-fire style peace, Javier's actions, similar to the intent behind night walks, street talks, and the ProCam logic, contrast to police perspectives seen in Chapter 4, which use violent or abusive tactics in seeking to establish 'breathing room' for young people and social life to flourish without violence.

Tico, Baga, Vilson, and the Caixa Dispute

Relations of power between *morro* community leaders, as well as patterns of violence associated with trafficking, have shifted over the course of generations in MS. As residents confirmed, Baga's use of intimidation became politically precarious, initiating a steep rise in local homicides and fear. As Vilson recalled:

> Vilson: "Trust is developed over the years that one lives here. Those years give way to relationships, correlation of forces, friends, alliances, enemies, etc. Those things all shift over time. My presence in the periphery is *emblematic.* With all that we have done, I could have been assassinated. Perhaps emblematic because of the fact that I never blamed A, B, C, or D, for the murders, or railed against them; but I never failed to show, at a funeral, or in a time of crisis."

> "That said there have been funerals that I didn't want to preside over, but I went. When Baga was alive, he tried to impose their code and order, directly confronting community institutions. There were occasions in which he slashed the tires of my car. Once they used a nail to slice open the hood, and spilled all the fluids. They sent me a message."
>
> Jared: "A written message?"
>
> Vilson: "No, they came by to tell me in the street, '*you see what they did to your car? The same can be done to your body.'* We had a closed meeting in the church of about 40 people with whom we had extreme trust, about what we should do, whether I should stay or leave. We decided that I should stay. For a very vulnerable time I slept inside my house while the community provided safety; It was different here, totally fragile, and for months, a person always stayed here, awake."
>
> "[Baga] tried three times to assassinate me. The second time, he paid [for my murder] with cocaine, and what happened? In the group that would execute me, there was this son of a *pai de santo*[85] who was in the dying process. I accompanied him the whole week until he died, then did his funeral. In that process, one early morning, his son came knocking on my door saying that he had something important to say. And he revealed the plan, even in that difficult time. He saw what I did for his father, went against the gang and [secretly] came to tell me that I was going to be killed."

This antagonistic relationship between Vilson and Baga, who initiated trafficking on the *morro*, contrasts to that of Tico, now in charge, demonstrated by the respect that Tico and his crew have begun to afford Vilson. In the following example, Vilson recalls the violent encounter of being assaulted in this home in December 2011 by two men from outside the community:

> Vilson: "When they came to my door and they said '*don't react*'. What? You invade my house and tell me not to react? I struggled, but it was just me against two of them. They hit me with a chain and drew blood. I must have fainted. I knew them. Perhaps that's why I reacted. They had been painting my house, some subcontractors of a subcontractor. They'd covered their faces with charcoal, but I knew who they were."

[85] The title of a Candomblé community's religious leader.

“I was in the back room, where you stay. Cida had come by earlier and told me, *'these two guys are doing cocaine.'* The day before, one of my neighbors said – *‘there are two guys watching your house.’* That night I even locked the door, which I didn’t ever do. They took 10,000€ in cash that I was holding from a donor to give to the Church’s Guinea Bissau project. But what’s losing 10,000€ compared to your life? Nothing.”

Jared: “Were they apprehended?”

Vilson: “No. I didn’t even put in a police report. [Tico’s] traffickers stood guard watching my house for a month. They sent me a message, saying I could sleep peacefully (he chuckles).”

“I woke up after fainting to see where they were. I called out to *Seu Toca* (a neighbor) through the window. (*Laughing*) Dona Ivonette (Toca’s wife) had an appointment with Dr. Galvão the next morning at 7am, and she told him. He called his people and they called their people and the whole city knew about it. The press came to my house. Some reports were cruel. They said, ‘*it’s good for him to see how we feel when we are robbed,’* or, *‘See, he works for the bandidos, and look what they do to him*.’ But those guys who assaulted me weren’t even from here.”

“I sat in the street before mass and thought about how cruel violence can be. I thought about the cruelty of the act of violence. Perhaps this is why violence in the flesh is traumatic. For about 20 days it was traumatic for me. It wasn’t fear. It was the feeling of remembrance. The chill in my body that I felt for a while was the same chill of the impact I felt when they attacked me. You see, a response by a trafficker or the state does nothing. You are left to deal with your body. And nobody responds. Did you see the way Dida’s house was destroyed? Nobody responds.”

“Violence makes its mark, but you have to look larger than that. It renders you impotent. You can’t see it as just factual – you’ve gotta see it as historical. All violence is a scream, with a demand behind it. The youth here, they are produced by this violence. Violence is an education that should have the [counter] opportunity to say, ‘what we are doing is violent’. Are they unconscious of their own act of violence? Is Tico, in what he did to Lúcio, conscious of this? Correctives could be many: a beating, punishment in economic terms; they could stop him from selling. But they make his body suffer. It’s overwhelming barbarity what they do. And this is in our face, our side of the fence, and in our house on this island of a half a million people.”

Notably, there is no love between Vilson and Tico. Nor is not my intention to causally link, or evaluate the differences in the way distinct actors mete out violence or *correitivos* to sustain their legitimacy. The distinction between the actions of Tico and Baga, in relation to local leaders like Vilson, I claim, evidences a shift in the way that Vilson's presence and work over time in the community have afforded him a distinct legitimacy in the eyes of the local *patrão*.

Tico's men offer an unsolicited, protective response, which speaks to fruits of mediator labors that have, over time, demonstrated consistency as proactive, non-criminalizing, non-exploitive engagements with traffickers in community conflict and non-conflict scenarios and interactions. Data concurrent with this example suggests a trend that non-dominating power of mediators on the hill is, at best, making people think. I also observed Vilson decide to use this to his advantage in the Caixa noise dispute.

On the one hand, Lia once suggested: "*Tico once told me [he thinks] if Padre Vilson called the police up here, they would take us all prisoner.*" On the other, the men involved in the Caixa noise dispute elected to approach and draw upon Tico's influence as a resource for managing the growing tensions as a result of the noise and brewing animosities. Unlike residents who may seek out traffickers to exercise third party intervener roles discussed in Chapter 1, here it is not Tico to whom the men go to trouble-shoot the issue. Rather, the respect between Vilson and Tico positions Tico as a resource for Vilson in the management of the dispute. Tico's power, in parallel to Vilson's ability to call on him, is key, and factors instrumentally into the decision made about how to address and non-violently satisfy the primary goals of residents – to quell both the noise *and* growing tensions amongst residents and young traffickers.

Pearce's (2013a: 655) sixth proposition of NDP contends: "*authority remains conceptually and practically important to the growth of non-dominating power. However, authority which is co-constructed in coactive spaces is not a force of conservation sanctified by tradition, but an immanent and dynamic source of trust amidst turbulence and uncertainty*." Authority here is that afforded to a legitimate local authority, symbolized by Vilson and those who seek him out,

who demonstrates consistency in “co-active participatory processes,” rather than the authority of a puppeteer.

Rather, Vilson’s non-dominating authority “preserves the human desire for stability and trust without conserving and reifying them in ways which serve the persistence of dominating power”. In this way, Tico’s power can be seen as leveled, and co-opted, for the purposes of assuaging hyper-local disputes within his own sphere of influence, in which Vilson retains enough certainty that his approach will be effective in getting Tico to act.[86]

The Dida Resolution

Pearce’s (2013a: 649) second proposition states that non-dominating power is grown through the way conflict, disagreement and difference are addressed, turning these into productive and non-violent instruments for change. Here, Pearce draws on Mary Parker Follet’s notion of *power with*, for which she locates the alternative of “interpenetration,” as opposed to that of compromise or concession, in which power with offers “possibilities for group members to thrash out something beyond the sum of the parts” (Pearce, 2013a: 650, citing Mansbridge, 1998: xxiii).

For non-dominating power to demonstrate it can act on dominating power, it must challenge oppressive capacities. Citing Arendt’s understanding of power as the opposite of violence, Pearce (2013a: 650, citing Pearce, 2007) contends that NDP “could potentially be correlated with a process of diminishing violence,” whereby a “form of power which enables others, which fosters cooperation and … capacity to act together for change… might arguably also impact the recourse to violence”.

In the saga of Dona Dida, I suggest that the process which unfolded as a result of mediator intervention represents an exercise of non-dominating power, in that rather than intervening to negotiate a transactional or monetary repair for the damages done to Dida or her property, the dialogue convened by mediators with *Descoberta* traffickers sparks an opportunity for the CCEA to forge presence in new territory.

[86] In this case, it is assumed Tico would act non-violently, as traffickers playing music is not a code-breaking misstep.

At the very least, in theory, this enables additional footholds by which mediators begin their work in an untouched stronghold of power that traffickers consistently held over that area, influencing local youth in significant ways, providing them an uninterrupted stream of labor. In a way, the convening intervention provides a pathway through which local residents infiltrate and *interpenetrate coactively*, transgressing strategically and physically the 'trafficker territory'.

The answer to Dona Uda's *meio-campo* played out as MS leaders gathered in Vilson's living room after mass. It was then that the small cohort of mediative actors decided that Ana and Uda would contact *Descoberta* trafficking leaders, Kiko, Schwa, Diego, and Falso, inviting them to a meeting that took place only a few days later in Vilson's home. Vilson (28/09/12) opened:

> "We have been talking about things for a while and wondering what we might do to become closer, and see how we can help you out. Some of you have kids now and we think a lot about that. Ana was here yesterday saying, *'let's call those guys and see how we can help out.'* We want to know what's happening with you, and your kids. We live close to each other and have this idea of living a little closer together, you know? So the objective of this meeting is to ask, how do you all see that? Living closer together, that conversation?"

General exchanges led quickly into vociferous complaints regarding community and quality of life issues. Frustrations were voiced, specific infrastructure and developmental concerns were surfaced, and it becomes evident that each young man plays a local leadership role beyond trafficking, even organizing *Descoberta* youth to play in a city football league. As this negotiation unfolds over hours, continuing on subsequent days, a mutually serving collaboration emerges, which establishes a meeting with ProCam project staff and local leaders to see about formalizing the project's presence.

Mediating with security in mind, in this case, did not involve revisiting Dida's assault. Instead, the intervention draws on the premise of the incident and heightened tensions non-confrontationally, almost unassumingly, to work toward a higher goal of building relationships across previously impenetrable and antagonistic, if co-existing borders. The only reference to Dida's home came indirectly, from Ana, toward the end of the initial night's conversation, after risk

seemed improbable, and a certain interpenetration and sense of agreement had been reached:

> Ana: “Ok, now that we have this taken care of… I am gonna say something to you really honestly - that NOISE, *my god*, people! You gotta have better sense about you. Dona Uda’s mom is 84. Dona Kinha is 84. Dona Gia is 85. My aunt is 87. There are days when that sound is just intolerable. You have the right to listen to it, but turn it down a little!
>
> Vilson: “Put ‘a little control’ on it” (*dar um controladinho*)
>
> Kiko: (Sheepishly) “I know, I know, if they had just talked to us, but sometimes, I know, but they should just go talk to [the guys] instead of calling the police. That gets the argument heated!”
>
> Ana: “You know, between 2am and 4am I don’t hear it because I fall asleep with the TV on, but if you could just moderate the sound a bit, on the weekends. Why don’t you put on some of that suave music, something *sexy*. I mean, all that rap music?! *Nossa*!”

A series of similar meetings would transpire in late September and early October of 2012, leading into neighborhood walk-throughs where traffickers led the ProCam team on something of a scouting walk, to get to know each other and discuss organizing possibilities. No one engaged in discussion of reparations for Dida’s home, but nor did she leave the community. In one sense, the initial and subsequent meetings bypassed or even dismissed individual restorative possibilities.

This was on par with observations I made of Gelson at school, as well as Cida’s attacking of Diego’s ex-girlfriend. Instead, the mediators prioritized collective safety and making middle- to long-term gains over short-term restorations or reparations. That is, they did not endeavor to promote relational harmony, but instead used the convening of a dialogue to reduce tensions and infiltrate new spaces that would create broader impact. This demonstrated the fruits of a strategic analytical exercise based on a recognition of the interplay between dominating and non-dominating power at work in the periphery. It also signals the potential of the latter that key informants used to achieve strategic spatial influence where they had not before.

By not engaging the trafficking leaders confrontationally, admonishing behaviors, or attempting to exact reparations, mediators' approach to intervention took a different route, albeit one that effectively re-oriented local antagonisms while enhancing their proximity. This would lead to an increasing the likelihood of non-trafficking actors establishing a much broader influence or legitimacy with local generations of youth through the ProCam project.

Elite Intervention

Pearce's (2013a: 647) first proposition posits that NDP is grown from "cooperative human interaction, which, over time, reduces and ultimately challenges the normalization of dominating power". Based on Follet's concept of power *with*, NDP grows "through encounters with the desires and experiences of others," and "create a new 'whole' out of the parts and new forms of agency".

I contend that Vilson's social mediative tactics of boundary crossing and problematization with actors outside the *morro*, offer deconstruction of social scripts that are, in this case of city elites and state agents whose actions and omissions can shape the way that authorities and institutions can wield violence and increase insecurity to effect morro communities, sustains this proposition by working to reduce the fear and social distance.

It does so through the way Vilson has built elite partnerships, which in turn foster a *re-crossing* of boundaries that infuses critical human and financial resources into periphery neighborhoods in ways that the state's efforts to do so have resulted in the generation of instability and insecurity. Vilson serves not only as an intermediary between these worlds, but also as a gatekeeper. His activities furthermore catalyze and enable the legitimacy of the IVG organizations' non-dominating legitimacy with residents as such actions promote participatory community development.

No Such Thing as a Free Lunch

Shadowing Vilson included an upside, not simply for a good meal, but also for my own research and networking purposes to speak with diverse individuals. These included visits, invitations, and meals in elite spaces in the city center.

> *Field Notes (11/11/14):* Lunch today was a plate of luxury. Kids all have iPads to keep themselves entertained, while the parents discuss upcoming holidays to Rome, Lisbon, and London where one family will visit their son at university. They ask me about my work, and as usual, comment on the status of the US economy and US-Brazilian relations.

In these spaces, near but so far from situations of misery from which Vilson has just come, he also builds critical connections. He has been invited to lunch and give a blessing and prayer before the approaching holidays. But this is not all. Vilson often utilizes such opportunities strategically, such as for marketing or showcasing some of his experiences or working realities for this group, who are also donors to the '*projetos,'* yet only vaguely familiar with the ins and outs of everyday complexities and urgencies of socio-educational work. Some of these donors come from the São Sebastião church, where Vilson gives mass twice per week. In this way, he also fosters a more cohesive cross-boundary flow of resources and volunteers, who are increasingly gravitating toward supporting IVG-network projects.

Still, he uses the space to bridge realities, mediating this space by bringing distant worlds closer together, translating stories in ways that people across distant social dividing lines can grasp and understand. I observed this pattern during events like masses or funerals, from periphery communities to elite churches in the center, between which Vilson might work in a matter of hours, often formulating and articulating the same messages to each community, in ways that resonated poignantly yet contextually, tailored to the worldviews or concerns of his target audience. As Vilson once described to me:

> "The way that you approach and talk with this other side has to be a way in which you don't shy away from a type of message that communicates the other [periphery] dimension. Even at a funeral. I spoke about the understanding of what it means to be a human being and that love is that which helps us transform and be in service of others*. You have to be able to grab elements that make sense in that world in order to generate reflections such that they begin to understand the other side of things that most times never cross paths."*

> "The problem is that we transit between those two worlds - in minutes, I'm in a world that's not the *morro*. In that world, there were bouquets that cost probably R$8000. That could give a family from the *morro* a whole year of dignified

> nourishment. If I don't start there, we're not going to break culturally with the process of social inequality, which becomes a cultural process, and produces a dangerous co-existence that people become used to. These are cultural violences that perpetuate themselves through relationships" (24/04/13).

At lunch, Vilson tells a story about one of the recovering young women in the CCEA's *comunidade ambiental*, a young blonde-haired girl of 19, with crystal blue eyes who had come from a rural area. Adopted by a local woman who took her in, she was kept as a slave for domestic servitude. The girl finally escaped and went to live in the street. Today, she is recovering and recuperating her life after surviving on the street for some time.

The aptly named *comunidade ambiental* is perhaps not just a clever name, but rather, a way to speak about a constructive approach the CCEA is taking to Florianópolis' recurring "homeless" question. The initiative contrasts with disparaging media and police attention and discourse, which has included a 2012 city wide round-up and criminal record-building profiling of mostly dark-skinned individuals whom police "suspect" of being homeless.

In another story he recalls Artur's improving health, the baby of a recovering crack addict, in which Vilson personalizes and humanizes the regularity of such cases through a care-based scenario, to which most at the table will never be exposed. Vilson shares the challenges along with the positives – a young Diego's (a medical student) university experiences, and upcoming graduation, toward which some of the donors in this group have contributed support.

These efforts do not just butter-up donors. By carrying stories from the periphery to the center, Vilson uses his legitimacy in strategic ways, to touch upon the 'experiences and desires of others,' taking up the task of shaping internal elite narratives about what are often difficult realities that he deals with everyday. No negotiation takes place. His mediative role is that of translating, and also influencing, suggesting to me later that listening is still the key tool – not convincing. Discussing ways to resist naturalizing a dominant view of the world, Pease (2004: 41 citing Tillner, 1997: 3) asserts that one must "question the appearance of naturalness" when interrogating dominant identities, or,

> "Lay open their contingency, their dependency on power relations and to particularise them'. He proposes an important strategy of endeavouring to represent non-dominant identities as 'normal' and representing dominant identities as 'particular' as a way of subverting the tendency form dominant groups to always represent themselves as the 'universal'."

Vilson's approach is to not simply humanize, but problematize violence and insecurity faced by *morro* residents in the eyes of the city's elite citizens who, by action or omission in the face of political, economic, or security-related influence, can have significant impact on peoples' lives. In these spaces, he strives to normalize his neighbors, proposing challenges of *morro* families in the realm of an elite family gathering, or in sync with the ethic of a faith-based gathering at mass.

On the urban front, violence is in many ways experienced in Brazil in a highly democratic way, accessible to all at any given time. As Souza e Silva (2003)[87] concluded, dispelling Ventura's (1968) notion of the *cidade partida*, or divided city, the pain and fear of violence is not limited to, nor "intrinsic" to the favelas, but rather a unifying social dynamic belonging to the city as a whole. Vilson unifying advantage is this, as he shuttles and discusses the realities of suffering and struggle across social dividing lines, smuggling them into places where these details would never otherwise appear.

That was the second time I had heard the story about the enslaved 19 year-old blonde. Moments earlier, driving to the restaurant, the version of the story that Vilson told me was much more graphic in its detail about the severity of the situation of abuse and slavery that had befallen the young girl, who was a minor at the time of her enslavement. The contrast reminded me of Vilson's sophistication when it came to literally translating realities into a digestible form for distinct palates. We stay at the luncheon only briefly, as Vilson must leave to attend another meeting. Before we go, he asks the families to stand and lock hands in a prayer:

> "We thank the families here for another year of companionship and strength, and we are reminded of the Christmas spirit and that he made us in his image.

> So we remember that we must work together - and remember that as we look toward the upcoming year, there is sun above the clouds."

The Mocotó-Cor Project

Vilson has only in recent years begun to operationalize his elite connections. In part this is due to self-imposed seclusion after years of struggling against political and social elites. It is also due to his analysis of the expanding drug and weapons trade in the city, and steadily climbing levels of violence between traffickers and police during incursions.

The idea of establishing a greater presence in *Mocotó* through social project intervention, which persists as one of the capital's more volatile areas, had been an idea mulling for over a decade, but neither ACAM nor the CCEA ever had a critical mass of laborers or resources with which to follow through. Mocotó-Cor is a participatory, resident-designed, community reinvestment project that began its first phase in November 2014 of aesthetic improvements including infrastructure painting, repair, and general neighborhood trash clean up.

The project was borne and created alongside Valter Koerich, a wealthy businessman, whose friendship and partnership Vilson had begun to court informally in 2012, at a lunch meeting I also attended. Koerich provided not only the main financial backing and squadron of volunteers, and facilitate an approach to the project based on the premise of a collaborative, non-assistential characteristic, marking evidence of non-dominating possibilities, rather than elite imposition of development 'for the impoverished.' As an intermediary, or 'democratic' mediator (von Lieres and Piper, 2013), Vilson plays a critical role in translating and filtering direct community demands through ACAM/IVG, in order to give voice to families in the planning and design sessions held with Koerich and his team.

This contrasts to municipality initiatives and other public-private partnerships, which have had a history of overlooking community input in investment and improvement projects. Similarly, the nature of a sustained, volunteer-based project comes on the heels of a partnership cultivated through Vilson's personal

relationship with Keorich, which resurfaces the critical potential of fostering internal/external relations. The project offers the element of continuity and commitment, with the added benefit of creating political pressure for municipal investments, rather than just a one-off charitable event.

> *Field Notes (12/0914):* In all, 96 families were involved and had their houses painted in the first phases of this public works project. Environmental work such as *Comcap's* special garbage collection also took place. In all, 54 *Koerich* volunteers and 15 *Comcap* members, another five from Takaschima's office, myself, Vilson, and 19 ACAM educators and staff, participated. At the meeting, it becomes obvious that Koerich's involvement and relationship with Vilson (who founded ACAM 30 years ago), will enhance leverage with the city administration.
>
> The mayor's *Prefecture in the Neighborhood* initiative, which holds public forums around the city, had held thematic meetings about sewer, electricity and water at strategically distant locations in the *Queimada* area atop Mocotó. This location served to avoid residents' demands, but reducing the number of *Mocotó* residents who would realistically attend so far up, to voice their concerns. In fact, it was Koerich's idea to lobby for another Prefecture meeting down below to treat major issues. Vilson took time to walk him through the *morro* so that he could see for himself some of the treacherous terrain and demands of geography, which make it easy for the city to avoid or ignore. In this way, this new initiative cultivated by Vilson over time, has facilitated the answer to numerous demands made over generations of periphery residents, which will now make their way further to the state through intermediaries.
>
> The mediative value of *Mocotó-Cor* itself has additional ramifications. Vilson envisions this to be a counter proposal to Rio's UPP logic, through which a non-confrontational collaborative approach of community improvements will begin to foster news spaces of local civic action and increased activism for making demands on the city. Such efforts are difficult for traffickers to resist or reject, not only because these projects realize resident-directed demands, but also because, like Mocotó-Cor, they foster a strategic presence of organized volunteers *en masse* who would be difficult to stop from entering.
>
> Upon hearing about the first phase, traffickers extended their tacit approval, passing the message to Vilson via ACAM staff and parents. Yet it's questionable whether they are really giving approval, or simply realize that it cannot be stopped. The only incident with traffickers occurred when a group recognized that Keorich's videographer filming for marketing purposes was the

> same man police had once contracted to film live raids and arrests in the area. A naïve move on the part of this particular professional, but one that was nevertheless negotiated on the spot between traffickers and the team of photographers.
>
> These details suggest that social responsiveness to improving local living conditions and infrastructure is a sizable carrot without the need for sticks. In this way, Koerich has become an ally in important ways, encouraging other businesses to get in on the action and provide in-kind material resources. *Intelbras* recently contacted Koerich to see how they could get involved, but of course, they need a gatekeeper.

At a meeting with Koerich's team at his office on the Monday after the second phase of painting, Vilson (11/11/14) runs over a checklist agenda and handouts about the next stages of activities. He reminds those present from Koerich's staff of the logic behind the IVG efforts:

> "The idea is not to simply 'help' the community. There is a larger political pedagogy here, which is the break with paternalism. We don't do things *for*; we do things *with*. What we do is an educational process that works both ways. People on the *morro* do things for themselves, like painting - many families commented that they do that on their own. We seek protagonism and empowerment, not assistentialism, and push for reclaiming public spaces, which are all of ours."
>
> "*WE* want a responsive state, not one that promotes dependency - power *over* - we know the history of our country. *Mocotó-Cor* impressed upon the community a distinct type of citizenship engagement. It's like the proverb that says 'we are simple people, doing simple things, in invisible spaces.' We do this because youth happens quickly, and youth get burned quickly as many have to deal with prisons and trafficking at young ages. So our work must be done concretely, using small gestures, and in doing this, we work in the micro and influence the macro".

Koerich's text message to Vilson on the Monday following the event read: "It's good to be on your side." If nothing else, this personal sentiment reflects Pearce's third proposition that non-dominating power strengthens the capacity of oneself and others to act and impact the world.

The RACDCA Justice Network

Pearce's (2013a: 653) fifth proposition contends that "non-dominating power effects change primarily on the boundaries which limit social capacity to act rather than on power-wielding agents per se." Exploring the RACDCA network, I suggest that social mediative capacities were a critically catalytic element for convening social capacities to act toward structural change in the municipality impacting citizenship rights and protections, and catalyzing real reductions in violence. Again, this occurred through breaking down critical barriers and fostering new spaces of encounter and dialogue and encounter across lines of social conflict, distance, and antagonism, symbolically represented by state judiciary agents, law enforcement, and other 'elite' actors.

Empirical data sourced during my research suggests that state actors and non-periphery-based city elites could, and were supportive, if theoretically, of making critical contributions and playing strategically supportive roles through their spheres of influence, to foster changes in the way that their fellow citizens experienced insecurity and violence in periphery neighborhoods. Social scripts and narratives that sustain social distance amongst classes also limited them, like anyone else.

These often blinded individuals to particular realities, or simply disallowed the personal connections or gateways through which to materialize the full extent of their desire to contribute. This was true in particular for advocates of justice working for the court system, who count themselves as allies in defending and protecting rights and reducing urban violence.

RACDCA network dialogues offer an example to see the removal of barriers to the social capacity to act, in terms of the way the state and its agents exercise power that often perpetuate rights violations. It demonstrates how impact can be made through mechanisms of discussion and deliberation, which will ultimately reduce violent state behavior within the application of Brazil's protection system for minors. This coincides with Pearce's (2013a: 653) fifth proposition in that dialogue serves its participants by moving "away from an exclusive focus on the power-wielding actor and stressing the problem of dominating power itself," allowing the possibility to "reduce such power without demanding a direct

challenge to this actor." In other words, it draws out the essence of judicious and *just* intentions through collaborative, co-action to change policies, implement more stringent checks and balances, and re-configure institutional behaviors rather than simply call for mobilization and protest.

History and Origins

The Articulation and Connectivity Network for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (or RACDCA)[88] was created in 2012 after a meeting of state and non-governmental actors. These individuals shared the vision of developing activities to make Santa Catarina's treatment of minors in the socio-educational system more efficacious in accordance with the principles of integrated protection and absolute prioritization of the child and adolescent (RACDCA, 2015: 4).

RACDCA and dialogues held amongst its participants, serves as an innovative forum for public exchange through which enhanced and networked interaction amongst the state and primarily CCEA staff involved with youth in the socio-educational system, grew. The network has expanded to include law enforcement and executive authorities, technical experts, educators, administrators, and others. Whereas the network was officially borne from a coalescing of participants who recognized the deep cracks and violations of youth protection and rights, concerns that were shared during a workshop that the IVG organized in October of 2012, it was over the six months prior, in which Vilson had begun to mobilize and convene to make things happen.

In October 2012, the IVG organized, planned and held the first seminar/workshop as a public forum to discuss the "*The Cracks and Interfaces of Justice,"* a participatory event attended by approximately 70 attendees from all walks of NGO and state institutions. Panelists from CCEA, as well as Judicial officials, namely judges and psychologists, provided short presentations, including a very poignant presentation by Judge Takaschima, who discussed his efforts to overhaul the appalling conditions of youth internment centers across the state. In a poignant moment during his session, perhaps only half in

[88] RACDCA is the Portuguese acronym, which stands for Rede de Articulação e Conectividade dos Direitos da Criancça and Adolescente

jest, Takaschima noted that the conditions of youth incarceration were so dire, that efforts to induce the needed institutional reforms for youth protection within the existing system might be best enforced by invoking the *violation of federal animal rights laws*.

As Sabrina, a CCEA social worker, described:

> "The network came out of the first seminar we had – really from the group dynamic – when the working groups started to raise some of the challenges. This began to percolate and reveal details – it brought people together. And we brought those [charting] papers we created back here and worked on them! Vilson had the idea of the group. Then Takaschima brought the need for the *fluxo*, from his work with the MSEs, and these are central figures who create political will, they illuminated ideas and they are able to really push things forward, to articulate things, to mediate and influence" (20/11/14).

Afternoon workshop activities offered collaborative working-group and plenary opportunities to critically examine challenges in effectuating the System of Rights Guarantees, not only on a systemic level, but also operational obstacles. Workgroup sessions drilled down to the categorical demands and possibilities for interfaces and possibilities for change.

The richness, enthusiasm, and evident demand generated by the cross-sector collaboration led Vilson to propose that a working group continue to address the issues, which the involved state institutions all shared in their legal responsibility to improve. The "Justice Interface Commission" later the RACDCA, met the following Monday morning in the *Espaço Seu Teco* in Mont Serrat. It has continued to meet biweekly involving a small group of core, as well as at-will attendees, ever since.[89]

RACDCA's origins can be linked to Vilson's boundary-crossing efforts earlier that year. His convening efforts emerged through informally engaging state

[89] Subsequent seminars including 2013's "Cracks and Interfaces of the State" would bring together federal rights commission officials from Brasilia, while the third seminar in November 2014 focused thematically on Civil Society, including presentations and discussions with local CSO projects like the ProCam and Instituto Guga Kuerten, as well as nationally renown figures such as *Comandos do Afroreggae.*

officials, allies, and at times, even those who opposed his work, listening and discussing some of the emergent challenges that had come to his attention. At first, Vilson simply listened, to various sides of his networks and contacts, in formal meetings and informal problem-solving sessions with CCEA staff, which included whispers and stories from community residents, not uncommon in his everyday work.

In response to a particular dilemma facing the CCEA, Vilson and Ivone convened a critical meeting in mid August of 2012, with members of the judiciary and CCEA's *Casa de Acolhimento* and *Frutos Semi-Liberdade* project, to discuss the impending situation of Lori-William. Lori joined six other who had grown up under the tutelage of a state *abrigo*. Nearing 18, they would be legally forced to leave the state's custodial care. As a child of the state with no relatives to support him, Lori had none of the means necessary to pay for independent costs of living, despite his studies and employment through the *Jovem Aprendiz* program.

Similar to others in this situation, street life and trafficking was a viable economic option for a young person his age. The CCEA was also legally obligated to no longer house him, despite fierce moral resistance, the gamble of being fined, shut down, or having their funding revoked by the state, should they disobey the law, created a significant dilemma of sacrificing one for the lot. In contention, Ivone was adamant: *"we're not just going to throw them out just because the law says so"* (21/08/12). Nevertheless, attention was brought to this statewide issue about young people in this perplexing, state-induced situation of vulnerability, which offered a clear cyclical possibility of a revolving door.

Lori had begun to research what it might take to create a *república*, or dormitory/transitional home for individuals in his situation, to be presented and discussed for state officials at the meeting. Attempts by the CCEA to negotiate with representatives from the judiciary were received with support, though their overtures were limited by realistic reach to individually promote change, or secure funding or legislative approval.

Lori's plight, the CCEA's conundrum, and the shared recognition of a morally challenging but imperative pathway for creating change in the way the state did business, suggested a significant crack in the system, amongst other violation and abuses that were being surfaced. As an insider partial, Vilson had not only convened the meeting, but had also advocated for action, learning in the process about the limitations of state actors to address these and other challenges that everybody recognized, but no one entity or individual alone seemed to have the power to fix.

Network Operation

The RACDCA dialogues became a collaborative space in which similar experiences and challenges surrounding abuses, violations, and dysfunction or omissions could be shared. Institutional representatives and NGO staff, all part of the rights guarantee system, could collectively trouble-shoot or identity fragilities within their operational procedures that either perpetuated rights violations, deprioritized protection of youth rights, or created challenges between the defense of rights, and the fulfillment or compliance with institutional procedures.

In essence, the dialogues peeled away the layers of a thin democratic reality that demonstrated how fragmented and silo'ed institutions had become, while actors ran through the motion of conducting non-reflective business as usual, effectively sustaining and reproducing rights violations and, in many cases, direct violence. The large majority of the youth who committed infractions and were therefore involved in the system, originated from periphery communities, including the *Maciço*. As Lilian (18/11/14) described:

> "Collaboration already exists, but we do not *connect* at all. The network gave us the chance to connect, not just collaborate. I think our difficulty is that we don't know how to work in a connective fashion. I still don't know what that is exactly, in terms of governmental situations, and our bureaucracy. What happens is that one institution ends up going over the top of another, not because it wants to, but that's how the work gets done. It's not about seniority or one institution wanting to dominate. So the network is really the synthesis of togetherness."

One of the primary outputs of the RACDCA was the creation of a universal protocol and flow chart (*o fluxo*) to ensure proper management of youth and rights protections while under state custody, during processing or detention, which would be transparent to all the entities involved. The *fluxo* would limit the possibility that rights violations could occur under state custody through the direct violence perpetuated by security agents within the police force and in the socio-educational regime. Increasing transparency, reducing operational corruption and resolve existing inter-institutional disputes would diminish abuses and more concretely guarantee minors their legally afforded protections that were being violated from the moment of being placed in police custody.

Curiously, the network dialogues, much like the ProCam project, were in their own right, *mediative.* Participants noted that these inter-sectoral exchanges took on an inter-institutional dispute resolution function aside from the advocacy work of their charge. In effect, the network served to surface concerns, interests, positions, and envision desired futures, while also helping to resolve contentions inter-institutional disputes. In one case, such a dispute became the basis for proposed legal action by the *Polícia Civil* (PC) against the *Conselho Tutelar* (CT), for refusing to remove a minor from the *delegacia*. This laid bare the challenges associated with the state's assuming of responsibility for minor citizens' protection by institutions who consistently "passed the hot potato" of youth to each other, failing to communicate effectively, and ultimately violating young people's rights.

The hot potato passing in repeated cases, however, had a detrimental effect on young people, as well as educators and CCEA staff who were subjected to the risk of attack in the safe space of a place like *Frutos*, by rival youths. As Lilian (18/11/14) explained:

> "There are different levels of mediation here: Inter-institutional arguments and played out in those spaces between individuals, yes that happened! And it had to be dealt with – so in that space between institutions that disagreed, we dealt with that. Cristina, me, Sabrina, Takaschima, and others, would all raise challenges – like the frisking policy of youth while always being in police custody. The police would say – *'it has to be done.'* We challenged this. So the

> [protocol] deals with rights violations that were happening regularly, simply because some policy had said so! Problem-solving was happening all the time."

The dispute between the CT and the Polícia Civil was exemplary. By law, the *delegacia* required the *Conselheiros* to pick up youth who were not being sent to internment, to return them to the custody of their family and wait for their judicial hearing:

> "The delegacy would first call the family – not just let them out of the station – but if there was nobody to answer, they would call the CT and demand they drop whatever they were doing and come to get the kid, or they were threatened with arrest and imprisonment if they did not, as abnegation of their responsibilities! The officer on duty would call and say, *'you have X time to come get them out of the delegacy,'* even if they were attending to another case, [because by rule] the CT was the responsible state organ. This power wielding was relentless. If the CT did not respond, they would be [technically] breaking the law – but there were many cases in which there was not feasible return – no matter what time the night, and particularly in the early hours of the morning, once processing was complete" (Karla, 19/11/14).

In some cases, youth could not be returned home for practical reasons, either because no home or parents existed to return to, or because they were in situations of high risk of re-entering their own communities, which included trafficking vendettas or other threats to life.

Conselheiros claimed that they were also at risk to enter into communities late at night. One *Conselheiro* shared at the third seminar that he spent 17 hours in his car and his own home with one young man until he was finally able to get connected to a responsible family member. Resolution of this particular issue was made possible, while also providing a window into additional solutions that would reach other cases. As Karla (19/11/14) explained:

> "The network had a fundamental role, which was mediation. We called everybody – we convened– all the institutions – we convened the Delegacia, the Child Court reps, the CT, the Public Defender's office, the network representatives, the municipal social services secretary (of Florianópolis) and we said ok, what are we going to do with this? We have a problem to resolve. We took the ECA and read the relevant statutes and details to make sure that we cleared up all the items – how the treatment of the child must be, etc., What

happened was that we realized that *neither* the PC nor the CT actually held that responsibility."

"Unfortunately, the Secretary of Social Services didn't do the follow up and it remains an issue, because what happens is that when these situations occur in the middle of the night (when most youth are picked up by police) they have nobody to contact to go back to, but the ECA doesn't say that it's either of the institutions' responsibility to put them back into the community. So, where are they gonna sleep? They can't stay in the police station because they were processed and let go. But the police say, '*just bring them wherever'* - but who has the responsibility? It's a *minor*, a teenager, you can't just abandon and leave them. So we called that meeting, and we found an [temporary] alternative - a small space that the municipality had. The city's *abrigos* can't accept these kids in the middle of the night because normally they arrive in such a disturbed state after they've been arrested, processed, abused and beat up by the police, and probably all of their rights violated, which is really common."

"We know this because we work with an *abrigo* – it's common knowledge. They end up messing up the routine of the rest of the house – those *abrigos* strive for a familial environment, and if you force the entry of a teenager who just committed an infraction, who just got beaten up by the police, what are they going to do in the house with the others?"

"The *abrigos* began to refuse to accept these cases because they create other problems, arriving in such a state of revolt, and bring in that drama and trauma, and nor are the staffers prepared at night for a specialized treatment of that kind. They are already understaffed and may have just two people on staff, one looking after the girls and one the boys. And how can you deal with that while you have to also deal with protecting the rights of the other kids there sleeping? So this creates other problems. This temporary housing is adjacent to where the city's first homeless shelter was recently put, and we can at least in the meantime guarantee safety, a secure room, board, and a shower. Everybody agreed this was a provisory solution for now".

Rights Violations and Insecurity

The surfacing of these concerns were in part what generated a series of technical cooperation agreements amongst the involved entities, supported by high level political figures in the city and state, to enable real change inside institutions participating in the network. Discussions that led to the *fluxo* development, and a growing legitimacy and recognition of the network's innovation, were themselves a boundary-crossing medium.

Much like Vilson's elite lunches, the discussions brought together CCEA professionals working in periphery communities who would expose many of the state authorities, from middle and upper class backgrounds, to the realities of insecurity, threat, precariousness and challenges faced by periphery populations, about whom poor judicial and legal decisions were being made. These processes directly implicated collective and personal security for *morro* residents. Like *Mocotó-Cor*, critical demands and periphery voices made their way to the state through vested intermediaries and at times, residents themselves. Significantly, the systematic narratives of abuses suffered by youth, discussed in Chapter 3, were also presented and tied together for the first time, leaving actors in the network no choice but to act.[90]

Judicial decisions rendered by judges, who faced a lack of vacancies at youth incarceration centers, had also forced youth in state custody into scenarios of heightened risk, like Karla described, increasing insecurity amongst residents for example, at the CCEA frutos semi-liberdade program. Judges argued that youth had to be sent *somewhere*, despite spaces like *Frutos* being unprepared and uninformed about such cases. Sabrina (20/11/14) related an all too familiar issue:

> *"Kids would arrive at Frutos not because something worked, but because there was nowhere else to go.* So kids would come sent on behalf of the judge or secretary of justice, who would say – go there [to Frutos] – because realistically they would be afraid of the kid, and say *'go, just get out of here. There's a vacancy there,'* and they would send them. After São Lucas closed, there was no room. So what started to happen? The state judges started sending kids, who had committed really egregious crimes, violence, homicides, etc. You have to have a different structure set up for treating and giving attention to these issues!"

[90] Dialogue amongst agents involved in the network revealed a series of physical, as well as civil rights abuses, perpetuated in many cases inside institutions, such as São Lucas, closed for gross violations and deteriorating conditions, where provisional responsibility to educate youth, for instance, were being widely ignored. A regular fixture of violations came at the civil police delegacies, as discussed in chapter three. In Joinville, *socio-educativo* authorities were forcing all new entries to shave their heads.

> "If they are coming directly to the *semi-liberdade*, which is a process-oriented project, *not* a provisional measure, they're with other kids there, and are either going to desert and leave, or start repeating dangerous behaviors with other kids at the house. We experienced that a lot in these last years. They sent us these kids when they shouldn't have. For example, there was a really tough kid who threatened everybody; the kids, the educators, etc., so we had to ask for a transfer for him… He busted up everything in the house, at the time of his transfer, and the judicial office too… and I think this example helps define this problem - for the Secretary of Justice, they saw the problem as the kid: *'Look how aggressive he is,'* but without looking at the context, and the violence he had lived through his whole life, nobody did any work with him! We have to do something differently!"

> "So, we undertook a diagnostic, and realized how many situations like this kids were in – whose sentence was even declared by a judge to be 'internment,' not semi-liberty. But what had happened – our evaluators saw that if they had no vacancy, they would send them to us… it's just that they didn't send us their reports, they just sent us the final judicial decision that explained to the Justice Secretariat: *'we are sending this child to the semi-liberdade.'* Until we finally started to realize this, it was a huge number, something like of 70 kids attended at the house, 30 were like this that year (in 2012)."

> "The whole purpose of the house is not for those situations! It's not equipped for that – the whole objective for the kids there is to help support them as individuals to have some concept of producing changes that they want to see in their lives and to mobilize to find that pathway."

In a few but limited cases, judicial decisions to place youth in certain *semi-liberdade* homes led to beatings and even internal homicides by others in rival gangs. RACDCA focused on such cracks in this system. It remains one of the few, if only environments in which state institutions and CSOs really had a chance to interface and move beyond their fragmented operations, to account for these and related perpetuations of violence, some of which proved to be directly linked to constrained or simply uninformed, distanced judicial decision-making. Though discussed, such contradictions, while less frequent, still occur:

> "Judges, for example, Brigitte, are also pressured for numbers by the state. So when she gets squeezed, she forgets the entire conversation and goes against everything we've been doing. Ideally in those moments she would turn to the

> state and point out the contradictions instead of putting pressure on the CSO to deal with a case for which they're unprepared."
>
> "But in those moments she loses herself and signs an order that forces us to accept an adolescent who we know is going to come in and turn right around and leave when he or she gets there. The judiciary washes their hands and can record yet another case they've 'resolved,' but in doing so they send a kid to us [*abrigo*] who put others in danger, and we've had to deal with those scenarios where kids have come in armed, or threaten us or behave in a way that's risk – the judge simply transfers the violence onto us" (Ivone, 21/11/14).

Institutionally, fragmentation also meant that institutions were operating below maximum effectiveness. The CT didn't know staff from CRAS, for example, even though they operated in parallel functions. As Ivone (21/11/14) summed up:

> "if the CRAS would go check out reports of 'negligence' they would probably be able to resolve things before the CT was called and a child was traumatized by being taken from their family and put into state custody. Theoretically, legally, this institutional interaction should happen. The interdisciplinary piece already exists on paper, but the inter part ends up not happening."

Ultimately, youth become disillusioned and respond to what they experience as disconnected, hypocritical, if not violent actions of officials who, for them, represented an often, punishing series of experiences:

> Jared: "Do the kids at *Frutos* talk about these experiences?"
>
> Sabrina: "Yes of course. Always. Once, a superior court judge came to *Frutos* and some of the kids said *'I'm not gonna greet that guy or shake their hand'* because when he came to the *socio-educativo* and saw us in handcuffs in the cell, they didn't greet us or shake our hands then! So, what, now just because I'm in this house and I'm in a free space, I'm supposed to suddenly be their friend? No way!'" (20/11/14)

Innovation, Limitation, and Change

The biweekly dialogue of the network members, a few of which I attended in October 2012 and April 2013, demonstrated that the convening power of a new

type of dialogical encounter amongst state agents and NGOs fostered increased crossing of horizontal inter-institutional boundaries in which individuals could cooperate in order to act and reduce rights violations. As it grew in size and reputation, RACDCA gained critical legitimacy, demonstrated not only by the signing of technical agreements amongst the city and institutions, but also by the presence of national figures from federal government and civil society in the ongoing seminar series.

Nowhere was this force more powerful than for *Conselho Tutelar* agents operating in cities beyond the capital, who were able to leverage the network's action steps to induce more local reforms in their own cities.

Ivone (21/11/14), who has decades of history of participating in developing and organizing national advocacy and rights campaigns around issues such as urban housing, violence, and homelessness in Brazil, notes the nuance of the protocol that was developed in Florianópolis by the network:

> "There are municipalities [in Brazil] that do have these types of discussions and agreements within the range of their services, for example regarding policies for women. These are the areas that have higher indexes of violence against women and they have articulated networks and a protocol that integrates that work. Today, women's rights are more respected, but in terms of adolescents, I don't know any other place that has something like we created here. There's a city, for example, Belo Horizonte, they have a larger discussion than here along the lines of adolescent violence and rights, but at this level, of having a protocol, I don't know where else it exists".

Vertical boundaries were also transgressed for the first time, as demands carried the weight of the network that was growing in size, placing impetus for change on a relatively inflexible, punitively-oriented institutional political leadership, which to date had done little to foster change around these issues. Still, there is room for improvement and embedding the network's gains in more concrete ways that would move things from the technical level to the political level.[91]

[91] As Ivone (21/11/14) noted, "right now these accords exist for the people executing but it's not yet embedded in the institution - for now it's alright, because the technical people are the ones doing the work, but it must reach higher offices so that there is

As many of these examples demonstrate, networked dialogues provided space in which CSO members voice periphery experiences in the mix, so that state agents to become more familiar with some of the dangerous intricacies of their active and passive decision making, which had entailed increased risk and insecurity for youth, as well as in some rare cases, even deadly implications.

As noted, the biweekly forums also enabled members to engage in the inter-institutional disputes and transcend them, breaking down institutional barriers to collaboration in real time, in order to guarantee, in real terms, protections and guard against violations of youth rights. This was not just temporary, but also morphed into a protocol signed in force, strengthening the system of interaction that continues today:

> Jared: "Initially, what were the explanations or rationale proposed by state authorities, who participated in the network meetings, about these rights violations and violence?"
>
> Sabrina: "Oh (laughs) a bit of everything. Nerves! They were nervous. They looked to me a lot. We did a lot of work to make sure that the Secretariat of Justice was present to make sure they executed, because they are the executors of the socio-educational system. That's where the network comes in – in the socio-educational system, the intake process – (if there is no education) they are violating rights with the receiving process for kids! So they have to make collaboration between the justice and education secretaries viable in order to ensure that happens, but they weren't."
>
> Jared: "In what way is the network innovative?"
>
> Sabrina: "It's innovative because of its origin, which is different from other states. It was a process that was initiated as an innovative concept in terms of the appropriation of consciousness of the *people involved* – by the people, you see that after the year now."

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more of a political backing, and policies develop. It's not at a political level yet. What we have to think about for the future is how to make the protocol obligatory. Perhaps that would help in the future, because with elections, administrators are going to change, and the new ones have to assume the work they've done. So what type of concessions can we make so that each time power changes hands, every four years, this stuff remains viable, and we don't have to convince the new people of its validity."

> "I think what happens here in the capital – judges like Brigitte and Takaschima, they exchange notes and communicate with each other now, because there are times they each don't know what to do, and they talk and ask each other – that's mediation! So we have case X here that we don't know what to do with – So they call the CT, that's what the network does – they start asking each other – 'what do I do with this case?' Where this used to be a top-down process, literally, *they think together now."*
>
> "We had a situation just last week from a kid who was threatened with death and since we don't have a PPCAM here in Santa Catarina, we had to apply another type of protection that was needed, so Takaschima was able to enact another process rapidly as a temporary measure. We needed to do this rapidly – because this is a question of hours… rapidly, because a life is being threatened… they took *four days*... What happened was that *Frutos* supported for the kid to have immediate protection – so the kid was in another *socio-educativo* in the south. We had to do all this while we tried to get him to stay in an aunt's house… it was a real homemade resolution (laughs). But the network makes that accessible!" (20/11//14)

The myriad results of the RACDCA came with a fair amount of internal tension, which was something which participants feared might also deal a blow to its legitimacy, should others be exposed to the "messy" internal processes (Lilian, 18/11/14).[92]

Conclusions

Examples in this chapter have analyzed examples of mediator-induced change, premised on Pearce's development of non-dominating power. The evidence demonstrates ways in which social mediative tactics serve as catalysts, in direct but also indirect ways, to promote impact around violence and insecurity beyond measures or efforts to induce change at individual or interpersonal levels.

[92] When I asked Lilian about why there was not a significant push to involve members of the community such as parents or youth, she expressed her fear that the appearance of the dialogues, which were admittedly messy at the time, would give off the impression that RACDCA was in fact in shambles and ineffective; in effect, getting a look at where, and how, the sausage is made. This was a consistent fear that people had, which speaks to the dedication, good-faith effort, and tenacity of members to truly move beyond petty fighting, engage creatively on issues and find solutions to impending problems. Their intention is to begin to structure a greater involvement of community members now that there is a protocol in place that can speak to these concrete changes that represents a network of state institutions committed to transparency and accountability.

Discussing and connecting examples to each of Pearce's six propositions, the argument suggests a significant, if understudied value of the nature of oppositional, boundary-crossing efforts used by intermediaries. It also suggests a type of hybridization of mediation approaches, which bridge disputing and 'democratic' forms, blending advocacy for, and engagement of antagonists, and creating ripple effects in more ways that resonate and replicate internal change. Such efforts might accomplish more than those that emphasize interpersonal conflict alone, within a system of significant limitations, oppressive social norms, and attitudes, omissions, and corruption of elite power holders that are extremely difficult to change.

THESIS CONCLUSIONS

Pursuing Change through Conflict in a Context of Violence

Introduction

This thesis has illuminated the complex interplay amongst sources of conflict, reproductions of urban violence, and the exercise of local intermediary agency around the management of neighborhood tensions in the public and private spaces of Florianopolis' peripheries. Taking an ethnographic approach to research and analysis, the study makes original contributions to several bodies of literature, enhancing theory and practice in the areas of urban violence studies, conflict prevention and intervention, community mediation, and peacebuilding.

The interrogation of mediation and its expanding horizons in an urban periphery community reveals socially transformative impacts. This is accomplished through mediator support of re-configurations in the way that violence transmits and generates deleterious, disempowering effects upon residents' quality of life and citizenship rights. Third party intervention practices, or the mediative endeavors performed by non-state, unarmed residents, demonstrate potential for cultivating non-dominating power, reflecting a unique, and strategic purpose for applications in contexts of violence and insecurity.

These findings contribute to the framing of mediation as a third party intervention practice that is still very much a phenomenon in evolution - one whose premises are subject to the way emerging orientations and contextual realities shape interventions. Chapter 1 offered empirically based discussions about mediation in periphery communities, positing the existing options as violence *reproducing* practices of conflict intervention. While these become more widely accessible options for residents of Brazil's morros, they are based on a relatively limited availability of data, which also fails to consider or integrate the phenomena of violence into its analysis and social transformation claims.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 raised central and sub-questions regarding the challenges faced by conflict intervention practices and disempowering experiences that residents face in the pursuit of resolution pathways on the *Maciço*. Demonstrating how local disputes and tensions are intimately linked and often sourced from common formulae that foster insecurity and sustain socially conflictive dynamics amongst antagonists, the thesis then moves on to examining the orientation and tactics of *morro* mediators operating in the territory-in-dispute. Where Chapters 5 and 6 showcased original data on non-state, unarmed mediator modalities and tactics, Chapter 7 demonstrated the ultimate social impact of this nuanced, risky, and ultimately innovative work.

Meanings of Mediation at the Margins

Given mediation practices' rapid proliferation, together with the creativity and adaptations redefining purposes and uses of intervention work, our basis of knowledge regarding the convergence of mediation and violence in 21st century Latin America is incomplete. This study contributes to filling this gap. Where little research exists regarding peace practices and change in the way that urban community members themselves address and manage the inseparable phenomena of conflict and violence, questions remain about how to understand the role and potential that interveners have in shaping environmental and relational dynamics, which are identified as key elements for defining quality of life and non-violent experiences of democratic citizenship in Brazil's urban peripheries.

In Florianópolis, violence and insecurity shape the way that local agents conceptualized and practiced mediation. Their middling movements tend to prioritize less visible transmissions of violence, contending more often with social scripts and subtle cultivation of dominant power by local actors, than efforts to achieve settlement or harmony through facilitated negotiation. I have also observed the repertoire of tactics, skills or processes developed by third parties as ones shaped and tempered by the peculiar risks and relationship-building priorities. These were nevertheless complicated by local conflict interactions amongst antagonistic territorial actors.

Interventions can be seen in conjunction with the efforts and exercise of residents' local agency to manage and navigate their own disputes or pathways to resolution. These demonstrated strategies ranging from avoidance to negotiation, and illuminated how the local disputing environment presents citizens with an even greater propensity for risk and danger when undertaking such actions. This process is more visible where tensions or disputes involve dangerous intimates or *nefarious neighbors*, whose participation in the street-market economy tended to invite more than a modicum of domestic volatility.

Further complications and insecurity generating experiences occur when the urban excluded endeavored to exercise their rights as citizens by involving democratic state agents, or institutions whose legal frameworks and practices are theoretically designed to support or protect them by delivering security as public good. These dynamics help to shape and clarify the range of tactics and orientation of third party interveners in promoting social change as they mobilize to intervene and support their neighbors who face such double-bind constraints.

Mediation at the margins moves beyond static processes or the pursuit of individualizing benefits, reparations, or outcomes. Mediators *stay with conflict* (Mayer, 2009) in ways that, while at once addressing urgencies and escalatory local tension, do not assume facilitated negotiation as a best practice to define mediation. Nor do they aim for the achievement of harmonizing outcomes. Instead, practices are seen to support decision-making, and recognizing that many scenarios may be ongoing, or for which 'creative non-resolution' may best frame the scope of their interventions.

Nevertheless, interveners also utilized dialogical spaces to strategically build a legitimacy for resistance. The ripple effects and social impact catalyzed by mediators, as distinct from "hope lines" (CDA, 2011) observed at the root of ineffective peace programming, occurred through interveners' direct support of how their neighbors either experienced, or practiced, violence. In this way, mediators positioned themselves strategically in key spaces with key actors in order to obstruct, divert, or otherwise interrupt local transmissions of violence, as well as the ways in which antagonistic territorial actors use violence, by action or omission, to sustain a dominant social order.

Practically speaking, while there was no formal effort to systematize practice, reflect, or exchange information, key informants were constantly doing so, remaining in touch informally with each other. This facilitated the flow of data and information that enabled local awareness, in ways such that allowed concerned individuals to keep their fingers on the pulse of community happenings, and strategically mobilize.

This pattern informed how interveners could preserve their own safety or make wise choices about approaches to conflict. It also revealed a peculiar division of labor in which 'best fit' interpersonal relationships on the *morro* were utilized strategically for interveners to achieve goals like convening or de-escalation, which nobody could take for granted. This division or diversity of repertoires is clearly observed in the case with intervention in the aftermath of Diego's murder, as well as success in (swiftly) convening the *Descoberta* crew to de-escalate tensions after the assault on Dida's home.

These observations affirm existing, as well as new contributions to mediation when used in function of peacebuilding. For example, it highlights the strategic importance of Wehr and Lederach's (1991) insider partial mediation role in the Latin American context, as well as research findings (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2011: 9; see also Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson, 2007) on peace programming effectiveness, which links approaches that stimulate and facilitate connections between "key people and more people," as well as showing that change is effective where peacework in individual/personal realms are linked to those that target socio-political arenas ripe for socio-political change.

Mediation practiced in the periphery conforms little to conventional assumptions and tenets that ground conventional community or ADR practices. One key thread running through these chapters is that in fact, local mediative agency is exercised in antithesis to the conventional 'neutral' third party stance. Similarly, mediators do not often deploy tactics with the explicit goal of achieving harmonizing outcomes. Instead, the spatial, temporal, and political orientation of interveners gave way to a set of actions performed with intentionality,

specifically informed or shaped by dynamics of power and dimensions of insecurity, ultimately shifting aims and premises of local practice. While peacemaking, prevention or elimination of violence clearly constituted short and long term objectives, mediators were nevertheless observed to intervene in conflicts, disputes and tension-filled scenarios or social interactions without facilitating or negotiating transactional outcomes, or striving to quell conflict.

Though de-escalation of tensions was at times critical, mediators also convened and intervened in key social spaces in which they *used* local conflict and territorial antagonisms as portals and pathways through which to provoke, contest, and generally shake up the way that dominant, competing, and often violent actions of social ordering shapes life on the *Maciço*. This was accomplished by mainstreaming engagement in socially inappropriate acts, wherein interveners were observed to catalyze or create tensions of their own. Over time, these initiating interventions permitted a more open contestation of social scripts, generation of curiosity and decision-making regarding citizenship rights, or problematizing the status quo.

Proactive in their efforts, mediators strategically intervene and build presence around observable, but also less visible urgencies, emergencies and tensions, physically moving into contested spaces in order to do so. I observed mediators *getting in the middle* of community disputes in ways that also refrained from explicitly expressing their intentions of acting or negotiating on behalf of the aggrieved, a conflict party, or a neighbor in need. This helped manage and minimize risk and unintended consequences while simultaneously carving out a space to stirring the pot of status quo behavioral norms.

Importantly, mediators recognized that in order for violence to shift, effecting community dynamics beyond individualizing impact would require a much broader reach, which they alone were unable to materialize despite a fierce determination.[93] This was accomplished by crossing boundaries and convening internally *and* externally, to engage with 'territorial antagonists' whose hand in

[93] Likewise, domestic violence was often raised as a problem and pattern in private spaces, which key informants recognized in the ebb and flow of daily life, yet did not mobilize around separately or particularly. Allusions and recognition of DV experienced by minors and adults was often part of normal conversation, and seen in various examples of the 'thick' descriptions shared in the chapters above.

social ordering and reproduction can agitate and sustain social conflict and transmissions of visible and invisible forms of violence. This demonstrates the role that mediators can play, albeit a more politicized one, in shaping the way that macro patterns and forces create impact on local conditions.

These elements suggest mediation as a highly politicized practice. Mediation at the margins exercised by voluntarily engaged third party actors may thus be best understood as a contextualized, hybridized model of intervention, combining elements of the democratic 'advocacy' mediation concept (von Lieres and Piper, 2014), innovations in social mediation (De Carlo, 2002; Social Mediation, 2000), and the nuanced approaches and tactical repertoire of third party interveners as conflict specialists. This blending of models illuminates an important area for further research, in order to understand the continuing evolution of mediator role and purposes in the project of change making with respect to deleterious social dynamics and conditions that communities have expressed interest in changing.

In this way, mediators operating in contexts of violence can, and perhaps should, ethically speaking, consider the full potential of their practices as social intervention devices (Neves, 2009). This includes how they conceive their purposes and approaches as social instrumentalists (Shoeny and Warfield, 2000) in generating positive or negative impact within the broader context or system.

Forethought and discussion about how that intervention may be part and parcel of local social ordering, whether it is desirable or not, is key to understanding the power and political nature of practices when implemented by state or NGO actors. This can preface a discussion amongst local organizers or would-be conflict interveners about what model to adopt, or adapt, as it forces them to contend with the political nature of conflict and change work in which they're involved. It also invites organizers at a minimum to discuss or debate how they can actively resist violence reproductions and the consolidation structures of oppression by tapping into local scenarios of tension (see Roy, et al., 2009; Jabri, 2005; Mitchell, 2005).

Aiming at Exclusion, Missing Connection

In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I present a less favorable view to the potentially violent and deleterious effects that periphery-based community mediation practices make, based on their underlying and flawed, if dangerously incoherent logic and ideology. This argument is sourced in part by critically examining claims made by community mediation advocates about the citizenship strengthening and empowerment potential of local mediation practices. This contention is based on the argument that mediation is a means for promoting inclusion and access to justice institutions for communities who have suffered historical patterns of civic and social exclusion facilitated in part by state policies and actions.

While this may have long-term consequences, the more relevant contribution that my critique levies may in fact be that the possibility for peace in both short and long term gains, is revealed by the juxtaposition of my research findings and the state's efforts to promote inclusion (or at least use mediation as a means by which to reduce the way that citizens experience exclusion). Taket (2009: 12) observes that

> "Social inclusion does not imply social connectedness. Social connectedness refers to the relationships people have with others and the community. The process of social connectedness is linked to social fabric and capital whereby multiple dimensions interact to create connectedness"

The implications of this study's findings, which demonstrate the relevance of mediation's use as a practice in which convening and promoting connectedness are critical tools for building peace and reducing violence, are that mediation's full potential in communities that experience and build legacies shaped by high levels of violence and insecurity may be realized only if, or when, organizers contend with, and remedy, underlying assumptions about the citizenship-strengthening argument underpinning the promise of local conflict intervention initiatives.

Combating exclusion requires the development of a cogent theory of change that may require a tinkering and creativity of existing realms of practice, particularly if they purport the aim of eliminating or re-configuring exclusionary experiences. Touted as a mechanism to increase *inclusion*, community

mediation organizers have not yet seriously taken up the task of increasing the coherence of their work by asking what *connectedness*, as a function of practice, may in fact offer to the project of conflict management and its contribution to reducing or interrupting violence. Out beyond the reaches of contact theory, the value of learning about mediation on the *morro* may be the instruction about how to more effectively draw from violence and conflict through the prism of connectedness to inform practice development, rather than striving to artificially produce temporary fixes in a volatile system, or sweeping the realities of uncertainty and volatility under the rug.

"Time needs Time to Change"

- Elderly MS Resident

Field Notes (10/11/14): This drizzly Monday morning, Vilson and I were sipping coffee and reflecting about the weekend's Mocotó-Cor experience. Suddenly, a young woman appeared at the window. Catching her breath, Juliana introduced herself as an urban development student from the UFSC, politely asking how to find *Seu Teco,* to interview him in her effort to learn about the *Maciço's* history and infrastructure.

Today in his early 70s, *Teco* is one of Mont Serrat's venerated elders. A local political figure and community reference, he is also an engineer and jack-of-all-trades and still quite active at this age, not least for his deep technical knowledge of the complex *morro* terrain. *Teco* is also one of the community's most sought after and frequently interviewed figures. Journalists and academics alike seem to seek him out as a spokesperson for public comment. He may be amongst the *morro's* few who enjoy some regularity of mainstream media presence, a voice that gets heard by those in the city center.

'Oh, so you want to interview (explorar) Seu Teco? Hmmm. Today is not a very good day, with all this rain. Maybe you can come back another time,' Vilson replied. As Juliana turned to begin her wet trek back to the UFSC campus under the morning rain, Vilson took another sip of coffee, murming that: *'the morro is like a supermarket for the UFSC.'*

A seemingly innocent request expressed by an aspiring student invites a particularly perplexing reply from the priest. Vilson uses the verb *explorar* to reference Juliana's intention of interviewing and gaining information from *Teco*. *Explorar*, in Portuguese, depending its use in context, could have inferred 'to

> investigate', as in 'to explore.' On the other hand, the word can also be used to mean *to exploit*, carrying an abusively extractive association. From my place at the table, Vilson was being nothing less than deliberate, if subtly communicating a message that Juliana may not even have grasped in the moment.

The exchange is symbolic of the impact that decades of mistrust and social exclusion, measured cumulatively over generations, have made with very real consequences upon *morro* residents. These dynamics can bodly and subtly reinforce the way that violence transmits and embeds through time and in social spaces to define the totality of Brazilian citizens' experiences democracy, citizenship and quality of life.

The aggregate effects of social exclusion, and the ways in which state and perverse civil society actors both create order, and regulate daily life, are nevertheless not impossible obstacles that change agents can help overcome. Despite these realities, residents endeavor, if at times cautiously, to re-write these historical scripts in ways that promote peace and justice for their families and city at large, in which almost all *Florianópolitanos* take great pride.

Deconstructing these scripts requires listening and appreciation of local knowledge and learning from the strategic exercise of agency to resist and remain resilient, rather than imposing quick-fix solutions and ideas that can wind up doing more harm than good. As a source of creativity and resourcefulness, the *morro* is a home for evolving definitions of mediation practice. As Penglase (2013: 175) has written, violence that marks everyday life in the periphery

> "Does not merely destroy or undermine systems of meaning, but also creates particular types of subjectivities, affects how parts of the hill are used, and influences the shape of memories, ways of speaking, and the embodied experience of the neighborhood."

Violence can thus be generative of new possibilities, but it requires attention to local knowledge and agency in order to understand why people do what they do in service of conflict and disputing. Just as violence is understood as an extremely complex and ultimately destructive phenomenon, it is also something that can unify this work. Mediators demonstrate a key role in promoting the reduction of antagonistic social distance and interactions that sustain violence's

reproduction. This is accomplished through practices of convening, facilitating communication, and performing intervention in ways that first do no harm. As the findings have shown, the mediative role, free from the confines of conventional prescriptions, underwrites a re-organization of the way that social ordering itself, unfolds.

Rare is the practitioner or policy maker who endeavors to re-visit basic assumptions and understandings about sources of conflict, the importance of connectedness, and the way that people have adapted to life and survival in contexts of violence; rarer still the availability and attention paid to ethnographic accounts that can help illuminate these realities by appreciating chaos, if finding ways to render them legible (Goldstein, 2013: 253). Where they do exist, scholar-practitioners have yet been able to effectively introduce, promote, or depart from the premise of these questions, concepts and models of practice, increase their visibility, or apply them in support of those who wish to integrate mediation or other conflict practices into their work.

Today's market driven emphasis on mediation's branding comprising approaches to mainstream practice (Jarret, 2013), as well as increasing demand across the globe for non-violent approaches to conflict, give rise to now globally exported processes from within Northern borders. Based on the evidence in this thesis, I assert in some ways that this pattern of export/import may be likened to what Goldstein (2012: 253) calls a 'red-herring' or pattern that distracts and pulls our attention to defining 'true' models of community justice (or in this case, mediation). Such things may mistakenly become celebrated at the expense of overlooking the ways in which violence and complex social dynamics deter and detract from the realities of local conflict and efforts to manage insecurity or make any impact on social conflict and change over the long run at all. By keeping eyes firmly affixed on people's experiences of everyday disputing realities, the study, practice, and evolution of mediation have much to gain *and* offer as a manner of supporting constructive change and its agents in contexts of urban violence.

If nothing else, mediators can begin to listen, deeply, to community, and to the trauma that people frequently reveal and expose at the mediation 'table,' no

matter the presenting dispute, in ways that can intelligently inform the evolution and streamlining of more effective conflict intervention and violence prevention practices. Learning how to listen in the midst of chaotic environment, and to engage patiently through one's presence in the midst of complexity, can do much to improve the structuring of future conflict intervention and management support. This will inevitably enhance not only the use and technical delivery of mediation modalities, but also make a more useful and humanistic contribution to building a more just peace.

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Maciço Residents

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Marlene	(05/10/12) Interview. Mont Serrat, Florianópolis
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Darcy	(24/04/13) Interview. Mont Serrat, Florianópolis
Dona Teresa	(24/04/13) Interview. Alto da Caieira, Florianópolis
	(25/11/14) Interview. Alto da Caieira, Florianópolis
Cida	(21/11/14) Interview. Mont Serrat, Florianópolis

Maciço Residents Cont'd

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